{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, CCPS Transportation, LLC, 2012-12-14","title":"Failure Report-CCPS Transportation, LLC 12/14/12","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-12-21","effective_on":"2012-12-14","summary":"CCPS Transportation, LLC; Hazardous Liquid; OK; failure 2012-12-14; apparent cause: Equipment Failure.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-ccps-transportation-llc-121412.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-ccps-transportation-llc-121412.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-ccps-transportation-llc-121412","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-ccps-transportation-llc-121412","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nSouthwest Region\nPrincipal Investigator Gene Roberson\nRegion Director R. M. Seeley\nDate of Report 07/16/2013\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Enbridge Pipeline – Sump Pump\nDischarge Flex Hose Failure\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 12/14/2012\nCommodity Released Hazardous Liquid (Crude Oil)\nCity/County & State Wynona, Osage County, Oklahoma\nOPID & Operator Name 32080 CCPS Transportation, LLC\nUnit # & Unit Name 74179 Spearhead Pipeline\nSMART Activity # 142160\nMilepost / Location Pershing Pump Station\nType of Failure Equipment Failure - Flex Hose Failure on Sump Pump Discharge Resulting\nin the Release of Crude Oil.\nFatalities None\nInjuries None\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nRural pump station site.\nProperty Damage $157,000\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure\n12/14/2012\nExecutive Summary\nAt approximately 8:30 a.m. Central Standard Time (CST) on December 14, 2012, CCPS Transportation,\nLLC (Enbridge) identified a release of crude oil within their Pershing Pump Station in Osage County,\nOklahoma, in the area of the sump pump. Enbridge notified the National Response Center of the crude\noil release on Friday, December 14, 2012, at 10:21 a.m. CST. PHMSA responded to the site to conduct\nan investigation.\nTechnicians performed maintenance on the high level set on Thursday, December 13, 2012, and upon\ncompletion left the sump pump in automatic mode to reduce the level in the sump. Controllers\nmonitoring the sump indicated it had shut off upon reaching the low level set as expected. The\ninvestigation identified the source of the release to be the flex hose fitting between the sump pump and\nthe pipeline. Enbridge activated their Oil Pollution Act (OPA) plan to clean up the site. The spill affected\napproximately a 20–by-20-foot area in the site. No local emergency personnel responded to the scene.\nThere were no injuries, road closures, or resident evacuations associated with this accident. The station\noperations were not affected by the release.\nFigure 1 Flex Hose Installation\nPage 2 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure\n12/14/2012\nSystem Details\nCCPS Transportation, LLC is a subsidiary of Enbridge Pipeline. The Pershing Station is a part of the\nSpearhead pipeline system. Spearhead is a 650-mile, 24-inch-diameter pipeline system that runs from\nFlannigan, Illinois, to Cushing, Oklahoma. It is connected to Enbridge’s mainline system in Flannigan,\nIllinois, and its primary function is transporting Canadian crude to Cushing, Oklahoma. The Southwest\nRegion has regulatory responsibility for the 88-mile section from the Kansas border to Cushing,\nOklahoma. The Pershing Station is an unmanned station located in Osage County, Oklahoma.\nFigure 2 Site During Cleanup\nThe failure occurred in a stainless-steel flex hose fitting within the station. Pershing Station was not\naffected by the release, and pipeline operation continued as normal. No previous failures were noted\nin the station.\nPipe Specifications\nNo pipe failed during this event. A flex hose was found to have failed on the discharge line of the sump\ninjection pump. The flex hose was a certified ANSI 600 fitting. Enbridge installed the flexible hose in\n2009 with the intent to isolate injection pump vibrations from the main line when reinjecting crude from\nthe sump back into the pipeline.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nThe Enbridge Spearhead pipeline was operating normally at the time of the accident and continued to\noperate normally as the release did not affect the pipeline. On December 13, 2012, station technicians\nperformed work on the high level switch associated with the station sump. Upon completion of their\nduties, they activated the switch to confirm it was operational. They confirmed that it was operating\ncorrectly and left the injection pump running to empty the sump. Dispatchers then confirmed the\nPage 3 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure\n12/14/2012\ninjection pump shut down upon the sump reaching its low level switch. This was considered a normal\noperation, and no personnel were required to be on site.\nWhen the technician returned to the station on Friday, December 14, 2012, crude oil was observed\naffecting an approximately 20–by-20-foot area on the ground in the station around the injection pump.\nThe investigation indicated the release had been from the flex hose located on the pump* discharge.\nThe volume of product in sump between the high level and low level switches is 38 barrels.\n*Pump only reinjects crude oil from the station sump back into the pipeline.\nEnbridge reported the release to the National Response Center at approximately 10:21 a.m. CST on\nDecember 14, 2012 (See Appendix A).\nEmergency Response\nEnbridge isolated the Pershing Station sump and activated their OPA plan. No pooling crude oil was\nobserved as site clean up began. No local emergency and fire personnel responded to the scene. Due\nto the remoteness of the station, no roads were closed, and no residents were evacuated. All of the\nrelease remained within the station site.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nFollowing the emergency response, Enbridge locked out the station sump. The pipeline was not\naffected and remained in service.\nThe sump pump and all related piping was removed to allow soil removal for clean up. The flex hose\nwas sent to a lab for analysis to determine the cause of failure. After soil removal was complete, the site\nwas filled with new soil, the soil was compacted, and a new foundation was constructed to facilitate the\nre-installation of the pump and piping. Enbridge chose to install hard piping in the place of the flex\nhose.\nInvestigation Details\nAt approximately 10:21 a.m. CST, December 14, 2012, Enbridge reported a release of crude oil to the\nNational Response Center due to a ruptured flex hose at Enbridge’s Pershing Station in Osage County,\nOklahoma. The station was built in 2009 to increase delivery capacities of their Spearhead pipeline to\nCushing, Oklahoma. PHMSA’s Southwest Region received the incident notification and made plans to\nhave an investigator on site. The investigator arrived on site at 8:00 a.m. on December 18. The spill\nclean up was in progress with all of the area piping disassembled and the failed flex hose in the station\nshop being readied for shipment to a metallurgical lab for analysis. The investigator requested sump\ndrawings and material documentation, and reviewed construction records available on-site. Because of\nthe hose design, the area of failure was not visible for viewing on-site. The operator’s written report can\nbe seen in Appendix B.\nThe failed flex hose was a certified ANSI 600 fitting. The pipeline has an MOP of 1440 psig and was\noperating at 354 psig at the time of failure. The PHMSA investigator was able to view the site with the\nPage 4 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure\n12/14/2012\noperator. No cause for failure was apparent from a visual examination. Photos of the failed flex hose\ncan be seen in Appendix C.\nFigure 3 Failed Hose\nFigure 4 Failed Hose with SS Wrap Removed\nThe operator replaced two hoses (failed hose and another) downstream of the injection pump with hard\npipe prior to returning the sump to service. The failed flex hose was sent to a metallurgical lab for\ntesting.\nPage 5 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – CCPS Transportation, LLC – Sump Pump Hose Failure\n12/14/2012\nMetallurgical Analysis\nThe flex hose was sent to an Edmonton, AB, Canada metallurgical lab for analysis (Appendix C).\nThe analysis concluded:\n The cause of the leak was the formation of a transverse crack along an internal convolution in\napproximately the middle of the hose’s length.\n The failure mechanism was fatigue, and the failure cause was likely vibrations on the component\nresulting in high bending stresses on the convolutions.\n The uneven formation of the convolutions (with sharply bent internal convolutions) was likely a\ncontributing factor in the failure.\n No evidence was found to suggest that material/microstructure was a factor in the failure.\nMechanical Analysis\nThere was no mechanical analysis to be made.\nConclusion\nThe failure occurred in a flex hose. Per the metallurgical analysis, the cause of the leak was the\nformation of a transverse crack along an internal convolution of the hose. The failure mechanism was\nfatigue, and the failure cause was likely vibrations on the component resulting in high bending stresses\non the convolutions.\nThe operator chose to remove the fitting to eliminate additional releases or spills of crude oil from their\nsystem.\nAppendices\nA Telephonics Notice Report – NRC # 1033226\nB Operator Accident Report – ODES # 20130007\nC Operator Failure Investigation\nPage 6 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nAPPENDIX A\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 1 of 2\n•PHMSA\nMaterials Safety\nPipeline & Hazardous\nHMIS-> INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS\nAdministration\n(Version 4.0.0 PROD)\nRules of Behavior\nHome\nLogout\nMenu\nNRC Number:\n[Return to Search]\nCall Date:\n12/14/2012\n1033226\nCall Time:\n11:21:06\nCaller Intormation\nFirst Name:\nDAVID\nCompany Name:\nENBRIDGE PIPELINE\nLast Name:\n[HODGINS\nAddress:\n[21979 N 1500 E RD\nCity:\nPONTIAC\nState:\nCountry:\nPhone 1:\nUSA\nZIp:\nConfidential:\nOrganization Type:\n[PRIVAT\n9182851132\nPhone 2:\n61784\n• Yes No •No Rosponso\nIs caller the spiller?\n@Yes ONo CINo Response\nFirst Name:\n[DAVID\nDischarger Information\nLast Name:\nHODGINS\nCompany Name:\nENBRIDGE PIPELINE\nAddress:\n21979 N 1500 E RD\nCity:\nPhone 1:\nCountry:\nUSA\n[PONTIAC\nState:\nIL\n[9182851132\nZip:\nPhone 2:\n61764\nOrganization Type:\n[PRIVA]\nState:\nOK\nSpill Information\nCounty:\nOSAGE\nNearest City:\nLecation\n(WYNONA\nZip Code:\n21443 STATE RD 99\nSpill Date:\nIncident Type\nDTG Type:\n/12/14/2012 (mm/dd/yyy)\nALL\n<- Select DTG Type ->\nSpill Time:\n[08:30:00\n1(24hh:mm:ss)\nDescription\nReported incident Type PIPELINE\nFAILED AND DISCHARGED 1620 GALLONS OF CRUDE OIL ONTO THE SOIL.\nCALLER STATED THAT THEY HAVE A PUMPING STATION AND THE SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE LINE\nMaterial / Chris Name\nMaterials Involved\nOIL: CRUDE\nChris Code\nDIL\nTotal Qty.\n11620 GALLON(S)\nWater Qty.\nAdditional Medium Information:\nMedium Type:\n< Select Medium Type\n(GROUND\nInjuries:\nFatalites:\nmhtml:file://C:\\Users\\Cynthia.Lewis\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Inter... 7/22/2013\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 2 of2\nEvacuations: D Yes l2l No D Unknown No. of Evacuations:\nDamages: D Yes rg] No D Unknown Damage Amount:\nFederal Agency Notified: D Y6G D No rg) Unhnown Other Agency Notified: D Yes D No @ Unknown\nState Agency Notified: D Yp~, D No @ Unknown\nRemedial Actions\nCOLLECT THE SOIL AND DISPOSE OF IT PROPERLY .\nAdditjonal Info\n~\nDegrees:.\nMinutes:\nSeconds: Quadrant:\n~\nDegrees: .\nDistance from City:\nSection:\nRange:\nMinutes:\nSeconds: Quadrant:\nDirection:\nTownship:\nMilepost: [---------------·-\n[]Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters)\n<<Previous\n1..1 of 1\nmhtml :file:/ /C:\\ U sers\\Cynthia.Lewis\\AppData \\Local\\Microsoft\\ Windows\\ Temporary Inter.. . 7/22/2013\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAPPENDIX B\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to OMB NO: 2137-0047\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil EXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2014\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\n0 U.S Department of Transportation\nOriginal Report 01/11/2013\nDate:\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration No. 20 130007- 17553\n--------------------------\n_(DOT Use On_lyl_\nACCIDENT REPORT • HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection Is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safetv (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS I\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nlltw l/11!11(11( a.llmli<~. aQt >J.Q'doiatzliatz.\nPART A· KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: I Supplemental : I Final:\nJ Yes J Yes\nLast Revision Date: 03/15/201 3\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 32080\n2. Name of Operator CCPS TRANSPORTATION , LLC\n3. Add ress of OPerator:\n3a. Street Address 1100 LOU ISIANA, SUITE 3300\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code 77002\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 12/14/2012 08:30\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 35.59243\nLonqitude: -96.30796\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1033226\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the 12/14/201 2 10:21\nNational Response Center (if applicable):\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant Crude Oil\nvolum e released)\n- SPecifv Commodity Subtype:\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuei/Aiternative Fuel and Commod ity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend , then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Aiternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B1 00):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentiona lly (Barrels): 10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each cateqorv:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor emplovees workinq for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emerqency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this OPerator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there iniuries reou irinq inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each cateoorv:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees wo rking for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emerqency responders\n38.50\n38. 50\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? -If No, Explain:\nNo\nM/L and Sta are operating. Sump will be emptied manually\nuntil repair complete.\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown :\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? 16. Did the commodity explode? No\nNo\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identifi ed Accident: 18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 12/14/201 2 08:30\nI 12/14/201 2 08:30\nPART B- ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? I Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2- 12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (1 3- 15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Oklahoma\n3. Zip Code: 74084\n4. City Wynona\n5. County or Pari sh Oasaqe\n6. Operator-designated location: Survey Station No.\nSpecify: Reinjection L\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: CCPS Transportation\n8. Segment name/ID: L 55 Pershing Station\n9. Was Accident on Federal land , other than the Outer Continental Shelf No\n(OCS)?\n10. Location of Accident: 11. Area of Accident (as found): Totally contained on Operator-controlled property\nAboveground\nTypical aboveground facility piping or appurtenance\nSpecify: - If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in):\nNo\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? - If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing-\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing -\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing-\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/d rilled\n- If Water crossing -\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters- Specify:\n-State:\n-Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n-On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n-Block#:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C- ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: 2. Part of system involved in Accident: - If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\nInterstate\nOnshore Pump/Meter Station Equipment and Piping\nForm PHMSA F 7000. 1 (Rev. 12-201 2)\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n3. Item involved in Accident: - If Pipe, specifv:\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n3d. PiPe specification:\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. PiPe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3i. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other- Describe:\n- If Other, describe: 4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 5. Material involved in Accident: - If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify: 6. Type of Accident Involved: - If Mechanical Puncture- Specify Approx. size:\nOther\nFlex Hose\n2009\nMaterial other than Carbon Steel\nStainless Steel\nRupture\n- If Leak- Select Tvpe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation: in . (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in . (widest opening) bv\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\nOther\n- If Other - Describe:\nPART D- ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife imPact: No\n1a. If Yes, sPecifY all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: No\n4a. If Yes, sPecifv all that apply:\n-Surface water\n- Groundwater\n-Soil\n-Vegetation\n-Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\nSa. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n-Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area No\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\n7. Did the released commod ity reach or occur in one or more High No\nConseauence Area (HCA)?\n?a. If Yes, specify HCA tvpe(s): (Select all that applv!\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nlntearitv Management Program?\n- Hiah Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for th is Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Manaqement Proaram?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"cou ld affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Proqram?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)- Drinkinq Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManaaement Proaram?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)- Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManaqement Proaram?\nB. Estimated Property Damaqe:\nBa. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property $ 0\ndamaae\nBb. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 7,000\nBe. Estimated cost of Operator's property damaqe & repairs $ 40,000\nBd. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 50,000\nBe. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 60,000\nBf. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\nBa. Total estimated property damaae (sum of above) $ 157,000\nPARTE- ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the Accident (psig):\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the Accident (psig):\n4. Not including pressu re reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure restriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\n354.00\n1,440.00\nPressure did not exceed MOP\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restri ction mandated by PH MSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question No\n2?\n- If Yes- (Complete 5a.- 5e. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninsPection tools?\n- If No, Which physica l features limit tool accommodation? select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tiqht or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i. e. unbarred tee's,\nprojectinq instrumentation, etc. )\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n-Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that applv)\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wa ll buildup\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other-\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of PiPeline system: 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based svstem in Place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident?\nIf Yes -\n> 20% SMYS Regulated Trunklinerrransmission\nYes\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? 6b. Was it fu lly functional at the time of the Accident? 6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calcu lations) assist with the detection of the Accident?\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of the Accident?\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or faci lity involved in the Accident?\n-If Yes:\n?a. Was it operatinq at the time of the Accident?\n?b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n?c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\n?d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume ca lculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accid ent?\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? - If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\"\n, or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its contractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\nYes\nYes\nNo\nNo\nNo\nLocal Operating Personnel, including contractors\nOperator employee\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the due to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\nAccident? investigate)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the The facility would have appeard to be operating normally to\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\nforovide an exolanation for why the operator did not investigate) a controller.\n-If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that aoo/y)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- lnvestiaation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requ irements of DOT's Drua & Alcohol Testina reau lations?\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\nNo\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n1 b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drua & Alcohol Testing regulations?\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nNo\nPART G- APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART Gin shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G6 - Equipment Failure\nG1 • Corrosion Failure -only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion:\nInternal Corrosion:\n-If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination: I\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that aoolv)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n-Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the fo ll owin~:r (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metalluraical analvsis\n-Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n0 4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathod ic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes- Year protection started :\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbanding of coating evident at\nthe Point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\"- Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\"- Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\"\n- Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Resu lts of visual examination:\n-Other:\n7. Tvpe of corrosion (select all that aoolv): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n-Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiolooical\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metalluraical analvsis\n-Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that aoolv): -\n- Low ooint in oipe\n-Elbow\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n-Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11 . Was the interior coated or lined with protective coatinq ?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is TankNessel.\n14. List the year of the most rece nt inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No in-Service Inspection com pleted\nComplete the following If any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Maqnetic Flux Leakaqe Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n-Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n-Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes-\nMost recent year tested: I\nTest pressure: I\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this seqment? I\n-If Yes, and an investiqative diq was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year cond ucted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a diq site:\nMost recent year conducted: I\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radioqraphy\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted :\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nG2 • Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage- Sub-Cause: I\n-If Earth Movement NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n1. Specify: I\n- If Other, Describe: I\n· If Heavv Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n-If Liqhtninq:\n3. Specify:\n-If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n·If Hiah Winds: u\n·If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that app/v)\n- Hurricane\n- Trooical Storm\n- Tornado\n-Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 • Excavation Damage · only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage - Sub-Cause:\n· If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n• If Excavation Dama1:1e bv Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n·If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n·If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activitv:\nComplete Questions 1·5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select tvoe of internal inspection tool and indicate most recentyear run: -\n- Maonetic Flux Leakaoe\nMost recent yea r conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent yea r conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent yea r conducted:\n-Other\nMost recent yea r conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\norioinal construction at the ooint of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psiol:\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nseoment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n-If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\nSa. If Yes, for each examination , conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destru ctive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radioaraphy\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year cond ucted:\n-Wet Maqnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n-Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n-Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from : (select all that apply)-\n- One-Call System\n-Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cqa-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n-Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation ?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damaqe cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-0/RT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-0 /RT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 -Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nOther Outside Force Damage - Sub-Cause:\n-If Nearby Industrial Man-made or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:\n-If Damaae bv Car Truck or Other Motorized Vehicle/Eaulpment NOT Enaaaed In Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats Barges Drilling Rigs or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\nTheir MoorinQ:\n2. Select one or more of the followinQ IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n-Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n-If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT En!!aaed In Excavation:\n-If Electrical Arcin!l from Other Equipment or Facility:\n·If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year ru n:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n-Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent vear conducted:\n-Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n-Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damaQe was sustained?\n5. Has one or more hydrates! or other pressure test been conducted\nsince oriQinal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investiQative diQ was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted: I\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a diQ site:\nMost recent year conducted: I\n7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n-Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n-Dry MaQnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted :\n-Other\nMost recent year conducted :\nDescribe:\n• If Intentional Damage:\n8. Specify: I\n- If Other, Describe: I\n- If Other Outside Force Damage:\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n9. Describe:\nGS ·Material Failure of Pipe or Weld -only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nUse this section to report material failures ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is \"Pipe\" or\n\"Weld.\"\nMaterial Failure of Pipe or Weld -Sub-Cause:\n1. The sub-cause selected below is based on the following : (select all that apply)\n- Field Examination\n- Determined by Metallurgical Analysis\n- Other Analysis\n- If \"Other Analysis\", Describe:\n- Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation\n(Supplemental Report requ ired)\n·If Construction Installation or Fabrication-related:\n2. List contributing factors : (select all that apply)\n- Fatique or Vibration-related\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Mechanical Stress:\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n·If Oriainal Manufacturing-related (NOT airth weld or other welds formed in the fieldl:\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n-Fatigue or Vibration-related:\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Descri","truncated":true,"body_characters":47386}