{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Buckeye Partners, LP, 2012-07-13","title":"Failure Report-Buckeye Partners 7/13/12","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-11-23","effective_on":"2012-07-13","summary":"Buckeye Partners, LP; Hazardous Liquid; PA; failure 2012-07-13; apparent cause: Corrosion Failure.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-71312.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-71312.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-71312","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-buckeye-partners-71312","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator Alex Dankanich\nSenior Accident Investigator Mike Yazemboski\nRegion Director Byron Coy\nDate of Report 7/17/2013\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Buckeye Macungie Tank 230 bottom\nweld failure\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 07/13/2012\nCommodity Released Hazardous Liquid (Gasoline)\nCity/County & State Emmaus, Lehigh County, PA\nOpID & Operator Name 1845 - Buckeye Partners, LP\nUnit # & Unit Name 321 - Macungie - PA\nSMART Activity # 140298\nMilepost / Location Macungie Station, 5131 Buckeye Road, Emmaus, PA 18049\nLatitude 40.513554, Longitude -75.53238\nType of Failure Leak from crack in weld between tank bottom and wall\nFatalities No\nInjuries No\nDescription of area impacted Leak was contained to the tank dike area. Facility is located a High\nConsequence Area (HCA).\nTotal Costs $380,538\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Tank 230 Leak\n[Failure Date 7/13/2012]\nExecutive Summary\nAt 11:30 am on July 13, 2012, gasoline was discovered in the dike area of Tank 230 in the Buckeye\nMacungie Station located in Emmaus, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania. Tank 230 is designated as a break-\nout tank and is thus regulated under 49 CFR, Part 195. The leak was caused by a low cycle fatigue weld\nfailure due to the filling and draining of the tank. Corrosion contributed to the weld failure.\nApproximately 9 barrels of gasoline leaked into tank dike area. The gasoline was totally contained on\nOperator-controlled property. Tank 230 is located in a designated high consequence area (HCA). There\nwere no injuries or fatalities, evacuations, or supply disruptions as a result of the incident.\nAn inspector from PHMSA Eastern Region was dispatched to the location on August 16, 2012 to conduct\nan investigation into the cause of the release.\nSystem Details\nBuckeye Partners, LP owns and operates a break out tank farm in Macungie, PA (Appendix A). Refined\nproducts are regularly delivered to the tank farm, temporarily stored, and shipped out by pipeline and\nby truck to fill requests for product. A Buckeye owned system of pipelines enters and exits the tank\nfarm.\nTank 230 is an atmospheric storage tank that was built in 1974. It is 110 foot diameter by 48 feet high\nand has an internal floating roof and a steel cone roof. It was last internally inspected on 4/2/1997 by\nDJA Inspection Services, Inc (Appendix B / Appendix C). At that time it had a magnetic flux leakage scan\nover 100% of the floor, and ultrasonic thickness readings taken on the bottom. Repairs were made on\nall pits as needed to achieve a calculated floor life of about 24 years. A 2008 external inspection\n(Appendix D) included ultrasonic thickness readings of the shell, nozzles and roof.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nPrior to the leak that was discovered on July 13, 2012, Tank 230 was in normal service (Appendix E).\nThere were no leaks or operational issues reported since the tank bottom was repaired following the\n1997 out-of-service inspection.\nEmergency Response\nAt 11:30 am on July 13, 2012, while performing a monthly tank inspection on Tank 230 at Buckeye's\nMacungie Station (Appendix F), a Buckeye operations employee noticed stained soil next to the tank.\nEmergency response procedures were initiated and all appropriate notifications were made. The tank\nwas isolated and emptied. Three monitoring wells were excavated in the area of the stained soil.\nGasoline odor was detected in the well closest to the tank, but no free product was observed. The\nmonitoring wells were checked during the tank emptying process and no additional product was\ndiscovered. The tank was emptied and cleaned.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nThe tank bottom was inspected and repaired. Below is a list of the repairs completed. The tank was\nhydrostatically tested and returned to service in January of 2013.\n1. New 30 inch wide annular ring installed\na. Vacuum box tested lap weld to existing tank bottom\nb. Vacuum box and mag particle tested annular ring butt welds\nc. Oil penetrant tested shell/annular ring corner weld\nd. Helium tested entire tank bottom\n140298 Buckeye 1845 Failure Investigation Report [Final for Sharepoint] Page 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Tank 230 Leak\n[Failure Date 7/13/2012]\n2. Repaired 4 soilside pits\n3. Installed new epoxy floor coating\n4. Removed leak detection tubes\n5. Installed new man-way and door sheet\n6. Painted tank exterior shell course 1 (up to first horizontal weld – 8’)\nInvestigation Details\nPHMSA Eastern Region received an NRC report 1017664 on 7-14-2012 regarding a possible tank leak\nafter a routine plant patrol found gasoline at the chime area of Tank 230 at the Buckeye Macungie PA\ntank farm. The gasoline appeared to be coming from under the tank bottom. The gasoline was\ntransferred to another tank, and the tank was cleaned and taken out of service for inspection. An\ninternal inspection and investigation revealed a crack in the fillet weld at the base of the tank wall and\nbottom plate.\nA metallurgical analysis (Appendix G) was performed on the failed weld. A summary of the metallurgical\nanalysis is below. Tank 230 was repaired and returned to service.\nA soil boring investigation was conducted and soil samples were sent for laboratory analysis. Soil results\nindicated that concentrations of target constituents of concern are below PADEP approved risk-based\nsite specific standards for the Macungie Station; therefore, no additional environmental Investigation or\nremediation was conducted.\nMetallurgical Analysis Summary:\nThe analysis states: “We believe the crack that ultimately formed the leak had initiated and propagated\nunder cyclic fatigue loading. Specifically, the failure mechanism was low-cycle fatigue (LCF). LCF occurs\nunder high-amplitude low-frequency loading. In this instance cyclic loading was a function of the\napplied pressure variations directly related to changing gasoline levels in the tank. While LCF can also\nbe associated with thermal stress, this is not likely in this instance as such thermal stress changes are a\nfunction of temperature change. Since the tank only saw ambient temperatures, changes in thermal\nstresses would have been negligible. This initiated the crack from the inside of the tank that propagated\nthrough-wall, causing the leak. As previously noted, we were unable to identify features associated\nwith fatigue from fracture surface evaluation. However, the presence of multiple cracks adjacent to the\nleak was an indicator of LCF. Multiple parallel cracks are common under LCF as the high strain\namplitude can initiate several cracks. Only one preferential crack will continue to propagate while the\nothers stop. The presence of these multiple transgranular cracks is a good indicator of an LCF\nmechanism. We are of the opinion that the root cause of cracking really resulted directly from the loss\nof wall associated with external pitting corrosion. The degree of external pitting observed would have\nincreased the stress from applied service loads, in some cases more than doubling local stress. We\nbelieve the increase in stress caused by wall loss was sufficient to initiate and propagate an LCF crack\nadjacent to the weld toe in the floor plate”\n.\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nThe source of the release was determined to be a small crack in the floor plate near the tank shell.\nLaboratory analysis revealed that corrosion contributed to the weld failure. Weld failure was due to\nLow Cycle Fatigue from the filling and draining of the tank.\nThere were leak detection tubes near the failure location which had been placed there after the tank\nwas built. The tubes were no longer being used, however, Buckeye believes that the placement of these\n140298 Buckeye 1845 Failure Investigation Report [Final for Sharepoint] Page 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Tank 230 Leak\n[Failure Date 7/13/2012]\ntubes displaced the firm soil foundation in the area where the leak occurred. This may have contributed\nto the cycling effect of the floor plate during filling and draining of the tank.\nAppendices\nAppendix Description\nA 140298 Appendix A Maps\nB 140298 Appendix B Bottom Inspection Report - 1997\nC 140298 Appendix C Tank 230_mrt_calc 1997\nD 140298 Appendix D API-653 In-Service Inspection - 2008\nE 140298 Appendix E NRC Report 1017664\nF 140298 Appendix F Buckeye O&M Inspection procedures\nG 140298 Appendix G Metallurgical Test Report\nH 140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\n140298 Buckeye 1845 Failure Investigation Report [Final for Sharepoint] Page 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nAppendices A-D\nRemoved\nFiles available at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nPage 1 of 2\n140298 Appendix E NRC Report 1017664\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 1017664\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 14:41 on 13-JUL-12\nIncident Type: STORAGE TANK\nIncident Cause: EQUIPMENT FAILURE\nAffected Area:\nThe incident was discovered on 13-JUL-12 at 13:00 local time.\nAffected Medium: OTHER DIKED AREA\n____________________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization: BUCKEYE PARTNERS\nEMMAUS, PA 18049\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\n5131 BUCKEYE RD County: LEHIGH\nCity: EMMAUS State: PA Zip: 18049\n____________________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: GAS Official Material Name: GASOLINE: AUTOMOTIVE (UNLEADED)\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 25 BARREL(S)\n________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nTHE CALLER REPORTED THAT WHILE DOING A TANK INSPECTION, PRODUCT STAINING WAS\nDISCOVERED ON THE DIKE FLOOR. THERE WAS A DEVIATION IN THE PRODUCT LEVELS LAST\nNIGHT WHICH WOULD INDICATE 25 BBLS OF GASOLINE HAD DISCHARGED.\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nDescription of Tank: GASOLINE\nTank Above/Below Ground: ABOVE\nTransportable Container: NO\nTank Regulated: YES\nTank Regulated By: PHMSA\nTank ID: 23\nCapacity of Tank: 73600 BARREL(S)\nActual Amount: 60074 BARREL(S)\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDAMAGES\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nLength of Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure\nAir: N\nRoad: N Major\nArtery: N\nWaterway: N\nTrack: N\nPage 1 of 2\nhttp://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard\nweb+inc\n_\n_\nseq=1017664\n7/13/2013\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nPage 2 of 2\n140298 Appendix E NRC Report 1017664\nPassengers Transferred: NO\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nTANK WILL BE EMPTIED/ INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY\nRelease Secured: YES\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: CLEAR, ºF\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal:\nState/Local: DEP/ FD\nState/Local On Scene:\nState Agency Number:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-JUL-12 14:49\nDHS PROTECTIVE SECURITY ADVISOR (PSA DESK)\n13-JUL-12 14:49\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-JUL-12 14:49\nU.S. EPA III (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-JUL-12 14:50\nFLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PHILADELPHIA (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-JUL-12 14:49\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-JUL-12 14:49\nNJ STATE POLICE (MARINE SERVICES BUREAU)\n13-JUL-12 14:49\nNOAA RPTS FOR PA (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-JUL-12 14:49\nPA STATE POLICE (BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION)\n13-JUL-12 14:49\nPA EMERG MGMT AGCY (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-JUL-12 14:49\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\n___________________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 1017664 ***\nPage 2 of 2\nhttp://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard\nweb+inc\n_\n_\nseq=1017664\n7/13/2013\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nAppendix F\nO&M Inspection Procedures\nRemoved\nFiles available at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix G\nMetallurgical Test Report\nRemoved\nFiles available at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2014\nOriginal Report\nDate: 08/10/2012\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20120232 - 17205\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes Yes\nLast Revision Date: 02/04/2013\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 1845\n2. Name of Operator BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address FIVE TEK PARK\n3b. City BREINIGSVILLE\n3c. State Pennsylvania\n3d. Zip Code 18031\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 07/13/2012 11:30\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 40.513554\nLongitude: -75.53238\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1017664\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 07/13/2012 14:40\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nRefined and/or Petroleum Product (non-HVL) which is a\nLiquid at Ambient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Gasoline (non-Ethanol)\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 8.70\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): .02\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 1 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? No\n- If No, Explain: THE TANK WAS ISOLATED AND EMPTIED\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 07/13/2012 11:30\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 07/13/2012 11:30\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Pennsylvania\n3. Zip Code: 18049\n4. City EMMAUS\n5. County or Parish LEHIGH\n6. Operator-designated location:\nSpecify:\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: MACUNGIE STATION\n8. Segment name/ID: ZG\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Totally contained on Operator-controlled property\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Tank, including attached appurtenances\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in):\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, including\nAttached Appurtenances\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify: Atmospheric or Low Pressure\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 2 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\n3. Item involved in Accident: Tank/Vessel\n- If Pipe, specify:\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n3d. Pipe specification:\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify: Single Bottom System\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1974\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Leak\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type: Crack\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned:\n4. Anticipated remediation:\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nYes\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? Yes\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 3 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area: Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\nYes\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\nYes\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n8. Estimated Property Damage:\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage $ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 0\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 370,115\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 10,423\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 0\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n8g. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $ 380,538\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): .00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): .00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5e. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools?\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 4 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system:\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nNo\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nNo\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operating Personnel, including contractors\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\nOperator employee\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\nTHE RELEASE VOLUME WAS TOO SMALL TO BE\nDETECTED BY THE CONTROLLER\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 5 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G1 - Corrosion Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion: Yes\nInternal Corrosion:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination: Localized Pitting\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic Yes\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis Yes\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground? No\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted? No\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion? No\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 6 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection Yes\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 1997\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection Yes\n- No In-Service Inspection completed 2008\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 7 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 8 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 9 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n140298 Appendix H Accident Report 20120232 - 17205\nTheir Mooring:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n- If Electrical Arcing from Other Equipment or Facility:\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the ","truncated":true,"body_characters":49814}