{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Enterprise Products Operating, LLC, 2013-08-12","title":"Failure Report- Enterprise Products Operating, LLC 8/12/13","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-08-12","effective_on":"2013-08-12","summary":"Enterprise Products Operating, LLC; Hazardous Liquid; IL; failure 2013-08-12; apparent cause: Material Failure Pipe.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-81213.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-81213.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-81213","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-81213","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nCentral Region\nPrincipal Investigator Joe Elmer\nSenior Accident Investigator Karen Butler\nRegion Director Linda Daugherty/ Allan Beshore\nDate of Report 05/26/2015\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating, LLC –\nMaterial Failure\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 08/12/2013\nCommodity Released Ethane/Propane Mix\nCity/County & State Erie / Whiteside, Illinois\nOpID & Operator Name 31618 Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\nUnit # & Unit Name 2313 (MAPCO) IOWA CITY\nSMART Activity # 144352\nMilepost / Location MP 16.2 / Morris Lateral (LID 624)\nType of Failure Rupture, Material Failure\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nRural (corn field), non-HCA\nTotal Costs $515,000\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Material Failure\nFailure Date 08/12/2013\nExecutive Summary1\nOn August 12, 2013, at approximately 11:14 p.m. CDT,\n2 Enterprise Products Operating LLC’s (Enterprise)\n10-inch nominal diameter Morris Lateral (LID 624) pipeline ruptured at M.P. 16.2, in Whiteside County,\nnear Erie, IL. The rupture resulted in the release of approximately 18,400 barrels of ethane/propane mix\ninto an agricultural field and was not located in a High Consequence Area (HCA). The product did ignite,\nand an explosion associated with the rupture produced a crater in the ground approximately 36 feet\nlong and 22 feet wide.\nA section of pipe approximately 33 feet in length was ejected from the ditch during the failure. The pipe\nthat was ejected from the ditch broke apart into 12 different pieces, which were recovered from the\ncorn field. No fatalities or injuries occurred as a result of the failure. A total of five roads were closed\nand 32 homes evacuated as a result of the fire and explosion. The total cost of the failure, emergency\nresponse, pipeline repair, and environmental cleanup is estimated at $515,000.\nPHMSA worked with the operator throughout the week of August 12 to review and approve a restart\nplan including a 20 percent reduction in maximum operating pressure, have metallurgical specialists on-\nsite before sections of the pipe failure were transferred, provide detailed emergency response timelines,\nreview metallurgical protocols, review previous close internal survey (CIS) and inline inspection (ILI)\ndata, and identify go forward integrity actions.\nThe fracture propagated both upstream and downstream from the origin of the failure. Metallurgical\nanalysis determined that the pipe failure was caused by a defect that formed in the longitudinal ERW\n(HF) pipe seam. The defect was a combination of two flaws: an external surface breaking hook crack and\na crack that formed at the base of the hook crack and that grew to a critical size over time. Significant\ncorrosion by-products were also found present during the failure metallurgical analysis. Three failure\nmechanisms were present and possible: 1) Environmental cracking such as SCC, 2) Pressure-cycle\ninduced fatigue crack growth, and 3) Corrosion-fatigue.\nAs a result of the failure and in concert with PHMSA discussion, Enterprise performed a hydrotest on the\nMorris Lateral (LID 624), and an additional failure occurred during the hydrotest at MP 32.66. This failed\npipe also received a metallurgical analysis. The metallurgical analysis for the hydrotest failure identified\nthe failure cause as SCC (near-nuetral ph).\nSystem Details\nThe Morris Lateral (LID 624) is also known as the Red Line and transports an ethane-propane mix from\nIowa City, IA, to the Lyondell petrochemical plants in Morris, IL, and Clinton, IA. An AuxsAble terminal\ncalled Channahon is located on the east end of the Morris Lateral, also called the Red Line in Illinois. The\npipeline is a bi-directional line, but at the time of the failure the flow was from west to east. The pump\nstations from west to east are located in Iowa and are as follows: Iowa City Terminal, Clinton, and\nWillow. AuxAble is able to inject into the Morris Lateral at MP 107, therefore both AuxAble and\nEnterprise are capable of delivering ethane-propane to Morris/Lyondell and Clinton/Lyondell locations.\nAt the failure location, the pipeline is constructed of API 5LX Grade X-52 line pipe manufactured in 1973\n1 This Failure Investigation Report is based upon facts and information available to PHMSA at the time of issuance.\nAny statements, conclusions, appendices, data summary, or findings stated herein are subject to revision and do\nnot constitute any final determination about the need for further investigation or enforcement action by any\ngovernment agency.\n2 All times reflect Central Daylight Time (CDT) zone unless otherwise specifically noted.\nPage 2 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Material Failure\nFailure Date 08/12/2013\nby American Steel Pipe Company. The pipeline is 10.750-inch O.D., 0.188-inch wall thickness, high\nfrequency ERW type pipe coated with cold applied tape. The pipeline is protected by an impressed\ncurrent type of cathodic protection system.\n3 The nearest residence was located approximately 600\nyards south of the rupture location. The nearest railroad line was located 2.75 miles north of the\nrupture site.\nThe Morris Lateral’s maximum operating pressure (MOP) is 1,307 psig, which is equivalent to 72 percent\nof the specified minimum yield strength of the pipe. The pipeline was hydrostatically tested in 1986 with\nan 8-hour test and a minimum pressure of 1,741 psig, which was equivalent to 95.7 percent of the\nspecified minimum yield strength of the pipe. Documentation indicated that the highest historical\noperating pressure for a portion of the pipeline from Clinton to MP 55.45 is 1,225 psig. Enterprise\nreported that during the 1986 hydrostatic test, the line was tested in 11 segments, and 3 experienced\nfailures (two from mechanical damage and one from a pinhole in a weld). The metallurgical report\nindicated that no hydrotest failures were recorded for this section of the pipeline that failed on August\n12, 2013.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nAt approximately 6:09 p.m. on August 12, 2013, the controller started Pump No. 1 at the Willow pump\nstation in order to meet scheduled product delivery requirements. At 10:57 p.m., the discharge pressure\nat the Willow pump station reached 1,254 psig, which was the highest pressure that was recorded at the\nstation just prior to the failure. This was also the highest pressure observed at this station in the 60 days\nprior to the failure, and for a portion of the pipeline, exceeded the highest historical operating pressure\nof 1,225 psig.\nAt 11:10 p.m., the discharge pressure at the Willow station dropped rapidly from 1,252 psig to 1,232\npsig in a 15-second poll. At the same time, the Whiteside County Sheriff’s Department started to receive\n911 calls of a fire north of I-80 and Erie Bridge. At 11:11 p.m., the pressure continued to drop at the\nWillow station to 1,166 psig. The pressure was also dropping at the Van Orin block valve from 1,034 psig\nto 1,011 psig. However, the pressure at Collins Lake Block valve was holding at 931 psig.\nAt 11:14 p.m., the Erie Fire Department was dispatched to the accident site.\nAt approximately 11:16 p.m., on August 12, 2013, Pump No. 1 at the Willow pump station shut down\nbecause of low suction pressure and the SCADA system sensed a significant pressure drop on the\npipeline. The Houston Pipeline Control issued a start command to the Willow station Pump No. 2 at\n11:17 p.m., however the Pump No. 2 failed to start due to low pressure on the pump suction. The\ncontroller suspected a line break leak had occurred and requested that the operator at the Iowa City\npump station shut down the pumps at that location. At 11:23 p.m., Pump No. 1 at the Iowa City station\nwas shut down, and callouts to Enterprise personnel were started by 11:29 p.m.\nEmergency Response\nA resident who lives near the intersection of Albany Road and Stropes Road in Whiteside County, IL,\ncalled the Erie Fire Protection District at 11:14 p.m. on August 12, 2013, to report a large fire in a corn\n3 Tape coating systems may shield the pipe from cathodic protection currents, resulting in ineffective protection.\nPage 3 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Material Failure\nFailure Date 08/12/2013\nfield. Erie Fire Protection District personnel were dispatched to the Albany Road location and arrived at\nthe scene at 11:23 p.m. The Fire District personnel were able to determine that the fire was associated\nwith a pipeline that had ruptured. Product that was released from the pipeline ignited, and flames from\nthe fire reached heights up to 250 feet above the ground.\nAt 11:25 p.m., the controller closed MOV 9013 at Iowa City. By 11: 45 p.m., the Iowa City Terminal\noperator had received a call from Cochin Pipeline’s control room stating that they had been made aware\nof a pipeline fire in Illinois, and Enterprise technicians were being mobilized between Morris and Iowa\nCity. Alternate supply by AuxsAble to Morris/Lyondell was established by 11: 48 p.m. At 11:58 p.m. the\ncontrol room received a call from a farmer located near the pipeline who reported observing the fire.\nThe Fire District personnel determined that the pipeline was operated by Enterprise Products Pipeline\nLLC and called the Enterprise Pipeline emergency number at approximately 12:00 a.m. on August 13,\n2013. After the call from the Fire District, the Enterprise control room notified the Illinois Highway\nPatrol of the situation. Enterprise Pipeline Company personnel and Erie Fire Protection District\npersonnel discussed the situation and together it was decided to set up a one-mile safety buffer around\nthe rupture site. Fire district personnel, with the assistance of other emergency responders, blocked\nfive roads within the safety buffer zone and evacuated all 32 residences that were located within the\nsafety buffer zone. Other emergency responders that assisted with activities at the accident location\nincluded the Erie Police Department, the Fulton Police Department, the Prophetstown Police\nDepartment, the Illinois State Police, the Whiteside Sherriff’s Department, and the Albany Fire\nDepartment.\nAt 12:04 a.m. on August 13, 2013, the controller closed the MOVs at MP 55 and MP 116, which isolated\na 61-mile segment of the pipeline. On August 13, 2013, Enterprise Product Pipeline notified the\nNational Response Center (NRC) of the release at 12:17 a.m. (1:17 ET). The #3 MOV at Willow station\n(MP 2) was closed by the controller at 12:17 a.m. and the manual valve at MP 107 was closed by\noperations personnel at 12:35 a.m. Enterprise Pipeline Company personnel began to arrive at the\naccident location at 1:03 a.m. Operations personnel closed the manual valve at MP 26 at 1:22 a.m. and\nthe manual valve at MP 27 at 1:32 a.m. A total of four Enterprise employees including the Regional\nManager were at the site by 2:17 a.m. The manual valve at MP 16 was closed at 2:35 a.m., isolating the\nline segment between MP 16 and MP 26.\nThe occupants of all but two of the residences were allowed to return home by approximately 4:00 a.m.\nAt approximately 5:30 a.m. Enterprise Pipeline employees and the Erie District Fire Chief went to inspect\nthe immediate area of the rupture determined to be MP 16.2. The area was determined to be safe and\nthe fire was deemed under control. At that point the occupants of the final two residences were\nallowed to return home, the roads were opened, and the Erie Fire district personnel were released from\nthe scene.\nThe Whiteside County ESDA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 5 also responded to\nthe scene. COMED inspected the electric power lines in the area and no damage was reported.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nOn the evening of August 14, 2013, excavation activities commenced at the rupture site. The initial goal\nof the excavation activities was to locate the girth weld immediately downstream of the rupture, located\nPage 4 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Material Failure\nFailure Date 08/12/2013\napproximately 35 feet to the east of the crater. Enterprise submitted the repair plan to PHMSA on the\nmorning of August 15 and that plan was approved in the afternoon of August 15. Excavation of the\ndamaged section of the pipeline continued into the evening of August 15. At that point the length of the\nexposed pipeline was approximately 250 feet. Girth welds at each end of the exposed pipe were located\nand cuts were made at the girth welds and the exposed pipeline was removed from the ditch. The ends\nof the pipe that remained in the ditch were prepared for welding and then examined nondestructively\nto ensure that the pipe ends were free of any injurious defects.\nWhile the excavation was proceeding, new replacement pipe was delivered to the repair site and was\nwelded into a 300-foot long segment with end caps. The pipe and end caps were welded together by\nqualified welders who followed a qualified welding procedure. The welds were radiographed and met\nthe requirements of API 1104.\nThe replacement pipe segment was located above ground adjacent to the excavation. It was filled with\nwater and placed on hydrostatic at 2:45 p.m. on August 16, 2013. The replacement pipe segment was\ntested to a pressure of 2,000 psig, which is equivalent to 110 percent SMYS. The test was complete at\n7:28 p.m. on August 16. After the test was complete, the segment was dewatered, the end caps were\ncut off, and the segment was cut into two segments to facilitate installation in the ditch.\nThe replacement pipe segments were placed in the ditch and aligned with the ends of the existing\npipeline. The three welds were completed early in the morning of August 17. The welds were\nradiographed and met the requirements of API 1104.\nAfter receiving PHMSA approval, Enterprise initiated the start-up plan at 7:00 a.m. on the morning of\nAugust 17 by notifying the first responders in the area of the pipeline failure that the pipeline was being\nre-started. After the notifications were made, the pipeline segment between the valve at MP 16 and\nMP 26, which contained the repair segment, was purged with nitrogen. At 2:10 p.m. Enterprise began\nfilling that portion of the pipeline with product. At 6:00 p.m. the pressure in the line reached 860 psig\nand that segment of the line was placed on a 2-hour hold test in accordance with the start-up plan.\nDuring the hold test, aerial patrols were conducted and the line was monitored through the SCADA\nsystem to ensure it was leak free. At 8:00 p.m. the control room took over operation of the pipeline and\nwas allowed to operate the line with an MOP of 960 psig at the Willow pump station. This represents a\n20 percent reduction from the pressure at the time of the failure.\nInvestigation Details\nPHMSA worked with the operator through teleconferences and data exchange throughout the week of\nAugust 12 to review and approve a restart plan including a 20 percent reduction in maximum operating\npressure, have metallurgical specialists on-site before sections of the pipe failure were transferred,\nprovide detailed emergency response timelines, review metallurgical protocols, review previous CIS and\nILI data, and identify go forward integrity actions.\nAfter the area was declared safe on the morning of August 13, Enterprise began initial site investigation\nand located 11 small pieces of steel pipe that had been ejected from the ditch when the pipeline\nruptured. The pieces were numbered and cataloged by the location of each piece. A twelfth pipe\nfragment was subsequently located.\nOn August 13, 2013, at approximately 1:36 p.m., a PHMSA Central Region Investigator arrived on scene.\nThe investigator photographed and diagrammed the scene and then interviewed Enterprise personnel\nand first responders. On August 14, a metallurgist from Kiefner and Associates arrived at the failure site\nPage 5 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Material Failure\nFailure Date 08/12/2013\nand began conducting an investigation into the cause of the failure, which included a visual examination\nof the failure site and magnetic particle inspections on some of the failed pieces of pipe. Detailed\nmeasurements of the longitudinal seam on each pipe fragment were made to ensure that all fragments\nhad been located. Once it was determined that all pieces had been found, each fragment was processed\nand loaded onto a truck on August 16 for shipment to Kiefner’s laboratory in Columbus, OH. A chain of\ncustody document was prepared to ensure proper handling of the samples.\nOn August 15, 2013, Enterprise continued the site investigation and took a Ph reading in the crater (5.5).\nA pipe to soil reading at the failure location and A/C reading at the same location were recorded as -\n1.848 volts and 12.2 volts respectively.\nWhile the failure area was not in an HCA, integrity data indicated that the pipeline had been smart\npigged several times:\nA TDW Deformation tool run was performed on 4/10/2002 and a PII MFL tool run on 4/24/2002.\nWhile deformations were present on the pipeline, no repairs occurred in the nearby area from\nValve AM76 to the small drainage ditch (drainage ditch was evident when reviewing the ROW in\nthe area of the failure).\nA Tuboscope Deformation tool run on 7/14/2005 was performed to verify that the Tuboscope\nUT tool run on 8/24/2005 could occur without damaging the tool. No deformation data was\nanalyzed. The ultrasonic tool run did not require any repairs in the area of the failure. However,\nthe pipeline contained 37 crack features: 6 crack-field, 30 crack-like, and 1 notch-like feature.\n13 crack-like features were repaired with Type B sleeves and 14 crack-like features were\nrecoated. Two crack-fields features were sleeved, and four crack-field features were recoated.\nField observations did not indicate the presence of SCC, but three remaining crack-like features\nand one remaining notch-like feature were not investigated.\nA Magpie Combo MFL/DEF tool run occurred on 11/8/2006. The tool run did result in several\nidentifications but only one was found in the immediate area and was a topside dent with metal\nloss. This feature was repaired with a Type B sleeve on 1/22/2007 and new coating was applied\nbut remained approximately 271 feet away from the failure site. Corrosion and deformation\nanomalies do exist and indications appear to be increasing over time.\nA Magpie Compo MFL/DEP tool run occurred again on 5/12/2010. While anomalies were found,\nno repairs were made in the area of the failure (Valve AM76 to the drainage ditch). Corrosion\nand deformation anomalies do exist and appear to be increasing (vendor threshold of detections\nare more accurate but not all increases appear to be explained by this factor).\nA close interval survey (CIS) was performed on a portion of the pipeline between MP 26 and MP 55.4 in\n2007. While this did not cover the immediate area of the failure, findings from the CIS required that the\ncathodic protection system be improved. An annual review of cathodic protection system performance\nwas completed in 2009 and did appear to have addressed concerns identified by the 2007 CIS. The\ncorrosion growth rate as it existed at the time of the failure determined that the earliest possible non-\nrepaired feature would fail by 5/8/2027. The pipeline has 39 reported casings. None are thought to be\nshorted in the CIS area conducted in 2007.\nA corrosion coupon is monitored upstream of Iowa City Terminal and has not shown a corrosion rate in\nexcess of 1 mil per year from 1997-2010.\nAnalysis for SCC was part of the integrity program prior to the failure, and a Phase II SCC study was\nreferenced. However in light of the failure, this program should benefit from being more aggressive and\na hydrotest was warranted.\nPage 6 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Material Failure\nFailure Date 08/12/2013\nAs part of the investigation, PHMSA requested that numerous documents be provided for review. The\ndocuments provided by Enterprise included the CPDM Survey report (2011 – 2013) for the line segment\nbetween Clinton and Morris pump stations, 2010 Inline Inspection (ILI) indications for the Morris Lateral,\nthe 2006 Close Interval Survey (CIS) Data between MP 14 and MP 19, the pressure/flow data for August\n11, 12, and 13, Abnormal Operation Conditions (AOC) for 2013, coupon monitoring inspection records,\nemergency incident logs, 2006 Magpie Combo MFL/DEF tool results, and the 2010 Magpie Combo\nMFL/DEF tool results.\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nThe Kiefner metallurgical examination determined that the cause of the failure was an original\nmanufacturing defect that grew in service until it reached critical size and failed at the operating\npressure. The original manufacturing defect was an external surface-breaking hook crack that measured\napproximately 4.4 inches long and had a maximum depth of .062 inches, approximately 30 percent of\nactual pipe wall thickness. A secondary defect formed at the base of the hook crack and grew over time\nwhile the pipeline was in service. The overall length of the defect at the time of failure was 4.4 inches,\nand the maximum depth of the combined defects was 0.161 inches, approximately 78 percent of actual\npipe wall thickness. Fractographic and metallographic examinations of the fracture surface were\ncompleted. Thermal damage of the fracture surface prevented detailed microscopic examination of the\nfracture surface, which could have helped to identify the actual growth mechanism of the secondary\ndefect. Metallurgical characteristics of the fracture surface were consistent with environmental cracking\n(SCC) and with pressure-cycle induced fatigue, but were insufficient to conclusively identify the exact\ngrowth mechanism. Corrosion-fatigue could also not be eliminated.\nPipe material properties were consistent with the requirements for the specified size and grade of pipe.\nEnterprise Products Pipeline Company conducted a hydro-test of the Morris Lateral Pipeline for much of\nthe pipeline (from station # 0+0 to 6315+75). The hydro-test was planned to be conducted in four\nsections in a 2 week span starting on July 7, 2014. On August 2, 2014, a hydro-test failure occurred at\nMP 32.66 (station # 1724+53) at 1,425 psig with a target spike test pressure of 1,702 psig. The failed\npipe joint containing the failure measured 63.5 feet and was cut in the field to 20 feet-8 inches for\nshipping to Keifner and Associates for metallurgical analysis.\nThe hydrotest failed pipe in the rupture area measured 46.5 inches long and was located approximately\n27 inches downstream of a girth weld (labeled ESN 1724+47). The pipeline was constructed in 1973 of\n10.75-inch outside diameter, 0.188-inch wall thickness, grade X52, high frequency electric-resistance\nwelded (HF-ERW) line pipe manufactured by American Steel Pipe and was coated with cold applied tape.\nAfter the pipeline was repaired, the pipeline was successfully hydrotested to a spike test pressure of\n1,702 psig for 30 minutes, followed by an 8-hour strength test at 1,653-psig on August 12, 2014.\nThe Kiefner metallurgical examination of the rupture determined that the cause of the hydro-test failure\nwas stress corrosion cracking (SCC) that developed in the ERW seam area. The SCC grew to a maximum\nsize of 3.3-inches long by .15-inches deep, approximately 80 percent of the pipe’s 0.188-inch nominal\nwall thickness.\nEnterprise will perform an Information Analysis to determine the method for reassessment of the\npipeline. Enterprise expects to complete the Information Analysis no later than the fall of 2016. The re-\nassessment date for this pipeline will be determined through the Information Analysis process but will\nnot be longer than the 5-year interval, not to exceed 68 months.\nPage 7 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Operating LLC – Material Failure\nFailure Date 08/12/2013\nBased on the SCC threat, coating type, and other potential corrosion issues, PHMSA should elevate this\npipeline risk factor for inspection cycles/frequency.\nAppendices\nA Map and Photographs\nB NRC Report\nC Operator’s Accident Report\nD Metallurgical Analysis\nE Hydrostatic Test Results\nPage 8 of 8\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nMap of accident location\n) Pipoline and Heard\nI(b) (7)(F)\nerial Safaty Administrat\nOPID31618 Enterprise Products Operating, LLC - Erie, IL Accident\nPHIS CENTRAL REGION\n25 25\nView of Accident Site Looking South\n(Photograph Taken by Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\nPage 1 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nMorris Lateral Map (Red Line).\nPage 2 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nView Rupture Area Looking Southeast\n(Photograph Taken by Enterprise Products Operating, LLC)\nView of ROW Looking Northwest\nPage 3 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nView of Rupture Area Looking Southeast\nExterior View of Piece # 2 (Containing Failure Origin)\nPage 4 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nInterior View of Piece # 2 (Containing Failure Origin)\nView of All Fragments Being Processed\nPage 5 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nView of All Fragments Processed For Shipping\nView of Pressure Gauge During Hydrostatic Test of Replacement Pipe\nPage 6 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nView of Crater with Replacement Pipe\nView of Repaired Pipe Looking Northwest\nPage 7 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Report\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n***GOVERNMENT USE ONLY***GOVERNMENT USE ONLY***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 1056922\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken by: CIV ANTONAY GREER at 01:17 on 13-AUG-13\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: EQUIPMENT FAILURE\nAffected Area:\nIncident was discovered on 12-AUG-13 at 23:20 local incident time.\nAffected Medium: AIR / ATMOSPHERE\nREPORTING PARTY\nName:\nGREG BENDER\nOrganization: ENTERPRISE PRODUCT PIPELINE\nAddress:\n9420 WEST SAM HOUSTON PKWY NORTH\nHOUSTON, TX 77064\nPRIMARY Phone: (281)8872640\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\nPage 1 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Report\n_______________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nName: GREG BENDER\nOrganization: ENTERPRISE PRODUCT PIPELINE\nAddress: 9420 WEST SAM HOUSTON PKWY NORTH\nHOUSTON, TX 77064\nPRIMARY Phone: (281)8872640\n________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nCounty: WHITESIDE\nCity: ERIE State: IL\nERIE AND ALBANY RD.\n_______________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: NCC Official Material Name: NO CHRIS CODE\nAlso Known As: ETHANE PROPANE\nQty Released: 32818 BARREL(S)\n________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nTHE CALLER REPORTED THAT ETHANE PROPANE IS RELEASING FROM A 10\"\nSTEEL PIPELINE DUE TO A LINE RUPTURE. AS A RESULT OF THE RELEASE A\nFIRE IGNITED, WITH THE POSSIBILITY TO RELEASE UP TO 32,818 BARRELS\nOF MATERIAL (THIS NUMBER HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED, HOWEVER IS A\nSPECULATED AMOUNT FROM BLOCK VALVE TO BLOCK VALVE). THE REPORTING\nSOURCE WILL CONTACT THE NRC WITH AN UPDATED QUANTITY.\nPage 2 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Report\n________________________________________________________________________\nSENSITIVE INFORMATION\n________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: DISTRIBUTION\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\n______________________________________________________________________\nIMPACT\nFire Involved: YES Fire Extinguished: NO\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS:NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nHours Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closed Closure\nN\nAir:\nN Major\nRoad: Artery:N\nN\nPage 3 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Report\nWaterway:\nN\nTrack:\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n______________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nTHAT SECTION OF THE PIPE HAS BEEN ISOLATED\nRelease Secured: NO\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n______________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: UNKNOWN, ºF\n______________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal:\nState/Local: STATE POLICE\nState/Local On Scene:\nState Agency Number:\n_______________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (609)7240008\nPage 4 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Report\nCG INVESTIGATIVE SVC CHICAGO (CGIS RAO CHICAGO)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (630)9862160\nCGIS RAO ST. LOUIS (COMMAND CENTER)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (314)2692420\nDHS PROTECTIVE SECURITY ADVISOR (PSA DESK)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (703)2355724\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (202)3661863\nEPA CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION (CID REGION V)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (312)8869872\nU.S. EPA V (MAIN OFFICE)\n(312)3532318\nUSCG NATIONAL COMMAND CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n(202)3722100\nIA U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (INTELLIGENCE OFFICER)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (515)4739345\nIL U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE CENTRAL (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (217)4924402\nIL DNR (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (217)5577817\nIL STATE EMERG AGCY (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (217)7827860\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (202)2829201\nNOAA RPTS FOR IL (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (206)5264911\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)\n(202)2671136\nPage 5 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Report\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (AUTOMATIC REPORTS)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (202)2671136\nNRC SENIOR WATCH OFFICER (MAIN OFFICE)\n(202)2672100\nNTSB PIPELINE (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (202)3146293\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (202)3660568\nMSD QUAD CITIES (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (309)7820627\nSECTOR UPPER MISSISSIPPI RIVER (COMMAND CENTER)\n(314)2692332\nIA DEPT NAT RES ATTN: DUTY OFFICER (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (515)2818694\nIL EPA ERT (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (217)7823637\nDOI/OEPC DENVER (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (303)4452500\nUSCG DISTRICT 8 (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-AUG-13 01:33 (504)5896225\n_______________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nTHE CALLER HAD VERY LITTLE INFORMATION AT THE TIME OF THE REPORT.\n______________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT #1056922 ***\nReport any problems by calling 1-800-424-8802\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT http://www.nrc.uscg.mil\nPage 6 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except hat the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 07/31/2015\nOriginal Report\nDate: 09/10/2013\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20130307 - 20452\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. All responses to the collection of information are mandatory.\nSend comments regarding this burden or any other aspect of his collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden to: Information\nCollection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes Yes\nLast Revision Date: 05/18/2015\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 31618\n2. Name of Operator ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 1100 Louisiana Street\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code 77002\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 08/12/2013 23:10\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 41.697667\nLongitude: -90.098627\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1056922\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 08/13/2013 00:17\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nHVL or Other Flammable or Toxic Fluid which is a Gas at\nAmbient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Other HVL\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Descr be: Ethane/Propane Mix\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend e.g. B2, B20, B100\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 18,400.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels):\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 1 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 08/12/2013 23:16\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: 08/17/2013 20:33\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? Yes\n16. Did the commodity explode? Yes\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 32\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident - effective 7- 2014\nchanged to \"Local time Operator identified failure\": 08/12/2013 23:16\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 08/13/2013 01:03\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Illinois\n3. Zip Code: 61250\n4. City Erie\n5. County or Parish Whiteside\n6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: Milepost 16.2\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: MAPL East Leg - Morris Lateral\n8. Segment name/ID: LID 624\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 48\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\n- If Pipe, specify: Pipe Seam\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 10\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 2 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .188\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 52,000\n3d. Pipe specification: API 5L\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Longitudinal ERW - High Frequency\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: American Steel\n3g. Year of manufacture: 1973\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Cold Applied Tape\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify. If Pipe Girth Weld,\n3a through 3h above are required:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, descr be:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1973\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Rupture\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation: Longitudinal\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by 10\nin. (length circumferentially or axially) 393\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: Yes\n4. Anticipated remediation: Yes\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater Yes\n- Soil Yes\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: Yes\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater Yes\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels): .00\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known: Perched water bearing zone.\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nNo\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? No\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nForm PHMSA F 7000.1\nPage 3 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA i","truncated":true,"body_characters":68400}