{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Enterprise Crude Pipeline, 2015-12-01","title":"Enterprise Crude Pipeline-12/1/15","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2017-04-19","effective_on":"2015-12-01","summary":"Enterprise Crude Pipeline; Hazardous Liquid Apparent; OK; failure 2015-12-01; apparent cause: Tank Line Failure Due to Internal Corrosion.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-enterprise-crude-pipeline-12115-0.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-enterprise-crude-pipeline-12115-0.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-enterprise-crude-pipeline-12115-0","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/inspections-and-investigations/enterprise-crude-pipeline-12115-0","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nUSDOT U.S. Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nSouthwest Region\nInvestigators Charles Onwuachi\nDavid York\nRegion Director R.M. Seeley\nDate of Report 12/27/2016\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Crude Pipeline, LLC,\nCushing West Tank Farm Release\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 12/1/2015\nCommodity Released Crude Oil\nCity/County & State Cushing, Payne County, OK\nOpID & Operator Name 30829 Enterprise Crude Pipeline\nUnit # & Unit Name 14464 Oklahoma 30-Inch\nSMART Activity # 151766\nMilepost/Location Cushing\nType of Failure Tank line failure due to internal corrosion\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area impacted On-site impact to soil and containment pond\nTotal Costs $291,898\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report: Cushing West Tank Farm Release\n12/1/2015\nExecutive Summary\nOn December 1, 2015, at approximately 10:10 p.m. Central Standard Time (CST), personnel from\nEnterprise Crude Pipeline, LLC (Enterprise), discovered a spill at their West Cushing Tank Farm in Cushing,\nOklahoma. Approximately 1,000 barrels of crude oil were released within the terminal, briefly\ninterrupting operations as Enterprise investigated the source of the leak. Enterprise reported the release\nto the National Response Center at 11:30 p.m. CST.\nThe spill was contained within the tank farm after travelling along the surface of the ground to a retention\npond on the west side of the terminal. The source of the release was determined to be a buried steel tank\ntransfer pipeline within the station that had an outer diameter of 16 inches. Stress Engineering Services\nof Houston, Texas, performed a failure analysis on the damaged portion of pipe, stating in their final report\nthat the cause of the spill was internal corrosion. The remaining portion of the line was evacuated of\nproduct and abandoned in place.\nNo fire or injuries occurred as a result of the failure; however, the spill resulted in approximately $291,898\nin total damages.\nPage 2 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report: Cushing West Tank Farm Release\n12/1/2015\nSystem Details\nEnterprise operates two storage tank terminals in Cushing, Oklahoma, designated as their East & West\nTank Farms. The combined storage capacity of the terminals is approximately 3.3 million barrels\n(MMbbls),\n1 inclusive of five larger external floating roof tanks that are leased to Paragon but operated by\nEnterprise. Currently there are fifteen storage tanks within the terminal that serve as breakout tanks to\nseveral crude oil pipelines operated by Enterprise and other entities. Product is transported into the West\nTerminal through pipeline systems operated by Enterprise, including the Red River Gathering System and\nthe Basin Pipeline. Product can also be delivered to the Seaway Crude Pipeline system that connects the\nWest Cushing Terminal to refineries on the Gulf Coast.\nSource: http://www.enterpriseproducts.com/about-us/system-map\nThe leak was identified on an 1,160-foot section of steel pipeline with a 16-inch outer diameter that served\nas a fill line within the facility for Tank 41123. The pipe wall measured 0.25 inches, and was manufactured\nwith a fusion bond external coating; however, the pipeline did not have an internal coating. The maximum\noperating pressure of the line was designated as 275 pounds per square inch gauge (psig), limited by the\nAmerican National Standards Institute (ANSI) 150 components installed on the system. The manufacturer\nand specified minimum yield strength of the line segment was reportedly unknown.\nThe West Terminal is in the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) Inspection\nSystem 1970 under the name Enterprise_Crude.\n1 Crude Oil Pipelines & Services. Enterprise Products Partners, L.P. Retrieved August 2016.\nhttp://www.enterpriseproducts.com/operations/onshore-crude-oil-pipelines-services\nPage 3 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report: Cushing West Tank Farm Release\n12/1/2015\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nOn December 1, 2015, at approximately 1:00 p.m. CST, Enterprise started to move product out of Tank\n41123. The three pipelines connected to Tank 41123 have outer diameters of 16, 18, and 24 inches. The\ntransfer was scheduled for the 18-inch delivery line, progressing throughout the day and ending by\nmidnight. During the course of this delivery process, Enterprise began a flush into Tank 41123 through\nthe 16-inch fill line at approximately 8:28 p.m. (b)((F)\nCST. The flush lasted for roughly 30 minutes.\nAt 9:56 p.m. CST, a terminal operator-who was\nscheduled to take samples from the Manifold A\narea-detected the scent of crude oil and\ndiscovered oil on the ground just north of\nManifold A.\nEmergency Response\nUpon notification from the terminal operator,\noperations personnel immediately initiated\nshutdown of all equipment within the terminal.\nNotification of the incident was made by\ntelephone, first to operations and maintenance\nsupervisors and then to response contractors and additional operations personnel. Two local spill\nresponse teams were mobilized and began arriving at the terminal at 11:30 p.m. with heavy machinery,\nfrac tanks, and vacuum trucks. Crews continued work to identify and sequester the source of the release,\nisolating Tank 41123 at 11:45 p.m. through the use of manual valves.\nThe oil travelled approximately 1,200 feet from the leak source to an onsite containment area and\nretention pond. The contaminated soil was removed to an area on the northwest side of the terminal\nwhile personnel installed a hard boom across the retention area, removing the oil with surface skimmers.\nThe Cushing West Terminal is not located in an area determined to possibly affect a High Consequence\nArea as a result of an unintended release. The Terminal is included in the Facility Response Plan written\nto comply with Title 49 CFR 194; however, the plan was not activated in response to this spill.\nPHMSA's Southwest Region responded to the site on Thursday, December 3, 2015, to initiate an\ninvestigation.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nThe 16-inch pipeline was not immediately returned to service following the release. Following visual\nexamination, Enterprise installed a mechanical clamp over the damaged portion of the pipeline on\nDecember 3, 2015. The line was drained down and remained inactive, and the damaged portion of the\npipe was later removed and sent to Houston, Texas, for failure analysis.\nWith the damaged 16-inch fill line isolated, the West Terminal restarted operations on Wednesday,\nDecember 2, 2015.\nPage 4 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report: Cushing West Tank Farm Release\n12/1/2015\nInvestigation Details\nPHMSA’s investigation included a review of the events, the response of Enterprise personnel, Supervisory\nControl and Data Acquisition (SCADA) operations, and internal corrosion management within the\nterminal.\n(b) (7)(F)\nThe release was discovered following the flush performed on Tank 41123 through a third-party line. The\nflush operation required an attendant be onsite at the Manifold A area. As the flush was completed the\nmanual valve to the 16-inch line at Manifold A area was closed, at which time Enterprise personnel had\nnot detected an abnormal condition at the terminal.\nAt approximately 10:00 a.m. on December 2, hydro-excavation revealed the source of the spill to be the\n16-inch fill line. A visual examination revealed a small hole at the 6 o’clock position on the piping, buried\nunder approximately 3.5 feet of soil and gravel. No mechanical damage was visible, and the external\ncoating around the defect appeared to be in good condition. Enterprise ordered a 16 x 18 PLDICO Clamp\n+ Sleeve to facilitate the repair, which was completed on December 3, before PHMSA inspectors arrived\nonsite.\nAt the time of the accident, the pressure within the 16-inch line was estimated to be less than 10 psig.\nEnterprise provided records indicating the 16-inch line was hydrostatically tested in 1997 to a minimum\npressure of 346 psig for 8 hours.\nProduct is transported to the West Terminal through pipelines owned and operated by Enterprise and\nEnbridge, as well as through a truck terminal located within the facility. Internal corrosion monitoring at\nthe West Terminal is conducted primarily through weight loss coupons installed on incoming pipelines at\nthe East Terminal: there are no monitoring points located within the West Terminal. Records show that\nthe average corrosion rate in miles per year (MPY) over the course of three years leading up to the\naccident was well below what would be considered significant. Additionally, biocide treatment was\nstarted in 2012.\nMetallurgical Analysis\nEnterprise sent approximately 6 feet of the failed 16-inch pipe to Stress Engineering Services in Houston,\nTexas, for analysis. The findings are summarized here; a copy of the final report can be found in Appendix\nD.\nIn a final report dated July 12, 2016, Stress Engineering concluded that the hole, measuring 1 1/16 inches\nin diameter and found in the bottom of the 16-inch pipe, was the result of a carbon dioxide-driven attack.\nSeveral pits of varying size were found along the bottom of the pipe sample, around which tests registered\nthe presence of hydrogen sulfide, although the report concluded that this did not influence the creation\nof the pitting. Chemical analysis on deposits within the pit adjacent to the through-wall defect revealed\nthe presence of sand and chlorine, products likely to be entrained in the product stream.\nPage 5 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report: Cushing West Tank Farm Release\n12/1/2015\nWhile the year and manufacturer of the pipe were unknown, tensile and hardness tests show the pipe\nmet the current requirements for the American Petroleum Institute (API) Grades X42, X46, and B. The\nanalysis did not discover any manufacturing or metallurgical defects that could have contributed to the\nfailure, and apart from the external coating missing at the defect, the fusion-bonded epoxy (FBE) coating\nwas determined to be in good condition.\nConclusion\nPHSMA concurs with the findings of the metallurgical analysis. The pit immediately adjacent to the\nthrough-wall defect exhibited signs of deposit corrosion, common in station piping where flow rates are\ngenerally lower than transmission piping and pigging is largely impracticable.\nPHMSA determined the accident likely went undetected for approximately one hour, and Enterprise’s\nresponse was appropriate following discovery of the spill.\nAppendices\nA Map and Photographs\nB NRC Report #1134731\nC Operator Accident Report to PHMSA (#20150464)\nD Laboratory Analysis\nPage 6 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report: Cushing West Tank Farm Release\n12/1/2015\nAppendix A – Map\nPage 7 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nHMIS-> INCIDENTS-TELEPHONICS\nMaterials Safety\nPipeline & Hazardous\nAdministration\n(Version 4.0.0 PROD)\nRules of Behavior\nHome\nLogout\nMenu\n[Retum to Search!\nNRC Number:\nCall Date:\n12/02/2015\nCall Time:\n00:30:00\nCaller Information\n[DAVIO\nENTERPRISE CRUDE PIPELINE\nLast Name:\nGIBBBIS\nCity:\nHOUSTON\n(9420 WEST SAM HOUSTON FKWY NCRTH\nUSA\nState:\n[PRIVATE\n(2818872640\nZp:\nPhone 2:\n77064\n• Yes E No F$No Response\nIs caller the spiter?\nDAVID\nDischarger Information\nENTERFRISE CRUDE PIPELINE\nLast Name:\nHail\nCity:\n19420 WEST SAM HOUSTON FKWY NORTH\n¡USA\nHOUSTON\nState:\n(2018972840\nZip:\n[TX\n[PRIVATE\nPhone 2:\n77064\nNearest Cty:\nState:\n(CUSHING\nOK\nSpill Information\nCounty:\nLocation\nZp Code:\n740120 SOUTH 3510 ROAD\nSpil Date:\n(12/01/2015 (mm/dd/yay)\nSpill Time:\n2215:00 (24hh:mm:ss)\nIncient Type\nDTG Type:\nk- Select DTG Type ->\nDescription\nStorage Tanks\nReported Incident Type\nSTORAGE TANKS\nCALLER IS REPORTING A DISCHARGE OF LIGHT SOUR CRUDE FROM A CRUDE TANK DUE TO A\nCRACKED MANIFOLD.\nMaterial / Chris Name\nMaterials Inolved\n[OL: CRUDE\n(Chris Code.\n800 BARREL(S)\n[Total Qty.\nWater Qty.\nAdditional Medium Information:\nMedium Type:\n- Select Medium Type.\n/ ONSITE FIRE RESERVOIR (SECONDARY CONTAINMENT)\nEvacuations:\nInjuries:\nDamages:\nC Yes ® No C Unknown\n• Yes @ No Unknown\nOther Agency Notified:\nFederel Agency Notified:\n© yes O No Unknown\n• Yes C No FUnknown\nState Agency Notified:\n• yes @ No Unknown\nRomedial Actions\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nIN THE PROCESS GETTING A PLANNED TOGETHER FOR CLAN UP.\nCALLER STATED THAT THE MATERIAL DISCHARGED INTO AN ONSITE PIT WITH WATER IN IT THAT\ntonal inte\nIS USED TO PUT OUT FIRES.\n•ll Rescinded Comments (max 250 charactors) |\n22 Preybus\n1..1 of 25\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nexceed 5100,00 for are violation or each day that such relation persist excep actine rain cavil\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nEXPIRATION DATE: 12/31/2016\nOriginal Report\nDate:\n12/16/2015\nU.S Department of Transportation\nNo.\n20150464 - 21420\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nvith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nfederal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nSend comments regarding this burden or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden to: information\nOMB Control Number.\nThe OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. All responses to the collection of information are mandatory.\nCollection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\namples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page i\nportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide speci\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply)\nOriginal:\nSupplemental:\nYes\nFinal:\nYes\nLast Revision Date:\n2. Name of Operator\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID):\n06/06/2016\n30829\n3. Address of Operator:\nENTERPRISE CRUDE PIPELINE LLC\n3b. City\n3а. Street Address\n1100 Louisiana Street\n3c. State\nTexas\nHouston\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident:\n3d. Zip Code\n77002\n5. Location of Accident:\n12/01/2015 22:10\n35.95201\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable):\n-96.759592\nNational Response Center (if applicable):\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\n1134731\n12/01/2015 22:35\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nCrude Oil\n- Specify Commodity Subtype:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend e.g. B2, B20, B100\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels):\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n1,000.00\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels):\n(Barrels):\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12. Were there fatalities?\nNo\n1,000.00\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\n12e. General public\nassociated with this Operator\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization?\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\nNo\n13a. Operator employees\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13a. Worse with this Operaight-of- way, bur NoT\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident?\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n- If No, Explain:\nYes\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n12/01/2015 22:10\n15. Did the commodity ignite?\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n12/02/2015 13:00\n16. Did the commodity explode?\nNo\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n17. Number of general public evacuated:\nNo\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident - effective 7- 2014\nchanged to \"Local time Operator identified failure\":\n12/01/2015 22:10\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site:\n12/01/2015 22:10\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Accident onshore?\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nYes\n- If Onshore:\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n2. State:\n4. City\n3. Zip Code:\nOklahoma\n74023\n6. Operator-designated location:\n5. County or Parish\nCushing\nPayne\n7. Pipeline/Facility name:\nSpecify:\nMilepost/Valve Station\nWest Terminal\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n8. Segment name/ID:\nCushing West Terminal\nTank 23 flush line\n(OCS)?\nNo\n10. Location of Accident:\n11. Area of Accident (as found):\nUnderground\nTotally contained on Operator-controlled property\n- If Other, Describe:\nSpecify:\nUnder soil\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing?\nDepth-of-Cover (in):\nNo\n36\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing -\n- If Railroad crossing -\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Road crossing -\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing -\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\nCased/ Uncased\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- If Offshore:\n- Select:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n15. Area of Accident:\n- Block #•\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility:\n2. Part of system involved in Accident:\nInterstate\nAppurtenances, specify:\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nOnshore Terminal/Tank Farm Equipment and Piping\n3. Item involved in Accident:\n- If Pipe, specify:\nPipe\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\nPipe Body\n16\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n.250\nЗе.\n3a. Pipe specification:\n5L\nUnknown\nPipe Seam, specify:\nPipe manufacturer:\n- If Other, Describe:\nLongitudinal ERW - High Frequency\n3g. Year of manufacture:\nUnknown\nUnknown\nPipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify. If Pipe Girth Weld,\n- If Other, Describe:\nFusion Bonded Epoxy\nЗa through 3h above are required:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other, describe:\n- If Other - Describe:\n5. Material involved in Accident:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed:\n1993\n6. Type of Accident Involved:\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\nCarbon Steel\nLeak\n- If Mechanical Puncture - Specify Approx. size:\nin. (circumferential)\nin. (axial) by\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nPinhole\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other - Describe:\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact:\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n| No\n- Birds\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination:\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned:\nYes\n4. Anticipated remediation:\nNo\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\nYes\n- Surface water\n- Soil\n- Groundwater\n- Vegetation\nYes\n5. Water contamination:\n- Wildlife\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\nNo\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a Hiah Consequence Area\nNo\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nNo\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nIntegrity Management Program?\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\nIntegrity Management Program?\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nManagement Program?\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nManagement Program?\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\n8. Estimated cost to Operator - effective 12-2012, changed to \"Estimated Property Damage\":\nManagement Program?\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\n\"paid/reimbursed by the Operator\" removed\ndamage paid/reimbursed by the Operator - effective 12-2012,\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs\nEstimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation\n$\n$\nchanged to \"Total estimated property damage (sum of above)\"\n8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) - effective 12-2012,\n$\n291,898\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig):\n10.00\nAccident (psig):\n275.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nPressure did not exceed MOP\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\nDid the pressure exceed this established pressure\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\n2?\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. - 5f below) effective 12-2012, changed to \"(Complete 5.a - 5.e below)\"\nsource:\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply).\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\n- If Other, Describe:\nrun?\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Other -\n5f. Function of pipeline system:\n- If Other, Describe:\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident?\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\n> 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\nYes\nIf Yes -\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\nYes\nalerts), events), and/or volume calculations) assist with\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarms),\nYes\nthe detection of the Accident?\nNo\nalert(s), events), and/or volume calculations) assist with\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarms),\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\ninvolved in the Accident?\nNo\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\nalarms), alerts), events), and/or volume calculations) assist\nTc. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nalarm(s), alerts), events), and/or volume calculations) assist\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator?\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\n8a. If \"Controller\" \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\n- If Other, Specify:\nLocal Operating Personnel, including contractors\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify:\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Ground Patrol by Operator or its\nOperator employee\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controllers) or\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\ncontrollers) actions or control room issues was necessan\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did no\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\ncontrollers) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\nController nor control room were a contributing factor\n- If Yes, specify investigation results): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controllers)\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\n1b. Specify how many tailed:\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nNo\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G - APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART Gin shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause:\nG1 - Corrosion Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\n- If External Corrosion:\nCorrosion Failure - Sub-Cause:\nInternal Corrosion\n1. Results of visual examination:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- If Other, Describe: 1\n- Atmospheric\n- Galvanic\n- Microbiological\n- Stray Current\n- Other:\n- Selective Seam\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\n04a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" - Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" - Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" - Most recent year conducted:\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\nthe corrosion?\n6. Results of visual examination:\n• If Internal Corrosion:\n. Type of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Other:\nGeneral Corrosion\n- Water drop-out/Acid\nCorrosive Commodity\n- Erosion\n- Microbiological\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\ncarbon dioxide\nYes\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Other:\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\nYes\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Low point in pipe\n- Other:\n- Elbow\nYes\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n- If Other, Describe:\nYes\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nNo\nNot applicable - Not mainline pipe\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the 'Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nNot applicable - Not mainline pipe\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following If any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nMost recent year:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\nDescribe:\nIf Yes -\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nNo\nMost recent year tested:\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident.:\nHas one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\nMost recent year conducted:\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage - Sub-Cause:\n1. Specify:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Specify:\n- If Lightning:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. Specify:\n4. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n- If Other, Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n5. Describe:\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Tropical Storm\n- Hurricane\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage - Sub-Cause:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART\nC, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nMost recent year conducted:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\nDescribe:\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\nMost recent year tested:\n4. Has one or more Dired Assessment been conducted pressure (psig:\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\nMost recent year conducted:\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\nMost recent year conducted:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- Excavator\n- One-Call System\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- Private\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Federal Land\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Data not collected\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\nDid the damage cause an interruption in service?\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nOther Outside Force Damage - Sub-Cause:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Tornado\n- Tropical Storm\n- Other\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation: Complete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nAccident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nthe Accident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nMost recent year conducted\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\nDescribe:\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\n6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nTest pressure (psig):\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\nMost recent year conducted:\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Intentional Damage:\nDescribe:\n8. Specify:\n- If Other Outside Force Damage:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Describe:\nG5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\n\"Weld.\"\nUse this section to report material failures ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is \"Pipe\" or\nMaterial Failure of Pipe or Weld - Sub-Cause:\n1. The sub-cause shown above is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Determined by Metallurgical Analysis\n- Field Examination\n- Other Analysis\n- Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation\n- If \"Other Analysis\", Describe:\n(Supplemental Report required)\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n- If Construction, Installation, or Fabrication-related Or If Original Manufacturing-related: T\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n- Fatigue or Vibration-related\n- If Other, Describe:\nSpecify:\n- Mechanical Stress:\n- Other\n- If Environmental Cracking-related:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. Specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\nComplete the following if any Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause is selected.\n4. Additional factors: (select all that apply):\n- Dent\n- Pipe Bend\n- Gouge\n- Arc Burn\n- Lack of Fusion\n- Crack\n- Buckle\n- Lamination\n- Misalignment\n- Wrinkle\n- Burnt Steel\n- Other:\n5. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\n- If Other, ","truncated":true,"body_characters":44928}