{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Enterprise Operating Products, 2009-12-23","title":"Failure Report- Enterprise Operating Products 12/23/09","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2010-12-17","effective_on":"2009-12-23","summary":"Enterprise Operating Products; Hazardous Liquid; TX; failure 2009-12-23; apparent cause: Material Failure - Fitting.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-operating-products-122309.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-operating-products-122309.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-operating-products-122309","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-enterprise-operating-products-122309","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nMemorandum\nu. S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\nDate:\nTo: R.M. Seeley, Southwest Region Director\nFrom: Kim Nguyen, General Engineer ~ ~\nSUbject: Incident Report - Enterprise Products Operating LLC\nOperator Number 31618, Unit Number 60534\nAccident Location: Port Bolivar Galveston, TX\nDate ofAccident: December 23,2009, NRC Number: 926954\nSMART Activity # 128212103\nsep~,20l0\nSummary:\nOn December 23, 2009, at approximately 7: 15 am, the Galveston City Fire Department\n(GFD) was notified by a citizen of crude oil spraying up to 15 feet in the air at the\nEnterprise Products Operating LLC (Enterprise) Bolivar station in Bolivar, TX which is part\nof the Enterprise (EPCO) Cameron Highway Oil Pipeline System (CHOPS) crude oil\ntransmission system. GFD arrived at the accident site at 7:30 am. The Galveston County\nSheriff Department promptly notified Enterprise of the release at approximately 7:48 am.\nEnterprise instructed GFD not to close any valves. At approximately 8: 1 0 am, Enterprise\nstarted shutting off crude oil from High Island A5 platform going to Bolivar station, and\nisolated the CHOPS system segment A5. There was no fire or explosion as a result of the\naccident, and an estimated 120 bbls crude oil were released to the environment (110 bbls\ncrude oil were recovered via a vacuum truck). There was impact to the public as crude oil\nsheen was discovered on State Road (SR) 87 (adjacent to the Bolivar Station) causing traffic\nsafety issues, and SR 87 was closed to the public by the Galveston County Sheriff\nDepartment (GCSD) from approximately 9:00 AM to 11 :00 PM on December 23, 2009.\nThere was impact to the environment as a result of the crude oil release, and crude oil\nrecovery and soil remediation was completed on December 25, 2009. The nearest\nresidential area to the accident site is ~ mile away. The cause of the crude oil release was\ndetermined to be the failure ofcap screws in a pressure switch, PSH-ll 003, due to hydrogen\nassisted cracking promoted by galvanic corrosion.\n-1\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nDuring Enterprise’s response to the accident, three Enterprise field operation specialists\nfrom Sabine Pass, Port Arthur, and Texas City, TX were dispatched to the accident site on\nthe morning of December 23, 2009. Upon arriving at approximately 9:00 AM, they closed\n¾ inch (V-11003) Whitley ball valve, located on top of the 24-inch pipeline, that was used\nto isolate the failed pressure switch, and the release of crude oil into the environment was\nstopped. The release was estimated to have been active from approximately 7:00 AM to\n9:00 AM on December 23, 2009. Enterprise established an on-site incident commander in\ncoordination with GFD and GCSD, and T&T Marines Salvages was contracted to provide\nresponse clean-up and remediation services. The failed cap screws from the pressure switch\nand associated components were transported to the Stress Engineering Services Inc. (SES)\nlaboratory for metallurgical analysis. The Bolivar station resumed operation at\napproximately 6:00 pm on December 24, 2009 without incident. T&T Marines Salvages\ncompleted crude oil recovery and soil remediation on December 25, 2009.\nBackground:\nOver the last five years, Enterprise has experienced 1 accident (in 2008) on this PHMSA\nInspection Unit 60534. The cause of this accident was due to Hurricane Ike storm surge\ncausing a major washout of concrete supports under the pipeline resulting in a crack on a\nweld of a 2 inch pipe nipple which allowed crude oil to be released to the environment (2\nbbls).\nSystem Description:\nPHMSA Inspection Unit 60534 includes the CHOPS offshore crude oil pipeline system\nwhich is designed for transportation of approximately 650,000 b/d of crude oil. CHOPS\nconsists of approximately 237 miles of 30\" offshore pipeline and approximately 138 miles\nof dual 24\" pipeline. The 30\" pipeline originates at the Ship Shoal (SS) 332B platform\ncrosses Garden Banks (GB) 72 platform and terminates at the CHOPS High Island (HI) A5\nplatform. Departing the HI A5 platform are two 24\" pipelines, with onshore destinations of\nPort Neches, TX and Texas City, TX respectively. The Port Neches 'leg' is approximately\n68 miles in length, and the Texas City 'leg' is approximately 69 miles in length. CHOPS has\na MOP of 2160 psig from SS332B to the onshore spec break platforms (HI A5), the MOP\nreduces to 1250 psig, the meters have a MOP of 275 psig. The Bolivar Station where the\naccident occurred is a midpoint meter station in the 24-inch pipeline as the crude oil is\ntransported on shore and onto the Texas City terminus.\nFindings:\nThe SES metallurgy evaluation report concluded that the cause of failed cap screws in the\npressure switch was due to hydrogen assisted cracking. The high hardness (Rockwell C 43)\nof the steel that the failed cap screws were manufactured from probably played a significant\nrole in the cracking process. The metallurgy laboratory analysis also indicated that the\nhousing of the failed switch had been fabricated of type 316 stainless steel (16-18%\nChromium, 10-14% Nickel), and the failed switch had been fabricated of stainless steel\ncontaining approximately 13% chromium.\n-2-\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nConclusions:\nThe metallurgy laboratory analysis also concluded that the presence of solutions containing\nzinc salts may have contributed to the observed cracking of the screws indirectly by\npromoting galvanic coupling between the screws and the more corrosion resistant type 316\nstainless steel housing in which they were mounted. The origin of zinc salts are not\nidentified during the investigation.\nAs a result of the accident investigation, EPCO implemented the following preventive\nmeasures on the CHOPS system:\n• Replaced the failed pressure switch (ITT Neodyne, model 122P88CC6448) with a\ndifferent pressure switch manufactured by Custom Control Sensors, model 646GZE.\nThis model has been widely used at the facility and proven to be reliable. Enterprise has\nhad no problems in the field with this model, to date.\n• Installed excess flow valves between the ¾” Whitley isolation ball valve and PSL-11004\nand PSH-11003 to prevent overflow\nAs a result of the accident investigation, EPCO implemented the following mitigative\nmeasures on the CHOPS system:\n• Verified the Bolivar Station product containment alarm operated as designed\n• Verified with the Liquid Control Center that the lightning and video cameras for the\nCHOPS system operated as designed\n• Verified that the monitoring of pipeline pressures and pressure switches in the Liquid\nControl Center operated as designed\n• Emphasized the importance of the monitoring system (video camera and ATMOS leak\ndetection) with the onshore measurement technicians and the Liquid Control Center.\nAppendices:\nAppendix A – NRC # 926954\nAppendix B – PHMSA 7000-1 Form\nAppendix C– Enterprise Bolivar Station P&ID and Replaced Pressure Switch\nSpecifications\nAppendix D– Accident Time Line\nAppendix E– Metallurgical Evaluation Report\nAppendix F – Post-Accident Photos\n-3-\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nAppendix A\nNRC # 926954\n-4.\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nPage 1 of 2\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 926954\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 09:38 on 23-DEC-09\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: UNKNOWN\nAffected Area:\nThe incident was discovered on 23-DEC-09 at 08:00 local time.\nAffected Medium: LAND ONTO THE GROUND\n____________________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization: ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS\nHOUSTON, TX 77002\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nCAMERON HWY PIPELINE County: CHAMBERS\nBOLIVAR PENINSULA\nCity: GALVESTON State: TX\n____________________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: OIL Official Material Name: OIL: CRUDE\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nCALLER STATED THERE IS A SPILL OF MATERIALS FROM A 24 INCH STEEL TRANSMISSION\nPIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES. NO WATERWAYS IMPACTED BUT A HIGHWAY WAS CLOSED.\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: TRANSMISSION\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: ABOVE\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDAMAGES\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nLength of Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure\nAir: N\nRoad: Y HIGHWAY 87 .8 E/W\nWaterway: N\nMajor\nArtery:\nY\nTrack: N\nPassengers Transferred: NO\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nhttp://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard\nweb+inc\n_\n_\nseq=926954\n12/14/2010\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nPage 2 of 2\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nCALLER STATED THEY HAVE TECHNICIANS EN ROUTE.\nRelease Secured: YES\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: OVERCAST, 55ºF\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: NONE\nState/Local: TRRC\nState/Local On Scene: State Agency Number: NONE\nCOUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nU.S. EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-DEC-09 09:49\nFLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIST COMMAND CENTER)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nFLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PORT ARTHUR (FIELD UNIT)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nJFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nNOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-DEC-09 09:48\nHOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nSECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON (COMMAND CENTER)\n23-DEC-09 09:50\nTCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nTX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nTX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 1)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nTX GENERAL LAND OFFICE (TXGLO REGION 2)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\nTEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)\n23-DEC-09 09:47\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nCALLER DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.\n___________________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 926954 ***\nhttp://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard\nweb+inc\n_\n_\nseq=926954\n12/14/2010\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nAppendix B\nPHMSA 7000-1 Form\n-5-\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 Form Approved\nOMB No. 2137-0047\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nResearch and Special Programs\nAdministration\nACCIDENT REPORT – HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nReport Date\nNo.\n(DOT Use Only)\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the\ninformation requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions,\nyou can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at http://ops.dot.gov.\nPART A – GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION\nOriginal Report Supplemental Report Final Report\n1. a. Operator's OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) / ____________/\n2. b. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter Owner’s OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) / ___ /\nc. Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________\nd. Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________\ne. Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________\nCity, County, State and Zip Code\nIMPORTANT: IF THE SPILL IS SMALL, THAT IS, THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS,\nCOMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY, UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR §195.52(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE\nREPORTABLE UNDER §195.50 AS REVISED IN CY 2001.\n2. Time and date of the accident\n/ / / / / / / /\nhr. month day year\n3. Location of accident\n(If offshore, do not complete a through d. See Part C.1)\na. Latitude: _____ Longitude:\n__________\n(if not available, see instructions for how to provide specific location)\nb. _________________________________________________\nCity, and County or Parish\nc. _________________________________________________\nState and Zip Code\nd. Mile post/valve station or survey station no.\n(whichever gives more accurate location)\n_________________________________\n4. Telephone report\n/ / / / / / / /\nNRC Report Number month day year\n5. Losses (Estimated)\nPublic/Community Losses reimbursed by operator:\nPublic/private property damage $_______________\nCost of emergency response phase $_______________\nCost of environmental remediation $_______________\nOther Costs $_______________\n(describe) _____________________________________\nOperator Losses:\nValue of product lost $_______________\nValue of operator property damage $_______________\nOther Costs $_______________\n(describe) _____________________________________\nTotal Costs $_______________\n6. Commodity Spilled Yes No\n(If Yes, complete Parts a through c where applicable)\na. Name of commodity spilled ___________________________\nb. Classification of commodity spilled:\nHVLs /other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions\nCO2 or other non-flammable, non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions\nGasoline, diesel, fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions\nCrude oil\nc. Estimated amount of commodity\ninvolved :\nBarrels\nGallons (check only if spill is\nless than one barrel)\nAmounts:\nSpilled : ____________\nRecovered: ____________\nCAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) : (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)\nCorrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage\nMaterial and/or Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other\nPART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE\n(type or print) Preparer's Name and Title Preparer's E-mail Address Area Code and Telephone Number\nArea Code and Facsimile Number\nAuthorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title Date Area Code and Telephone Number\nForm RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4\nOPS Data Facsimile\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nPART C – ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)\n1. Additional location information\na. Line segment name or ID _______________________\nb. Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental\nShelf Yes No\nc. Is pipeline interstate? Yes No\nOffshore: Yes No (complete d if offshore)\nd. Area ___________________ Block # ______________\nState / / or Outer Continental Shelf\n2. Location of system involved (check all that apply)\nOperator’s Property\nPipeline Right of Way\nHigh Consequence Area (HCA)?\nDescribe HCA____________________________________\n3. Part of system involved in accident\nAbove Ground Storage Tank\nCavern or other below ground storage facility\nPump/meter station; terminal/tank farm piping and\nequipment, including sumps\nOther Specify: _________________________________\nOnshore pipeline, including valve sites\nOffshore pipeline, including platforms\nIf failure occurred on Pipeline, complete items a - g:\n4. Failure occurred on\nBody of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap\nPump Sump Joint\nComponent Valve Metering Facility\nRepair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting\nGirth Weld\nOther (specify)\nYear the component that failed was installed: / /\n5. Maximum operating pressure (MOP)\na. Estimated pressure at point and time of accident:\n____ PSIG\nb. MOP at time of accident:\n___________PSIG\nc. Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident?\nYes No\na. Type of leak or rupture\nLeak: Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec. H5)\nPuncture, diameter (inches) _________\nRupture: Circumferential – Separation\nLongitudinal – Tear/Crack, length (inches) __________\nPropagation Length, total, both sides (feet) _________\nN/A\nOther _______________________________\nb.Type of block valve used for isolation of immediate section:\nUpstream: Manual Automatic Remote Control\nCheck Valve\nDownstream: Manual Automatic Remote Control\nCheck Valve\nc. Length of segment isolated _______ ft\nd. Distance between valves _______ ft\ne. Is segment configured for internal inspection tools? Yes No\nf. Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of\nfailure? Yes No Don’t Know\nNot Possible due to physical constraints in the system\ng. If Yes, type of device run (check all that apply)\nHigh Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: ______\nLow Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: ______\nUT tool Year run: ______\nGeometry tool Year run: ______\nCaliper tool Year run: ______\nCrack tool Year run: ______\nHard Spot tool Year run: ______\nOther tool Year run: ______\nPART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E – ENVIRONMENT\n1. Nominal pipe size (NPS) / / in.\n2. Wall thickness / / in.\n3. Specification SMYS / /\n4. Seam type\n5. Valve type\n6. Manufactured by in year / /\n1. Area of accident In open ditch\nUnder pavement Above ground\nUnderground Under water\nInside/under building Other ____________\n2. Depth of cover: inches\nPART F – CONSEQUENCES\n1. Consequences (check and complete all that apply)\na. Fatalities Injuries c. Product ignited Yes No d. Explosion Yes No\nNumber of operator employees: _______ _______ e. Evacuation (general public only) / / people\nContractor employees working for operator: _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation:\nGeneral public: _______ _______ Precautionary by company\nTotals: _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official\nb. Was pipeline/segment shutdown due to leak? Yes No f. Elapsed time until area was made safe:\nIf Yes, how long? ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes / / hr. / / min.\n2. Environmental Impact\na. Wildlife Impact: Fish/aquatic Yes No e. Water Contamination: Yes No (If Yes, provide the following)\nBirds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels\nTerrestrial Yes No Ocean/Seawater No Yes\nb. Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes\nIf Yes, estimated number of cubic yards: _________\nGroundwater No Yes\nc. Long term impact assessment performed: Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes, check below.)\nd. Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake\nIf Yes, check all that apply: Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife\nForm RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) OPS Data Facsimile\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nPART G – LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION\n1. Computer based leak detection capability in place? 2. Was the release initially detected by? (check one): Yes No\nCPM/SCADA-based system with leak detection\nStatic shut-in test or other pressure or leak test\nLocal operating personnel, procedures or equipment\nRemote operating personnel, including controllers\nAir patrol or ground surveillance\nA third party Other (specify) _________________\n3. Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____\nPART H – APPARENT CAUSE\nImportant: There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H. Check the box corresponding to the\nprimary cause of the accident. Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories\ncorresponding to the cause you indicate. See the instructions for guidance.\nH1 – CORROSION\n1. External Corrosion\n2. Internal Corrosion\n(Complete items a – e\nwhere applicable.) b. Visual Examination\nLocalized Pitting\nGeneral Corrosion\nOther ____________________\na. Pipe Coating\nc. Cause of Corrosion\nBare\nGalvanic Atmospheric\nCoated\nStray Current Microbiological\nCathodic Protection Disrupted\nStress Corrosion Cracking\nSelective Seam Corrosion\nOther ____________________\nd. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident?\nNo Yes, Year Protection Started: / /\ne. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion?\nNo Yes => Estimated time prior to accident: / / years / / months Unknown\nH2 – NATURAL FORCES\n3. Earth Movement => Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other\n4. Lightning\n5. Heavy Rains/Floods => Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other\n6. Temperature => Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other\n7. High Winds\nH3 – EXCAVATION DAMAGE\n8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractors/Not Third Party)\n9. Third Party (complete a-f)\na. Excavator group\nGeneral Public Government Excavator other than Operator/subcontractor\nb. Type: Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer Phone/Cable\nLandowner-not farming related Farming Railroad\nOther liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor\nNautical Operations Other ________\nc. Excavation was: Open Trench Sub-strata (boring, directional drilling, etc…)\nd. Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No e. Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity?\nIf Yes, Date of last contact /_________/\nYes; Date received: / / mo. / / day / ______/ yr. No\nNotification received from: One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner\nf. Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation? No i. Temporary markings: Flags Stakes Paint\nii. Permanent markings:\niii. Marks were (check one) : Accurate Not Accurate\niv. Were marks made within required time? Yes No\nH4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE\n10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure => Fire/Explosion cause: Man made Natural\n11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe\n12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe\n13. Vandalism\nYes (If Yes, check applicable items i - iv)\nForm RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4\nOPS Data Facsimile\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nH5 – MATERIAL AND/OR WELD FAILURES\nMaterial\n14. Body of Pipe => Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other\n15. Component => Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other\n16. Joint => Gasket O-Ring Threads Other\nWeld\n17. Butt => Pipe Fabrication Other\n18. Fillet => Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other\n19. Pipe Seam => LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld\nHF ERW SAW Spiral Other\nComplete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5.\na. Type of failure:\nConstruction Defect => Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures\nMaterial Defect\nb. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site? Yes No\nc. Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred? Yes, complete d-g No\nd. Date of test: / / yr. / / mo. / / day\ne. Test medium: Water Inert Gas Other\nf. Time held at test pressure: / / hr.\ng. Estimated test pressure at point of accident: PSIG\nH6 – EQUIPMENT\n20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment => Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications\nBlock valve Relief valve Power failure Other\n21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling => Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other\n22. Seal Failure => Gasket O-Ring Seal/Pump Packing Other\nH7 – INCORRECT OPERATION\n23. Incorrect Operation\na. Type: Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures\nOther _______________________________________\nb. Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test: drug test: / / alcohol test /_________/\nH8 – OTHER\n24. Miscellaneous, describe:\n25. Unknown\nInvestigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete)\nPART I – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)\nForm RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4\nOPS Data Facsimile\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nAppendix C\nPort Bolivar Galveston station P&ID\n&\nProduct Specification for the Pressure\nSwitch that failed allowing crude oil to be\nreleased\n-6-\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n,\n, ,\n,\nl,\n,\n- 1 -, 1\n,\n- ­ - - 1\n1\n1 '\nI\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n,\nI\n1 '\ni\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nWI(:)E f:lANGE \"PRE$URE\nEXTERNAl.. ADJUSTMENT DIAPHRAGM VAOUUM\nSSTPORr\nINsrJU.IJlDON DRAWING\n1~1{t]: . .: . .1.\nL\n_ _•. • .B7\n- - r\n, .\n-4.250646GZE\nI \"2.12 18\" FREE LEADS\nr---'\n. ELECTRICAL\n- ----r---- CONNECTION\nI I I 112-14 NPT\nB.O '\nMAX .265 DIA.\nMTGHOLES 646GZEl\n(2 PLACES)\n3.35 \" ADJ. SCREW ~ ~;,r-.~\nMAX I '\"\n, I RANGE SCALE 1- ,\n~ =r2.BO ~ PRESSURE PORT - 2.25 ­ SQ\nMAX 1/2-14 NPT\nSHIPPING Wf.\nAPPIlOX. 56 OZ.\n3.30 11587 GRAMSI\n• _. . -,- MAX\n.----t--''':'''.;\"I:.. . __ I 1P I\nI 'I. ..25 (TYPP .r::\nOP~RAnNG AND ORD~RING DArA:\nPRESSURE SWITCHES 1/2\" STAINLESS STEEL\n• PRESSURE PORT &\nMODEL 646GZE POlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM\nWelted 316 SST\nParts Iton\nPo~imide\nMax Proof Adiu.loble Sel-Paint RonRe Approx.\nSy'. (Te.t) On Incr. On Deer. Dead-\nPress. Pre.... Pre... Pre... bond\np,i p,1 p,i p,1 p.i\nMODEL MODEL\nSPDT-Std. OPOT \"M'\n500 750 1.2-16 .4-15.2 .8\n3000 5000 8-75 3-70 5\n3000 5000 20-150 8-138 12\n3000 5000 50-375 22-347 28\n3000 5000 330-1000 265-935 65\n3000 5000 950-2300 775-2125 175\n646(;1101 646GZEMI\n646GZE2 646GZEM2\n646GZEII 646GZEMll\n646GZE3 646GZEM3\n646GZE5 646GZEM5\n646GZE7 646GZEM7\nPress.•4 to 5000 psi\nVae. 1.0 to 28.5\" Hg\nSERIES:\n646GZE\n646GZE-7011\n646VZE\nStandard Features:\n• U.L. I CSA\nExplosion Proof: Div. 1, 2\n• NEMA: 4,7,9, 13\n• Fire Resistant\nSteel Body\nAMBIENT TEMP. RANGE\n-30· to 160' F\n-34\" to 71\" C\nOptions Code:\n\"F\" Ethylene Propylene O-ring\n\"Y\" EECS Certified to EXsIIT5\n\"700B\" Gold Contacts\n\"7030\" Gold Contacts\nwjSST Diaphragm\n\"7044\" Monel Pori and Diaphragm\n\"7045 \" Hastelloy Port and Diaphragm\n\"7065\" TeRan Wire wjSST Diaphragm\nPRESSURE SWITCHES 1/2N STAINLESS STEEL\nMODEL 646GZE-7011 • PRESSURE PORT &\nDIAPHRAGM\nWettoo 316 SST\nParts Viton\n500 750 1.4-16 .4-15 1\n3000 5000 10-75 3-68 7\n3000 SOOO 20-1 SO 6-136 14\n3000 5000 50-375 16-347 34\n3000 SOOO 330-1000 250-920 BO\n3000 5000 950-2300 750-2100 200\nSOOO 7S00 2100-3400 1820-3120 280\n5000 7500 3200-5000 2720-4S20 480\n646GZEI-7011 646GZEMI-7011\n646GZE2-7011 646GZEM2-7011\n646GZEII-7011 646GZEMII-7011\n646GZE3-7011 646GZEM3-7011\n646GZES-70I I 646GZEM5-7011\n646GZE7-7011 646GZEM7-7011\n646GZE9- 7011 646GZEM9-7011\n646GZE10-701 64 6GZEM10-701\nVACUUM SWITCHES 1/2\" STAINLESS STEEL\nMODEL 646VZE • PRESSURE PORT &\nPOlYIMIDE DIAPHRAGM\nWelted 316 SST\nParts Po~imide\nton\nMax Proof Ad·u.loble Se/-Polnt Ranoe Approx.\nSy•\n. (Te,t) On Incr. On Deer. DeadPres.s.\nPre... Vacuum Vacuum bond\npsi p.i In. Hg In. Hg In . Hg\nMODEL MODEL\nSPDT-Std. DPDT'M\"\n150 250 3.5-28.5 1.0- 26.0\n64 6VZEI 646VZEMI\ni.~\nIUCTRICJU CHARACTERISTICS.\nRATING OF SWITCH ELEMENT\nAMPERES\nVOLTS SPOT DPDT \"M\"\nRe•\n. Re•\n.\n125 AC - 50(60 Hz \n 15 5\n250 AC - SO/60 Hz \n 15\n5\n1480 AC - 50(60 Hz\n15\n-\nSCH.MATIC AND WIRING CO\"\"\nSPDT-Slondard DPDT \"M\"\nP\nCOLOR OF lfA;JS COlOI! OF lfA;JS P\nRED NIC RED NICI\nIIROWN C UOWN Cl;J\nBLUE N/O =:-t BLUE N101 -e--J\nGREEN ----jl~\nBlACl( NIC2\nYELLOW C2\nPURPLE N/02:J\nGREEN ----1)1\nINC10SUR./C.III'IPlCATlONS.\nDiv. 1 explolion-proof and hermetically\n.ooled el\",,!rlcal a ....mbly Part No.\n17-51 (17-73 for ~MW model option), li.led\nby both Unde\".,riter'il Loborotorle., tnc. (File\nNo. E32961) and CSA Telting Laboratorle.\n(File No. 22921) for ha..,rdou. tocatlon.,\ncia.. 1, Group. A, II\" C, and D; Cia.. 2\nGroup. E, F , and O.\nModeI646GZEMl hOI an appro\"lmale dead\nband of .9 p.1.\nHOW ro ORD~RI Specify model number, add desired \"options\" listing letter codes first followed by numbers:\nCustom Control Sensors, Inc.· 21111 Plummer Street, Chatsworth, CA 91311· Tel: (818)341·4610· Fax: (818)709-0426\ne-mail: switchnel@ccsdualsnap.com· htlp:llwww.ccsdualsnap.com\n12:> D\n.4\n.5\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix D\nAccident Time Line\n-7-\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nTimeline Information for Enterprise Bolivar Station Crude Oil release on\nDecember 23,2009 - NRC#926954\nDecember 23.2009\n07:02 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received Bolivar\ncontainment alarm from the Bolivar Station.\n07:48 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) received a call from\nLynette with Galveston Co. sheriff's department reporting a broken oil pipeline at\nPort Bolivar.\n07:49 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Bruce Ousley\n(EPCO) and connected him to Lynette at Galveston Co. sheriff's department.\n07:55 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Billy at Sunoco\nto see if they can take oil and notified Gilbert Rivera Jr.\n08:00 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) requested Adam to\nhead to Bolivar, he can make it quicker than Bruce.\n08:05 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) verified oil mist at\nBolivar on camera and spoke with Buster Bergeron.\n08:07 AM CST - Philip (EPCO) notified Jeff Myers (as he responded).\n0807 AM CST - TRRC Representative (Randy Vaughn) contacted John Jewett\n(EPCO) regarding a possible Crude Oil Leak on Bolivar Peninsula.\n08:10AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called John at AS and\nrequested he start shutting oil off going to Bolivar and stack back to GB72 and\ncalled Mike at SS332 to divert all he could away from CHOPS.\n08:11 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) called Lucy at Shell\ncontrol to get her to go to max rate on Seajack.\n08:20 AM CST - Philip notified Greg Chapman (EPCO).\n08:21 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) started BYPASSING\nCHOPS oil to Sunoco.\n08:23 AM CST - AS system blocked off to Bolivar Station.\n08:28 AM CST - John Jewett with EPCO pipeline compliance called to verify leak\nand said they would make all agency notifications.\n08:39 AM CST - Philip contacted the Galveston Co. on site command center\n(Herbert Franklin, Incident Commander), and it was verified the oil spray had\nstopped.\n09:00 AM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is closed to the Public\nas a result of the crude oil release. Three EPCO Field Operation Specialists\narrived at the Bolivar Station. They closed % inch (V-11 003) Whitney ball valve,\nlocated on top of the 24 inch-line, that is used to isolate the failed pressure switch\nPSH-11 003 to stop the product release to the environment.\n09:08 AM CST (and again at 09:14 AM CST) - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control\nCenter) was contacted by Frank Groves - TRRC Oil & Gas Div., Region 3\nregarding accident\n09:18 AM CST - Jeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) was contacted by\nEPA representative - Mark Hays\n09:23 AM CST - John Jewett contacted Victor Lopez - PHMSA SW Region,\nregarding accident\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n09:38 AM CST - NRC contacted, reference number 926954 at 09:38 a.m.\n10:05 AM CST - Bruce Ousley reports TNT Marine is on the way to clean up\nreleased crude oil. Bruce reports all oil outside the containment area is from\nspray.\n10:30 AM CST - TNT Marine arrives to clean up released crude oil, and\nfollowing meeting initiate response at 12:30 PM CST. The clean-up response\nefforts will continue until the afternoon of December 25, 2009 when the spill\nresponse and clean-up efforts are declared to be finished .\n11 :00 AM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) contacts John Jewett\nregarding accident and establishes logistics for on-site investigation.\n02:00 PM CST - Kim Nguyen (PHMSA SW Region) arrive on-site to initiate\ninvestigation.\n11 :00 PM CST - Highway 87 (in front of Bolivar Station) is re-opened to the\nPublic.\nDecember 24, 2009\n05:00 PM CST - Coby Goos (EPCO) contacts Kim Nguyen to notify PHMSA that\nthe Bolivar Station is being re-activated, and the CHOPS Crude Oil System is restarting.\nDecember 25, 2009\n12:00 PM CST -The clean-up response efforts are declared to be finished.\nOther Miscellaneous Notifications and Contacts\nJeffrey Young (Enterprise Control Center) contacted Texas emergency response\ncenter which covers TRRC, TGLO and TCEQ. Incident number is 20094041.\nJohn Jewett contacted Home Land Security this morning. NRC #926954.Talked\nto Kevin Lee\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nAppendix E\nMetallurgical Evaluation Report\n-8\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n13800 Westfair East Drive, Houston, Texas 77041-1101\nPhone: (281) 955-2900 Fax: (281) 955-2638\nWebsite: www.stress.com\nan employee-owned company HOUSTON • CINCINNATI • NEW OR LEANS • BATON ROUGE\nFebruary 2, 2010\nSENIOR PRINCIPALS\nPresident\nJoe A. Fowler, Ph.D., P .E.\nSenior Vice President\nW . Thomas Asbill, P.E.\nVice PresldenlS\nRonald O. Young. Ph.D., P.E.\nClinton A. Haynes\nJack E. Miller, P.E.\nJ. Randy Long. P.E.\nCharles A. Miller, P.E\nPRINCIPALS\nJames W. Alben, P.E .\nChristopher Alexander. Ph. O.\nCk 1ud!o Allavillo. Corp . LIII\nMnrk A. Bennen. P.E.\nKenneth K. Shalla. Ph.D.\nRichard S. Boswell, P.E.\nABllk 8oubenider. Ph.D.. P .E.\nHelen Cl'lan, C.P.A.\nJohn F. Chappell. P.E.\nKimberly O. Flesner, P.E.\nS. Allen FOl(, P.E.\nGreg Gillie, P.E.\nDavid L Garrell, Ph.D.\nAndreas T. Kalsounas. P .E.\nTell)l M. Lechinger\nChristopher Malice, Ph.D., P.E.\nHarbindsr Pardal. Ph. D.\nThomas L. Power, Ph.D., P.E.\nGeorge R. Ross, Ph.D., P.E.\nRam6n I. San Pedro. P.E.\nTeri Shackelford\nMellhew J. Stahl. D. E:ng ., P.E.\nDavid A. Tekamp, P.E\nKurt D.Vandervort. Ph.D., P.E.\nKenneth A. Waeber, P.E.\nRaben E. Wink\nBobby W . Wright P.E.\nJay Z. Yuan. Ph.D .. P.E.\nSENIOR ASSOCIATESI\nSTAFF CONSULTANTS\nGlennA. Aucoin, P.!·\n.\nRichard C Blel, P.I\nJ. Kirk Brownlee. P.E:.\nMichael J. EffenbOl ger. P.E.\nMichael W. Guillol, Ph.D .• P.E.\nDaVid P. Huey, P.E.\nDaniel KrZYWicki, P.E., CSP\nKennelh R. Riggs. Ph.D., P.E.\nSENIOR ASSOCIATES\nPaul Angher. P E.\nRoger D. Cordes. Ph.D .. P E.\nDonnie W. Curinglon\nNrlpendu DUlla, Ph .D .. P.E.\nSteven A. Garcia\nMark E. Hamilton\nBreit A. Hormberg\nW,llram A. Mil:cr . P.E.\nJohn M. Moore\nRonald A. Morrison, P.E .\nDaVid F. Renzi\nBlian S. Royer, PE\nMohmod Samman, Ph .D ., P.E.\nDanicl A. Pitts, P.E.\nLeo Vega\nSTAFF CONSULTANTS\nRay A. Ayers. Ph.D., P.E.\nMark Banel. P.E.\nClinton H. (Clint) Brill. P.E.\nCharles Buscemi\nPaul Oowdican, P.E.\nJoe W . Frey, P E.\nSCOII Harding. Ph.D., P.E .\nSIeve Haysen. Ph.D .. P.E.\nJoe Kintz, P. E.\nSleven Kinyon, Ph.D.\nPaul J. Kovach, P.E.\nAon Scrrvner\nJackie E. Smilh, P E.\nASSOCIATES\nJuhan Bedoya\nLyle E. Breau x. P.F .\nJames Brewer . P.F\nNapoleon F. Douglas. Jr.\nKenny T. Farrow, Ph .D.\nKar en Lucio\nOlhp A. f\\,\\amar, Ph.D.\nScot T. McNeill. Ph.O.\nSalhish Remamoorlhy\nChad Seercy, Ph.D.\nAwn Sreeranganalhan\nLance Staudacher\nKevin Wang, Ph.D., P.E\nMr. Joe Sobilo PN 1251102\nEnterprise Products Company\n1100 Louisiana\nP.O. Box 4735\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: Failure of Cap Screws in Switch\nSubject: Results of Metallurgical Evaluation\nIntroduction\nEnterprise Products Company (EPCO) re\" cently experienced a failure in an electrical\nswitch on one of their offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico. Four small cap screws\nholding the top cover on the switch apparently failed during service, exposing the\ninternals of the switch.\nFollowing the failure, EPCO retained Stress Engineering Services (SES) to examine and\ntest samples from the switch and to assist in determining the most likely cause(s) for the\nobserved failure. The failed switch was thus shipped to the SES facility in Houston,\nTexas where the SES evaluation was performed.\nDiscussion\nA view of the failed switch is presented in Photograph 1 (in Appendix A). A closer view\nof the cap that separated from the remainder of the switch is shown in Photograph 2. The\nend of one of the four screws that failed during the incident is just visible in Photograph 2\nand is marked by the arrow in the photograph.\nCloser views of the ends of the broken screws are presented in Photographs 3 and 4. The\nouter ends of all the broken screws were apparently lost during the incident.\nThe screw at the upper left in Photograph 4 was arbitrarily designated as screw # 1 by\nSES. Screw # 2 was at the upper right, screw # 3 was at the lower right and screw # 4\nwas at the lower left in the photograph.\nScrew # 1 had what appeared to be a coating of a foreign substance on its fracture surface,\nwhile the fracture surfaces of the other three screws were very clean and appeared to be\nessentially identical. The ends of screws # 1 and # 3 were thus removed from the body of\nthe switch for more detailed examination of their fracture surfaces. In view of their\nsimilarity to screw # 3, screws # 2 and # 4 were not examined in detail.\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\nMr. Joe Sobilo\nEnterprise Products Company February 2, 2010\nThe compositions of the screws and the body of the switch into which they had been threaded\nwere examined using the x-ray spectrometer (EDS) attachment of SES's scanning electron\nmicroscope (SEM). An SEM-EDS scan gives a semi-quantitative analysis of the chemical\nelements present in the small portion of the sample surface excited by the electron beam of the\nSEM.\nThe measured compositions of the screws # 1 and # 3 are presented in Scans I and II in\nAppendix B. The analyses indicated that the screws had been fabricated of stainless steel\ncontaining approximately 13 % chromium.\nThe composition of the housing in which the screws had been located during use is presented in\nScan III. The analysis of the housing showed that it had apparently been fabricated of a Type\n316, austenitic stainless steel.\nAlso presented in Appendix B (Scan IV) is the composition of the foreign substance found on\nthe as-received fracture surface of screw # 1. As shown in scan IV, the foreign substance\nappeared to consist primarily of zinc, carbon, and oxygen. It thus appeared that the foreign\nsubstance may have consisted of zinc carbonate.\nOn the other hand, it should be noted that the foreign substance contained low concentrations of\niron and chromium and thus did not appear to have been a corrosion product. Corrosion of the\nunderlying screw would probably have produced a layer of mixed iron and chromium oxides on\nthe screw surface.\nCross sections were taken through both of the screws for metallurgical structural evaluations.\nThe structures of the screws are shown in Photographs 5 and 6. The structures appeared to\nconsist of tempered martensite and the structures of the two screws were essentially identical.\nThe cross sections used to produce Photographs 5 and 6 were also used for hardness\nmeasurements. The hardness measurements showed that the screws were uniform in hardness\nacross their cross sections. The measured hardness values ranged from Rockwell C 40.8 to\nRockwell C 44.4. The average hardness of screw # 1 was Rockwell C 43.0 and the average\nhardness of screw # 3 was Rockwell C 42.7.\nThe fracture surfaces of screws # 1 and # 3 were also examined using the SEM. Prior to this\nexamination, the foreign material on screw # 1 was removed ultrasonically using a non-corrosive\ncommercially available cleaning solution. The as-received fracture surface on screw # 3 was\nclean and required no cleaning.\nThe fracture surfaces on screws # 1 and # 3 are shown in Photographs 7 and 8, respectively. As\ncan be seen the fracture surfaces appeared to be identical. The fracture surfaces both had the\n\"rock candy\" texture that is typical of hydrogen stress cracking that has occurred along prior\naustenitic grain boundaries in a quenched and tempered steel structure.\nStress Engineering Services, Inc. 2 PN 1251102\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\nMr. Joe Sobilo\nEnterprise Products Company February 2, 2010\nThe similarity of the clean fractures on screws # 2, # 3, and # 4 plus the similarity of the fracture\nsurface structures shown in Photographs 7 and 8 indicate that all of the failed attachment screws\napparently failed primarily due to hydrogen stress cracking. The lack of any significant\ncorrosion damage on the cleaned face of screw # 1 indicates that corrosion due to the presence of\nthe zinc carbonate deposit apparently played little, if any, direct role in the fracture of screw # 1.\nConclusions\nBased upon the results of o","truncated":true,"body_characters":45982}