# Failure Report- Enterprise Products Operating LLC 12/27/11 - **operation:** document - **citation:** PHMSA FIR, Enterprise Products Operating LLC, 2011-12-27 - **title:** Failure Report- Enterprise Products Operating LLC 12/27/11 - **source type:** incident - **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration - **status:** historical - **official:** true - **published on:** 2016-04-08 - **effective on:** 2011-12-27 - **summary:** Enterprise Products Operating LLC; Hazardous Liquid; TX; failure 2011-12-27; apparent cause: Material Weld Failure. - **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-122711.json - **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-122711.md - **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-122711 - **source url:** https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-122711 **body:** <<>> DOT US Department of Transportation PHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration OPS Office of Pipeline Safety Southwest Region Principal Investigator Gene Roberson Region Director R. M. Seeley Date of Report 09/12/2013 Subject Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Pipeline – Rio Grande PL Girth Weld Failure Operator, Location, & Consequences Date of Failure 12/27/2011 Commodity Released LPG Products (Propane/Butane) City/County & State Kermit/Loving County, Texas OPID & Operator Name 31618 Enterpise Products Operating LLC Unit # & Unit Name 16024 Rio Grande Pipeline SMART Activity # 137399 Milepost / Location MP 50.16 Type of Failure Girth weld failure (complete separation of circumference of weld) Fatalities None Injuries 1 requiring hospitalization (flash fire during repair) Description of Area Impacted Rural area, within a production field Property Damage $230,000 <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure 12/27/2011 Executive Summary At approximately 9:00 p.m. central standard time (CST), December 27, 2011, Enterprise Products Operating, LLC (Enterprise) controllers received an alarm indicating a pressure drop on several transmitters along their 8-inch-diameter Rio Grande Pipeline liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) system and proceeded to shut the system down. Enterprise notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the release at 10:42 p.m. on December 27, 2011. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 28, 2011, responding personnel confirmed the line rupture near mile post (MP) 50.16 in Loving County, Texas. During the pipeline repair, a flash fire involving residual pipeline product in the soil occurred, injuring 3 employees, one of whom required in-patient hospitalization. Enterprise had performed one cold cut of the pipeline and was preparing to cut off the other side of the failed pipe when the flash fire occurred. The rupture was attributed to the complete circumferential separation of an acetylene girth weld, and the flash fire was attributed to operator error. No additional product was released from the pipe. Failed Girth Weld Page 2 of 6 <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure 12/27/2011 Enterprise’s 8-inch Rio Grande pipeline system transports LPG products 223 miles from Odessa, Texas, to San Elizario, Texas. The pipeline has three operating segments: Lawson Junction to Pecos River, Pecos River to Delaware, and Delaware to San Elizario. The failure occurred in the Lawson Junction to Pecos River segment at MP 50.16. The Lawson Junction to Pecos River segment (MP 0 to MP 71) was installed in 1952. The pipeline has an maximum operating pressure (MOP) of 1,440 pounds per square inch gage (psig) and was operating at approximately 1,300 psig at the time of failure. A hydro test was performed in 1996 to 71 percent of specified minimum yield strength (SMYS) in the area of the failure. During the 1952 construction project, portions of a 1928, 8.625-inch outer diameter (OD), 0.277-inch wall thickness, Grade B seamless line pipe with acetylene girth welds were tied into the Rio Grande Pipeline from MP 31 to MP 70 (vintage section). Within the vintage section, there have been some replacements of the acetylene welded pipe. System Details 1 mile 1996 MP 70 (sinkhole activity) 1996 All road casings + 100 feet Between MP 31 to 70 1996 168 feet MP 50 (47 feet upstream of failure) Events Leading up to the Failure The Enterprise Rio Grande Pipeline was operating normally prior to the incident until just prior to the release, on December 27, 2011, at 8:14 p.m., the Delaware pumping unit of the Rio Grande Pipeline experienced a power failure and shut down. The maximum discharge pressure from the Lawson pump station was 1,337 pounds per square inch (psi) at 8:27 p.m., and at 9:10 p.m., the discharge pressure was 731 psi. At 9:00 p.m., a pipeline leak monitor alarm was received, and at 9:28 p.m. the pipeline controller shut down the Lawson unit in response to the pressure drop. The controller closed the Lawson Junction block valve at 9:32 p.m. and closed the MP 159 block valve at 9:41 p.m. The estimated time of the failure was 9:00 p.m., which corresponded to the time the alarms were received in the control room followed by the drop in line pressure from 1,337 to 731 psi. Emergency Response The Enterprise Control Center responded to a rapid pressure drop on the Rio Grande Pipeline system from an operating pressure of 1,300 psi to 469 psi at approximately 9:30 p.m. on December 27, 2011. Upon recieving the alarms, the Control Center began the shut down sequence for the pipeline system and notified the local Sheriff’s department of a possible pipeline rupture in the area. Enterprise technicians were dispatched to the area to investigate. Enterprise reported the release to the NRC (#999086) at approximately 10:42 p.m. CST on December 27, 2011 (Appendix A). Page 3 of 6 <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure 12/27/2011 Enterprise personnel confirmed the exact location of the rupture, MP 50.5, at approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 28, 2011. Once isolated, the pipeline was blown down and the released product dissipated. No local emergency or fire personnel responded to the scene. Due to the remoteness of the failure location, no roads were closed and no residents were evacuated. PHMSA did not respond to the accident site. Summary of Return-to-Service Following the emergency response, Enterprise isolated the pipeline. Enterprise secured the area and began taking steps to clear and repair the line segment. The residual hydrocarbons were purged with nitrogen from the upstream and downstream valve locations. The area was excavated with a backhoe to expose enough pipe to facilitate the repair. After the line was confirmed to be free of hydrocarbons, on-site contractors proceeded to cold cut the east side of the line. The first cold cut was successful, and approximately 20 feet of pipe was removed. At approximately 5:00 p.m. on December 28, 2011, a flash fire occurred in the trench when a concentration of hydrocarbons exceeding the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) for the hydrocarbon mixture ignited. Two Enterprise employees and four contractors were in the trench working on various tasks, such as removing additional soil with shovels, taking measurements, and evaluating the amount of additional pipe that needed to be removed from the west side of the weld failure, when the flash fire occurred. Three individuals were injured as a result of the flash fire. Enterprise discontinued all repair activities. On December 30, 2011, following the development and implementation of a work plan and work permits, the failed section was cut out and replaced with 24 feet of new pipe. The pipeline was then purged and returned to service at 80 percent of the operating pressure at the time of the incident while the investigation continued into the cause of the failure. The removed pipe was then sent to Kiefner and Associates, Inc. for metallurgical analysis. Pipe Replacement Page 4 of 6 <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure 12/27/2011 After receipt and analysis of the metallurgical report, and a subsidence hazard assessment performed as part of the accident investigation, the pressure restriction was removed from the system in December 2012. Investigation Details At approximately 10:42 p.m. CST, December 27, 2011, Enterprise Products reported, to the NRC, a release of LPG in Loving County, Texas. PHMSA’s Southwest Region received the incident notification and began communicating with the operator. Upon isolation of the valve section, the area was made safe and the repair began. Cold cuts were being used to remove the section of old pipe, and one piece had been removed from the line. With multiple employees around the area, at 5:00 p.m., on December 28, 2011, a flash fire occurred due to product saturation in the soil around the bell hole. Due to the fire, 3 employees received minor burns. One of the three injured employees required in-patient hospitalization. The repair activities were stopped so that Enterprise could respond to the injuries and reassess the project. A maintenance crew from another location was dispatched to complete the repair. PHMSA then scheduled a meeting to investigate the actions taken due to the flash fire. Findings from this meeting indicated the initial area crew did not establish a job plan as required by Enterprise. Before performing the subsequent repair, a copy of the work plan (form SF20) was furnished to PHMSA investigators, upon request, from Enterprise, with all additional safety forms attached. Repairs were then completed. Site After Flash Fire Following the accident, the pipeline was returned to service at a reduced operating pressure. PHMSA requested additional testing and investigation into the cause of the failure. Enterprise’s final report determined external stresses were exerted on the acetylene weld. Based on this finding, Enterprise initiated a study to the review the possibility of this event reoccurring in other sections of the acetylene pipe that remained within the MP 31 to MP 70 sections. Golder Associates conducted a Subsidence Hazards Assessemnt of the Rio Grande Pipeline and presented their results to Enterprise in September Page 5 of 6 <<>> Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Girth Weld Failure 12/27/2011 2012. The information was also reviewed with PHMSA, and additional information was provided by Enterprise. A final meeting was held in December 2012, and the pipeline was returned to full service. Metallurgical Analysis The failed girth weld and associated pipe was sent to Kiefner & Associates, Inc., in Worthington, Ohio, for metallurgical analysis. The conclusions of the analysis were:  The fracture initiated at an area of incomplete penetration in the acetylene weld, in a ductile manner, and propagated within and around the circumferential weld.  The cause of the girth weld failure was due to external stresses on the pipeline. This was the conclusion since no evidence of time-dependent degradation was identified on the pipe.  The failure mechanism was longitudinal in nature (geotechnical soil shift/ thermal expansion).  No failure would have occurred in the girth weld without the applied longitudinal stresses. Mechanical Analysis There was no mechanical analysis to be made. Geotechnical Analysis A Subsidence Hazards Assessment was performed by Golder Associates on the Lawson Junction to Pecos River segment of the Rio Grande Pipeline. The assessment identified a possible subsidence feature that could have contributed to the external forces that caused the failure. External forces could also have been caused by the 1996 pipeline rehabilitation project that replaced 168 feet of pipeline just 47 feet upstream of the failure location. No other actions were identified by the Assessment that required action on the pipeline segment. Conclusion A failure occurred in an acetylene girth weld that completely separated from the 8-inch Rio Grande Pipeline. The separation began in a location of incomplete penetration within the weld due to the application of external forces on the pipeline. The flash fire and injuries were a result of incorrect operation and failing to follow procedures associated with hot work on the pipeline. Appendices A Telephonics Notice Report – NRC # 999086 B Operator Accident Report – ODES # 20120023 Girth Weld Failure C Operator Accident Report – ODES # 20120070 Flash Fire from Soil D Operator Incident Investigation Report – #11856/SF-108 Page 6 of 6 <<>> APPENDIX A <<>> TeleDetail Page 1 of 2 NRC Number: Call Date: First Name: Company Name: Address: City: Country: Phone 1: Organization Type: Confidential: First Name: Company Name: Address: City: Country: Phone 1: Organization Type: State: Nearest City: Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (Version 4.0.0 PROD) [Return to Search] 999086 12/27/2011 Call Time: Caller Information BRAD Last Name: ;ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS PIPELINE ··Housi: o"N________ state - ~-------, Zip: 2818872641 Phone 2: PRIVA' Is caller the spiller? D YHs G!l No 0 No FlGt>ponoe Discharger Information BRAD Last Name: ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS PIPELINE - . '9420 W. SAM HOUSTON PKWY NORTH HOUSTON State: 'USA Zip: :2818872641 Phone 2: PRIVA' Spill Information TX County: ODESSA Zip Code: HMIS-> INCIDENTS-> TELEPHONICS Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu 23:42:43 WELLS 'TX 77064 WELLS ·;:x 77064 - EcrO'il - -·--·---------·-·--- .. ·--i ---, ~ Spill Date: DTG Type: Incident Type _12/27/20 11 . (mm/dd/yyyy) Spill Time: 21:10:00 i (24hh:mm:ss) <- Select DTG Type -> • ALL • Reported Incident Type 'PiPE'iJNE ~ .. ---------·------·M-----------------------·--------" ""1 CALLER IS REPORTING A RELEASE OF PROPANE DUE TO KNOWLEDGE OF A LOSS OF PRESSURE • IN THE PIPELINE . Materials lnyolyed Material I Chris Narne PROPANE Medium Type: Additional Medium Information: ATMOSPHERE <·Select Mc;diurn Type . Injuries: Fatalites: mhtml:file :/ /C:\ U sers\Cynthia.Lewis\AppData \Local\Microsoft\ Windows\ Temporary Intern .. . 9/3/2013 <<>> TeleDetail Page 2 of2 Evacuations: Damages: 0 Yer. li!l No 0 Unknown No. of Evacuations: 0 Ye> li!l Nt' 0 Unknown Damage Amount: Federal Agency Notified: 0 Y6s 0 No [§'] Unl,nown State Agency Notified: 0 Yf!~ O No [§] Unknown Other Agency Notified: 0 Yes 0 No li!l Unknown Remedial Actions ISOLATED THE PIPELINE AND TECHNICIANS AR E ON-SC EN E . Additional Info NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION . J.millJsJ.e Degrees:. Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant: ~ Degrees: . Minutes: Seconds: Distance from City: Section: Direction: Township: Range: Milepost: Quadrant: · ----~--..:.. ____ . ___ _ []Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters) <> mhtml:file://C:\Users\Cynthia.Lewis\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Intern... 9/3/2013 <<>> APPENDIX B <<>> NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122. 0 U.S Department of Transportation Pipeline and Haza rdous Materials Safety Administration OMB NO: 2137-0047 EXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013 Report Date: 01/20/2012 No. 20120023- 16510 -------------------------- _iDOl Use OnJltL ACCIDENT REPORT • HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE SYSTEMS A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washinqton, D.C. 20590. INSTRUCTIONS I Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at llttr.rb'~~~ D.llliJ~i;j aQt (J.Q'iiQ{P.~liatJ.. PART A· KEY REPORT INFORMATION Report Type: (select all that apply) Original: I Supplemental: l Final: I Yes l Yes Last Revision Date: 03/2 1/2012 1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 31618 2. Name of Operator 3. Address of Operator: 3a. Street Address 1100 Lou isiana Street 3b. City HOUSTON 3c. State Texas 3d. Zip Code 77002 4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 12/27/2011 2 1:00 5. Location of Accident: Latitud e: 31.78341 ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC -103.46442 6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 999086 7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the 12/27/201121:10 National Response Center (if applicable): 8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant HVL or Other Flammable or Toxic Fluid wh ich is a Gas at volume released) Ambient Conditions - Specify Commodity Subtype: Other HVL - If "Other" Subtype, Describe: Propane/Butane mix - If Biofuei/Aiternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Ethanol Blend, then% Ethanol Blend: Lon~itud e: %: - If Biofuei/Aiternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Biodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B1 00): B 9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown (Barrels): 11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 12. Were there fatalities? No - If Yes, specify the number in each cateaorv: 12a. Operator employees 12b. Contractor employees work in~ for the Operator 12c. Non-Operator emergency responders 12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator 12e. General public 12f. Total fatalities (sum of above) 13. Were there iniuries reauirina inoatient hosoitalization? No - If Yes, soecify the number in each ca t e~orv : 13a. Operator employees 13b. Contractor employees workinq for the Operator 13c. Non-Operator emeraency responders 13d. Workers workinq on the riqht-of-way, but NOT 3,283.00 Page 1 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> associated with this Operator 13e. General public 13f. Total injuries (sum of above) 14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes - If No, Explain: - If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock) 14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: - Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) 15. Did the commodity iQnite? 16. Did the commodity explode? No No 17. Number of Qeneral public evacuated: 0 18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock): 18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 12/27/2011 21:30 01/12/201 2 10:55 12/27/2011 23:02 12/28/2011 00:28 PART B- ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION 1. Was the oriQin of Accident onshore? I Yes If Yes, Complete Questions (2-12) If No, Complete Questions (13-15) • If Onshore: 2. State: Texas 3. Zip Code: 79745 4. City Kermit 5. County or Parish Lovinq 6. Operator-desiqnated location: Milepost/Valve Station Specify: 50.16 7. Pipeline/Facility name: 8. Segment name!ID : 9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)? 10. Location of Accident: 11 . Area of Accident (as found): Rio Grande Pipeline LID 1058 No Pipeline RiQht-of-way Underground Specify: Under soil - If Other, Describe: Depth-of-Cover (in): 22 No 12. Did Accident occur in a crossinq? - If Yes, specify below: - If Bridge crossing - Cased/ Uncased: - If Railroad crossing - Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled - If Road crossing- Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled - If Water crossing - Cased/ Uncased - Name of body of water, if commonly known: - Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: -Select: · If Offshore: 13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: 14. Origin of Accident: - In State waters - Specify: -State: - Area: - Block/Tract #: - Nearest County/Parish: - On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)- Specify: - Area: I -Block#: I 15. Area of Accident: I PART C- ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION 1. Is the pipeline or facility: 2. Part of system involved in Accident: - If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached Appurtenances, specify: 3. Item involved in Accident: - If Pipe, specify: Interstate Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites Weld, includinq heat-affected zone Page 2 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 3b. Wall thickness (in): 3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strenoth) of pipe (psi): 3d. Pipe specification: 3e. PiPe Seam , specify: - If Other, Describe: 3f. Pipe manufacturer: 3o. Year of manufacture: 3h. Pipeline coatino type at point of Accident, specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify: - If Other, Describe: - If Valve, specify: - If Mainline, specify: - If Other, Describe: 3i. Manufactured bv: 3i. Year of manufacture: - If Tank/Vessel, specify: - If Other- Describe: - If Other, describe: 4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 5. Material involved in Accident: - If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify: 6. Tvpe of Accident Involved: - If Mechanical Puncture- Specify Approx. size: Pipe Girth Weld 1929 Material other than Carbon Steel Acetylene Weld Rupture in. (axial) by in. (circumferential) - If Leak- Select Type: - If Other, Describe: - If Rupture- Select Orientation: - If Other, Describe: Approx. size: in . (widest openinq) by 4 in. (lenqth circumferentially or axially) 4 - If Other- Describe: PART D -ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: No 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds -Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: Yes 3. Lonq term impact assessment performed or planned: No 4. Anticipated remediation: No 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Veqetation - Wild life 5. Water contamination: No 5a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Ocean/Seawater -Surface - Groundwater - Drinkinq water: (Select one or both) - Private Well - Public Water Intake 5b. Estimated amount released in or reachino water (Barrels): 5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known : 6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility been identified as one that "could affect" a High Consequence Area No (HCA) as determined in the Operator's lnteqrity Manaqement Program? 7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High No Consequence Area (HCA)? ?a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply) - Commercially Navigable Waterway: Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Circumferential Page 3 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted -- -- <<>> lnteority ManaQement ProQram? - Hioh Population Area: Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's lnteQrity ManaQement ProQram? - Other Populated Area Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management ProQram? - Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)- Drinking Water Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity ManaQement Prooram? - Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)- EcoloQ ical Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity ManaQement ProQram? B. Estimated Property Damage: Ba. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property $ 0 damaoe Bb. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 100,000 Be. Estimated cost of Operator's property damaQe & reoairs $ 105,000 Bd. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency resoonse $ 12,000 Be. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 0 Bf. Estimated other costs $ 0 Describe: BQ. Total estimated property damaQe (sum of above) $ 217,000 PARTE- ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION 1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psio): 2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the Accident (psio): 3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the Accident (psiQ): 4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations (such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility relating to the Accident operating under an established pressure restriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the MOP? 1 ,33B.OO 1,440.00 Pressure did not exceed MOP No - If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below: 4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure restriction? 4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the State? 5. 2? Was "Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites" OR "Offshore Pipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend" selected in PART C, Question Yes - If Yes- (Complete Sa. - Sf. below) 5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release Remotely Controlled source: 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: Manual 5c. Lenoth of seoment isolated between va lves (ft): 63,5B9 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal Yes inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? select all that apply) - ChanQes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - TiQht or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakaoe internal inspection tools\ -Other - - If Other, Describe: 5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which significantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool run? No - If Yes, Which ooerational factors complicate execution?( select all that apply) - Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall builduP I - Low operatinQ pressure(s) I Page 4 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> - Low flow or absence of flow - Incompatible commodity - Other- - If Other, Describe: 5f. Function of pipeline system: 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? If Yes - > 20% SMYS Regulated TrunklinefTransmission Yes 6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? 6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes Yes 6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with Yes the detection of the Accident? 6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with Yes the confirmation of the Accident? 7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility Yes involved in the Accident? - If Yes: ?a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? ?b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes Yes ?c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calcu lations) assist Yes with the detection of the Accident? ?d . Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist Yes with the confirmation of the Accident? 8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Controller - If Other, SpecifY: 8a. If "Controller", "Local Operating Personnel", including contractors", "Air Patrol", or "Guard Patrol by Operator or its Operator employee contractor" is selected in Question 8, specify the followina: 9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary control room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the due to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not Accident? investiaate l - If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the Determined controllers actions did not contribute to the controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: release. forovide an explanation for why the operator did not investiaate) -If Yes, specify investiqation resu lt(s): (select all that applYJ - Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator), and other factors associated with fatiaue - Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations, continuous hours of service (while working for the OPerator), and other factors associated with fatique Provide an explanation for whv not: - Investigation identified no control room issues - lnvestiaation identified no controller issues - Investigation identified incorrect controller action or controller error - Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the controller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s) response - Investigation identified incorrect procedures - Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response - Investigation identified areas other than those above: Describe: PART F ·DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION 1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Drua & Alcohol Testing regulations? -If Yes: 1a. Specify how many were tested: 1 b. Specify how many failed : No Page 5 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's Druq & Alcohol Testinq requ lations? -If Yes: 2a. Specify how many were tested: 2b. Specify how many failed: No PART G- APPARENT CAUSE Select only one box from PART GIn shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer the questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H). Apparent Cause: GS - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld G1 ·Corrosion Failure -only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column External Corrosion: Internal Corrosion: -If External Corrosion: 1. Results of visual examination: I - If Other, Describe: I 2. TvPe of corrosion: (select all that aoolv) -Galvanic - Atmospheric - Stray Current - Microbioloqical - Selective Seam -Other: - If Other, Describe: 3. The tvpe(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the followinq: (select all that apply) - Field examination - Determined by metallurgical analysis - Other: - If Other, Describe: 4. Was the failed item buried under the ground? -If Yes: D4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at the time of the Accident? If Yes - Year protection started : 4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbanding of coating evident at the point of the Accident? 4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted at the point of the Accident? If "Yes, CP Annual Survey"- Most recent year conducted: If "Yes, Close Interval Survey"- Most recent year conducted: If "Yes, Other CP Survey"- Most recent year conducted: - If No: 4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted? 5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of the corrosion? - If Internal Corrosion: 6. Results of visual examination: - Other: 7. Tvpe of corrosion (select all that apply): - - Corrosive Commodity -Water drop-out/Acid - Microbioloqical - Erosion -Other: - If Other, Describe: 8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the followinq (select all that apply): - - Field examination - Determined by metallurgical analysis - Other: - If Other, Describe: 9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): - - Low point in pipe -Elbow I - Other: Page 6 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> - If Other, Describe: 10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? 11 . Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? 12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely utilized? 13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Complete the following If any Corrosion Failure sub-cause Is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is TankNessel. 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: 14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection - No In-Service Inspection completed Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal insoection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Most recent year: - Ultrasonic Most recent year: - Geometry Most recent vear: - Calioer Most recent year: - Crack Most recent vear: - Hard Soot Most recent year: - Combination Tool Most recent vear: -Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year: -Other Most recent year: Describe: 16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? If Yes- Most recent vear tested: Test oressure: 17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment? -If Yes, and an investioative dio was conducted at the point of the Accident:: Most recent vear conducted: - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dio site: Most recent year conducted: 18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the ooint of the Accident since Januarv 1, 2002? 18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most recent year the examination was conducted: - Radiooraohv - Guided Wave Ultrasonic - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool - Wet Magnetic Particle Test - Drv Maonetic Particle Test - Other Most recent vear conducted: Most recent vear conducted: Most recent vear conducted: Most recent vear conducted: Most recent vear conducted: Most recent vear conducted: Describe: G2 • Natural Force Damage -only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column Natural Force Damage- Sub-Cause: I -If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods: 1. Specify: I Page 7 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> - If Other, Describe: -If Heavy Rains/Floods: 2. Specify: - If Other, Describe: • If Lightning: 3. Specify: I ·If Temperature: 4. Specify: I - If Other, Describe: • If High Winds: • If Other Natural Force Damage: 5. Describe: Complete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected. 6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in conjunction with an extreme weather event? 6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply) - Hurricane - Tropical Storm -Tornado -Other - If Other, Describe: G3 • Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column Excavation Damage - Sub-Cause: • If Excavation Damage byOperator (First Party): ·If Excavation Dama1:1e bv Operator's Contractor{Second Party): • If Excavation Damage by Third Party: • If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1·5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved In Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. 1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? 1a. If Yes, for each tool used select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: - - Magnetic Flux Leakage Most recent year conducted: - Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Geometry Most recent year conducted: - Caliper Most recent year conducted: - Crack Most recent year conducted: - Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: - Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: - Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: -Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: 2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was completed BEFORE the damage was sustained? 3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? -If Yes: Most recent vear tested: Test pressure (psig): 4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline segment? - If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident: Most recent vear conducted: I - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site: Most recent year conducted: Page 8 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? 5a. If Yes, for each examination , conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most recent year the examination was conducted: - Radiography Most recent year conducted: - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Most recent year conducted: - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Most recent year conducted: - Wet Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: -Dry Magnetic Particle Test -- Most recent year conducted: - Other Most recent year conducted: Describe: Complete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause. 6. Did the operator qet prior notification of the excavation activity? 6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that aoolv) - - One-Call System -Excavator - Contractor - Landowner Complete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected. 7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA- DIRT (www.cga-dirt.com}? 8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) - - Public - If "Public", Specify: -Private - If "Private", Specify: - Pipeline Property/Easement - Power/Transmission Line - Railroad - Dedicated Public Utility Easement - Federal Land - Data not collected - Unknown/Other 9. Type of excavator: 10. Type of excavation equipment: 11. Type of work performed: 12. Was the One-Call Center notified? 12a. If Yes, specify ticket number: 12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center exists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified : 13. Type of Locator: 14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation? 15. Were facilities marked correctly? 16. Did the damaqe cause an interruption in service? 16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours} 17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-0/RT Root Cause and then, where available as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-0/RT Root Cause as well): Root Cause: - If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Locating Practices Not Sufficient specify: - If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify: - If Other/None of the Above, explain: G4 • Other Outside Force Damage · only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column Other Outside Force Damage- Sub-Cause: • If Nearby Industrial, Man-made or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident: ·If Damage by Car Truck or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged In Excavation: 1. Vehicle/Equipment ooerated bv: I ·If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost Their Mooring: Page 9 of 14 Reproduction of this form is permitted <<>> 2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor: - Hurricane - Tropical Storm - Tornado - Heavy Rains/Flood -Other - If Other, Describe: -If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT Engaged in Excavation: • If Electrical Arcing from Other Eauioment or Facility: ·If Previous Mechanical Damaae NOT Related to Excavation: Complete Q - **truncated:** true - **body characters:** 86388