# Failure Report-Buckeye Partners 9/20/11 - **operation:** document - **citation:** PHMSA FIR, Buckeye Partners, 2011-03-20 - **title:** Failure Report-Buckeye Partners 9/20/11 - **source type:** incident - **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration - **status:** historical - **official:** true - **published on:** 2011-09-20 - **effective on:** 2011-03-20 - **summary:** Buckeye Partners; Hazardous Liquid; PA; failure 2011-03-20; apparent cause: Corrosion External. - **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-92011.json - **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-92011.md - **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-buckeye-partners-92011 - **source url:** https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-buckeye-partners-92011 **body:** <<>> DOT US Department of Transportation PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration OPS Office of Pipeline Safety Eastern Region Principal Investigator Michael Yazemboski Region Director Byron Coy Date of Report 08/05/2011 Subject Failure Investigation Report – Buckeye External Corrosion Pit near Shippingport, PA Operator, Location, & Consequences Date of Failure 03/20/2011 Commodity Released Diesel City/County & State Shippingport/Beaver County, PA OpID & Operator Name 1845 Buckeye Pipeline LP Unit # & Unit Name 3221 Coraopolis Area – PA SMART Activity # 133920 Milepost / Location Latitude: 40.62252, Longitude: ‐80.4181 Type of Failure Pipeline Leak due to localized external corrosion pit Fatalities 0 Injuries 0 Description of area impacted HCA area Property Damage $118,617 Page 1 of 3 133920 Buckeye I03 1845 Coraopolis 3221 03202011 Summary <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Buckeye External Corrosion Pit near Shippingport, PA Failure Date: 03/20/2011 Executive Summary On March 20, 2011, Buckeye Pipeline reported a leak on their 10” line 820 that runs from their Coraopolis Terminal to the Midland Terminal. The leak was located in a wooded area behind a Gypsum plant near the intersection of Ferry Hill Road and Shippingport Road in Shippingport, PA. The leak was due to an isolated external corrosion pit located in the 12:00 position on the pipe. Approximately 300 barrels of diesel fuel were spilled as a result of the leak and it was estimated that 238 barrels were recovered. The spill follow the natural terrain from the leak site to a stormwater drainage canal located behind the Gypsum plant, where it was contained and prevented from entering the Ohio River. Buckeye was able to isolate the line by closing block valves upstream and downstream of the leak site. Once isolated, Buckeye drained the leaking segment of line into tank trucks located at their Midland Terminal. On March 23, Buckeye repaired the leak by cutting out and replacing a 10’ section of pipe with new pipe. The line was returned to full operation on March 23 around 10:00am. System Details The leak was on Buckeye’s Line 820. Line 820 is a 10" line running from Buckeye’s Coraopolis Terminal to their Midland Terminal located in Shippingport, PA. (Appendix A / Appendix B) The Coraopolis Unit contains 145 miles of 6", 10", and 12" pipe that runs from Midland Terminal to the Indiana Terminal located in Indiana, PA and to the Pittsburgh airport. Events Leading up to the Failure The leak was initially reported to the NRC by a local resident (Appendix C). Buckeye was in the process of pumping Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel (ULSD) fuel from Buckeye’s Coraopolis Terminal to their Midland Terminal located in Shippingport, PA. The pressure at the site at the time of failure was 462 psig which was below the MAOP of 1147 psig. A resident reported a spray of product that could be seen rising above the trees in a wooded area behind the Gypsum plant. Buckeye responded and determined that it was their line 820 that was leaking. Emergency Response On March 20, 2011, at approximately 14:02, Buckeye was notified by emergency responders of a possible leak on the Buckeye line in Shippingport, PA. Buckeye immediately dispatched local field personnel and began a controlled shutdown and isolation of the line. The appropriate internal and external notifications were made to report the release and dispatch teams of responders to contain the product and repair the defect in the line. Buckeye was able to isolate the line by closing block valves upstream and downstream of the leak site. Once isolated, Buckeye drained the leaking segment of line into tank trucks located at their Midland Terminal. Buckeye established a local command center on site. Local, State, and Federal agencies responded. Buckeye successfully implemented their Oil Spill Response Plan (dated 7/13/2010) and Emergency Plan Procedures. Page 2 of 3 <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Buckeye External Corrosion Pit near Shippingport, PA Failure Date: 03/20/2011 Summary of Return‐to‐Service On March 23, 2011, Buckeye repaired the leak by cutting out and replacing a 10’ section of pipe with new pipe. A successful pressure test was conducted prior to returning the line to service. During the start up phase, the pressure in the line was increased in incremental steps until final operating pressure was achieved. The line was returned to full operation on March 23, 2011. Investigation Details In April 2010, Buckeye identified a washout condition near the leak location. A review of the records indicated that approximately 2’ of pipe was exposed and that the coating was intact and not damaged. This washout area was scheduled to be monitored during future patrols of the area until permanent remediation could be implemented. This condition is not believed to be a contributing factor in causing the leak. The damaged pipe was cut out and replaced on 3/23/2011. The pipe segment containing the defect was sent to a laboratory for metallurgical analysis to determine the exact cause of the release. Most of the product has been recovered as remediation efforts continue. A professional metallurgical analysis indicates it is likely that the corrosive low pH water directly contacting the exposed segment of pipeline caused the localized external pitting corrosion leading to the through wall defect and the surrounding metal loss. Findings & Contributing Factors The cause has been determined to be due to low pH water directly contacting the exposed segment of pipeline causing the localized external pitting leading to the through wall defect and the surrounding metal loss (Appendix D). The corrosion is limited to the section of exposed piping where the coating had become disbonded. Appendices Appendix A ‐ Site Maps Appendix B ‐ Photographs Appendix C ‐ NRC Reports Appendix D ‐ Buckeye Accident Report Page 3 of 3 <<>> N BUCKEYE SHIPPINGPORT PIPELINE RELEASE 133920 Appendix A - Site Maps PARTNERS, L.P. A OVERVIEW MAP The Response Group 09:00 3/22/2011 80°25'16 W 80°2512 W 8025W 80254 W 80°25'0"W 80246W 40°37'24"N Spill Site: CP717ZD 80.41803° W 40.62250° N ZD820CP 40°37'20"N Legend Slightly Colored Spill Site Shippingport 40°3716'N • Buckeye Pipelines 0.0125 0.025 0.05 Miles 40°37'16"N 2of6 80°25'16 W 80°25'12 W 80:258 W 80254W 802510 <<>> N BUCKEYE SHIPPINGPORT PIPELINE RELEASE 133920 Appendix A - Site Maps PARTNERS, L.P. A SITUATION MAP The Response Group 10:00 3/21/2011 281-880-5000 80°25'40 W 8025'35 W 8025'30 W 80°25'25 W 8025'20"W 80'25'15 W 80/2510 W 80°25'0 W 80245W 802450W 40°37'45'N Ferry Hill Kerona Rd Security Post 4003745 N Walnut St 40'37'40'N 40°37'40'N Allison Rd 40335N 40°37'35"V Shippingport Rd NICP Staging Area Vacuum Truck Underflow Dam 40°37'30'N Ferry Hill Rd Vacuum Truck 40 37'30'N Underflow Dam Vacuum Truck Vacuum Truck Security Post. Legend Pumo Sta 40°37'25'N * Spill Site Vacuum Truck Spill Site: Underflow Dam 40.62250° N 80.41803W Security Check Points Incident Command Post 40°37'20"N Staging Area 4037'20 N Sorbent Boom Buckeye Pipelines 0.035 0.07 0.14 Miles 3 df 802540W 80°25'35 W 8025'30 W 80°25'25 W 80°25'20 W 8055W 80°25'10 W 80°25'5 W 80°25'0"W 80455W 80°24'50"W <<>> N BUCKEYE SHIPPINGPORT PIPELINE RELEASE 133920 Appendix A - Site Maps PARTNERS, L.P. A SITUATION MAP Emergency n The Response Group 12:30 3/22/2011 802540W 025'35W 8025'30W 802525W 8025'20 W 80°25'15 W 80°25'10 W 025'W 8025'0 W 802455 W 8024'50 W 8024'45 W Shippingport Community Park 45'N 40°37 verona Ra Security Post 40°37'45'N 40°37'40'N 40°37'40"N 40°3735'N SH agport Rd 40°37'35'N ICP Vacuum Tri Vacuum Truck Staging Area Underflow Dam S 40°37'30"N 40°37'30°N Vacuum Truck Underflow Dam Security Post 40°37'25"N Legend * Spill Site Spill Site: 40.62250° N Vacuum Truck 80.41803° W Underflow Dam 40°37'20'N Security Check Points 4037'20'N Incident Command Post Staging Area Shippin Sorbent Boom Buckeye Pipelines 0 0.04 0.08 0.16 Miles 8025'45 W 802540W 802535 W 80°25'30 W 8025'25 W 8025'20 W 802515 W 80:2510 W 8025W 800250W 8045W 80-24:5W 8002445 W <<>> N BUCKEYE SHIPPINGPORT PIPELINE RELEASE 133920 Appendix A - Site Maps PARTNERS, L.P. A SITUATION MAP Emergency r The Response Group 17:00 3/22/2011 802535W 80°25'30 W 8025'25 W 8025'20 W 8025'15 W 80'25'10 W 8025'W 80°25'0 W 80245W 8024'50W 40°345'N Kerona Rd Security Post 40º37'45'N Johnson Dr Morrow Dr Walnut St Cherry Aley 40°37'40'N 40°37'40'N Chenalt Alison Ro 4037'35'N Shippingpor 403735N 315' Sorbent 100' Containment Shippingport Rd NICP Vacuum Truck Vacuum Truck Staging Area Underflow Dam 403730'N 40'37'30"N Ferry Hill Rd Underflow Dam Legend 1112 Security Post Spill Site Vacuum Truck 40'37'25'N 40°37'25"N Underflow Dam Spill Site: Security Check Points 40.62250° N Incident Command Post Vacuum Truck 80.41803° W Staging Area • Containment Boom Sorbent Boom 40°37'20'N Buckeye Pipelines 0.035 0.07 0.14 Miles 40°37'20'N 802535W 8025'30 W 0255W 80°25'20 W 80•25'15W 80'25'10 W 8025W 80250W 802455W 802450W <<>> BUCKEYE N BUCKEYE PIPELINE INCIDENT 133920 Appendix A - Site Maps PARTNERS, L.P. A DETAILED OVERVIEW MAP Emerge The Response Group 3/20/2011 80°27 30"W 80270W 80230W 80260W 802530° 80250W 802430 80°240 W 40°39'0'N Industry Beaver Midland Rd 40°38'30'N 168 Midland Ave Lincoln Park Midland 68 40°38'0'N Initial Reported Incident Location Shippingport, PA 40°38'0'N Beaver Rd Shippingpc Shippingport Rd 40 37 30'N Phillis Istand Shippingport 40°37'0'N State Route +88 Mur Green C 10 36'30'N LEGEND 168 McCleary Incident Location • Buckeye Pipelines 0.2 0.4 16 of 6 08 Miles 802730W 80°270 W 802630 W 80260W 802530W 80$250 W 802430W 802410 <<>> 133920 Appendix B - Photos Photo 1 1 of 8 <<>> 133920 Appendix B - Photos Photo 2 2 of 8 <<>> 133920 Appendix B - Photos Photo 3 3 of 8 <<>> 133920 Appendix B - Photos Photo 4 4 of 8 <<>> 133920 Appendix B - Photos Photo 5 5 of 8 <<>> 133920 Appendix B - Photos Photo 6 6 of 8 <<>> 133920 Appendix B - Photos Photo 7 7 of 8 <<>> 133920 Appendix B - Photos Photo 8 8 of 8 <<>> TeleDetail Page 1 of 2 133920 Appendix C - NRC Report 970587 HMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS (Version 3.4.06 PROD ) Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu [Return to Search] NRC Number: 970587 Call Date: 03/20/2011 Call Time: 14:24:10 Caller Information First Name: TERRY Last Name: ERICKSON Company Name: BEAVER COUNTY 911 Address: City: State: PA Country: USA Zip: Phone 1: 7247750880 Phone 2: Organization Type: LOCAL Is caller the spiller? Yes Yes No No No Response No Response Confidential: Yes Yes No No No Response No Response Discharger Information First Name: Last Name: UNKNOWN Company Name: BUCKEYE PIPELINE Address: City: SHIPPINGPORT State: PA Country: USA Zip: Phone 1: Phone 2: Organization Type: PRIVAT Spill Information State: PA County: BEAVER Nearest City: SHIPPINGPORT Zip Code: Location Spill Date: (mm/dd/yyyy) 14:00:00 03/20/2011 Spill Time: (24hh:mm:ss) DTG Type: OCCURRED Incident Type PIPELINE Reported Incident Type PIPELINE Description CALLER STATED DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES A PIPELINE RUPTURED AND IS SHOOTING OIL ABOUT 40 FEET INTO THE AIR AND IT IS GOING INTO THE OHIO RIVER. NO INJURIES WERE REPORTED. Materials Involved Material / Chris Name Chris Code Total Qty. Water Qty. UNKNOWN OIL OUN 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT 1 of 2 https://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=&... 7/20/2011 <<>> TeleDetail Page 2 of 2 133920 Appendix C - NRC Report 970587 Medium Type: WATER Additional Medium Information: OHIO RIVER Injuries: Fatalites: Evacuations: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown No. of Evacuations: Damages: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Damage Amount: Federal Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown State Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Other Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Remedial Actions FIRE DEPT IS ON SCENE AND HAZMAT IS EN ROUTE. Additional Info NONE GIVEN. Latitude Degrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant: Longitude Degrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant: Distance from City: Direction: Section: Township: Range: Milepost: Rescinded Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters) << Previous << Previous 1..1 of 1 << Save >> 2 of 2 https://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=&... 7/20/2011 <<>> TeleDetail Page 1 of 2 133920 Appendix C - NRC Report 970594 HMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS (Version 3.4.06 PROD ) Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu [Return to Search] NRC Number: 970594 Call Date: 03/20/2011 Call Time: 15:33:36 Caller Information First Name: CARL Last Name: OSTACH Company Name: BUCKEYE PARTNERS Address: 469 MOON CLINTON ROAD City: CORAOPOLIS State: PA Country: USA Zip: 15108 Phone 1: 4122929019 Phone 2: 4122997010 Organization Type: PRIVAT Is caller the spiller? Yes Yes No No No Response No Response Confidential: Yes Yes No No No Response No Response Discharger Information First Name: CARL Last Name: OSTACH Company Name: BUCKEYE PARTNERS Address: 469 MOON CLINTON ROAD City: CORAOPOLIS State: PA Country: USA Zip: 15108 Phone 1: 4122929019 Phone 2: 4122997010 Organization Type: PRIVAT Spill Information State: PA County: BEAVER Nearest City: SHIPPINGPORT Zip Code: Location Spill Date: (mm/dd/yyyy) 15:10:00 03/20/2011 Spill Time: (24hh:mm:ss) DTG Type: DISCOVERED Incident Type PIPELINE Reported Incident Type PIPELINE Description CALLER STATED ULTRA LOW SULFUR DIESEL FUEL RELEASED FROM A PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES AND HAS ENTERED INTO THE OHIO RIVER. Materials Involved Material / Chris Name Chris Code Total Qty. Water Qty. OIL: DIESEL ODS 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT 1 of 2 https://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=&... 7/20/2011 <<>> TeleDetail Page 2 of 2 133920 Appendix C - NRC Report 970594 Medium Type: WATER Additional Medium Information: OHIO RIVER Injuries: Fatalites: Evacuations: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown No. of Evacuations: Damages: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Damage Amount: Federal Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown State Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Other Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Remedial Actions PIPELINE HAS BEEN SHUTDOWN, CLOSING VALVES TO ISOLATE PIPELINE SECTION, ACTIVATED CONTRACTORS FOR CLEANUP, PUBLIC RESPONDERS SUCH AS POLICE, FIRE AND OTHER AGENCIES ARE ON SITE. Additional Info CALLER HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AT THIS TIME. Latitude Degrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant: Longitude Degrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant: Distance from City: Direction: Section: Township: Range: Milepost: Rescinded Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters) << Previous << Previous 1..1 of 1 << Save >> 2 of 2 https://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=&... 7/20/2011 <<>> TeleDetail Page 1 of 2 133920 Appendix C - NRC Report 970718 HMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS (Version 3.4.06 PROD ) Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu [Return to Search] NRC Number: 970718 Call Date: 03/21/2011 Call Time: 17:11:57 Caller Information First Name: CARL Last Name: OSTACH Company Name: BUCKEYE PARTNERS Address: 469 MOON CLINTON ROAD City: CORAOPOLIS State: PA Country: USA Zip: 15108 Phone 1: 4122929019 Phone 2: 4122997010 Organization Type: PRIVAT Is caller the spiller? Yes Yes No No No Response No Response Confidential: Yes Yes No No No Response No Response Discharger Information First Name: CARL Last Name: OSTACH Company Name: BUCKEYE PARTNERS Address: 469 MOON CLINTON ROAD City: CORAOPOLIS State: PA Country: USA Zip: 15108 Phone 1: 4122929019 Phone 2: 4122997010 Organization Type: PRIVAT Spill Information State: PA County: BEAVER Nearest City: SHIPPINGPORT Zip Code: 15077 Location ROUTE 168 SHIPPINGPORT RD. Spill Date: (mm/dd/yyyy) 15:10:00 03/20/2011 Spill Time: (24hh:mm:ss) DTG Type: DISCOVERED Incident Type PIPELINE Reported Incident Type PIPELINE Description *** THIS IS A QUANTITY UPDATE REPORT; REFER TO NRC REPORT # 970594*** THE QUANTITY HAS BEEN UPDATED FROM AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT TO 300 BARRELS DUE TO A DISCHARGE OF LOW SULFUR DIESEL FUEL FROM A TRANSMISSION PIPELINE THAT OCCURRED ON 20MAR2011. THE CALLER STATED THAT THE AMOUNT RECOVERED WAS 238 BARRELS. Materials Involved Material / Chris Name Chris Code Total Qty. Water Qty. OIL: DIESEL ODS 300 BARREL(S) 1 of 2 https://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=&... 7/20/2011 <<>> TeleDetail Page 2 of 2 133920 Appendix C - NRC Report 970718 Medium Type: SOIL Additional Medium Information: / NO OFF SITE IMPACT Injuries: Fatalites: Evacuations: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown No. of Evacuations: Damages: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Damage Amount: Federal Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown State Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Other Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Remedial Actions 238 BARRELS HAS BEEN RECOVERED, ALL PRODUCT IS CONTAINED AT THIS TIME AND NO ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED. Additional Info *** THIS IS AN UPDATED REPORT; REFER TO NRC REPORT #970594*** CALLER HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. Latitude Degrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant: Longitude Degrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant: Distance from City: Direction: Section: Township: Range: Milepost: Rescinded Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters) << Previous << Previous 1..1 of 1 << Save >> 2 of 2 https://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=&... 7/20/2011 <<>> 133920 Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Supplemental Report NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122. OMB NO: 2137-0047 EXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013 Report Date: 04/18/2011 U.S Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration No. 20110120 - 15845 -------------------------- (DOT Use Only) ACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE SYSTEMS A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590. INSTRUCTIONS Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline. PART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION Report Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final: Yes Last Revision Date: 06/07/2011 1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 1845 2. Name of Operator BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP 3. Address of Operator: 3a. Street Address FIVE TEK PARK, 9999 HAMILTON BOULEVARD 3b. City BREINIGSVILLE 3c. State Pennsylvania 3d. Zip Code 18031 4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 03/20/2011 14:02 5. Location of Accident: Latitude: 40.62252 Longitude: -80.4181 6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 970587 7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the National Response Center (if applicable): 03/20/2011 14:24 8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant volume released) Refined and/or Petroleum Product (non-HVL) which is a Liquid at Ambient Conditions - Specify Commodity Subtype: Diesel, Fuel Oil, Kerosene, Jet Fuel - If "Other" Subtype, Describe: - If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Ethanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend: %: - If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Biodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100): B 9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 300.00 10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown (Barrels): 11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 268.00 12. Were there fatalities? No - If Yes, specify the number in each category: 12a. Operator employees 12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator 12c. Non-Operator emergency responders 12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator 12e. General public 12f. Total fatalities (sum of above) 13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No - If Yes, specify the number in each category: 13a. Operator employees 13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator 13c. Non-Operator emergency responders 13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT Page 1 of 14 1 of 14 <<>> 133920 Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Supplemental Report associated with this Operator 13e. General public 13f. Total injuries (sum of above) 14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes - If No, Explain: - If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock) 14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 03/20/2011 14:10 14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: 03/23/2011 15:23 - Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) 15. Did the commodity ignite? No 16. Did the commodity explode? No 17. Number of general public evacuated: 0 18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock): 18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 03/20/2011 14:02 18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 03/20/2011 15:16 PART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION 1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes If Yes, Complete Questions (2-12) If No, Complete Questions (13-15) - If Onshore: 2. State: Pennsylvania 3. Zip Code: 15077 4. City Shippingport 5. County or Parish Beaver 6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station Specify: MP 1.46 7. Pipeline/Facility name: 8. Segment name/ID: IP820CP 9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)? No 10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way 11. Area of Accident (as found): Aboveground Specify: Other - If Other, Describe: washout Depth-of-Cover (in): 12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No - If Yes, specify below: - If Bridge crossing – Cased/ Uncased: - If Railroad crossing – Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled - If Road crossing – Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled - If Water crossing – Cased/ Uncased - Name of body of water, if commonly known: - Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: - Select: - If Offshore: 13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: 14. Origin of Accident: - In State waters - Specify: - State: - Area: - Block/Tract #: - Nearest County/Parish: - On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify: - Area: - Block #: 15. Area of Accident: PART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION 1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate 2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites - If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached Appurtenances, specify: 3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe - If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body Page 2 of 14 2 of 14 <<>> 133920 Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Supplemental Report 3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 10 3b. Wall thickness (in): .279 3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 42,000 3d. Pipe specification: X42 3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Seamless - If Other, Describe: 3f. Pipe manufacturer: 3g. Year of manufacture: 3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Coal Tar - If Other, Describe: - If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Valve, specify: - If Mainline, specify: - If Other, Describe: 3i. Manufactured by: 3j. Year of manufacture: - If Tank/Vessel, specify: - If Other - Describe: - If Other, describe: 4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1951 5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel - If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify: 6. Type of Accident Involved: Leak - If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size: in. (axial) by in. (circumferential) - If Leak - Select Type: Pinhole - If Other, Describe: - If Rupture - Select Orientation: - If Other, Describe: Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: No 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: Yes 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: Yes 4. Anticipated remediation: No 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: No 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater - Surface - Groundwater - Drinking water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility been identified as one that "could affect" a High Consequence Area (HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? Yes 7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High Consequence Area (HCA)? Yes 7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply) - Commercially Navigable Waterway: Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Page 3 of 14 3 of 14 <<>> 133920 Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Supplemental Report Integrity Management Program? - High Population Area: Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? - Other Populated Area Yes Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? Yes - Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water Yes Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? Yes - Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? 8. Estimated cost to Operator : 8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator $ 0 8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 0 8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 111,959 8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 0 8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 6,658 8f. Estimated other costs $ 0 Describe: 8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) $ 118,617 PART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION 1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 462.00 2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 1,147.00 3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the Accident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP 4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations (such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility relating to the Accident operating under an established pressure restriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the MOP? No - If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below: 4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure restriction? 4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the State? 5. Was "Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites" OR "Offshore Pipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend" selected in PART C, Question 2? Yes - If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below) 5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source: Remotely Controlled 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: Remotely Controlled 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 88,806 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? Yes - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply) - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - - If Other, Describe: 5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which significantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool run? No - If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply) - Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup - Low operating pressure(s) Page 4 of 14 4 of 14 <<>> 133920 Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Supplemental Report - Low flow or absence of flow - Incompatible commodity - Other - - If Other, Describe: 5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes If Yes - 6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes 6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes 6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? No 6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? No 7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes - If Yes: 7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes 7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes 7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the detection of the Accident? No 7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident? No 8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Notification from Emergency Responder - If Other, Specify: 8a. If "Controller", "Local Operating Personnel", including contractors", "Air Patrol", or "Guard Patrol by Operator or its contractor" is selected in Question 8, specify the following: 9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or control room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the Accident? Yes, but the investigation of the control room and/or controller actions has not yet been completed by the operator (Supplemental Report Required) - If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) - If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) - Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue - Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue Provide an explanation for why not: - Investigation identified no control room issues - Investigation identified no controller issues - Investigation identified incorrect controller action or controller error - Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the controller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s) response - Investigation identified incorrect procedures - Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response - Investigation identified areas other than those above: Describe: PART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION 1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations? No - If Yes: 1a. Specify how many were tested: 1b. Specify how many failed: Page 5 of 14 5 of 14 <<>> 133920 Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Supplemental Report 2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations? No - If Yes: 2a. Specify how many were tested: 2b. Specify how many failed: PART G – APPARENT CAUSE Select only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer the questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H). Apparent Cause: G1 - Corrosion Failure G1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column Corrosion Failure – Sub Cause: - If External Corrosion: 1. Results of visual examination: Localized Pitting - If Other, Describe: 2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply) - Galvanic - Atmospheric - Stray Current - Microbiological - Selective Seam - Other: Yes - If Other, Describe: A professional metallurgical analysis claims it is likely that the corrosive low pH water directly contacting the exposed segment of pipeline caused the localized external pitting corrosion leading to the through wall defect and the surrounding metal loss. 3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply) - Field examination - Determined by metallurgical analysis Yes - Other: - If Other, Describe: 4. Was the failed item buried under the ground? No - If Yes : 4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at the time of the Accident? If Yes - Year protection started: 4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the point of the Accident? 4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted at the point of the Accident? If "Yes, CP Annual Survey" – Most recent year conducted: If "Yes, Close Interval Survey" – Most recent year conducted: If "Yes, Other CP Survey" – Most recent year conducted: - If No: 4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted? Yes 5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of the corrosion? No - If Internal Corrosion: 6. Results of visual examination: - Other: 7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): - - Corrosive Commodity - Water drop-out/Acid - Microbiological - Erosion - Other: - If Other, Describe: 8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): - - Field examination - Determined by metallurgical analysis - Other: - If Other, Describe: 9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): - - Low point in pipe Page 6 of 14 6 of 14 <<>> 133920 Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Supplemental Report - Elbow - Other: - If Other, Describe: 10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? 11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? 12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely utilized? 13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Tank/Vessel. 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection - No In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? Yes 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Yes Most recent year: 2006 - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent year: - Caliper Most recent year: - Crack Most recent year: - Hard Spot Most recent year: - Combination Tool Yes Most recent year: 2011 - Transverse Field/Triaxial Yes Most recent year: 2009 - Other Most recent year: Describe: 16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? Yes If Yes - Most recent year tested: 2007 Test pressure: 17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment? No - If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:: Most recent year conducted: - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site: Most recent year conducted: 18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? No 18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most recent year the examination was conducted: - Radiography Most recent year conducted: - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Most recent year conducted: - Wet Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: - Dry Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: - Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: G2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column Natural Force Damage – Sub-Cause: Page 7 of 14 7 of 14 <<>> 133920 Appendix D - Buckeye Accident Supplemental Report - If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods: 1. Specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Heavy Rains/Floods: 2. Specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Lightning: 3. Specify: - If Temperature: 4. Specify: - If Other, Describe: - If High Winds: - If Other Natural Force Damage: 5. Describe: Complete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected. 6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in conjunction with an extreme weather event? 6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply) - Hurricane - Tropical Storm - Tornado - Other - If Other, Describe: G3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column Excavation Damage – Sub-Cause: - If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party): - If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party): - If Excavation Damage by Third Party: - If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Most recent year conducted: - Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Geometry Most recent year conducted: - Caliper Most recent year conducted: - Crack Most recent year conducted: - Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: - Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: - Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: - Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: - **truncated:** true - **body characters:** 53860