{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Enterprise Products Operating, LLC, 2015-01-26","title":"Enterprise Products Operating, LLC-1/26/15","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2017-04-14","effective_on":"2015-01-26","summary":"Enterprise Products Operating, LLC; Hazardous Liquid; WV; failure 2015-01-26; apparent cause: Material Failure Pipe or Weld.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-enterprise-products-operating-llc-12615.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-enterprise-products-operating-llc-12615.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-enterprise-products-operating-llc-12615","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/inspections-and-investigations/enterprise-products-operating-llc-12615","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT U.S. Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator Michael Yazemboski\nSenior Accident Investigator Michael Yazemboski\nRegion Director Byron E. Coy\nDate of Report 2/24/2016\nSubject Failure Investigation Report—Enterprise Products Operating, LLC:\nATEX Ethane Pipeline Failure, Follansbee, West Virginia\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 1/26/2015\nCommodity Released Ethane\nCity/County & State Follansbee, Brook County, West Virginia\nOpID & Operator Name 31618 Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\nUnit # & Unit Name 3051 Greensburg\nSMART Activity # 149469\nMilepost/Location Latitude: 40.366817, Longitude: -80.584594\nType of Failure Girth Weld Failure Caused by Ductile Tensile Overload\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area impacted Non-HCA\nTotal Costs $6,910,591\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report—Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\nATEX Ethane Pipeline Failure\nFollansbee, Brook County, West Virginia\n[Failure Date 1/26/2015]\nExecutive Summary\nOn January 26, 2015, an accident occurred on the\nEnterprise Products ATEX-1 20-inch nominal pipe size\n(NPS) pipeline resulting in the release of approximately\n30,565 barrels of liquid ethane in a rural, wooded, non-\nhigh consequence area (HCA) area near Follansbee, West\nVirginia. The ATEX-1 pipeline is approximately 1,265 miles\nlong and transports product from Washington County,\nPennsylvania, to Mont Belvieu, Texas (ATEX-1). The\naccident occurred on a 255-mile section of ATEX-1 that\nruns from Washington County, Pennsylvania, to Seymour,\nIndiana. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration’s (PHMSA) Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) initiated an investigation on January 26, 2015,\ndetermining that the accident was caused by a girth weld failure due to a ductile tensile overload from\nstresses resulting from the weight of the surrounding soil. As a result, on January 29, 2015, OPS issued a\nCorrective Action Order (CAO) (CPF 1-2015-5002H) requiring Enterprise to take certain corrective actions\npertaining to the safety and remediation of the ATEX-1 pipeline system. An Amended Corrective Action\nOrder (ACAO) was issued on March 12, 2015. There were no injuries, deaths, or extensive property\ndamage associated with this accident; however, fire from the rupture burned approximately 5 acres of\nwoodlands and damaged the siding on one home located approximately 2,000 feet from the failure\nlocation. Enterprise reported the failure to the National Response Center on January 26, 2015, at 11:38\na.m. CST.\nSystem Details\nThe ATEX-1 pipeline originates in Washington County,\nPennsylvania, and is connected to four fractionators in the\nMarcellus/Utica shale plays: the MarkWest Houston plant\nin Pennsylvania, the Cadiz plant in Ohio, the Blue Racer\nNatrium plant in West Virginia, and the Utica East Ohio\nScio plant in Ohio. The ATEX-1 pipeline has a capacity of\n125,000 barrels per day (bpd), expandable to\napproximately 265,000 bpd. The ATEX-1 line terminates\nat Enterprise’s complex in Mont Belvieu, Texas, which\nincludes over 100 million barrels of natural gas liquid\n(NGL) and petroleum liquid storage capacity, more than\n750,000 bpd of fractionation capacity, and an extensive NGL distribution system.\nThe failure occurred near milepost (MP) 23.1 on Enterprise’s\nATEX-1 20-inch NPS pipeline segment in West Virginia. This\nsection of the ATEX-1 pipeline is part of the Greensburg-\nPA/WV unit, originating at the MarkWest Processing facility\nin Houston, Pennsylvania, and running west through West\nVirginia. The total length of the ATEX-1 line in the\nGreensburg-PA/WV unit is approximately 26 miles. The\nATEX-1 Greensburg Unit passes through Washington County\n(b) (7)(F)\nPage 2 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report—Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\nATEX Ethane Pipeline Failure\nFollansbee, Brook County, West Virginia\n[Failure Date 1/26/2015]\nin Pennsylvania and Brooke and Hancock Counties in West Virginia, terminating at the Ohio/West\nVirginia state line (Appendix A, map 4).\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nThe operating pressure at the time of failure was 1,183 psig, which was below the maximum operating\npressure (MOP) of 1,440 psig for the affected segment.\n1 On January 26, 2015, at approximately 9:38\na.m. CST, Enterprise’s control room observed a sudden pressure drop on its supervisory control and data\nacquisition (SCADA) screens, indicating a possible failure on the ATEX-1 pipeline near MP 23.1.\nEmergency Response\nUpon identifying a sudden pressure drop on the ATEX-1 Line,\nEnterprise’s control room began closing the automated block\nvalves (Motor Operated Valve (MOV)- ) and\n(b) (7)(F)\nMOV- to isolate the segment. The control\n(b) (7)(F)\nroom then notified Enterprise field personnel, who\nresponded by manually closing mainline block valves (MLV)-\n(b) (7)(F) (b) (7)(F)\n) and MLV- to further restrict\nproduct flow. A detailed map showing the ATEX-1 line and\nthe location of valves can be found in Appendix A, map 4.\nImmediately after the accident, Line A-1, an 8-inch NPS\npropane line located in the vicinity of the rupture site, was\nalso isolated as a precaution. It was later determined that Line A-1 was not impacted by the fire or\nexplosion due to its location several hundred feet from the failure site (Appendix A, map 3). Line A-1\nwas later returned to normal service.\nThe fire departments in Wellsburg, West Virginia, and Follansbee, West Virginia, responded to incident,\nevacuating a nearby residence approximately 2,000 feet from the site and closing Lee Road and Scott\nHollow Road to vehicle traffic. The residence suffered external damage to its siding due to radiant heat\ncaused by the fire (Appendix A). The resulting explosion and fire from the rupture burned\napproximately 5 acres of woodland and damaged overhead powerlines located in the vicinity of the\nrupture (Appendix A). There were no reported injuries, fatalities, or permanent evacuations. A detailed\ntimeline of events can be found in Appendix E.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nOn January 29, 2015, PHMSA issued a CAO requiring Enterprise to take certain corrective actions to\nverify the safety and integrity of the ATEX-1 Pipeline. An ACAO was later issued on March 12, 2015. The\nrequirements of the order included the following elements (details of which are outlined in the order):\n1. Repair Plan\n2. Restart Plan\n3. Contingency Plan (Operating and Monitoring of the Pipeline During Startup)\n4. Records Verification (Confirmation of Maximum Operating Pressure)\n5. Review of Prior In-line inspection (ILI) Results\n1 The term “Affected Segment” means the segment that runs from the MarkWest Processing Facility in Houston,\nPennsylvania, to Seymour, Indiana.\nPage 3 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report—Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\nATEX Ethane Pipeline Failure\nFollansbee, Brook County, West Virginia\n[Failure Date 1/26/2015]\n6. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing\n7. Root Cause Failure Analysis\n8. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review\n9. Public Awareness Program Review\n10. Remedial Work Plan (RWP)\nRepair and remediation work at the site was performed in accordance with Enterprise’s Repair Plan\n(Appendix I). Replacement pipe was installed and the damaged segments of pipe were removed and\nsent to Kiefner and Associates for metallurgical analysis (Appendix D).\nOn February 14, 2015, the ATEX pipeline section stretching from Houston, Pennsylvania, to the Ohio\nRiver resumed operations at a reduced MOP of 947 psig (20% pressure reduction from 1,183 psig at the\ntime of the incident) in accordance with the PHMSA-approved Restart Plan submitted by Enterprise\n(Appendix H). Following the restart of the line, a series of ILI tools were run in accordance with the\nPHSMA-approved RWP submitted by Enterprise (Appendix G).\nEnterprise completed analysis of the data, including bending strain across all segments, on August 14,\n2015. All necessary excavations were completed on August 28, 2015. PHMSA conducted numerous on-\nsite inspections throughout the course of the work to ensure that all requirements of the RWP were\ncompleted.\nOn September 8, 2015, PHMSA approved removal of the ACAO-initiated pressure restriction, and the\nATEX-1 pipeline was permitted to return to 100% MOP.\nInvestigation Details\n1. The ATEX-1 pipeline was placed into service on November 25, 2013.\n2. The pipeline transports liquid ethane.\n3. The line is 20-inch NPS, 0.312-inch wall thickness, API 5L X-70, high-frequency electric resistance\nwelded pipe manufactured by American Pipe.\n4. The pipe was externally coated with fusion bonded epoxy and protected since construction by\nan impressed current cathodic protection system.\n5. Historical operation and maintenance records were reviewed during the investigation. There\nwere no reported maintenance issues, incidents, or repairs made to the pipeline since it was\nplaced in service.\n6. Prior integrity assessments consisted of the original post-construction hydrostatic test and post-\nconstruction caliper ILI.\n7. The MOP of the pipeline in the affected segment is 1,440 psig, as established by hydrostatic\ntesting in 2013.\n8. The explosion and fire that resulted from the pipeline rupture burned approximately 5 acres of\nwoodlands. However, there was no impact to waterways due to the rapid vaporization of the\nliquid ethane, and the area is not considered an HCA.\n9. Immediately after the accident, Line A-1, an 8-inch NPS propane line located in the vicinity of\nthe rupture site, was also isolated as a precaution. It was later determined that Line A-1 was not\nimpacted by the fire or explosion due to its location several hundred feet from the failure site\n(Appendix A, map 3). Line A-1 was later returned to normal service.\n10. A nearby 6-inch NPS pipeline, Line A3, has been idle since 1972 and is not currently in operation.\nPage 4 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report—Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\nATEX Ethane Pipeline Failure\nFollansbee, Brook County, West Virginia\n[Failure Date 1/26/2015]\n11. Prior to the failure, SCADA pressure records showed the MOP of the line was not exceeded.\nOperating pressure at the time of failure was 1,183 psig, below the MOP of 1,440 psig.\n12. PHMSA reviewed the adequacy of emergency response related to the release, as well as\napplicable procedures pertaining to construction, operations, and maintenance of the ATEX-1\npipeline. No issues were identified.\n13. Samples of the affected pipe were removed and sent to Kiefner for metallurgical analysis and\ntesting. These samples included the upstream and downstream girth welds, upstream and\ndownstream pipe joints, and 2 feet of the pipe immediately upstream and downstream of the\nfailure location. Results of the testing and examination are outlined in Appendix D of this\nreport.\n14. A survey of the failure site comparing the elevation of the pipeline at the failure location to the\nas-built map elevations was conducted during the excavation and remediation process. The\nsurvey indicated that the pipe had dropped more than 3 feet since the line was originally\nconstructed. A geotechnical survey conducted by Pennsylvania Soil and Rock determined that\nthe failed pipe was installed across a transition area or “head wall” of an old underground mine\nand surface strip mine. In addition, the soil on which the pipeline was laid had undergone little\nconsolidation since the mining was completed. Details of the geotechnical survey analysis can\nbe found in the Enterprise Remedial Work Plan (Appendix G).\n15. Depth of cover at the failure site was approximately 12 feet.\n16. There were multiple complex bends near the failure location.\n17. Buoyancy control weights were installed in the vicinity of the failure site during the original\nconstruction of the pipeline (Appendix A, photo 7).\n18. The explosion and fire that resulted from the pipeline rupture burned approximately 5 acres of\nwoodlands and damaged high tension power lines near the failure site (Appendix A, photo 2).\n19. Due to the rapid vaporization of the liquid ethane there was no impact to waterways.\n20. Approximately 30,565 barrels of liquid ethane were released.\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nFindings:\nMetallurgical testing of the failed pipe section was conducted by Kiefner and Associates, and showed\nthat the accident was caused by a girth weld failure due to a ductile tensile overload from stresses\nresulting from loads imposed by the surrounding soil. The data also indicated that the intact upstream\nand downstream girth welds met the quality requirements and mechanical properties of API 1104. The\nmechanical properties of the pipe joints immediately adjacent to the rupture location, as well as the\nnext pipe joints upstream and downstream, also met the chemical and mechanical properties for Grade\nX70 pipe (Appendix D).\nContributing Factors:\nPrevious mining activities were a contributing factor to the failure. The pipeline settlement in the failure\nlocation was likely caused by the consolidation of existing surface mine spoils during construction,\nadded cover, and the placement of buoyancy control measures on the pipe.\nPage 5 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report—Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\nATEX Ethane Pipeline Failure\nFollansbee, Brook County, West Virginia\n[Failure Date 1/26/2015]\nAppendices\nA 149469 Appendix A—Maps and Photographs\nB 149469 Appendix B—NRC Report 1106602\nC 149469 Appendix C—Incident Report Form 7000.1\nD 149469 Appendix D—Metallurgical Analysis Report\nE 149469 Appendix E—Timeline of Events\nF 149469 Appendix F—Amended CAO—CPF120155002H\nG 149469 Appendix G—ATEX Remedial Work Plan\nH 149469 Appendix H—ATEX Restart Plan\nI 149469 Appendix I—ATEX Repair Plan\nPage 6 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nMap-1\nMap-2\nPage 1 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nMap-3\nPage 2 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\n(b) (7)(F)\nMap-4 : Atex-1 Pipeline\nPage 3 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPage 4 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 1 : (Jan 26, 2015)\nThe explosion and fire that resulted from the pipeline rupture burned approximately 5 acres of\nwoodlands. There was no impact to waterways due to the rapid vaporization of the liquid ethane.\nPage 5 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 2 – (Jan 26, 2015)\nPower lines were damaged in the right-of-way that crosses the Atex-1 pipeline.\nPage 6 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 3 – (Jan 26, 2015)\nSiding damaged from residual heat. This home is located approximately 2000 feet from the ruputure\nsite.\nPage 7 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 4 – (Jan 27, 2015)\nRupture site.\nPage 8 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 5 – (Jan 27, 2015)\nPage 9 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 6 – (Feb 1, 2015)\nExcavating the pipe.\nPage 10 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 7 – (Feb 2, 2015)\nPhoto shows failure location wrapped with rock shield to protect the pipe ends durng excavation.\nWeighted buoyancy control bags are shown on the pipe.\nPage 11 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 8 –(Feb 3, 2015)\nRemoval of ruptured pipe.\nPage 12 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 9 – (Feb 3, 2015)\nRuptured pipe section removed including upstream and downstream welds. Pipe and welds sent for\nmetallurgical testing.\nPage 13 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n149469 Appendix A_Maps and Photographs\nPhoto 10 - (Feb 5, 2015)\nInstalling replacement pipe section.\nPage 14 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n149469 Appendix B_NRC Report 1106602\nPage 1 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\n149469 Appendix B_NRC Report 1106602\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\n149469 Appendix B_NRC Report 1106602\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\n149469 Appendix B_NRC Report 1106602\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\n149469 Appendix C_Incident Report Form 7000.1\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 07/31/2015\nOriginal Report\nDate: 02/24/2015\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20150071 - 20723\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. All responses to the collection of information are mandatory.\nSend comments regarding this burden or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden to: Information\nCollection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes\nLast Revision Date: 09/08/2015\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 31618\n2. Name of Operator ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 1100 Louisiana Street\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code 77002\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 01/26/2015 09:38\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 40.366817\nLongitude: -80.584594\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1106602\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 01/26/2015 11:38\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nHVL or Other Flammable or Toxic Fluid which is a Gas at\nAmbient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Other HVL\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Descr be: Ethane\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend e.g. B2, B20, B100\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 30,565.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels):\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 1 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 26>>>\n\n149469 Appendix C_Incident Report Form 7000.1\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 01/26/2015 09:39\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: 02/14/2015 13:30\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? Yes\n16. Did the commodity explode? Yes\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 1\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident - effective 7- 2014\nchanged to \"Local time Operator identified failure\": 01/26/2015 09:39\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 01/26/2015 11:00\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: West Virginia\n3. Zip Code: 26035\n4. City Colliers\n5. County or Parish Brooke\n6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: 23.1\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: ATEX-1\n8. Segment name/ID: Greensburg - Pennsylvania/West Virginia\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Descr be:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 168\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\n- If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 20\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 2 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 27>>>\n\n149469 Appendix C_Incident Report Form 7000.1\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .312\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 70,000\n3d. Pipe specification: API-5L X70\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Longitudinal ERW - High Frequency\n- If Other, Descr be:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: American Pipe\n3g. Year of manufacture: 2013\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Fusion Bonded Epoxy\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify. If Pipe Girth Weld,\n3a through 3h above are required:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Descr be:\n- If Other, descr be:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 2013\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Rupture\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation: Circumferential\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by 1\nin. (length circumferentially or axially) 20\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: No\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: Yes\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil\n- Vegetation Yes\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nNo\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? No\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 3 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 28>>>\n\n149469 Appendix C_Incident Report Form 7000.1\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n8. Estimated cost to Operator – effective 12-2012, changed to \"Estimated Property Damage\":\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage paid/reimbursed by the Operator – effective 12-2012,\n\"paid/reimbursed by the Operator\" removed\n$ 95,000\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 194,000\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 1,821,591\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 0\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 0\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 4,800,000\nDescr be: Costs to implement Remedial Work Plan\n8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) – effective 12-2012,\nchanged to \"Total estimated property damage (sum of above)\" $ 6,910,591\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 1,183.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 1,440.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nYes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f below) effective 12-2012, changed to \"(Complete 5.a – 5.e below)\"\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Remotely Controlled\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Remotely Controlled\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 112,094\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools? Yes\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Descr be:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 4 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 29>>>\n\n149469 Appendix C_Incident Report Form 7000.1\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Descr be:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nYes\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nYes\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nYes\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\nYes\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator?\nCPM leak detection system or SCADA-based information\n(such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume\ncalculations)\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Ground Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify:\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\nLine ruptured while in steady-state operation below MOP.\nNo investigation into controller actions necessary.\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescr be:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 5 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 30>>>\n\n149469 Appendix C_Incident Report Form 7000.1\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub-Cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 6 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 31>>>\n\n149469 Appendix C_Incident Report Form 7000.1\n- If Other, Descr be:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescr be:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescr be:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 7 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 32>>>\n\n149469 Appendix C_Incident Report Form 7000.1\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Descr be:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART\nC, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescr be:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 8 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 33>>>\n\n149469 Appendix C_Incident Report Form 7000.1\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescr be:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the foll","truncated":true,"body_characters":52460}