{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Buckeye Partners, LP, 2012-06-17","title":"Failure Report-Buckeye Partners 5/17/12","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-03-29","effective_on":"2012-06-17","summary":"Buckeye Partners, LP; Hazardous Liquid; PA; failure 2012-06-17; apparent cause: Incorrect Operation.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-51712.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-51712.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-51712","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-buckeye-partners-51712","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator\nSenior Accident Investigator\nRegion Director\nDate of Report\nSubject\nBrett Mahan – NYS DPS\nMichael Yazemboski – PHMSA ER\nByron E. Coy\n04/18/2012\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners LP, Turnpike Road NY\nLine 803 Excavation Damage\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 09/20/2011\nCommodity Released Gasoline\nCity/County & State Aurelius / Cayuga, New York\nOpID & Operator Name 1845 Buckeye Partners L.P.\nUnit # & Unit Name 3201 Auburn Area - NY\nSMART Activity # 139214\nMilepost / Location MP 7.2 Line 803, Latitude: 42.959503 ; Longitude: -76.665351\nType of Failure Leak caused by excavation damage (farmer using plow to install drain tile\nin field)\nFatalities None\nInjuries None\nDescription of area Rural, Farming\nimpacted\nTotal Costs $1,391,720\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners LP, Turnpike Road NY-Line 803 Excavation Damage\nFailure Date 09/20/2011\nExecutive Summary\nOn September 20, 2011, at approximately 10:20, a farmer installing drain tile struck and ruptured a 10-\ninch liquid petroleum line owned and operated by Buckeye Pipeline LP, causing the release of\napproximately 595 barrels of gasoline. The damage occurred on Buckeye’s Line 803 in Cayuga County,\nNew York. The line runs approximately 95 miles from the Auburn Terminal to the Rochester Terminal.\nThe pipeline was marked out properly under Dig Safely-NY. The farmer had been in contact with local\nBuckeye personnel during the installation of drain tile in his field adjacent to Buckeye’s pipeline (Line\n803). The farmer was instructed by Buckeye not to dig in the pipeline right-of-way, which is\napproximately 25 feet from the centerline of the pipeline. On the day of the incident, the farmer was\nplowing the field approximately perpendicular to the pipeline, and failed to stop the tractor and raise\nthe tile-plow out of the ground prior to proceeding over the pipeline. After hitting the line, the farmer\ncalled Buckeye to report that he had hit the line and that gasoline was escaping from the pipe. Buckeye\npersonnel arrived at the site within 15 minutes to start the emergency response.\nThere were no injuries or fatalities as a result of the accident. Approximately 70 homes within a 1.5 mile\nradius of the leak site were evacuated as a precaution until the line was secured and the area made safe.\nSystem Details\nBuckeye Line 803 is located in Cayuga County, New York and runs from the Auburn Terminal to the\nRochester Terminal.\n1. The line is 10-inch diameter, API5L grade X46 seamless pipe, with a wall thickness of 0.279\ninches.\n2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The Maximum Operating Pressure is 1296 psig.\nThe elevation at failure site was 475 feet above sea level.\nThe line was installed in 1953.\nThe line had an external Coal Tar coating.\nOver pressure protection for Line 803 is provided by high pressure shut down switches on the\ndischarge lines from the Auburn pump station located approximately 7.2 miles upstream of the\nAuburn Terminal in Auburn, NY.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nPrior to the incident, the farmer had contacted local Buckeye personnel to notify them of the drainage\ntile installation that would be occurring near their Line 803. The farmer also contacted the One-Call\nSystem and the pipeline was properly marked out under Dig Safely-NY prior to the work commencing.\nOn the day of the incident, Line 803 was not flowing product and was shut in due to an unrelated leak at\nthe Auburn Tank Farm that was discovered earlier the same morning.\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners LP, Turnpike Road NY-Line 803 Excavation Damage\nFailure Date 09/20/2011\nEmergency Response\nAll of the events below occurred on September 20, 2011. Buckeye successfully implemented their\nEmergency and OPA Contingency Plans to address the safety and environmental issues resulting from\nthe leak.\nTime Event\n10:20 Buckeye’s Line 803 from Auburn to Waterloo was struck by a farmer installing\ndrainage tile in his field using a plow. The farmer immediately called a Buckeye\nemployee to report the damage. The Buckeye employee contacted Buckeye’s local\nControl Center to inform them of the line hit and instructed the farmer to call 911.\n10:25 The upstream valve at the Auburn Terminal was closed.\n10:35 Buckeye personnel arrived onsite to assess the situation.\n11:08 The downstream valve at Route 89 was closed.\n11:25 The downstream valve at Route 90 was closed. This allowed for the downstream\npump station to recover a portion of the gasoline remaining in the line before the\nline was completely isolated.\n11:30 The incident was reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report #990200) by\nBuckeye.\n15:00 An inspector with the New York State Department of Public Service (NYS DPS) arrived\non site to begin their investigation.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nOn September 20, 2011, at approximately 23:00, a temporary sleeve was installed over the damaged\narea of pipe (Appendix B – Photo #3). A permanent repair was made on September 22, 2011. The\nrepairs consisted of welding in a new section of pipe (Appendix B – Photo #5). All welds were x-rayed\nand found to meet code requirements. Line 803 was returned to service on September 23, 2011.\nInvestigation Details\nThe pressure at the Auburn Terminal, upstream of the failure location, at time of failure was\napproximately 300 psig. The elevation at the failure site was 475 feet above sea level. The pressure at\nthe time and location of the line hit was approximately 277 psig, below the MOP of 1296 psig.\nA visual inspection of the damaged section of pipe was performed by NYS DPS. The inspection indicated\nthat the coal tar coating was in excellent condition with no signs of disbondment. There was no external\ncorrosion present on the section of pipe exposed. Cathodic Protection was installed on line 803 and\nreadings taken the day of the incident showed an acceptable level of -1.435V taken at the leak site.\nThe leak location consisted of a hole approximately 10 inches in length by approximately 3 inches wide,\noriginating at the 9 o’clock position facing downstream. The hole was caused by the tile plow hitting the\npipeline (Appendix B – Photo #4).\nThe pipeline was marked out under Dig Safely-NY. When NYS DPS arrived onsite to begin their\ninvestigation, they verified that the line was accurately marked (Appendix B – Photo #6). The depth of\ncover was measured to be approximately 30 inches at the leak location.\nPretested pipe was used to make permanent repair. The NYS DPS inspector reviewed welding\nprocedures and pressure test records for the new piping and no issues were identified. The pretested\npipe test record is number 2151.\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners LP, Turnpike Road NY-Line 803 Excavation Damage\nFailure Date 09/20/2011\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nThe failure was due to excavation damage during the installation of drainage tile in a rural farm field.\nThe failure consisted of a hole in the pipe that measured approximately 10 inches by 3 inches (Appendix\nB – Photo #1). Approximately 595 Barrels of Gasoline was spilled. As of 10/19/2011, 271 Barrels had\nbeen recovered. The pipeline was properly marked per Dig Safely-NY regulations (Ticket Number 07281-\n146-004-00).\nAppendices\nAppendix Description\nA 139214 - Appendix A - Maps\nB 139214 - Appendix B - Photographs\nC 139214 - Appendix C - NRC Report 990200\nD 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix A - Maps\nOttawa ..\nMontreal\nlondon\nAccident\nLocation\n•\nHamilton\nColumbus\nPhiladelphia\nHamhn\nP•r!N Cenuo1\n~ lrondcquo•t 10•\n>Oft ~\n(HI _Rochester\n~ Cl Brighton\n,._\nRt!l'\nno\nAvon\nflJ Conesus\nWo$1 Sparta\nC!!..'\nf •s.J D.lnsville\nWllliamron\nWolworth\nG\n~\n~r\"~'\nGolhaln\nSouth Bristol\nPouor\nfw ) Penn Van\nl ~<~ l y H ill\nProtuburg\nAIOton Laf\\(lf\nMexico\nH.l.tll>9'\nCamck\nSwtong I • rui!On\nCentr•l\nr .. Sqwr•\n'\"\"\nv;\nWolcott J70 , ,.\n~\nB•idWuuviiiR .Ool)'\nBndgcport\nConqu~st VJ!l lltiU!Jl Cl\nS.v•nrlolh w...J..pon\nSyracuse\nSulllvJn\n~\nOeW1 tt\nSenno.ll\nM;uu!lusFJ~\ntl\nMill'l'f'tu )....,.,....,.\nc .... ...,..\nor\nNile> Otisco\nF•)\"'tt.e Voile)' .,\nScott\nTrul<\\on I •\nAccident Location tlund Solo!\\\nClnciM<>rus\nPage 1 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix A - Maps\nCenter\n(370\n→ Community,\n31\nState Barge\nNew Yolk Baldwinsville\nCana\nSyracuse\nNorth\n•Conquest\nVan Buren,\nLiverpool\nMattyda\nClyde\nMemphis\nSavannah,\nSite Canal\n\"Peru\n690\nSolvay.\nEast Syra\nWeedsport\nFairmount\nPort Byron\nCamillus\nSyracuse\nNE W\nYORK\nElbridge\nMarcellus\nSennett\nFalls®\nONONDAGA\nCA YU\n•G A\nThroop\nOnondaga Castle,\nSkaneateles\nOnondaga\n414)\n20\n'I.R.\n• Cayuga\n\"Auburn\n10\nFalls\nSeneca\n\"Relius\nMelrose Park\nMarietta\n(96\nOwasco\nOtisco Lake\nLake\n: NIE CA\nLake\nFleming\n34)\nNiles\n• Valley\nOtisco\nFayette\nCayuga\nUnion\nSprings\nShinin\nSpafford\nLandina\n°т\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nCamllr Rd\nMills Rd\n139214 - Appendix A - Maps\n\\\nGriffin Rd\n....\n'%\n.,\n~\nf..\nt\n\\\n~\n.,.,..~\n\"\"' \\\n~ '5\ni?\n@ ;:--\n11\nC>\n\\ 1$>\n~ s\n1& ~\n~\n.Fosterville\n@\n\\\ns.\n<I>\n\"' 1&\n\\\nt\n~\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix A - Maps\nRO\nTurnpike Rd\ny 450 Feet\n320 Feet\npipe\nDamage Location\npipe 2\nImage @ 2001 New York CIS\n© 2011 Coogle\nGoogle earth\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix B - Photographs\nPhoto #1: Damage to the external surface of the pipe.\nPage 1 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix B - Photographs\nPhoto #2: Damage to the internal surface of the pipe (cut out).\nPage 2 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix B - Photographs\nPhoto #3: Temporary leak clamp being installed to facilitate evacuation of the line.\nPage 3 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix B - Photographs\nPhoto #4: Temporary repair made to the pipe to stop the leak.\nPage 4 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix B - Photographs\nPhoto #5: Pipeline with the damaged section cut out.\nPage 5 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix B - Photographs\nPhoto #6: Looking East from the damage location. Photo shows the marking flags.\nFlags\nmarking\ncenter line of\npipe\nPage 6 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix C - NRC Report 990200\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 990200\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 11:30 on 20-SEP-11\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: OPERATOR ERROR\nAffected Area:\nThe incident occurred on 20-SEP-11 at 10:30 local time.\nAffected Medium: SOIL\n____________________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization: BUCKEYE PIPELINE CO\nLINDEN, NJ 07036\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nTURNPIKE RD County: CAYUGA\nCity: AUBURN State: NY\n____________________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: GAS Official Material Name: GASOLINE: AUTOMOTIVE (UNLEADED)\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 34 BARREL(S)\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nCALLER REPORTED A THIRD PARTY HIT A LINE WHILE INSTALLING A DRAIN.\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: TRANSMISSION\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDAMAGES\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nLength of Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure\nAir: N\nRoad: Y TURNPIKE RD ALL Major\nArtery: N\nWaterway: N\nTrack: N\nPassengers Transferred: NO\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nPage 1 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material: 139214 - Appendix C - NRC Report 990200\n____________________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nCONTRACTOR HAS BEEN HIRED\nRelease Secured: YES\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: UNKNOWN, ºF\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: 911\nState/Local: NYDEC\nState/Local On Scene: NONE\nState Agency Number: 1107816\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nDHS PROTECTIVE SECURITY ADVISOR (PSA DESK)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nU.S. EPA II (MAIN OFFICE)\n20-SEP-11 12:00\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nNJ OFC HMLND SECURITY & PREPAREDNES (COMMAND CENTER)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nNJ STATE POLICE (MARINE SERVICES BUREAU)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nNOAA RPTS FOR NY (MAIN OFFICE)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nNTSB PIPELINE (MAIN OFFICE)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nBUREAU TOXIC SUBSTANCE (MAIN OFFICE)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nNY STATE DEC SPILL HOTLINE (MAIN OFFICE)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nUSCG DISTRICT 1 (COMMAND CENTER)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\nUSCG DISTRICT 9 (COMMAND CENTER)\n20-SEP-11 11:35\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nNONE\n___________________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 990200 ***\nThe National Response Center is strictly an initial report taking agency and\ndoes not participate in the investigation or incident response. The NRC\nreceives initial reporting information only and notifies Federal and State\nOn-Scene Coordinators for response. The NRC does not verify nor does it take\nfollow-on incident information. Verification of data and incident response\nis the sole responsibility of Federal/State On-Scene Coordinators. Data\ncontained within the FOIA Web Database is initial information only. All\nreports provided via this server are for informational purposes only. Data\nto be used in legal proceedings must be obtained via written correspondence\nfrom the NRC.\nPage 2 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 10/19/2011\nNo. U.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n20110391 - 16132\n-------------------------(DOT\nUse Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Yes\nSupplemental: Final:\nLast Revision Date:\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 1845\n2. Name of Operator BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address FIVE TEK PARK, 9999 HAMILTON BOULEVARD\n3b. City BREINIGSVILLE\n3c. State Pennsylvania\n3d. Zip Code 18031\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 09/20/2011 10:22\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 42.959503\nLongitude: -76.665351\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 990200\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 09/20/2011 11:35\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nRefined and/or Petroleum Product (non-HVL) which is a\nLiquid at Ambient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Gasoline (non-Ethanol)\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 595.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 271.00\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nPage 1 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? No\n- If No, Explain: The pipeline was already shut down.\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 60\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 09/20/2011 10:22\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 09/20/2011 10:35\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: New York\n3. Zip Code: 13021\n4. City Auburn\n5. County or Parish Cayuga\n6. Operator-designated location: Survey Station No.\nSpecify: 375+03\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Auburn to Waterloo\n8. Segment name/ID: AB803WL\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 30\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\n- If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body\nPage 2 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 10\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .279\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 46,000\n3d. Pipe specification: X-46\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Seamless\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Coal Tar\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1953\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Mechanical Puncture\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by 10.00\nin. (circumferential) 3.00\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: Yes\n4. Anticipated remediation: Yes\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water Yes\n- Groundwater Yes\n- Soil Yes\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: Yes\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface Yes\n- Groundwater Yes\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both) Yes\n- Private Well Yes\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 108.00\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: Unnamed\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nNo\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? Yes\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nPage 3 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\nNo\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n8. Estimated Property Damage:\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage $ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 0\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 82,070\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 497,010\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 812,640\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n8g. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $ 1,391,720\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 277.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 1,296.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nYes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Remotely Controlled\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nCheck Valve\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 109,942\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools? Yes\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\n- Low operating pressure(s)\nPage 4 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\nIf Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes 6a.\nWas it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nYes\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nYes\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nYes\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\nYes\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator?\nCPM leak detection system or SCADA-based information\n(such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume\ncalculations)\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nThe controllers' actions had no bearing on the release.\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\nPage 5 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G3 - Excavation Damage\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion:\nInternal Corrosion:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\nCorrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\nField examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\nLow point in pipe\n- Elbow\nPage 6 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\nMagnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes Most\nrecent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\nPage 7 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause: Excavation Damage by Third Party\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\nMagnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nPage 8 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\n139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity? Yes\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\nOne-Call System Yes\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGADIRT\n(www.cga-dirt.com)? Yes\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\nPublic\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private Yes\n- If \"Private\", Specify: Private Landowner\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator: Farmer\n10. Type of excavation equipment: Farm Equipment\n11. Type of work performed: Drainage\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified? Yes\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number: 7281146005\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified: Dig Safely New York\n13. Type of Locator: Utility Owner\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation? Yes\n15. Were facilities marked correctly? Yes\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause: Excavation","truncated":true,"body_characters":50734}