{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, BP Pipeline Co, 2004-02-25","title":"Failure Report--BP Pipeline Co 2/25/04","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-12-26","effective_on":"2004-02-25","summary":"BP Pipeline Co; Hazardous Liquid; OH; failure 2004-02-25; apparent cause: Corrosion External.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-bp-pipeline-co-22504.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-bp-pipeline-co-22504.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-bp-pipeline-co-22504","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-bp-pipeline-co-22504","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nCentral Region\nPrincipal Investigator Gery Bauman\nRegion Director David Barrett\nDate of Report 6/4/2012\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – BP Oil Pipeline, External Corrosion, Interference\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 2/25/2004\nCommodity Released Refined Products - Diesel\nCity/County & State Cincinnati/Hamilton County, Ohio\nOpID & Operator Name 18386 BP Oil Pipeline Co. (current)\n31189 BP Pipeline (North America) Inc. (time of the accident)\nUnit # & Unit Name 3903 Miami Valley Pipeline BP\nSMART Activity # 110420\nMilepost / Location MP 4.5/Engineering Station 574+62\nType of Failure External Corrosion Leak, Interference\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area HCA, Residential Area, 2.5 miles from Ohio River, Under Pavement\nTotal Damages $42,000\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – BP External Corrosion Bromley-Cincinnati 6”\nFailure Date 02/25/2004\nExecutive Summary\nOn February 25, 2004, the Hamilton County, Ohio 911 service began to receive odor complaints from\nresidents living in the 1200 block of Anderson Ferry Road in Cincinnati, OH. The Delhi Fire Department\nresponded to the area and confirmed the odor of petroleum was present in the storm sewers. BP (the\noperator) was contacted by the Delhi Fire Department at 10:25 am ET regarding odors in the storm\nsewers. The operator suspended operations of the Bromley to Cincinnati (BOCI) refined products\npipeline shortly after contact from the Delhi Fire Department. BP began patrols of the pipeline looking\nfor the source of odor complaints. No obvious leaks were found. The operator then began a hold test\nwhich involved increasing pressure in a 5 mile section of the pipeline (up to 200 psig), shutting in this\nsection of pipeline with the increased pressure, and monitoring this section of pipeline for pressure and\ntemperature changes or deviations. Pressure was observed by the operator to drop approximately 1\npsig every 10 minutes. During the pressure hold test, BP personnel monitoring the storm sewers began\nto smell fuel and BP immediately stopped the hold test and lowered pressure on this 5 mile section. The\noperator began excavations in an effort to determine the exact leak location. Three different locations\nwere excavated initially. On February 29, 2004 at approximately 10:00 am ET, the source of the diesel\nfuel leak from the pipeline was discovered. The leak location was in front of a residence at 1221\nAnderson Ferry Road, in Cincinnati, Ohio (MP 4.5, Engineering Station 547+62).\nBP estimated the pressure at the leak site to be 799 psig. The Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of\nthe pipeline was 1,200 psig. The pipe that failed was 6.625-inch outside diameter (OD), 0.300-inch wall\nthickness (WT), Grade B, Low Frequency Electric Resistance Welded (ERW) line pipe, installed in 1938\nand was coated with coal tar enamel. The pipeline had been hydrotested in 1997 to a pressure of 1586\npsig and smart pigged with a Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool and geometry tool in 2002. The pipeline\nis approximately 22.2 miles long, had several foreign line crossings (1.5 inch gas pipeline and 0.75 inch\ncopper water line crossings) and portions of the pipeline were located under pavement in a frequently\ntraveled roadway. An additional cathodic protection rectifier had been installed in 2002 by the operator\nnear the area of the leak.\nThe operator had repaired or replaced 22 dents in the pipeline in 2003 as a result of the geometry tool\nindications and had performed several excavations to verify and evaluate the data obtained from the\nMFL tool run. BP’s engineers had completed and reviewed several confirmatory digs prior to the time of\nthe leak and had determined the initial MFL tool run data to be conservative. The initial 2002 MFL tool\nrun data indicated a 49% maximum depth indication at the leak site. The initial MFL tool run data and\nBP’s existing Integrity Management Procedures would not have required the leak location to be\nexcavated or repaired.\nA Corrective Action Order (CPF3-2004-5005H) was issued by PHMSA on March 2, 2004 with\nrequirements to: provide start-up procedures that included sufficient pressure monitoring, leak\npatrolling, and surveillance to detect leaks upon the resumed operation of the pipeline; reduce\noperating pressure not to exceed 80% of the pressure in effect just prior to the failure; perform\nPage 2 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – BP External Corrosion Bromley-Cincinnati 6”\nFailure Date 02/25/2004\nmetallurgical testing of the failed pipe section (including soil sample analysis); re-evaluate the 2002 MFL\ntool run data; integrate data sources and implement a written plan with corrective measures identified\nto address all known or suspected factors that caused or contributed to the pipe failure. The written\nplan was required to include: integration of all relevant data (including the failure and leak history of the\npipeline); a close-interval electrical survey; criteria to be used to prioritize any integrity threats that\nwere identified; appropriate repairs or other corrective measures to fully remediate the integrity\nthreatening conditions for the failure area and other areas on the pipeline with similar threats; a\ndescription of the repair method used; a proposed schedule for completion of all testing and repairs.\nThe pipe failure was at the 10 o’clock position. Microbial Induced Corrosion (MIC) was not a factor. MIC\nwas determined not to be present only after chemical and bacterial analysis of deposits near the leak\nand soils were completed (chemical analysis of deposits found in the pits near the leak, bacterial testing\nof deposits under the coating, and soil samples).\nThe metallurgical analysis identified that the cause of the leak was external corrosion “with some mild\nacceleration of corrosion on the seam due to selective seam corrosion.” The metallurgical analysis also\nsuggested that if corrosion growth rates did increase as initially thought, then “the change that took\nplace was related to the installation of a cathodic-protection rectifier in 2002 and/or other electrical\ninterference on the line.” The report also indicated that “corrosion had reached a depth of\napproximately 95 percent through wall before the leak occurred.”\nA review conducted later in the investigation process did find that the sensor malfunction in the 2002\nMFL tool run did contribute to under sizing of the corrosion anomalies.\nThere were no fires or injuries associated with the leak. The volume of product released was\ndetermined by the operator to be less than 5 gallons. Total estimated damages provided by the\noperator were $42,000. The operator confirmed that this included all costs incurred by the operator\n(for those activities not including the CAO) and the emergency response activities. Due to the size of the\nrelease and the estimated property damage of less than $50,000, a 30 day accident report form (PHMSA\n7000-1) was not completed or filed by the operator.\nPage 3 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – BP External Corrosion Bromley-Cincinnati 6”\nFailure Date 02/25/2004\nSystem Details\nThe BOCI pipeline transports refined products (no HVLs) from the Bromley pump station and barge\nterminal on the Ohio River to a truck terminal near the intersection of SR 562 and Interstate I-75. The\npipeline is approximately 22.2 miles long and transport refined products through residential, business\nand industrial areas. The pipeline crosses numerous roadways, other underground utilities, and is\nlocated near several schools. The pipeline was constructed in 1938 from 6.625-inch OD, 0.300-inch WT,\nGrade B, Low Frequency ERW line pipe coated with coal tar enamel.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nThe MOP of the pipeline is 1,200 psig and the normal operating pressure at the time of the failure was\n1,198 psig. The pipeline was hydrotested in 1997 to 1,586 psig.\nAn additional cathodic protection rectifier was installed in 2002. This was the same year that the\npipeline was smart pigged with MFL and geometry tools.\nIn 2003, BP repaired or replaced 22 dents to the pipeline based on the geometry tool data and\nexcavated several sites to verify and confirm data obtained from the 2002 MFL tool run.\nOn February 25, 2004 residents in the 1200 block of Anderson Ferry Road in Cincinnati, Ohio contacted\nthe area 911 service to report an odor of petroleum emanating from the storm sewers.\nEmergency Response\nThe Delhi Fire Department responded and confirmed the odor of petroleum was present in the storm\nsewers and checked the storm sewers with gas detectors. The gas detector readings did not indicate\nany measurement on the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) scale. A petroleum odor was still prevalent. The\nDelhi Fire Department then contacted BP at 10:25 am ET and informed the operator of the odors and\nassociated public calls. The Delhi Fire Department and BP continued to periodically check the sewers for\nan explosive fuel-air mixture. Once the source of the leak was isolated to one lateral entering the sewer\nsystem, BP used adsorbent pads to remove the product before it could spread further within the sewer\nsystem. The Delhi Fire Department continued to monitor the sewers for the presence of a hazardous\natmosphere until the leak on the pipe was uncovered and product movement into the sewer was\nstopped.\nThere were no fires or injuries associated with the leak. The volume of product released was\ndetermined by the operator to be less than 5 gallons. Property Damage was estimated by the operator\nat $42,000 and reported to PHMSA to include all costs incurred by the operator (for those activities not\nincluding the CAO) and the emergency response activities.\nPage 4 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – BP External Corrosion Bromley-Cincinnati 6”\nFailure Date 02/25/2004\nLeak Investigation\nBP suspended operations of the Bromley to Cincinnati (BOCI) refined products pipeline shortly after\ncontact from the Delhi Fire Department. BP began patrols of the pipeline looking for the source of odor.\nThe odor emanating from the sewers had dissipated and was initially no longer detectable. BP theorized\nthat the odor complaint was the result of something randomly being poured into the sewer system.\nBP then initiated a shut in test to prove the pipeline integrity. BP closed a mainline block valve\napproximately 5 miles north of the Bromley pump station and intentionally elevated pressure on the\npipeline to 200 psig. Pressure and temperature were then monitored for deviation or changes.\nPressure was observed to drop about 1 psi every 10 minutes. During the hold or shut in test, BP\npersonnel monitoring the storm sewers identified a return of the petroleum odor. BP immediately\nstopped the shut in test and lowered the pressure on the pipeline. BP excavated the pipeline at three\ndifferent locations in an effort to identify the leak location. On February 29, 2004 at about 10:00 am ET,\nthe source of the diesel fuel leak from the pipeline was discovered. The leak location was identified to\nbe in front of the residence at 1221 Anderson Ferry Road, Cincinnati, Ohio (MP 4.5, engineering survey\nstation 547+62).\nOne lane of Anderson Ferry Road had to be closed to make repairs to the pipeline. This lane closure was\nrequired as part of the pipeline was located parallel to Anderson Ferry Road underneath the road\npavement.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nOnce the specific location of the leak was identified, the pipe was temporarily repaired by the use of a\nbolt on leak clamp. When temporary repairs were finished, permanent repair plans were developed.\nThe operator’s repair plan included the drain down of the pipeline and the installation of new pipe to\nreplace portions of the pipe in the area that had leaked. BP installed and replaced 47 feet of old pipe\nwith new pipe. A CAO, CPF 3-2004-5005H, was issued on March 2, 2004 and encompassed requirements\nthat impacted the return to service plan.\nInvestigation Details\nA pipeline section containing the leak location was sent to Kiefner and Associates for metallurgical\nanalysis. A review of cathodic protection annual test station records for the previous three years\nindicated all on values were more negative than -1 volt. A review of the rectifier records for the\nprevious 3 years showed acceptable performance of the pipeline rectifiers and the addition of a rectifier\nin 2002 about 1 mile south of the leak site.\nRecords of a 2002 close-interval-survey were reviewed and indicated all areas recorded were more\nnegative than -0.850 mv off. The area adjacent to the leak was not covered in the close-interval-survey\ndue to the location of the pipeline being under the road pavement (the pipeline at the leak site was\nunder the south bound lane of Anderson Ferry Road). The original bell hole dug to expose the leak\nlocation was required to go through approximately 6” of asphalt, 4” of gravel, 8” of concrete (appeared\nPage 5 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – BP External Corrosion Bromley-Cincinnati 6”\nFailure Date 02/25/2004\nto be abandoned road bed), and then 3’ of brown clay. The presence of the asphalt and concrete\nexplained the lack of close-interval-survey readings in the area of the leak.\nA PHMSA Investigator was onsite during the excavation of the leak site. The Investigator noticed that\ncopper water service lines (3/4 inch in size) from a water main were in direct contact with the coating of\nthe pipeline. Any inadvertent contact between the copper water lines and the metallic pipeline could\nhave negatively impacted cathodic protection in the vicinity of the contact. At least one additional\nforeign line crossing was noted in the 2002 ILI tool run summary information (a 1-1/2 inch gas pipeline).\nAn MFL smart pig inspection of the pipeline was performed on April 23, 2002. The MFL tool originally\nidentified ten joints with corrosion features with maximum depth percentages between 40% and 49%.\nThe tool run data was reported to be complete and of good quality except for two inoperable sensor\ncarriers. Sensor #2 was inoperable for 92% of the 22 mile run and Sensor #6 was inoperable for 100% of\nthe 22 mile run. Prior to the leak and after the MFL data was reported to BP, two joints with reported\ncorrosion features were excavated to confirm the MFL tool run information. Actual corrosion\nmeasurements were taken and compared with those identified by the MFL tool. The initial confirmatory\ndig analysis revealed that the MFL tool corrosion data was reported to be conservative, indicating that\nthe tool was accurately depicting the size of anomalies within expected tool tolerance. The joint that\nleaked was not examined during the confirmatory dig phase of the program because of its location\n(below pavement in a residential neighborhood) and the initial reported value of metal loss. The 2002\nMFL data initially reported a 49% metal loss at the leak site. Based on the previous confirmation digs,\nthe reported depth of 49%, and BP’s existing Integrity Management Procedures, the anomaly at the\nfailure site was determined by BP to be acceptable and no repair or further action was determined to be\nnecessary.\nBP estimated the pressure at the leak site to be 799 psig. The Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of\nthe pipeline was 1,200 psig. The pipe failed at the 10 o’clock position and was 6.625-inch in outside\ndiameter (OD), 0.300-inch wall thickness (WT), Grade B, Low Frequency Electric Resistance Welded\n(ERW) line pipe, installed in 1938 and coated with coal tar enamel. The pipeline had been hydrotested\nin 1997 to a pressure of 1586 psig.\nOPS issued Alert Notices on January 28, 1988 and March 8, 1989 informing pipeline operators that low-\nfrequency ERW pipe is subject to longitudinal weld seam failures caused by the presence of\nmanufacturing defects in the ERW seams that can grow over time. Seam corrosion and cyclical fatigue\nhave been found to contribute to the growth of these defects and in some cases, operational failures\nhave occurred many months or years after successful hydrostatic testing was conducted.\nAs a result of the location of this failure, the fact that the commodity entered the sewer system, the\nspecifics of the Alert Notices and a knowledge of the pipeline system components, a Corrective Action\nOrder (CPF3-2004-5005H) was issued by PHMSA on March 2, 2004 with requirements to: provide start-\nup procedures that include sufficient pressure monitoring, leak patrolling, and surveillance to detect\nleaks upon the resumed operation of the pipeline; reduce operating pressure not to exceed 80% of the\npressure in effect just prior to the failure; perform metallurgical testing of the failed pipe section\nPage 6 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – BP External Corrosion Bromley-Cincinnati 6”\nFailure Date 02/25/2004\n(including soil sample analysis); re-evaluate the 2002 MFL tool run data; integrate data sources and\nimplement a written plan with corrective measures identified to address all known or suspected factors\nthat caused or contributed to the pipe failure. The written plan was required to include: integration of\nall relevant data (including the failure and leak history of the pipeline); a close-interval electrical survey;\ncriteria to be used to prioritize any integrity threats that were identified; appropriate repairs or other\ncorrective measures to fully remediate the integrity threatening conditions for the failure area and other\nareas on the pipeline with similar threats; a description of the repair method used; a proposed schedule\nfor completion of all testing and repairs.\nA review conducted later in the investigation identified that the tool run sensor malfunction in 2002 MFL\ndata did contribute to the corrosion anomalies being undersized.\nMicrobial Induced Corrosion (MIC) was determined not to be a factor after chemical and bacterial\nanalysis of deposits and soil samples was completed (chemical analysis of deposits found in the pits near\nthe leak, bacterial testing of deposits under the coating, and soil samples).\nThe metallurgical analysis identified that the cause of the leak was external corrosion “with some mild\nacceleration of corrosion on the seam due to selective seam corrosion”. The metallurgical analysis also\nsuggested that if corrosion growth rates did increase as initially thought, then the analysis suggested\n“the change that took place was related to the installation of a cathodic-protection rectifier in 2002\nand/or other electrical interference on the line.” The report indicated “corrosion had reached a depth\nof approximately 95 percent through wall before the leak occurred.”\nThe operator did not complete a root cause investigation, an internal accident investigation, or a 30 day\n(PHMSA Form 7000-1) accident report. The operator’s procedures placed the decision to investigate\nthis size of release at the discretion of the Team Leader or District Manager. In this accident, no one\ninternal to BP in the position of decision making identified the need for an internal investigation beyond\nthose actions required in the PHMSA Corrective Action Order. This release would have been considered\nas a Tier 1, Level 1 per the operator’s RCFA Reporting and Documentation Matrix.\nFindings & Contributing Factors\nKiefner and Associates completed a metallurgical investigation of the pipe. The metallurgical analysis\nidentified that the cause of the leak was external corrosion “with some mild acceleration of corrosion on\nthe seam due to selective seam corrosion.” The metallurgical analysis also suggested that if corrosion\ngrowth rates did increase as initially thought, then “the change that took place was related to the\ninstallation of a cathodic-protection rectifier in 2002 and/or other electrical interference on the line.”\nThis was supported by the fact that the copper water lines were visually found to be in direct contact\nwith the pipeline when the excavation of the leak site occurred. The metallurgical report indicated that\n“corrosion had reached a depth of approximately 95 percent through wall before the leak occurred.”\nCathodic Protection records indicated acceptable levels of protection at the test station locations. A\nclose interval survey did not obtain readings for the pipeline area under the pavement in the area of the\n1200 block of Anderson Ferry Road in Cincinnati, OH. The 2002 MFL tool run data initially indicated 49%\nPage 7 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – BP External Corrosion Bromley-Cincinnati 6”\nFailure Date 02/25/2004\nwall loss at the leak site. A 49% wall loss report was below the action level of BP’s Integrity\nManagement Plan existing at the time of the leak. A contributing cause for this leak was later\ndetermined to be the two inoperable sensors during the 2002 MFL tool run.\nA Form 7000-1 Accident Report was not filed or completed by the operator because the spill volume\nwas less than 5 gallons and property damage did not exceed $50,000.\nAppendices\nAppendix A - Site Map\nAppendix B - Photographs\nAppendix C – NRC Report\nAppendix D - Kiefner and Associates Metallurgical Report\nPage 8 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix A\nSite Map\nThis document is on file at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photographs\nPhoto 1 -View looking south on Anderson Ferry Road at leak site.\nPhoto 2 -View looking north at leak site.\nPage 1 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photographs\nPhoto 3 -leak origin.\nPhoto 4- Close-up of corrosion pit.\nPage 2 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photographs\n...... .\nPhoto 5 shows temporary leak clamp and stopple fitting used to drain pipeline in preparation for the\npipe cut out.\nPhoto 6 shows bell hole through pavement, top of stopple fitting is visible.\nPage3of3\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nAppendix C - NRC Report Page 1 of2\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 714345\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 12:55 on 25-FEB-04\nIncident Type: UNKNOWN SHEEN\nIncident Cause: UNKNOWN\nAffected Area: STORM SEWER\nThe incident was discovered on 25-FEB-04 at 12:30 local time.\nAffected Medium: WATER STORM SEWER\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nXX\nType of Organization: UNKNOWN\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nCounty: HAMILTON\nCity: CINCINNATTI State: OH\nANDERSON FERRY AND CLEANDER ROAD\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: OUN Official Material Name: UNKNOWN OIL\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT Qty in Water: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nCALLER IS REPORTING A PETROLEUM SHEEN IN THE STORM SEWER.\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPlatform Rig Name:\nPlatform Letter:\nLocation Area ID:\nLocation Block ID:\nOCSG Number:\nOCSP Number:\nState Lease Number:\nPier Dock Number:\nBerth Slip Number:\n---WATER INFORMATION--Body\nof Water: STORM SEWER\nTributary of: MUDDY CREEK TREATMENT CENTER\nNearest River Mile Marker:\nWater Supply Contaminated: NO\nFire Involved:\nNO\nDAMAGES\nUNKNOWN\nINJURIES:\nNO\nFATALITIES:\nNO\nEVACUATIONS:\nNO\nFire Extinguished:\nHospitalized:\nEmpl/Crew:\nWho Evacuated:\nDamages: NO\nEmpl/Crew:\nPassenger:\nRadius/Area:\nPassenger:\nOccupant:\nLength of Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure\nAir: N\nRoad: N Major\nArtery: N\nPage 1 of 2\nhttp://www.nrc. uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard _ web+inc _seq=714345 5/11/2012\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix C - NRC Report Page 2 of2\nv1a terway: N\nTrack: N\nPassengers Transferred: UNKNOWN\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material: NO\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nINVESTIGATION UNDERWAY\nRelease Secured: UNKNOWN\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\nWEATHER\nWeather: SUNNY, 30°F\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal:\nState/Local:\nState/Local On Scene:\nState Agency Number:\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nMSO LOUISVILLE (PRIMARY)\n25-FEB-04 13:11\nNOAA 1ST CLASS BB RPTS FOR OH (PRIMARY)\n25-FEB-04 13:01\nORSANCO ATTN: J. SCHULTE (PRIMARY)\n25-FEB-04 13:01\nIN DEPT ENV MNGMT ATTN: BEAUCHAMP (PRIMARY)\n25-FEB-04 13:01\nKY DEP/ERT ATTN: MR. BLAIR (PRIMARY)\n25-FEB-04 13:01\nOH EPA ATTN: DUTY OFFICER (PRIMARY)\n25-FEB-04 13:01\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nCALLER WILL NOTIFY;OH EPA\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT * 714345 ***\nThe National Response Center is strictly an initial report taking agency\nand does not participate in the investigation or incident response. The\nNRC receives initial reporting information only and notifies Federal and\nState On-Scene Coordinators for response. The NRC does not verify nor\ndoes it take follow-on incident information. Verification of data and\nincident response is the sole responsibility of Federal/State On-Scene\nCoordinators. Data contained within the FOIA Web Database is initial\ninformation only. All reports provided via this server are for\ninformational purposes only. Data to be used in legal proceedings must be\nobtained via written correspondence from the NRC.\nPage 2 of 2\nhttp://www .nrc. uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard _ web+inc _ seq=714 34 5 5/11/2012\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix D\nMetallurgical Report\nThis document is on file at PHMSA","truncated":false,"body_characters":25172}