{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Enterprise Products Operating LLC, 2011-12-27","title":"Failure Report- Enterprise Products Operating LLC 12/27/11","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-04-08","effective_on":"2011-12-27","summary":"Enterprise Products Operating LLC; Hazardous Liquid; TX; failure 2011-12-27; apparent cause: Material Weld Failure.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-122711.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-122711.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-122711","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-122711","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nSouthwest Region\nPrincipal Investigator Gene Roberson\nRegion Director R. M. Seeley\nDate of Report 09/12/2013\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Pipeline – Rio\nGrande PL Girth Weld Failure\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 12/27/2011\nCommodity Released LPG Products (Propane/Butane)\nCity/County & State Kermit/Loving County, Texas\nOPID & Operator Name 31618 Enterpise Products Operating LLC\nUnit # & Unit Name 16024 Rio Grande Pipeline\nSMART Activity # 137399\nMilepost / Location MP 50.16\nType of Failure Girth weld failure (complete separation of circumference of weld)\nFatalities None\nInjuries 1 requiring hospitalization (flash fire during repair)\nDescription of Area\nImpacted\nRural area, within a production field\nProperty Damage $230,000\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure\n12/27/2011\nExecutive Summary\nAt approximately 9:00 p.m. central standard time (CST), December 27, 2011, Enterprise Products\nOperating, LLC (Enterprise) controllers received an alarm indicating a pressure drop on several\ntransmitters along their 8-inch-diameter Rio Grande Pipeline liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) system and\nproceeded to shut the system down. Enterprise notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the\nrelease at 10:42 p.m. on December 27, 2011. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 28, 2011,\nresponding personnel confirmed the line rupture near mile post (MP) 50.16 in Loving County, Texas.\nDuring the pipeline repair, a flash fire involving residual pipeline product in the soil occurred, injuring 3\nemployees, one of whom required in-patient hospitalization. Enterprise had performed one cold cut of\nthe pipeline and was preparing to cut off the other side of the failed pipe when the flash fire occurred.\nThe rupture was attributed to the complete circumferential separation of an acetylene girth weld, and\nthe flash fire was attributed to operator error. No additional product was released from the pipe.\nFailed Girth Weld\nPage 2 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure\n12/27/2011\nEnterprise’s 8-inch Rio Grande pipeline system transports LPG products 223 miles from Odessa, Texas,\nto San Elizario, Texas. The pipeline has three operating segments: Lawson Junction to Pecos River, Pecos\nRiver to Delaware, and Delaware to San Elizario. The failure occurred in the Lawson Junction to Pecos\nRiver segment at MP 50.16.\nThe Lawson Junction to Pecos River segment (MP 0 to MP 71) was installed in 1952. The pipeline has an\nmaximum operating pressure (MOP) of 1,440 pounds per square inch gage (psig) and was operating at\napproximately 1,300 psig at the time of failure. A hydro test was performed in 1996 to 71 percent of\nspecified minimum yield strength (SMYS) in the area of the failure.\nDuring the 1952 construction project, portions of a 1928, 8.625-inch outer diameter (OD), 0.277-inch\nwall thickness, Grade B seamless line pipe with acetylene girth welds were tied into the Rio Grande\nPipeline from MP 31 to MP 70 (vintage section).\nWithin the vintage section, there have been some replacements of the acetylene welded pipe.\nSystem Details\n1 mile 1996 MP 70 (sinkhole activity)\n1996 All road casings + 100 feet Between MP 31 to 70\n1996 168 feet MP 50 (47 feet upstream of\nfailure)\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nThe Enterprise Rio Grande Pipeline was operating normally prior to the incident until just prior to the\nrelease, on December 27, 2011, at 8:14 p.m., the Delaware pumping unit of the Rio Grande Pipeline\nexperienced a power failure and shut down. The maximum discharge pressure from the Lawson pump\nstation was 1,337 pounds per square inch (psi) at 8:27 p.m., and at 9:10 p.m., the discharge pressure\nwas 731 psi. At 9:00 p.m., a pipeline leak monitor alarm was received, and at 9:28 p.m. the pipeline\ncontroller shut down the Lawson unit in response to the pressure drop. The controller closed the\nLawson Junction block valve at 9:32 p.m. and closed the MP 159 block valve at 9:41 p.m. The estimated\ntime of the failure was 9:00 p.m., which corresponded to the time the alarms were received in the\ncontrol room followed by the drop in line pressure from 1,337 to 731 psi.\nEmergency Response\nThe Enterprise Control Center responded to a rapid pressure drop on the Rio Grande Pipeline system\nfrom an operating pressure of 1,300 psi to 469 psi at approximately 9:30 p.m. on December 27, 2011.\nUpon recieving the alarms, the Control Center began the shut down sequence for the pipeline system\nand notified the local Sheriff’s department of a possible pipeline rupture in the area. Enterprise\ntechnicians were dispatched to the area to investigate.\nEnterprise reported the release to the NRC (#999086) at approximately 10:42 p.m. CST on December 27,\n2011 (Appendix A).\nPage 3 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure\n12/27/2011\nEnterprise personnel confirmed the exact location of the rupture, MP 50.5, at approximately 3:00 a.m.\non December 28, 2011. Once isolated, the pipeline was blown down and the released product\ndissipated. No local emergency or fire personnel responded to the scene. Due to the remoteness of the\nfailure location, no roads were closed and no residents were evacuated. PHMSA did not respond to the\naccident site.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nFollowing the emergency response, Enterprise isolated the pipeline. Enterprise secured the area and\nbegan taking steps to clear and repair the line segment. The residual hydrocarbons were purged with\nnitrogen from the upstream and downstream valve locations. The area was excavated with a backhoe\nto expose enough pipe to facilitate the repair. After the line was confirmed to be free of hydrocarbons,\non-site contractors proceeded to cold cut the east side of the line. The first cold cut was successful, and\napproximately 20 feet of pipe was removed.\nAt approximately 5:00 p.m. on December 28, 2011, a flash fire occurred in the trench when a\nconcentration of hydrocarbons exceeding the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) for the hydrocarbon\nmixture ignited. Two Enterprise employees and four contractors were in the trench working on various\ntasks, such as removing additional soil with shovels, taking measurements, and evaluating the amount of\nadditional pipe that needed to be removed from the west side of the weld failure, when the flash fire\noccurred. Three individuals were injured as a result of the flash fire. Enterprise discontinued all repair\nactivities.\nOn December 30, 2011, following the development and implementation of a work plan and work\npermits, the failed section was cut out and replaced with 24 feet of new pipe. The pipeline was then\npurged and returned to service at 80 percent of the operating pressure at the time of the incident while\nthe investigation continued into the cause of the failure. The removed pipe was then sent to Kiefner and\nAssociates, Inc. for metallurgical analysis.\nPipe Replacement\nPage 4 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure\n12/27/2011\nAfter receipt and analysis of the metallurgical report, and a subsidence hazard assessment performed as\npart of the accident investigation, the pressure restriction was removed from the system in December\n2012.\nInvestigation Details\nAt approximately 10:42 p.m. CST, December 27, 2011, Enterprise Products reported, to the NRC, a\nrelease of LPG in Loving County, Texas. PHMSA’s Southwest Region received the incident notification\nand began communicating with the operator. Upon isolation of the valve section, the area was made\nsafe and the repair began. Cold cuts were being used to remove the section of old pipe, and one piece\nhad been removed from the line. With multiple employees around the area, at 5:00 p.m., on December\n28, 2011, a flash fire occurred due to product saturation in the soil around the bell hole. Due to the fire,\n3 employees received minor burns. One of the three injured employees required in-patient\nhospitalization. The repair activities were stopped so that Enterprise could respond to the injuries and\nreassess the project. A maintenance crew from another location was dispatched to complete the repair.\nPHMSA then scheduled a meeting to investigate the actions taken due to the flash fire. Findings from\nthis meeting indicated the initial area crew did not establish a job plan as required by Enterprise. Before\nperforming the subsequent repair, a copy of the work plan (form SF20) was furnished to PHMSA\ninvestigators, upon request, from Enterprise, with all additional safety forms attached. Repairs were\nthen completed.\nSite After Flash Fire\nFollowing the accident, the pipeline was returned to service at a reduced operating pressure. PHMSA\nrequested additional testing and investigation into the cause of the failure. Enterprise’s final report\ndetermined external stresses were exerted on the acetylene weld. Based on this finding, Enterprise\ninitiated a study to the review the possibility of this event reoccurring in other sections of the acetylene\npipe that remained within the MP 31 to MP 70 sections. Golder Associates conducted a Subsidence\nHazards Assessemnt of the Rio Grande Pipeline and presented their results to Enterprise in September\nPage 5 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure\n12/27/2011\n2012. The information was also reviewed with PHMSA, and additional information was provided by\nEnterprise. A final meeting was held in December 2012, and the pipeline was returned to full service.\nMetallurgical Analysis\nThe failed girth weld and associated pipe was sent to Kiefner & Associates, Inc., in Worthington, Ohio,\nfor metallurgical analysis.\nThe conclusions of the analysis were:\n The fracture initiated at an area of incomplete penetration in the acetylene weld, in a ductile\nmanner, and propagated within and around the circumferential weld.\n The cause of the girth weld failure was due to external stresses on the pipeline. This was the\nconclusion since no evidence of time-dependent degradation was identified on the pipe.\n The failure mechanism was longitudinal in nature (geotechnical soil shift/ thermal expansion).\n No failure would have occurred in the girth weld without the applied longitudinal stresses.\nMechanical Analysis\nThere was no mechanical analysis to be made.\nGeotechnical Analysis\nA Subsidence Hazards Assessment was performed by Golder Associates on the Lawson Junction to Pecos\nRiver segment of the Rio Grande Pipeline. The assessment identified a possible subsidence feature that\ncould have contributed to the external forces that caused the failure. External forces could also have\nbeen caused by the 1996 pipeline rehabilitation project that replaced 168 feet of pipeline just 47 feet\nupstream of the failure location. No other actions were identified by the Assessment that required\naction on the pipeline segment.\nConclusion\nA failure occurred in an acetylene girth weld that completely separated from the 8-inch Rio Grande\nPipeline. The separation began in a location of incomplete penetration within the weld due to the\napplication of external forces on the pipeline. The flash fire and injuries were a result of incorrect\noperation and failing to follow procedures associated with hot work on the pipeline.\nAppendices\nA Telephonics Notice Report – NRC # 999086\nB Operator Accident Report – ODES # 20120023 Girth Weld Failure\nC Operator Accident Report – ODES # 20120070 Flash Fire from Soil\nD Operator Incident Investigation Report – #11856/SF-108\nPage 6 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nAPPENDIX A\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 1 of 2\nNRC Number:\nCall Date:\nFirst Name:\nCompany Name:\nAddress:\nCity:\nCountry:\nPhone 1:\nOrganization Type:\nConfidential:\nFirst Name:\nCompany Name:\nAddress:\nCity:\nCountry:\nPhone 1:\nOrganization Type:\nState:\nNearest City:\nPipeline & Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration (Version 4.0.0 PROD)\n[Return to Search]\n999086\n12/27/2011\nCall Time:\nCaller Information\nBRAD\nLast Name:\n;ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS PIPELINE\n··Housi: o\"N________ state\n- ~-------, Zip:\n2818872641\nPhone 2:\nPRIVA'\nIs caller the spiller?\nD YHs G!l No 0 No FlGt>ponoe\nDischarger Information\nBRAD Last Name:\nENTERPRISE PRODUCTS PIPELINE\n-\n.\n'9420 W. SAM HOUSTON PKWY NORTH\nHOUSTON\nState:\n'USA\nZip:\n:2818872641\nPhone 2:\nPRIVA'\nSpill Information\nTX\nCounty:\nODESSA\nZip Code:\nHMIS-> INCIDENTS-> TELEPHONICS\nRules of Behavior Home\nLogout Menu\n23:42:43\nWELLS\n'TX\n77064\nWELLS\n·;:x\n77064\n- EcrO'il - -·--·---------·-·---\n..\n·--i\n---,\n~\nSpill Date:\nDTG Type:\nIncident Type\n_12/27/20 11 . (mm/dd/yyyy)\nSpill Time:\n21:10:00 i (24hh:mm:ss)\n<- Select DTG Type -> •\nALL • Reported Incident Type 'PiPE'iJNE\n~\n.. ---------·------·M-----------------------·--------\" \"\"1\nCALLER IS REPORTING A RELEASE OF PROPANE DUE TO KNOWLEDGE OF A LOSS OF PRESSURE •\nIN THE PIPELINE .\nMaterials lnyolyed\nMaterial I Chris Narne\nPROPANE\nMedium Type: Additional Medium Information:\nATMOSPHERE\n<·Select Mc;diurn Type .\nInjuries: Fatalites:\nmhtml:file :/ /C:\\ U sers\\Cynthia.Lewis\\AppData \\Local\\Microsoft\\ Windows\\ Temporary Intern .. . 9/3/2013\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 2 of2\nEvacuations: Damages: 0 Yer. li!l No 0 Unknown No. of Evacuations:\n0 Ye> li!l Nt' 0 Unknown Damage Amount:\nFederal Agency Notified: 0 Y6s 0 No [§'] Unl,nown State Agency Notified: 0 Yf!~ O No [§] Unknown\nOther Agency Notified: 0 Yes 0 No li!l Unknown\nRemedial Actions\nISOLATED THE PIPELINE AND TECHNICIANS AR E ON-SC EN E .\nAdditional Info\nNO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION .\nJ.millJsJ.e\nDegrees:.\nMinutes: Seconds:\nQuadrant:\n~\nDegrees: .\nMinutes: Seconds:\nDistance from City:\nSection:\nDirection:\nTownship:\nRange: Milepost:\nQuadrant:\n· ----~--..:.. ____ . ___ _\n[]Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters)\n<<Previous 1 .. 1 of 1\n<<Save >>\nmhtml:file://C:\\Users\\Cynthia.Lewis\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Intern... 9/3/2013\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAPPENDIX B\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\n0 U.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Haza rdous Materials Safety Administration OMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 01/20/2012\nNo. 20120023- 16510\n--------------------------\n_iDOl Use OnJltL\nACCIDENT REPORT • HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washinqton, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS I\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nllttr.rb'~~~ D.llliJ~i;j aQt (J.Q'iiQ{P.~liatJ..\nPART A· KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: I Supplemental: l Final:\nI Yes l Yes\nLast Revision Date: 03/2 1/2012\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 31618\n2. Name of Operator 3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 1100 Lou isiana Street\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code 77002\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 12/27/2011 2 1:00\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitud e: 31.78341\nENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC\n-103.46442\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 999086\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the 12/27/201121:10\nNational Response Center (if applicable):\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant HVL or Other Flammable or Toxic Fluid wh ich is a Gas at\nvolume released) Ambient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Other HVL\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe: Propane/Butane mix\n- If Biofuei/Aiternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then% Ethanol Blend:\nLon~itud e:\n%:\n- If Biofuei/Aiternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B1 00):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels):\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each cateaorv:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees work in~ for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there iniuries reauirina inoatient hosoitalization? No\n- If Yes, soecify the number in each ca t e~orv :\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees workinq for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emeraency responders\n13d. Workers workinq on the riqht-of-way, but NOT\n3,283.00\nPage 1 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: - Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity iQnite? 16. Did the commodity explode? No\nNo\n17. Number of Qeneral public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 12/27/2011 21:30\n01/12/201 2 10:55\n12/27/2011 23:02\n12/28/2011 00:28\nPART B- ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the oriQin of Accident onshore? I Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n• If Onshore:\n2. State: Texas\n3. Zip Code: 79745\n4. City Kermit\n5. County or Parish Lovinq\n6. Operator-desiqnated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: 50.16\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: 8. Segment name!ID : 9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)?\n10. Location of Accident: 11 . Area of Accident (as found): Rio Grande Pipeline\nLID 1058\nNo\nPipeline RiQht-of-way\nUnderground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 22\nNo\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossinq? - If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing -\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing -\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing-\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing -\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n-Select:\n· If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n-State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)- Specify:\n- Area: I\n-Block#: I\n15. Area of Accident: I\nPART C- ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: 2. Part of system involved in Accident: - If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: - If Pipe, specify:\nInterstate\nOnshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\nWeld, includinq heat-affected zone\nPage 2 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strenoth) of pipe (psi):\n3d. Pipe specification:\n3e. PiPe Seam , specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3o. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coatino type at point of Accident, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify: - If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured bv:\n3i. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other- Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 5. Material involved in Accident: - If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify: 6. Tvpe of Accident Involved: - If Mechanical Puncture- Specify Approx. size:\nPipe Girth Weld\n1929\nMaterial other than Carbon Steel\nAcetylene Weld\nRupture\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak- Select Type:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture- Select Orientation: - If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in . (widest openinq) by 4\nin. (lenqth circumferentially or axially) 4\n- If Other- Describe:\nPART D -ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n-Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Lonq term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: No\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil\n- Veqetation\n- Wild life\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n-Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinkinq water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reachino water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known :\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area No\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's lnteqrity Manaqement Program?\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High No\nConsequence Area (HCA)?\n?a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nCircumferential\nPage 3 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n--\n--\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nlnteority ManaQement ProQram?\n- Hioh Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nlnteQrity ManaQement ProQram?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement ProQram?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)- Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManaQement Prooram?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)- EcoloQ ical\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManaQement ProQram?\nB. Estimated Property Damage:\nBa. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property $ 0\ndamaoe\nBb. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 100,000\nBe. Estimated cost of Operator's property damaQe & reoairs $ 105,000\nBd. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency resoonse $ 12,000\nBe. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 0\nBf. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\nBQ. Total estimated property damaQe (sum of above) $ 217,000\nPARTE- ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psio): 2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the Accident (psio):\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the Accident (psiQ):\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure restriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\n1 ,33B.OO\n1,440.00\nPressure did not exceed MOP\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. 2?\nWas \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question Yes\n- If Yes- (Complete Sa. - Sf. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release Remotely Controlled\nsource:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Manual\n5c. Lenoth of seoment isolated between va lves (ft): 63,5B9\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal Yes\ninspection tools?\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? select all that apply)\n- ChanQes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- TiQht or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakaoe internal inspection tools\\\n-Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool run?\nNo\n- If Yes, Which ooerational factors complicate execution?( select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall builduP I\n- Low operatinQ pressure(s) I\nPage 4 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other-\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident?\nIf Yes -\n> 20% SMYS Regulated TrunklinefTransmission\nYes\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? 6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\nYes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with Yes\nthe detection of the Accident?\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with Yes\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility Yes\ninvolved in the Accident?\n- If Yes:\n?a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? ?b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\nYes\n?c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calcu lations) assist Yes\nwith the detection of the Accident?\n?d . Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist Yes\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Controller\n- If Other, SpecifY:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its Operator employee\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the followina:\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the due to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\nAccident? investiaate l\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the Determined controllers actions did not contribute to the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\nrelease.\nforovide an explanation for why the operator did not investiaate)\n-If Yes, specify investiqation resu lt(s): (select all that applYJ\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatiaue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOPerator), and other factors associated with fatique\nProvide an explanation for whv not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- lnvestiaation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F ·DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drua & Alcohol Testing regulations?\n-If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\n1 b. Specify how many failed :\nNo\nPage 5 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Druq & Alcohol Testinq requ lations?\n-If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nNo\nPART G- APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART GIn shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: GS - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld\nG1 ·Corrosion Failure -only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion:\nInternal Corrosion:\n-If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination: I\n- If Other, Describe: I\n2. TvPe of corrosion: (select all that aoolv)\n-Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbioloqical\n- Selective Seam\n-Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The tvpe(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the followinq: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n-If Yes:\nD4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started :\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbanding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\"- Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\"- Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\"- Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Tvpe of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n-Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbioloqical\n- Erosion\n-Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the followinq (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n-Elbow I\n- Other:\nPage 6 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11 . Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following If any Corrosion Failure sub-cause Is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is TankNessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal insoection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent vear:\n- Calioer\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent vear:\n- Hard Soot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent vear:\n-Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n-Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes-\nMost recent vear tested:\nTest oressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n-If Yes, and an investioative dio was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent vear conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dio site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\nooint of the Accident since Januarv 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiooraohv\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\n- Drv Maonetic Particle Test\n- Other\nMost recent vear conducted:\nMost recent vear conducted:\nMost recent vear conducted:\nMost recent vear conducted:\nMost recent vear conducted:\nMost recent vear conducted:\nDescribe:\nG2 • Natural Force Damage -only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage- Sub-Cause: I\n-If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify: I\nPage 7 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n- If Other, Describe:\n-If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n• If Lightning:\n3. Specify: I\n·If Temperature:\n4. Specify: I\n- If Other, Describe:\n• If High Winds:\n• If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n-Tornado\n-Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 • Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage - Sub-Cause:\n• If Excavation Damage byOperator (First Party):\n·If Excavation Dama1:1e bv Operator's Contractor{Second Party):\n• If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n• If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1·5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved In Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n-Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n-If Yes:\nMost recent vear tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent vear conducted: I\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\nPage 8 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination , conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n-Dry Magnetic Particle Test\n--\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator qet prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that aoolv) -\n- One-Call System\n-Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com}?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n-Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified :\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damaqe cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours}\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-0/RT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-0/RT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 • Other Outside Force Damage · only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nOther Outside Force Damage- Sub-Cause:\n• If Nearby Industrial, Man-made or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:\n·If Damage by Car Truck or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged In Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment ooerated bv: I\n·If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\nPage 9 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n-Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n-If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n• If Electrical Arcing from Other Eauioment or Facility:\n·If Previous Mechanical Damaae NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Q","truncated":true,"body_characters":86388}