{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Buckeye Partners, LP, 2013-08-13","title":"Failure Report-Buckeye Partners 8/13/13","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-10-08","effective_on":"2013-08-13","summary":"Buckeye Partners, LP; Hazardous Liquid; NJ; failure 2013-08-13; apparent cause: Incorrect Operation.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-81313.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-81313.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-81313","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-buckeye-partners-81313","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator Robert Burrough\nSenior Accident Investigator Michael Yazemboski\nRegion Director Byron Coy\nDate of Report 07/25/2013\nSubject Failure Investigation Report\nBuckeye Partners Pipeline Gasoline Leak\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 12/10/2012\nCommodity Released Hazardous Liquid (Gasoline)\nCity/County & State Hillsborough, Somerset County, New Jersey\nOpID & Operator Name 1845 Buckeye Partners, LP\nUnit # & Unit Name 3191 Linden Area - NJ\nSMART Activity # 141992\nMilepost / Location MP 26, Route 206 and New Amwell Road\nLatitude 40.505602, Longitude -74.642893\nType of Failure Pinhole Leak / Other Outside Force Damage; Electrical Arcing from\nOther Equipment or Facility\nFatalities None\nInjuries None\nDescription of area impacted Local sewer impacted by gasoline. Soil remediation required up to\n200 feet north of leak site. Leak location is within a High\nConsequence Area.\nTotal Costs $113,318\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners Hillsborough, NJ [Pipeline Gasoline Leak]\n[Failure Date 12/10/2012]\nExecutive Summary\nOn December 10, 2012, at 11:00 p.m., Buckeye Partners, LP (Buckeye) was notified by the Hillsborough\nFire Department that gasoline was found in a local sewer that runs perpendicular to Lines 603 and 620 in\nHillsborough, NJ. Lines 603 and 620 are located in the same right‐of‐way. The two lines were shut\ndown, and Buckeye crew members and contractors were dispatched to locate the leak. Two pinhole\nleaks were discovered on the top of the pipe on Line 620 located near the casing vent at the Route 206\nCrossing near Hillsborough, NJ. The cause of the leak was due to a Public Service Electric and Gas\n(PSE&G) high-power overhead electrical wire striking the casing vent. The arcing caused two pinholes in\nthe pipeline and the release of approximately 48 barrels of gasoline. There were no evacuations and no\nreported injuries as a result of the incident. Two southbound lanes of Route 206 were closed from\nDecember 11, 2012, to December 14, 2012, while temporary pipe repairs were being made. On January\n10, 2013, a permanent repair consisting of the replacement of pipe at the Route 206 crossing was\ncompleted and the pipeline was returned to service.\nSystem Details\nUnit 3191 Linden Area – NJ consists of the following segments:\n1. 20-inch and 16-inch pipelines from Linden, NJ, to the Pennsylvania border (49.1 miles)\n2. A 12-inch pipeline from Sewaren, NJ, to Linden Station (5.2 miles)\n3. A 6-inch pipeline from Linden, NJ, (1 mile) that increases to an 8-inch pipeline to Newark Airport\n(6.1 miles), and two 12-inch pipelines from Linden, NJ, to Long Island, NY (2.8 miles).\nThe unit also includes 49 breakout tanks located at the Linden facility and 1 breakout tank located at\nNewark Airport. There is one pump station in the Linden facility.\nLine 620 was installed in 1974 as a 20-inch-diameter, 0.325-inch wall thickness, X52 carbon steel pipeline\nwith coal tar epoxy coating. Line 620 has a Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of 900 psig with a\nnormal operating pressure between 500 to 600 psig. Line 620 runs west from the Linden Station, located\nin Linden NJ, to the NJ/PA border and continues into Pennsylvania where it terminates at the Macungie\nTerminal inlet manifold in Macungie, PA (Appendix A, page 3).\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nOn December 8, 2012, prior to the incident, Line 620 was in normal operating mode with an estimated\npressure of 362 psig at the site and a pressure of 418 psig at the Linden Station. This pressure is well\nbelow the established MOP of 900 psig for this line. The pressure at the Hamilton Road Valve Station\n(located at MP 25.12 – approximately 1 mile from release site (at approximately the same elevation)) was\n362 psig.\nEmergency Response\nAt 2:33 p.m. on December 8, 2012, Linden Station was notified by the Hillsborough Police Department\nthat a PSE&G transformer malfunctioned, dropping the power lines onto a casing vent on Line 620 at the\nRoute 206 crossing (Appendix A). Buckeye responded and shut down lines 620 and 603 to test the\nintegrity of the lines (Appendix D). No leakage was identified, and the lines were cleared for restart at\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners Hillsborough, NJ [Pipeline Gasoline Leak]\n[Failure Date 12/10/2012]\n2:40 p.m. on December 8, 2012. On December 10, 2012, the New Jersey Department of Environmental\nProtection (NJDEP) was notified by the Hillsborough Municipal Authority (MUA) of the presence of\ngasoline in the sewer line. Buckeye responded to this notification and found high levels of Volatile\nOrganic Compounds (VOC) in the casing vent on Line 620. Buckeye activated their emergency response\nand established an Incident Command Center at a local hotel. Emergency response procedures were\nsuccessfully initiated and all proper notifications were made to the National Response Center (NRC)\n(Appendix B).\nA detailed summary of the emergency response activities and actions performed by Buckeye in response\nto this incident is outlined in Appendix D of this report.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nA full replacement of Line 620 at the Route 206 road crossing was completed by Buckeye on January 8,\n2013. Integrity testing was successfully completed on January 9, 2013, and the line was restarted at\n1:00 p.m. on January 10, 2013. The damaged pipe and casing were sent for metallurgical analysis to\nthe Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Materials and Corrosion Technology Center in Dublin, Ohio.\nInvestigation Details\nOn December 11, 2012, at 7:45 a.m., Buckeye discovered product in the casing vent on Line 620, and the\nleak was reported to the NRC. Buckeye performed a hold test on Line 603, adjacent to line 620, and\ndetermined that the pressure in Line 603 was stable, and the line was not involved in the release.\nOn December 13, 2012, PHMSA responded to the site to begin an investigation into the cause of the product\nrelease. Upon arrival at the accident site, the PHMSA inspector observed the excavation operations on\nthe west side of Route 206.\nOn December 15, 2012, using a remote camera, Buckeye discovered a pinhole leak on Line 620. The\npinhole leak was found on the east side of the Line 620 crossing at Route 206, approximately 6 feet from\nthe end of the casing, near the 12:00 position (top) of the pipeline.\nOn December 17, 2012, the PHMSA inspector observed the installation of a temporary PLIDCO‐style\nrepair sleeve on Line 620. Line 620 was restarted on December 18, 2012, and the excavation area was\nbackfilled.\nAdditional follow‐up meetings were held on December 18 and 20, 2012, by conference call and at Buckeye\nheadquarters, respectively, to review Buckeye’s response, procedures, and records and to follow‐up on\nthe proposed repair schedule.\nBuckeye estimated that 48 barrels of gasoline were released and 16 barrels were recovered.\nOn January 8, 2013, a permanent repair was made by replacing approximately 40 feet of pipe. The damaged\npipeline section, along with the section of casing pipe that was located at the leak site, was sent to DNV\nfor failure analysis. The pipeline was then restarted, and the excavation was backfilled.\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Buckeye Partners Hillsborough, NJ [Pipeline Gasoline Leak]\n[Failure Date 12/10/2012]\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nThe final metallurgical analysis from DNV, received on June 6, 2013, concluded that the cause of the\nrelease was due to a high current arc discharging energy from the pipe wall to the ground. The source\nof the arcing was from nearby power lines that fell and came into contact with the casing vent pipe on\nLine 620 (Appendix E-Lab Analysis). PHMSA’s accident investigation findings are consistent with this\nanalysis.\nAppendices\nA 141992-Appendix A - Maps and Photos\nB 141992-Appendix B - NRC Report 1032892\nC 141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\nD 141992-Appendix D - Operator Event Log\nE 141992-Appendix E - Lab Analysis Report\nF 141992-Appendix F - Operator Final Report\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\n141992-Appendix A - Maps and Photos\nBuckeye Pipeline Partners, L.P\nLine 620 Gasoline Leak\nHillsborough, NJ\nNew Amwell Road and Rt 206\nPage 1 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\n141992-Appendix A - Maps and Photos\nMap of Hillsborough, NJ Area and Buckeye Pipelines 603 and 620\nPage 2 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\n141992-Appendix A - Maps and Photos\nWest Side of Rt 206. Excavation of Line 620. PSE&G Nat Gas Distribution pipeline crosses above BPL’s line at an angle. Looking\nfrom west to east under Rt 206. 20” pipeline with 24” casing. Date 12/13/2012\nPage 3 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\n141992-Appendix A - Maps and Photos\nSame excavation, top of road view. Backhoe is on Rt 206. Date 12/13/2012\nSafety cones show approx location of east-side excavation\nPage 4 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\n141992-Appendix A - Maps and Photos\n20” Plidco-style clamp repair fitting (was installed on 12/17/2012). Picture taken 12/13/2012\nPage 5 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n141992-Appendix A - Maps and Photos\nExcavation on east side of Rt 206. Workers are facing east. Arrows on casing are pointing west, under Rt 206. Taken 12/17/2012.\nPrevious location of casing\nvent (was removed earlier)\nPage 6 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n141992-Appendix A - Maps and Photos\nClose-up of casing pipe and casing vent. Drip pan for collecting water, water/gasoline mixture shown under the pipeline. Vac\nTruck hose is present, but hard to see. Taken 12/17/2012.\nPage 7 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n141992-Appendix A - Maps and Photos\nPicture taken from north side of excavation. Picture shows cold cutting tool on casing. Blue pipe (under Line 620) is a sewer\npipeline that was believed to be abandoned, but was found to be active when it was hit. The blue pipe is the replacement section\nthat was installed early 12/17/2012. Taken 12/17/2012\nPage 8 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n141992-Appendix B - NRC Report 1032892\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 1032892\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 07:45 on 11-DEC-12\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: UNKNOWN\nAffected Area:\nThe incident was discovered on 10-DEC-12 at 11:00 local time.\nAffected Medium: LAND UNDERGROUND INTO THE GROUND\n____________________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization: BUCKEYE PIPELINE\nMACUNGIE, PA\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nCounty: SOMERSET\nCity: HILLSBOROUGH State: NJ\nINTERSECTION OF ROUTE 206 AND NEW AMNELL ROAD\n____________________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: GAS Official Material Name: GASOLINE: AUTOMOTIVE (UNLEADED)\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 25 GALLON(S)\n________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nCALLER STATED THERE WAS A SPILL OF GASOLINE POSSIBLY FROM A 20 INCH STEEL PIPELINE\nDUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES.\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: FLOW\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\nPage 1 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n141992-Appendix B - NRC Report 1032892\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDAMAGES\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nEVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nLength of Direction of\nClosure Type\nDescription of Closure Closure Closure\nAir: N\nRoad: N\nMajor\nArtery:\nN\nWaterway: N\nTrack: N\nPassengers Transferred: NO\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nCALLER STATED THEY HAVE A CONTRACTOR COMING TO THE SCENE TO EXCAVATE THE GROUND\nALONG WITH A VACUUM TRUCK. THE PIPELINE HAS BEEN SHUTDOWN.\nRelease Secured: YES\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: NONE\nState/Local: NJ DEP\nState/Local On Scene: NJ DEP, LOCAL PD & FD\nState Agency Number: 12-12-10-104104\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nPage 2 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n141992-Appendix B - NRC Report 1032892\nU.S. EPA II (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-DEC-12 07:58\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nNJ DEPT OF HEALTH & SENIOR SVC (COMMAND CENTER)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nNJ OFC HMLND SECURITY & PREPAREDNES (COMMAND CENTER)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nNJ STATE POLICE (MARINE SERVICES BUREAU)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nNOAA RPTS FOR NJ (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (AUTOMATIC REPORTS)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nSECTOR DELAWARE BAY (RESPONSE)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nNJ DEP POC: DUTY OFFICER (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nUSCG DISTRICT 1 (COMMAND CENTER)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\nUSCG DISTRICT 5 (D5 DRAT)\n11-DEC-12 07:56\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\n___________________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 1032892 ***\nPage 3 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2014\nOriginal Report\nDate: 01/07/2013\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20130004 - 18209\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes\nLast Revision Date: 06/20/2013\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 1845\n2. Name of Operator BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address FIVE TEK PARK\n3b. City BREINIGSVILLE\n3c. State Pennsylvania\n3d. Zip Code 18031\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 12/10/2012 11:00\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 40.505602\nLongitude: -74.642893\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1032892\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 12/11/2012 07:45\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nRefined and/or Petroleum Product (non-HVL) which is a\nLiquid at Ambient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Gasoline (non-Ethanol)\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 48.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 16.00\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 1 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 12/10/2012 11:00\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: 12/18/2012 07:19\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated:\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 12/10/2012 11:00\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site:\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: New Jersey\n3. Zip Code: 08844\n4. City Hillsborough\n5. County or Parish Somerset\n6. Operator-designated location: Survey Station No.\nSpecify: 138450\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: LN620FZ\n8. Segment name/ID:\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under pavement\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 108\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? Yes\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing – Yes\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled Cased\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 2 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\n- If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 20\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .325\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 52,000\n3d. Pipe specification: X52\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Longitudinal ERW - Unknown Frequency\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: US Steel\n3g. Year of manufacture: 1974\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Coal Tar\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1974\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Leak\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type: Pinhole\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: Yes\n4. Anticipated remediation: Yes\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater Yes\n- Soil Yes\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: Yes\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater Yes\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 1.00\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: Unknown\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nYes\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? Yes\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 3 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area: Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\nYes\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\nYes\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n8. Estimated Property Damage:\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage $ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 0\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 65,735\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 47,583\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 0\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n8g. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $ 113,318\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 362.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 900.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nYes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5e. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Remotely Controlled\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Remotely Controlled\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 69,493\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools? Yes\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 4 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nNo\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nNo\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Notification From Public\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\nYes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nYes\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues Yes\n- Investigation identified no controller issues Yes\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\n1b. Specify how many failed:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 5 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G4 - Other Outside Force Damage\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion:\nInternal Corrosion:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 6 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 7 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 8 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause: Electrical Arcing from Other Equipment or Facility\n- If Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPage 9 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\n141992-Appendix C- Operator Accident Report to PHMSA 20130004 - 18209\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane","truncated":true,"body_characters":50431}