{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Enbridge Pipelines, LLC, 2013-05-17","title":"Failure Report- Enbridge Pipelines 5/17/13","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2014-02-24","effective_on":"2013-05-17","summary":"Enbridge Pipelines, LLC; Hazardous Liquid; OK; failure 2013-05-17; apparent cause: Internal Corrosion.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enbridge-pipelines-51713.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enbridge-pipelines-51713.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enbridge-pipelines-51713","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-enbridge-pipelines-51713","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT U.S. Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nSouthwest Region\nPrincipal Investigator Molly Atkins\nRegion Director R.M. Seeley\nDate of Report 2/24/2014\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Enbridge Pipelines, LLC, Tank 3013 24-\ninch Fill Line failure in Cushing, OK\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 5/17/20131\nCommodity Released West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil\nCity/County & State Cushing, Lincoln County, OK\nOpID & Operator Name 31947, Enbridge Pipelines, LLC\nUnit # & Unit Name 22464, Cushing Tank Farm\nSMART Activity # 143591\nMilepost/Location Cushing, OK, Tank Farm\nType of Failure Internal Corrosion, Microbiologically Influenced (MIC)\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nNo off-site impacts; however, there were on-site impacts to vegetation,\ncontainment ponds, and small animals/reptiles\nProperty Damage $13,844,274 (Final Report)2\n1 Event occurred on May 17, 2013, but was not discovered or reported until May 18, 2013.\n2 Enbridge Pipelines, LLC. (Revision: 12/18/2013). 7000.1 Report 20130208.\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enbridge Cushing Tank Farm\nMay 17-18, 2013\nExecutive Summary\nOn the afternoon of May 18, 2013, Enbridge Pipelines, LLC (Enbridge), reported a release of\napproximately 2,500 barrels of crude oil from its Tank 3013 fill line into on-site containment ponds. The\nleak originated on the Tank 3013 fill line located outside of tank containment dike areas in a drainage\nswale on the morning of Friday, May 17, 2013. The leak—which was not visible at the surface due to\nvegetation in the drainage swale—was not identified until an odor was detected by operations\npersonnel, prompting further investigation into line balance calculations and site conditions. The leak\nwas observed and confirmed at 1:00 p.m. CT on Saturday, May 18, 2013.\nTank 3013 and its fill line were deinventoried and isolated, a unified command response center was set\nup, and clean-up began. The Tank 3013 fill line was excavated to investigate the source of the leak,\nwhich was found on the bottom of the pipe at the low point of the fill line. The failed pipe section was\nremoved and transported to a metallurgical laboratory for examination and testing. The Tank 3013 fill\nline was replaced in its entirety. In December 2013, after the new line was tested, Tank 3013 and the fill\nline were returned to service.\nThere were no injuries, fatalities, fires, explosions, or off-site impacts as a result of this leak. On-site\nimpacts were limited to vegetation, soil, and retainment pond areas. Approximately 2,246 barrels of\ncrude oil were released and 2,071 barrels were recovered. Forensic metallurgical analysis determined\nthat the immediate cause of failure was internal corrosion.\nSystem Details\nThe Cushing Tank Farm is operated by Enbridge, which has a terminal located in Cushing, Oklahoma.\nThe Enbridge terminal is 2 miles long and comprised of three operating areas: the North, Central, and\nSouth Terminals. The South Terminal is located in Lincoln County, Oklahoma, while the Central and\nNorth Terminals are in Payne County, Oklahoma. The Enbridge terminal currently has 89 breakout\ntanks, as well as several tanks in various stages of inspection or demolition and additional tanks\ncurrently under construction. The tally of 89 tanks was taken at the time of the most recent inspection\nand included 28 breakout tanks in the South Terminal, 34 breakout tanks in the Central Terminal, and 27\nbreakout tanks in the North Terminal. The terminal is operated by a local control room that is manned\n24 hours, seven days per week.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nTank 3013 and the connecting tank fill lines were purchased by Enbridge from Skelly Oil Company in\n1980. The tank has operated in crude oil service from the time of purchase to the present. Tank 3013\nwas out of service for an American Petroleum Institute (API) 653 internal inspection from May 2011\nthrough May 8, 2013, when the tank roof was floated by injection of 50,000 barrels of oil. On May 10,\n2013, the tank level radar gage was recalibrated, causing the calculated tank volume to increase by\n1,879 barrels although no additional oil was added to the tank. Tank 3013 was refilled on May 14, 2013,\nafter which point no additional withdrawals or injections were made and the tank valves remained in\ntheir normal open position for “ready for service” mode until the time of the release.\nPage 2 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enbridge Cushing Tank Farm\nMay 17-18, 2013\nOn Friday, May 17, 2013, maintenance pigging was performed on a line that is part of the Basin Pipeline\nSystem, owned by Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. Coordination of activities related to the interface of\nthat pipeline within the Enbridge Cushing Terminal was monitored by the controller on duty during the\nday shift. Enbridge outside technicians worked with the Plains All American Pipeline personnel who\nwere performing the pigging and line-fill activities in the North Terminal area.\nOn Friday, May 17, 2013, a product movement alarm was acknowledged for Tank 3013 at 14:39:09\nsupervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) time. The alarm noted a volume of\n(b) (7)(F)\n. Despite the controller’s acknowledgment of the\nalarm, it was not cleared at that time. No further product movement alarms were received for Tank\n3013. Because there was not a second alarm during that shift, and because the controller thought\nthe first movement alarm was related to weather and had cleared itself, the alarm remained in the\nstack and was not discussed in the shift hand-off (SHO).\nThe SHO from night shift to day shift on Saturday, May 18, 2013, did not mention anything about Tank\n3013. The daily balance performed at about 7:30 a.m. Central Time (CT) noted an imbalance of\napproximately the same value as the tank bottom adjustment for Tank 3013; the coincidental similarity\nwas attributed to the accounting entry rather than a possible leak because the controller did not have\nany indication of abnormal conditions in Tank 3013. The subsequent balance check performed Saturday\nmorning caused the controller to make a mental note of the imbalance, which he decided to investigate\nfurther if it did not return to normal after lunch.\nAround 1:00 p.m. CT on Saturday, May 18, 2013, an outside technician was returning to the control\nroom with lunch when he detected an odor. The outside technician communicated this information to\nthe controller, who instructed the outside technician to investigate the Tank 3013 area while he began\nfurther review of the balance information and trending data. The outside technician reported to the\ncontroller that there were no visible signs of a leak in the vicinity of Tank 3013. However, the controller\nasked the outside technician to continue looking and indicated that the issue might be related to Tank\n3013. By this time the product was just becoming visible on the surface of the dirt bank and the\ncontainment pond, into which it was flowing. The following aerial view depicts the site layout:\nPage 3 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enbridge Cushing Tank Farm\nMay 17-18, 2013\nTank 3013 Site Layout\nShortly after 1:00 p.m. CT, operations personnel confirmed that oil was leaking from the 24-inch-\ndiameter line connected to Tank 3013 at a low point in the line where it crossed below a drainage ditch.\nOil was found to have migrated from the drainage ditch into a nearby containment pond and then into a\nsecond, larger containment pond via a connecting drainage creek. Upon confirmation of the leak, all\nconnecting tank and manifold valves were closed to stop the outflow of oil. The outside technician\nclosed the Tank 3013 isolation valve and provided the controller with leak confirmation on the Tank\n3013 fill line. The controller initiated spill response notifications and set up the incident command at\nthe Cushing Terminal office location.\nEmergency Response\nOperator Response\nThe operator identified the release shortly after 1:00 p.m. CT on May 18, 2013, after which the operator\ninitiated its spill response plan and recovered approximately 2,071 barrels of the 2,246 barrels released.\nAll product was contained onsite and within planned containment areas. The clean-up operations were\ncarried out in extremely severe weather, yet did not result in injury or further release of product.\nThe operator reported the release to the National Response Center (NRC) Office 1047579 at 2:33 p.m.\nCT on May 18, 2013. The original release volume was estimated at 1,500 barrels (Appendix B).\nPHMSA Response\nPHMSA dispatched an accident investigator to the site. The accident investigator arrived on Sunday,\nMay 19, 2013, and remained onsite until Wednesday, May 22, 2013.\nInvestigation Details\nPHMSA’s investigation included a detailed review of the events and associated procedures related to\ninternal corrosion prevention, alarm response, and terminal balancing activities, as well as the\nnumerous control room processes related to leak detection and suspected leak investigation.\nPage 4 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enbridge Cushing Tank Farm\nMay 17-18, 2013\nTerminal piping leak detection is managed by monitoring flow rates, pressures, and tank volumes, as\nsupplemented by the SCADA alarm system. In addition, a tank volume balance procedure is used to\nidentify imbalances in tank levels that could indicate product loss either directly from a tank or from the\nassociated piping.\nThe SCADA system was designed and is managed by the Enbridge Pipeline Control Systems and Leak\nDetection group in Edmonton, Canada; however, various inputs to the system are set by operations\ntechnicians in Cushing, Oklahoma.\n(b) (7)(F)\n—which is set when no tank movement is anticipated\nand will trigger an alarm if the calculated tank movement exceeds the set value.\n(b) (7)(F)\n(b) (7)(F)\n. This\nvolume was chosen due to the size of the tank (capacity greater than 100,000 barrels) and to avoid\nnuisance alarms during weather events due to shifting of floating roofs and product movement inside\nthe tank, which can generate barrel movement volume ranging from 200 to 300 barrels. Fluctuation of\nthe floating roof during weather events can be an inch or more. If the volume is not set high enough to\naccount for such movements the tank movement alarms would not be meaningful during adverse\nweather events. In addition to tank balancing, other leak detection methods include visual checks and\nsurveillance by camera. These methods are intended to work in concert with the tank alarms as a\ncomprehensive set of actions designed to detect leaks as early as possible.\nTerminal monitoring by outside technician personnel includes a drive-through of the facility on a two-\nhour cycle, use of the Commodity Movement Tracking System for volumetric measurements on both a\ntwo-hour and a daily basis, and surveillance cameras installed inside the tank areas.\nMetallurgical Examination\nFollowing initial clean-up, an 8.5-foot section of the failed pipe was sent to Det Norske Veritas\nGermanischer Lloyd (DNVGL) in Columbus, Ohio, for metallurgical analysis. A summary of DNVGL’s\nfindings may be found later in this section, and the complete metallurgical report is provided in\nAppendix D.\nDNVGL’s report indicated that the leak in the 24-inch pipe originated from a hole 1.4 inches long\nand 0.8 inches wide (circumference) that was located beneath black deposits in an area of discrete\ninternal corrosion on the bottom of the pipe. In total, there were four corrosion pits found in the\npipe. The leak hole was 100 percent through the pipe wall, while the remaining three pits were\nbetween 35 percent and 53 percent through the pipe wall. There was no evidence of general\nPage 5 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enbridge Cushing Tank Farm\nMay 17-18, 2013\ncorrosion or pitting on the external surface of the pipe, and the pipe coating was well adhered in\nareas away from the leak site.\nThe pipeline steel’s tensile properties, Charpy properties, and chemical composition were shown to\nmeet the API 5LX Grade X70 line pipe steel requirements in place at the time of manufacture. The\naverage wall thickness measured was 0.284 inches, slightly greater than the specified value of 0.281\ninches shown on the construction drawings.\nHigh to very high concentrations of aerobic, anaerobic, acid-producing, sulfate-reducing, and iron-\nrelated bacteria were detected on the inside surface of the pipe at the leak site. Additionally, low\nto moderate concentrations of all five bacteria types were detected in deposits removed from the\nleak location in an area with no significant corrosion. The presence of microorganisms on the pipe\nsurfaces, combined with higher levels of bacteria present at the leak site, indicates that\nmicrobiologically induced corrosion (MIC) is likely the primary corrosion mechanism.\nDNVGL’s analysis determined that the leak occurred as a result of internal corrosion that\npropagated through the pipe wall at the 6:17 o’clock position. The internal corrosion was likely\nexacerbated due to the accumulation of deposits/sediments caused by non-flowing conditions.\nThere was no indication that the failure involved a mechanical (i.e. strength-related) component.\nFigure 1 provides a field photograph of the failure location and a close-up view of the pipe leak location:\nFindings & Contributing Factors\nEnbridge completed a detailed incident investigation and shared their findings with PHMSA, including\nthe following analysis of the events that delayed the detection of the release (Appendix E). These\nevents corroborated the findings of on-site interviews of operations personnel conducted by PHMSA\nimmediately after the release. The following is a summary of findings from the operator’s analysis of\nthe delayed detection:\nPage 6 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enbridge Cushing Tank Farm\nMay 17-18, 2013\nA tank movement alarm was received approximately 2.5 hours after the leak began when a tank\nmovement limit of 310 barrels was exceeded. This was mistakenly believed to be a false alarm due to\nnormal variations in calculated volume caused by weather effects.\nTank balancing calculations conducted every 2 hours on May 17-18 also revealed unexplained losses in\ntank volume. These were not acted upon, however, because the utilized volume limit was not exceeded\nin any of the 2-hour time periods.\nFinally, a 1,573-barrel-loss in tank volume was recorded by the 24-hour tank balance procedure\nconducted the morning of May 18. This also was not acted upon, as it was mistakenly believed to be\nrelated to a previous instrumentation calibration correction.\nThese issues allowed a significantly larger volume of crude oil to be released than otherwise would if the\nSCADA information had been correctly interpreted and acted upon.\nIn their investigation findings, Enbridge also provided a summary of the events that took place on the\nday of the intial leak and the actions undertaken following the discovery of the leak. Their findings\ndetailed actions Enbridge personnel should have taken in reponse to the original leak on May 17, 2013,\nand identified potential shortcomings in their procedures. These findings included a detailed\ninvestigation regarding why the leak went undetected for nearly 24 hours, resulting in a significantly\nincreased volume release.\nConclusions\nPHMSA concurs with the Enbridge investigation team determination that:\n1. The primary cause of the leak was the presence of an undetected internal corrosion defect\nthat extended through the pipe wall and produced a substantial crude oil release that went undetected\nfor almost 24 hours; and\n2. The consequences increased in severity due to misinterpretation of SCADA alarm and tank\nbalance information, thereby delaying the discovery of the real reason for loss of product from the tank.\nThe Enbridge investigation team identified the following items that may also have contributed to this\nincident:\n1. Existing procedures to assess alarm conditions provide Cushing CC operations technicians\nwith little guidance regarding how such assessments should be conducted;\n2. A large number of nuisance alarms went off in the control center at the same time that the\ntank movement alarm was received, which may have partially obscured the importance of that\nalarm;\n3. (b) (7)(F)\nPage 7 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enbridge Cushing Tank Farm\nMay 17-18, 2013\n4. Cushing CC operations technicians do not have dedicated, 24-hour support staff available to\nhelp evaluate and manage alarms;\n5. No documented guidance was provided to operations regarding when inhibition and/or\nflushing should be used as mitigation strategies;\n6. Heavy vegetation in site drainage ditches and around ponds may have prevented early\ndetection during routine drive-around site inspections; and\n7. An undetected maintenance issue with an underflow pipe flume (a large corrosion hole in the\npipe) allowed oil to migrate out of the upper pond, through a second drainage ditch, and into a\nlower pond, resulting in increased contamination and clean-up costs.\nAs a result of the Enbridge investigation team’s key findings, the following areas received\nrecommendations and procedural improvements aimed at the prevention of similar incidents in the\nfuture:\n• Procedures for locating, inspecting, and mitigating corrosion-prone facilities’ piping segments;\n• Terminal operating practices related to infrequently used piping;\n• Tank movement tracking and terminal alarm systems related to leak detection; and\n• Control center procedures regarding recognizing and assessing leak-related alarms.\nThe procedures related to the prevention of internal corrosion within terminal piping were expanded to\nincorporate the lessons learned from this accident. Additionally, the replacement tank fill line piping\nwas installed with an internal coating in order to minimize the likelihood of interior corrosion.\nAppendices\nA Enbridge Cushing Terminal Map\nB NRC Report\nC Operator Accident/Incident Report to PHMSA\nD Laboratory Analysis PP07 8181\nE Operator Incident Investigation Report and Findings\nPage 8 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix A\nEnbridge Cushing Terminal Map\nThis document is on file at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 1047579\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 15 : 33 on 18- MAY - 13\nIncident Type: FIXED\nIncident Cause : EQUIPMENT FAILURE\nAffected Area :\nThe incident occurred on 18-MAY-13 at 14:00 local time.\nAffected Medium: OTHER CONTAINMENT ON-SITE\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization: ENBRIDGE\nCUSHING, OK 74023\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\nINCIDENT LOCATION\n2101 S. LINWOOD AVE . County: LINCOLN\nCity : CUSHING State : OK Zip: 74023\nWITHIN CUSHING TERMINAL SOUTH TANK FARM\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nOfficial Material Name: OIL: CRUDE\nCHRIS Code: OIL\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 1500 BARREL(S)\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nA TRUNK LINE GOING TO A TANK ON THE PROPERTY IS LEAKING, THE LEAK HAS MIGRATED\nOUTSIDE OF A BERM AND IS SETTLING INTO A CONTAINMENT POND . CAUSE IS UNKNOWN . LINE\nWILL BE SEALED, DUG UP AND REPLACED.\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPackage: N/A\nBuilding ID:\nType of Fixed Object: TANK FARM\nPower Generating Facility: UNKNOWN\nGenerating Capacity:\nType of Fuel :\nNPDES:\nNPDES Compliance: UNKNOWN\nFire Involved: NO\nINJURIES: NO\nFATALITIES: NO\nEVACUATIONS : NO\nDamages: NO\nDAMAGES\nFire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nHospitalized:\nEmpl/Crew:\nWho Evacuated:\nEmpl/Crew:\nPassenger:\nRadius/Area:\nPassenger :\nOccupant :\nLength of\nClosure\nDirection of\nClosure\nClosure Type Description of Closure\nAir: N\nRoad : N\nWaterway: N\nMajor\nArtery : N\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nTrack : N\nPassengers Transferred : NO\nEnvironmental Impact : UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest : NONE Community Impact due to Material:\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nEVACUATING LINE, DIGGING UP LINE, CLEANUP UNDERWAY, ALL MATERIAL CONTAINED ON-SITE\nRelease Secured: YES\nRelease Rate :\nEstimated Release Duration:\nWEATHER\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal :\nState/Local: OK cc\nState/Local On Scene:\nState Agency Number :\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nCOLORADO INFO ANALYSIS CENTER (FUSION CENTER)\n18-MAY-13 15:39\nDHS PROTECTIVE SECURITY ADVISOR (PSA DESK)\n18-MAY- 13 15 : 39\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n18 - MAY - 13 15 : 39\nU.S. EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)\n18-MAY-13 15:45\nGULF STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)\n18- MAY-13 15:39\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n18-MAY- 13 15 : 39\nNOAA RPTS FOR OK (MAIN OFFICE)\n18-MAY-13 15:39\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (AUTOMATIC REPORTS)\n18-MAY- 13 15 : 39\nNRC SENIOR WATCH OFFICER (MAIN OFFICE)\n18 - MAY-13 15:45\nOFC OF ENV SVC CHEROKEE NATIONS OK (MAIN OFFICE)\n18-MAY- 13 15 : 39\nSAC AND FOX NATION (EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT)\n18-MAY-13 15 : 39\nDEQ OKLAHOMA (MAIN OFFICE)\n18-MAY-13 15 : 39\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nALL MATERIAL EXPECTED TO STAY ON PROPERTY, WILL NOTIFY LOCAL AUTHORITIES\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 1047579 ***\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2014\nOriginal Report\nDate: 06/14/2013\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20130208 - 18846\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Yes Final:\nYes\nLast Revision Date: 12/18/2013\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 31947\n2. Name of Operator ENBRIDGE PIPELINES (OZARK) L.L.C.\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 1100 LOUISIANA , SUITE 3300\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code 77002\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 05/18/2013 14:00\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 35.95885\nLongitude: -96.75655\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1047579\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 05/18/2013 14:25\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released) Crude Oil\n- Specify Commodity Subtype:\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 2,246.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 2,071.00\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? No\n- If No, Explain: The tank line was idle at the time of the leak\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 05/18/2013 14:00\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 05/18/2013 14:30\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Oklahoma\n3. Zip Code: 74023\n4. City Cushing\n5. County or Parish Lincoln\n6. Operator-designated location:\nSpecify:\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Cushing Terminal\n8. Segment name/ID: Tank 3013 Line Fill\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Totally contained on Operator-controlled property\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 18\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Terminal/Tank Farm Equipment and Piping\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n- If Pipe, specify: 3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 3b. Wall thickness (in): 3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 3d. Pipe specification: 3e. Pipe Seam , specify: - If Other, Describe: 3f. Pipe manufacturer: 3g. Year of manufacture: 3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: - If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 5. Material involved in Accident: - If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: - If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type: - If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water - Groundwater\n- Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife 5. Water contamination: 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface - Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? 7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\nPipe Body\n24\n.281\n24,000\nUnknown\nOther\nUnknown\nUnknown\n1978\nCoal Tar\n1979\nCarbon Steel\nLeak\nOther\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\n2,246.00\nUnnamed tributary to Wildhorse Creek\nNo\nNo\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n8. Estimated Property Damage:\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage $ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 30,000\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 754,000\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 5,600,000\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 7,460,274\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n8g. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $ 13,844,274\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 15.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 250.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. restriction?\nDid the pressure exceed this established pressure\n4b. State?\nWas this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\n5. 2?\nWas \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5e. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools?\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? If Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? 6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? 6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? - If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator?\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error - Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures - Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n=< 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\nNo\nCPM leak detection system or SCADA-based information\n(such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume\ncalculations)\nYes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\nYes\nYes\nYes\nYes\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nYes\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested: 3\n1b. Specify how many failed: 0\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G1 - Corrosion Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion:\nInternal Corrosion: Yes\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination: Localized Pitting\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological Yes\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis Yes\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1 (Rev. 12-2012)\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe Yes\n- Elbow\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? No\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? No\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident? No\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent yea","truncated":true,"body_characters":57180}