{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Chevron Pipe Line Company, 2011-09-08","title":"Failure Report-Chevron Pipe Line Company 9/8/2011","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-06-12","effective_on":"2011-09-08","summary":"Chevron Pipe Line Company; Hazardous Liquid; TX; failure 2011-09-08; apparent cause: Material Failure - Weld.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-chevron-pipe-line-company-982011.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-chevron-pipe-line-company-982011.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-chevron-pipe-line-company-982011","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-chevron-pipe-line-company-982011","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nSouthwest Region\nInvestigators Richard Lopez and Joseph Elmer\nRegion Director R. M. Seeley\nDate of Report April 19, 2012\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Chevron Coahoma LPG Loop\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 09/08/2011\nCommodity Released Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)\nCity/County & State Mitchell County, Texas\nOpID & Operator Name 2731, Chevron Pipe Line Company\nUnit # & Unit Name 36804, West Texas LPG System #3\nSMART Activity # 135846\nMilepost / Location MP 148.8, remote area\nType of Failure Crack near weld\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area Rural – open range\nimpacted\nProperty Damage $1,501,020\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Chevron Coahoma LPG Loop\nFailure Date 9/8/2011\nExecutive Summary\nAt approximately 07:50 a.m. on September 8, 2011, a failure occurred on the Chevron Pipe Line Company’s\n(CPL) 10-inch Coahoma LPG Loop pipeline, which resulted in the release of approximately 13,241 barrels of\nLPG. The failure occurred approximately 40 feet west of CPL’s MP 148.8, 2.7 miles south of Interstate 10 (Exit\n200) in Mitchell County, Texas. The area where the leak occurred is remote, isolated ranch land, not an HCA,\nand there are no known unusually sensitive environmental areas in the vicinity. The incident was reported to\nthe National Response Center as NRC Report # 988809.\nThe product released from the pipeline vaporized, ignited and caused a brush fire. The probable ignition\nsource for the fire was the start up of a production pump. There were no injuries or fatalities.\nThe failure occurred near the fillet weld of a reinforcing sleeve. The damaged segment was transported to\nStress Engineering Services (SES) in Houston, TX for analysis. The probable cause of the failure was determined\nto be a crack in the 10-inch diameter pipe located at the upstream fillet weld of the external sleeve. The crack\nwas the result of a combination of bending loads and excessive hardness in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of the\nweld. Chevron submitted an initial and final report to PHMSA.\nPage 2 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Chevron Coahoma LPG Loop\nFailure Date 9/8/2011\nSystem Details\nThe CPL West Texas LPG pipeline originates at natural gas processing facilities in western Texas and New\nMexico and ends at product storage facilities at Mt. Belvieu, TX and is approximately 2750 miles long. The\nroute is shown in a map provided by Chevron (Appendix A).\nPipe Specifications\nThe segment of pipeline where the failure occurred was the 10-inch (nominal diameter) Loop line. This\nsegment was fabricated using 0.219-inch wall thickness, Grade X-52, electric fusion welded line pipe\nmanufactured by US Steel and was constructed in 1967. Chevron reports that no known prior accidents exist\non this section. The pipeline is cathodically protected by an impressed current system. Chevron further\nreports that an ILI was performed in 2007 and adequate cathodic protection has been maintained.\nThe maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the segment of pipe where the failure occurred is 1042 psig. The\nMOP was established in 1967 by an eight-hour hydrostatic test. Actual operating pressure of the pipeline\nsegment at time of failure was 600 psig.\nSketch 1 – Pig Trap upstream of failure site (flow is from left to right)\nThe leak site is approx. 17.2 miles east CPL’s Coahoma pump station (Howard Co. TX.) and approx. 40-feet west\nof the MP 148.8 pig trap (Mitchell Co. TX). The area where the leak occurred is remote, isolated ranch land.\nThe terrain is generally flat with arid soil conditions typical of the West Texas region.\nPage 3 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Chevron Coahoma LPG Loop\nFailure Date 9/8/2011\nPhoto 1 – Facing upstream on line that failed\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nCPL’s Houston Control Center, while investigating a potential leak due to system imbalance, had shut down the\ntwo 10-inch sections of the LPG System for a stand up test at MP 158 & MP 139. One of the 10-inch lines was\nblocked in at 06:47 a.m. and the other at 06:58 a.m.\nShortly after the shut down the control center received a phone call at 07:52 a.m. reporting a vapor cloud in\nthe vicinity of the Chevron pipelines. The control center then received another phone call a few minutes later\nreporting that the vapor cloud had ignited. Chevron personnel and local Volunteer Fire Department personnel\narrived at the scene and began spraying water around the perimeter to extinguish any grass fires.\nPhoto 2 – Pig trap area facing upstream\nPage 4 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Chevron Coahoma LPG Loop\nFailure Date 9/8/2011\nThe photo is an upstream view of the two 10-inch pipelines within the trap area. The line on the right hand\nside is the 10-inch Loop line – the line that failed. The line in the middle was not affected. The line on the left\nis the 14-inch line that continues to Mt. Belvieu. Fire during the accident engulfed both 10-inch pipelines in\nthe trap area. Product from the failure site that is still burning can be seen in the background. Temporary\nflares can also be seen in the background.\nEmergency Response\nCPL’s Houston Control Center (investigating a potential leak, due to system imbalance) had shut down the two\n10-inch sections of the LPG System for a stand up test at MP 158 and MP 139. The two 10-inch lines were\nblocked in at 06:47 and 06:58 a. m. respectively.\nThe failure occurred near the fillet weld of a reinforcing sleeve. The product released from the pipeline,\nvaporized, ignited and caused a brush fire. The fire continued to burn from the pipeline for several days after\nthe failure likely because the ‘ice ball’ was slow to dissolve and kept supplying LPG vapors entrained in the ice\nball.\nThe probable ignition source for the fire was the start up of a production pump. There were no injuries or\nfatalities.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nBoth of the aboveground segments of the 10-inch pipelines and their respective main line valves located at the\nMP 148 valve site were engulfed in the fire. The aboveground pipe was tested for integrity by Chevron\nmaterial specialists. They conducted both the Brinnell and Rockwell hardness tests and concluded that both\nlines were safe to operate.\nPhoto 3 – Chevron specialists performing integrity tests\nThe valves on the inside 10-inch line (Line 2) in the scraper trap were evaluated by Chevron personnel after\npurging the LPG from the line. The valves internals on the line were then removed and replaced by a\ncontractor. With the valves rebuilt, Line No. 2 was returned to service. No upstream service disruptions to\nGas Processing Plants were caused by this accident.\nThe failed piece was cut and shipped to a metallurgical lab in Houston for detailed failure analysis. The valves\non Line No. 1 were also inspected and repairs were not required.\nPage 5 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Chevron Coahoma LPG Loop\nFailure Date 9/8/2011\nDuring the course of the investigation, PHMSA inspectors reviewed the Return to Service plans prepared by\nChevron. No concerns were identified.\nA close interval cathodic protection survey was performed during the investigation. Levels of protection met\nthe protection criteria.\nInvestigation Details\nAt approximately 09:39 a.m. (EST) on September 8, 2011, CPL reported to the National Response Center a\nfailure on their West Texas LPG pipeline (Appendix B). The leak site is approximately 17.2 miles east CPL’s\nCoahoma pump station (Howard Co. TX.) and approximately 40-feet west of the MP 148.8 pig trap (Mitchell\nCo. TX). The area where the leak occurred is remote, isolated ranch land. The terrain is generally flat with arid\nsoil conditions typical of the West Texas region. Chevron submitted an initial report to PHMSA as required by\n§195.54 Accident reports (Appendix C).\nPHMSA’s Southwest Region received the incident notification and dispatched investigators to the site the\nfollowing day. The investigators arrived on site on September 9th.\nThe maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the segment of the pipeline where the failure occurred is 1042\npsig. The MOP was established in 1967 by an eight-hour hydrostatic test. Actual operating pressure of the\npipeline segment at time of failure was 600 psig. The incident occurred below the specified MOP. The pipeline\nwas last inline inspected (ILI) in 2007. There were no actionable anomalies identified in the area of the failure\nby the ILI.\nChevron prepared a Work Plan to ensure a safe environment for investigating personnel entering the failure\nsite. The Work Plan was reviewed by all involved entities. PHMSA Investigators were able to enter the area of\nthe failure on September 9th but because the release product was still burning Chevron was unable to\nexcavate to enable examination the failed segment of the pipeline. The released product continued to burn\nfor several days likely because the melting of the ice ball kept feeding flammable vapors that ignited.\nPhotos 4 and 5 – Showing the failure and the location of the failure\nPage 6 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Chevron Coahoma LPG Loop\nFailure Date 9/8/2011\nMetallurgical Analysis\nThe pipeline segments involved in the incident were shipped to SES in Houston, TX for metallurgical analysis.\nSES’s analysis (Appendix D) identifies that:\n1. The failure occurred near the fillet weld of sleeve on an anchor near a pig trap.\n2. The controller’s actions were appropriate and the incident location was isolated promptly.\nPhoto 6 – Segment removed for metallurgical testing\nFindings & Contributing Factors\nSubsequent initial visual inspection of the failed section of pipeline showed the failure likely initiated at an\nanchor on the 10-inch Loop line. It is not known when or why the anchor was installed. The failure appeared\nto have occurred near the fillet weld where a reinforcing sleeve had been welded to the pipeline at an anchor.\nThe damaged segment was transported to Stress Engineering Services (SES) in Houston, TX for analysis. The\nprobable cause of the failure was determined to be a crack in the 10-inch diameter pipe located at the\nupstream fillet weld of the external sleeve. The crack was the result of a combination of bending loads and\nexcessive hardness in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of the weld.\nPage 7 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Chevron Coahoma LPG Loop\nFailure Date 9/8/2011\nAppendices\nA Map of CPL’s West Texas LPG system\nB Telephonic Notice Report – NRC #988809\nC Chevron Accident Report to PHMSA 20110380-16525\nD Metallurgical Evaluation Report\nPage 8 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix A Map of CPL’s West Texas LPG system\nThis document is on file at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix B Telephonic Notice Report – NRC #988809\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nLewis, Cynthia (PHMSA)\nFrom:\nSent:\nHQS-PF-fldr-NRC@uscg.mil\nTo:\nThursday, September 08, 2011 8:46 AN\nSubject:\nHP Accident/Incident Cadre <PHMSA>; CMC-01 (OST\nNRC#988809\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n***GOVERNMENT USE ONLY***GOVERNMENT USE ONLY***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 988809\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken by: MST1 JERRY HARDY at 09:39 on 08-SEP-11\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: UNKNOWN\nAffected Area:\nIncident was discovered on 08-SEP-11 at 07:50 local incident time.\nAffected Medium: AIR ATMOSPHERE\nREPORTING PARTY\nName:\nJOSEPH WHITE\nOrganization: CHEVRON PIPELINE CO.\nAddress:\n4800 FOURNACE PL\nBELLAIRE, TX 77401\nPRIMARY Phone: (281)6301927\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nName:\nJOSEPH WHITE\nOrganization: CHEVRON PIPELINE CO.\nAddress:\n4800 FOURNACE PL\nBELLAIRE, TX 77401\nPRIMARY Phone: (281)6301927\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nCounty: HOWARD\nCity: COAHOMA State: TX\nLatitude: 32° 15' 04\" N\nLongitude: 101° 18'21\" W\n4 MILE SOUTH OF NEAREST TOWN\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: LPG\nOfficial Material Name: LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\n1\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nCALLER REPORTED THAT A THIRD PARTY DISCOVERED A VAPOR CLOUD WHICH\nTHEN IGNITE FROM AN UNKNOWN SOURCE.\n________________________________________________________________________\nSENSITIVE INFORMATION\n________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: TRANSMISSION\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\n______________________________________________________________________\nIMPACT\nFire Involved: YES Fire Extinguished: NO\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS:NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nHours Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closed Closure\nN\nAir:\nN Major\nRoad: Artery:N\nN\nWaterway:\nN\nTrack:\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n______________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nLINE BLOCKED IN, AREA SECURED.\nRelease Secured: UNKNOWN\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n______________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: CLEAR, 68ºF Wind speed: 7 MPH Wind direction: NNE\n______________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: NONE\n2\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nState/Local: TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISION\nState/Local On Scene: NONE\nState Agency Number: 20112678\n_______________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nCALCASIEU PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPT (CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT)\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (337)4913778\nUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (301)6693363\nDHS TEXAS FUSION CENTER (INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS)\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (202)3068204\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (202)3661863\nU.S. EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)\n(866)3727745\nUSCG NATIONAL COMMAND CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n(202)3722100\nJFO‐LA (COMMAND CENTER)\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (225)3366513\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (202)2829201\nNOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (206)5264911\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)\n(202)2671136\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (202)3660568\nTCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (512)2392507\nTEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)\n08‐SEP‐11 09:45 (512)4242208\n_______________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nCALLER HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.\n______________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT #988809 ***\nReport any problems by calling 1‐800‐424‐8802\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT http://www.nrc.uscg.mil\n3\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix C Chevron Accident Report to PHMSA – 20110380\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 10/08/2011\nNo. U.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n20110380 - 16525\n-------------------------(DOT\nUse Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Yes Final:\nYes\nLast Revision Date: 03/27/2012\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 2731\n2. Name of Operator CHEVRON PIPE LINE CO\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 4800 FOURNACE PLACE, Rm C382A\n3b. City BELLAIRE\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code 774012324\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 09/08/2011 07:50\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 32.251168\nLongitude: -101.305851\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 988809\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 09/08/2011 08:36\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nHVL or Other Flammable or Toxic Fluid which is a Gas at\nAmbient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / NGL (Natural Gas\nLiquid)\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 13,241.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels):\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\nPage 1 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident?\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? Yes\n16. Did the commodity explode? Yes\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 09/08/2011 07:52\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 09/08/2011 08:20\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Texas\n3. Zip Code: 79565\n4. City Latan\n5. County or Parish Mitchell\n6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: 148.7\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: West Texas LPG\n8. Segment name/ID: 10\" Coahoma LPG Loop\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 39\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Weld, including heat-affected zone\nPage 2 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n- If Pipe, specify:\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n3d. Pipe specification:\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify: Fillet Weld\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1967\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Leak\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type: Crack\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: No\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: No\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nNo\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? No\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\nPage 3 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n8. Estimated Property Damage:\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage $ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 1,001,020\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 400,000\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 100,000\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 0\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n8g. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $ 1,501,020\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 600.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 1,040.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nYes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 100,320\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools? Yes\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\nPage 4 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\nIf Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes 6a.\nWas it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nYes\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nYes\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator?\nCPM leak detection system or SCADA-based information\n(such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume\ncalculations)\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nControl center personnel had detected the system\nimbalance, ordered the system blocked in & initated field\ninvestigation in the area of the imbalance, prior to receiving\nthe phone call confirming the location of the leak.\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nPage 5 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion:\nInternal Corrosion:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\nCorrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\nField examination\nPage 6 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\nLow point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\nMagnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes Most\nrecent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nPage 7 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\nMagnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nPage 8 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\nOne-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGADIRT\n(www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\nPublic\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Prac","truncated":true,"body_characters":52859}