# Failure Report-Buckeye Partners 5/17/12 - **operation:** document - **citation:** PHMSA FIR, Buckeye Partners, LP, 2012-06-17 - **title:** Failure Report-Buckeye Partners 5/17/12 - **source type:** incident - **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration - **status:** historical - **official:** true - **published on:** 2016-03-29 - **effective on:** 2012-06-17 - **summary:** Buckeye Partners, LP; Hazardous Liquid; PA; failure 2012-06-17; apparent cause: Incorrect Operation. - **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-51712.json - **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-51712.md - **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-51712 - **source url:** https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-buckeye-partners-51712 **body:** <<>> DOT US Department of Transportation PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration OPS Office of Pipeline Safety Eastern Region Principal Investigator Senior Accident Investigator Region Director Date of Report Subject Brett Mahan – NYS DPS Michael Yazemboski – PHMSA ER Byron E. Coy 04/18/2012 Failure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners LP, Turnpike Road NY Line 803 Excavation Damage Operator, Location, & Consequences Date of Failure 09/20/2011 Commodity Released Gasoline City/County & State Aurelius / Cayuga, New York OpID & Operator Name 1845 Buckeye Partners L.P. Unit # & Unit Name 3201 Auburn Area - NY SMART Activity # 139214 Milepost / Location MP 7.2 Line 803, Latitude: 42.959503 ; Longitude: -76.665351 Type of Failure Leak caused by excavation damage (farmer using plow to install drain tile in field) Fatalities None Injuries None Description of area Rural, Farming impacted Total Costs $1,391,720 <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners LP, Turnpike Road NY-Line 803 Excavation Damage Failure Date 09/20/2011 Executive Summary On September 20, 2011, at approximately 10:20, a farmer installing drain tile struck and ruptured a 10- inch liquid petroleum line owned and operated by Buckeye Pipeline LP, causing the release of approximately 595 barrels of gasoline. The damage occurred on Buckeye’s Line 803 in Cayuga County, New York. The line runs approximately 95 miles from the Auburn Terminal to the Rochester Terminal. The pipeline was marked out properly under Dig Safely-NY. The farmer had been in contact with local Buckeye personnel during the installation of drain tile in his field adjacent to Buckeye’s pipeline (Line 803). The farmer was instructed by Buckeye not to dig in the pipeline right-of-way, which is approximately 25 feet from the centerline of the pipeline. On the day of the incident, the farmer was plowing the field approximately perpendicular to the pipeline, and failed to stop the tractor and raise the tile-plow out of the ground prior to proceeding over the pipeline. After hitting the line, the farmer called Buckeye to report that he had hit the line and that gasoline was escaping from the pipe. Buckeye personnel arrived at the site within 15 minutes to start the emergency response. There were no injuries or fatalities as a result of the accident. Approximately 70 homes within a 1.5 mile radius of the leak site were evacuated as a precaution until the line was secured and the area made safe. System Details Buckeye Line 803 is located in Cayuga County, New York and runs from the Auburn Terminal to the Rochester Terminal. 1. The line is 10-inch diameter, API5L grade X46 seamless pipe, with a wall thickness of 0.279 inches. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The Maximum Operating Pressure is 1296 psig. The elevation at failure site was 475 feet above sea level. The line was installed in 1953. The line had an external Coal Tar coating. Over pressure protection for Line 803 is provided by high pressure shut down switches on the discharge lines from the Auburn pump station located approximately 7.2 miles upstream of the Auburn Terminal in Auburn, NY. Events Leading up to the Failure Prior to the incident, the farmer had contacted local Buckeye personnel to notify them of the drainage tile installation that would be occurring near their Line 803. The farmer also contacted the One-Call System and the pipeline was properly marked out under Dig Safely-NY prior to the work commencing. On the day of the incident, Line 803 was not flowing product and was shut in due to an unrelated leak at the Auburn Tank Farm that was discovered earlier the same morning. Page 2 of 4 <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners LP, Turnpike Road NY-Line 803 Excavation Damage Failure Date 09/20/2011 Emergency Response All of the events below occurred on September 20, 2011. Buckeye successfully implemented their Emergency and OPA Contingency Plans to address the safety and environmental issues resulting from the leak. Time Event 10:20 Buckeye’s Line 803 from Auburn to Waterloo was struck by a farmer installing drainage tile in his field using a plow. The farmer immediately called a Buckeye employee to report the damage. The Buckeye employee contacted Buckeye’s local Control Center to inform them of the line hit and instructed the farmer to call 911. 10:25 The upstream valve at the Auburn Terminal was closed. 10:35 Buckeye personnel arrived onsite to assess the situation. 11:08 The downstream valve at Route 89 was closed. 11:25 The downstream valve at Route 90 was closed. This allowed for the downstream pump station to recover a portion of the gasoline remaining in the line before the line was completely isolated. 11:30 The incident was reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report #990200) by Buckeye. 15:00 An inspector with the New York State Department of Public Service (NYS DPS) arrived on site to begin their investigation. Summary of Return-to-Service On September 20, 2011, at approximately 23:00, a temporary sleeve was installed over the damaged area of pipe (Appendix B – Photo #3). A permanent repair was made on September 22, 2011. The repairs consisted of welding in a new section of pipe (Appendix B – Photo #5). All welds were x-rayed and found to meet code requirements. Line 803 was returned to service on September 23, 2011. Investigation Details The pressure at the Auburn Terminal, upstream of the failure location, at time of failure was approximately 300 psig. The elevation at the failure site was 475 feet above sea level. The pressure at the time and location of the line hit was approximately 277 psig, below the MOP of 1296 psig. A visual inspection of the damaged section of pipe was performed by NYS DPS. The inspection indicated that the coal tar coating was in excellent condition with no signs of disbondment. There was no external corrosion present on the section of pipe exposed. Cathodic Protection was installed on line 803 and readings taken the day of the incident showed an acceptable level of -1.435V taken at the leak site. The leak location consisted of a hole approximately 10 inches in length by approximately 3 inches wide, originating at the 9 o’clock position facing downstream. The hole was caused by the tile plow hitting the pipeline (Appendix B – Photo #4). The pipeline was marked out under Dig Safely-NY. When NYS DPS arrived onsite to begin their investigation, they verified that the line was accurately marked (Appendix B – Photo #6). The depth of cover was measured to be approximately 30 inches at the leak location. Pretested pipe was used to make permanent repair. The NYS DPS inspector reviewed welding procedures and pressure test records for the new piping and no issues were identified. The pretested pipe test record is number 2151. Page 3 of 4 <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners LP, Turnpike Road NY-Line 803 Excavation Damage Failure Date 09/20/2011 Findings and Contributing Factors The failure was due to excavation damage during the installation of drainage tile in a rural farm field. The failure consisted of a hole in the pipe that measured approximately 10 inches by 3 inches (Appendix B – Photo #1). Approximately 595 Barrels of Gasoline was spilled. As of 10/19/2011, 271 Barrels had been recovered. The pipeline was properly marked per Dig Safely-NY regulations (Ticket Number 07281- 146-004-00). Appendices Appendix Description A 139214 - Appendix A - Maps B 139214 - Appendix B - Photographs C 139214 - Appendix C - NRC Report 990200 D 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 Page 4 of 4 <<>> 139214 - Appendix A - Maps Ottawa .. Montreal london Accident Location • Hamilton Columbus Philadelphia Hamhn P•r!N Cenuo1 ~ lrondcquo•t 10• >Oft ~ (HI _Rochester ~ Cl Brighton ,._ Rt!l' no Avon flJ Conesus Wo$1 Sparta C!!..' f •s.J D.lnsville Wllliamron Wolworth G ~ ~r"~' Golhaln South Bristol Pouor fw ) Penn Van l ~<~ l y H ill Protuburg AIOton Laf\(lf Mexico H.l.tll>9' Camck Swtong I • rui!On Centr•l r .. Sqwr• '"" v; Wolcott J70 , ,. ~ B•idWuuviiiR .Ool)' Bndgcport Conqu~st VJ!l lltiU!Jl Cl S.v•nrlolh w...J..pon Syracuse SulllvJn ~ OeW1 tt Senno.ll M;uu!lusFJ~ tl Mill'l'f'tu )....,.,....,. c .... ...,.. or Nile> Otisco F•)"'tt.e Voile)' ., Scott Trul<\on I • Accident Location tlund Solo!\ ClnciM<>rus Page 1 of 4 <<>> 139214 - Appendix A - Maps Center (370 → Community, 31 State Barge New Yolk Baldwinsville Cana Syracuse North •Conquest Van Buren, Liverpool Mattyda Clyde Memphis Savannah, Site Canal "Peru 690 Solvay. East Syra Weedsport Fairmount Port Byron Camillus Syracuse NE W YORK Elbridge Marcellus Sennett Falls® ONONDAGA CA YU •G A Throop Onondaga Castle, Skaneateles Onondaga 414) 20 'I.R. • Cayuga "Auburn 10 Falls Seneca "Relius Melrose Park Marietta (96 Owasco Otisco Lake Lake : NIE CA Lake Fleming 34) Niles • Valley Otisco Fayette Cayuga Union Springs Shinin Spafford Landina °т Page 2 of 4 <<>> Camllr Rd Mills Rd 139214 - Appendix A - Maps \ Griffin Rd .... '% ., ~ f.. t \ ~ .,.,..~ ""' \ ~ '5 i? @ ;:-- 11 C> \ 1$> ~ s 1& ~ ~ .Fosterville @ \ s. "' 1& \ t ~ Page 3 of 4 <<>> 139214 - Appendix A - Maps RO Turnpike Rd y 450 Feet 320 Feet pipe Damage Location pipe 2 Image @ 2001 New York CIS © 2011 Coogle Google earth Page 4 of 4 <<>> 139214 - Appendix B - Photographs Photo #1: Damage to the external surface of the pipe. Page 1 of 6 <<>> 139214 - Appendix B - Photographs Photo #2: Damage to the internal surface of the pipe (cut out). Page 2 of 6 <<>> 139214 - Appendix B - Photographs Photo #3: Temporary leak clamp being installed to facilitate evacuation of the line. Page 3 of 6 <<>> 139214 - Appendix B - Photographs Photo #4: Temporary repair made to the pipe to stop the leak. Page 4 of 6 <<>> 139214 - Appendix B - Photographs Photo #5: Pipeline with the damaged section cut out. Page 5 of 6 <<>> 139214 - Appendix B - Photographs Photo #6: Looking East from the damage location. Photo shows the marking flags. Flags marking center line of pipe Page 6 of 6 <<>> 139214 - Appendix C - NRC Report 990200 NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802 *** For Public Use *** Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws Incident Report # 990200 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION *Report taken at 11:30 on 20-SEP-11 Incident Type: PIPELINE Incident Cause: OPERATOR ERROR Affected Area: The incident occurred on 20-SEP-11 at 10:30 local time. Affected Medium: SOIL ____________________________________________________________________________ SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY Organization: BUCKEYE PIPELINE CO LINDEN, NJ 07036 Type of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE ____________________________________________________________________________ INCIDENT LOCATION TURNPIKE RD County: CAYUGA City: AUBURN State: NY ____________________________________________________________________________ RELEASED MATERIAL(S) CHRIS Code: GAS Official Material Name: GASOLINE: AUTOMOTIVE (UNLEADED) Also Known As: Qty Released: 34 BARREL(S) ____________________________________________________________________________ DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT CALLER REPORTED A THIRD PARTY HIT A LINE WHILE INSTALLING A DRAIN. ____________________________________________________________________________ INCIDENT DETAILS Pipeline Type: TRANSMISSION DOT Regulated: YES Pipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW Exposed or Under Water: NO Pipeline Covered: UNKNOWN ____________________________________________________________________________ DAMAGES Fire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN INJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger: FATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant: EVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area: Damages: NO Length of Direction of Closure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure Air: N Road: Y TURNPIKE RD ALL Major Artery: N Waterway: N Track: N Passengers Transferred: NO Environmental Impact: UNKNOWN Page 1 of 2 <<>> Media Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material: 139214 - Appendix C - NRC Report 990200 ____________________________________________________________________________ REMEDIAL ACTIONS CONTRACTOR HAS BEEN HIRED Release Secured: YES Release Rate: Estimated Release Duration: ____________________________________________________________________________ WEATHER Weather: UNKNOWN, ºF ____________________________________________________________________________ ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED Federal: 911 State/Local: NYDEC State/Local On Scene: NONE State Agency Number: 1107816 ____________________________________________________________________________ NOTIFICATIONS BY NRC ATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE) 20-SEP-11 11:35 USCG ICC (ICC ONI) 20-SEP-11 11:35 DHS PROTECTIVE SECURITY ADVISOR (PSA DESK) 20-SEP-11 11:35 DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE) 20-SEP-11 11:35 U.S. EPA II (MAIN OFFICE) 20-SEP-11 12:00 NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE) 20-SEP-11 11:35 NJ OFC HMLND SECURITY & PREPAREDNES (COMMAND CENTER) 20-SEP-11 11:35 NJ STATE POLICE (MARINE SERVICES BUREAU) 20-SEP-11 11:35 NOAA RPTS FOR NY (MAIN OFFICE) 20-SEP-11 11:35 NTSB PIPELINE (MAIN OFFICE) 20-SEP-11 11:35 BUREAU TOXIC SUBSTANCE (MAIN OFFICE) 20-SEP-11 11:35 NY STATE DEC SPILL HOTLINE (MAIN OFFICE) 20-SEP-11 11:35 PIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO)) 20-SEP-11 11:35 USCG DISTRICT 1 (COMMAND CENTER) 20-SEP-11 11:35 USCG DISTRICT 9 (COMMAND CENTER) 20-SEP-11 11:35 ____________________________________________________________________________ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NONE ___________________________________________________________________________ *** END INCIDENT REPORT # 990200 *** The National Response Center is strictly an initial report taking agency and does not participate in the investigation or incident response. The NRC receives initial reporting information only and notifies Federal and State On-Scene Coordinators for response. The NRC does not verify nor does it take follow-on incident information. Verification of data and incident response is the sole responsibility of Federal/State On-Scene Coordinators. Data contained within the FOIA Web Database is initial information only. All reports provided via this server are for informational purposes only. Data to be used in legal proceedings must be obtained via written correspondence from the NRC. Page 2 of 2 <<>> 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122. OMB NO: 2137-0047 EXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013 Report Date: 10/19/2011 No. U.S Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 20110391 - 16132 -------------------------(DOT Use Only) ACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE SYSTEMS A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590. INSTRUCTIONS Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline. PART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION Report Type: (select all that apply) Original: Yes Supplemental: Final: Last Revision Date: 1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 1845 2. Name of Operator BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP 3. Address of Operator: 3a. Street Address FIVE TEK PARK, 9999 HAMILTON BOULEVARD 3b. City BREINIGSVILLE 3c. State Pennsylvania 3d. Zip Code 18031 4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 09/20/2011 10:22 5. Location of Accident: Latitude: 42.959503 Longitude: -76.665351 6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 990200 7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the National Response Center (if applicable): 09/20/2011 11:35 8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant volume released) Refined and/or Petroleum Product (non-HVL) which is a Liquid at Ambient Conditions - Specify Commodity Subtype: Gasoline (non-Ethanol) - If "Other" Subtype, Describe: - If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Ethanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend: %: - If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Biodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100): B 9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 595.00 10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown (Barrels): 11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 271.00 12. Were there fatalities? No - If Yes, specify the number in each category: 12a. Operator employees 12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator 12c. Non-Operator emergency responders 12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator 12e. General public 12f. Total fatalities (sum of above) 13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No - If Yes, specify the number in each category: 13a. Operator employees 13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator 13c. Non-Operator emergency responders 13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT Page 1 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 associated with this Operator 13e. General public 13f. Total injuries (sum of above) 14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? No - If No, Explain: The pipeline was already shut down. - If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock) 14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: - Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) 15. Did the commodity ignite? No 16. Did the commodity explode? No 17. Number of general public evacuated: 60 18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock): 18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 09/20/2011 10:22 18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 09/20/2011 10:35 PART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION 1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes If Yes, Complete Questions (2-12) If No, Complete Questions (13-15) - If Onshore: 2. State: New York 3. Zip Code: 13021 4. City Auburn 5. County or Parish Cayuga 6. Operator-designated location: Survey Station No. Specify: 375+03 7. Pipeline/Facility name: Auburn to Waterloo 8. Segment name/ID: AB803WL 9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)? No 10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way 11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground Specify: Under soil - If Other, Describe: Depth-of-Cover (in): 30 12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No - If Yes, specify below: - If Bridge crossing – Cased/ Uncased: - If Railroad crossing – Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled - If Road crossing – Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled - If Water crossing – Cased/ Uncased - Name of body of water, if commonly known: - Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: - Select: - If Offshore: 13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: 14. Origin of Accident: - In State waters - Specify: - State: - Area: - Block/Tract #: - Nearest County/Parish: - On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify: - Area: - Block #: 15. Area of Accident: PART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION 1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate 2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites - If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached Appurtenances, specify: 3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe - If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body Page 2 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 10 3b. Wall thickness (in): .279 3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 46,000 3d. Pipe specification: X-46 3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Seamless - If Other, Describe: 3f. Pipe manufacturer: 3g. Year of manufacture: 3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Coal Tar - If Other, Describe: - If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Valve, specify: - If Mainline, specify: - If Other, Describe: 3i. Manufactured by: 3j. Year of manufacture: - If Tank/Vessel, specify: - If Other - Describe: - If Other, describe: 4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1953 5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel - If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify: 6. Type of Accident Involved: Mechanical Puncture - If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size: in. (axial) by 10.00 in. (circumferential) 3.00 - If Leak - Select Type: - If Other, Describe: - If Rupture - Select Orientation: - If Other, Describe: Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: No 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: Yes 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: Yes 4. Anticipated remediation: Yes 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water Yes - Groundwater Yes - Soil Yes - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: Yes 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface Yes - Groundwater Yes - Drinking water: (Select one or both) Yes - Private Well Yes - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 108.00 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: Unnamed 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility been identified as one that "could affect" a High Consequence Area (HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? No 7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High Consequence Area (HCA)? Yes 7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply) - Commercially Navigable Waterway: Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Page 3 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 Integrity Management Program? - High Population Area: Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? - Other Populated Area Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? - Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water Yes Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? No - Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? 8. Estimated Property Damage: 8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property damage $ 0 8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 0 8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 82,070 8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 497,010 8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 812,640 8f. Estimated other costs $ 0 Describe: 8g. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $ 1,391,720 PART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION 1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 277.00 2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 1,296.00 3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the Accident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP 4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations (such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility relating to the Accident operating under an established pressure restriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the MOP? No - If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below: 4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure restriction? 4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the State? 5. Was "Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites" OR "Offshore Pipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend" selected in PART C, Question 2? Yes - If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below) 5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source: Remotely Controlled 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: Check Valve 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 109,942 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? Yes - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply) - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - - If Other, Describe: 5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which significantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool run? No - If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply) - Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup - Low operating pressure(s) Page 4 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 - Low flow or absence of flow - Incompatible commodity - Other - If Other, Describe: 5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes If Yes 6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes 6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes 6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? Yes 6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? Yes 7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes - If Yes: 7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes 7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes 7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? Yes 7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? Yes 8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? CPM leak detection system or SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) - If Other, Specify: 8a. If "Controller", "Local Operating Personnel", including contractors", "Air Patrol", or "Guard Patrol by Operator or its contractor" is selected in Question 8, specify the following: 9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or control room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the Accident? No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not investigate) - If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) The controllers' actions had no bearing on the release. - If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) - Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue - Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue Provide an explanation for why not: - Investigation identified no control room issues - Investigation identified no controller issues - Investigation identified incorrect controller action or controller error - Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the controller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s) response - Investigation identified incorrect procedures - Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response - Investigation identified areas other than those above: Describe: PART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION 1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations? No - If Yes: 1a. Specify how many were tested: Page 5 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 1b. Specify how many failed: 2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations? No - If Yes: 2a. Specify how many were tested: 2b. Specify how many failed: PART G – APPARENT CAUSE Select only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer the questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H). Apparent Cause: G3 - Excavation Damage G1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column External Corrosion: Internal Corrosion: - If External Corrosion: 1. Results of visual examination: - If Other, Describe: 2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply) - Galvanic - Atmospheric - Stray Current - Microbiological - Selective Seam - Other: - If Other, Describe: 3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply) - Field examination - Determined by metallurgical analysis - Other: - If Other, Describe: 4. Was the failed item buried under the ground? - If Yes : 4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at the time of the Accident? If Yes - Year protection started: 4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the point of the Accident? 4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted at the point of the Accident? If "Yes, CP Annual Survey" – Most recent year conducted: If "Yes, Close Interval Survey" – Most recent year conducted: If "Yes, Other CP Survey" – Most recent year conducted: - If No: 4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted? 5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of the corrosion? - If Internal Corrosion: 6. Results of visual examination: - Other: 7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): - Corrosive Commodity - Water drop-out/Acid - Microbiological - Erosion - Other: - If Other, Describe: 8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): - Field examination - Determined by metallurgical analysis - Other: - If Other, Describe: 9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): - Low point in pipe - Elbow Page 6 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 - Other: - If Other, Describe: 10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? 11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? 12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely utilized? 13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Tank/Vessel. 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection - No In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper Most recent year: - Crack Most recent year: - Hard Spot Most recent year: - Combination Tool Most recent year: - Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year: - Other Most recent year: Describe: 16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? If Yes Most recent year tested: Test pressure: 17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment? - If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:: Most recent year conducted: - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site: Most recent year conducted: 18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? 18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most recent year the examination was conducted: - Radiography Most recent year conducted: - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Most recent year conducted: - Wet Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: - Dry Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: - Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: G2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column Natural Force Damage – Sub-Cause: - If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods: Page 7 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 1. Specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Heavy Rains/Floods: 2. Specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Lightning: 3. Specify: - If Temperature: 4. Specify: - If Other, Describe: - If High Winds: - If Other Natural Force Damage: 5. Describe: Complete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected. 6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in conjunction with an extreme weather event? 6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply) - Hurricane - Tropical Storm - Tornado - Other - If Other, Describe: G3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column Excavation Damage – Sub-Cause: Excavation Damage by Third Party - If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party): - If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party): - If Excavation Damage by Third Party: - If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - Magnetic Flux Leakage Most recent year conducted: - Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Geometry Most recent year conducted: - Caliper Most recent year conducted: - Crack Most recent year conducted: - Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: - Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: - Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: - Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: 2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was completed BEFORE the damage was sustained? 3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? - If Yes: Most recent year tested: Test pressure (psig): 4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline segment? - If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident: Most recent year conducted: - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site: Page 8 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 139214 - Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Report 20110391-16132 Most recent year conducted: 5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? 5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most recent year the examination was conducted: - Radiography Most recent year conducted: - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Most recent year conducted: - Wet Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: - Dry Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: - Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: Complete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause. 6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity? Yes 6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) - One-Call System Yes - Excavator - Contractor - Landowner Complete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected. 7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGADIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)? Yes 8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) - Public - If "Public", Specify: - Private Yes - If "Private", Specify: Private Landowner - Pipeline Property/Easement - Power/Transmission Line - Railroad - Dedicated Public Utility Easement - Federal Land - Data not collected - Unknown/Other 9. Type of excavator: Farmer 10. Type of excavation equipment: Farm Equipment 11. Type of work performed: Drainage 12. Was the One-Call Center notified? Yes 12a. If Yes, specify ticket number: 7281146005 12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center exists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified: Dig Safely New York 13. Type of Locator: Utility Owner 14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation? Yes 15. Were facilities marked correctly? Yes 16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service? 16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours) 17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where available as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well): Root Cause: Excavation - **truncated:** true - **body characters:** 50734