{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Enterprise Products Operating LLC, 2010-08-27","title":"Failure Report- Enterprise Products Operating LLC 8/27/10","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-01-13","effective_on":"2010-08-27","summary":"Enterprise Products Operating LLC; Hazardous Liquid; NY; failure 2010-08-27; apparent cause: Material Failure Pipe.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-82710.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-82710.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-82710","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-82710","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator John McCauley Jr. – NYDPS\nSenior Accident Investigator Michael Yazemboski\nRegion Director Byron E. Coy\nDate of Report 10/21/2011\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Products Propane Line Crack\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 08/27/2010\nCommodity Released Liquid Propane\nCity/County & State Gilboa, Schoharie County, NY\nOpID & Operator Name 31618 – Enterprise Products Partners L.P.\nUnit # & Unit Name 3041 – Watkins Glen – NY\nSMART Activity # 130938\nMilepost / Location 7068+66 (survey); Milepost 138.87\nLatitude 42.4687N, Longitude 74.3511W\nCircumferentially-oriented stress corrosion cracking caused the pipe to separate\nType of Failure Fatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area impacted Rural area. Non-HCA.\nProperty Damage $1,811,756\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report Enterprise Products Propane Line Crack\nFailure Date 8/27/2010\nExecutive Summary\nOn August 27, 2010, an 8-inch diameter steel liquid propane pipeline located on Keyserkill Road in the town of\nGilboa, New York, failed in service, resulting in the release of an estimated 3283 barrels of product. There were no\nfatalities or injuries associated with this event. A total of 23 persons in a 3 mile radius were evacuated by\nemergency responders. There was no fire or explosion. The pipeline (designated as P-41) is owned and operated\nby Enterprise Products Partners L.P. (Enterprise – Operator). The pipeline transports liquid propane from Watkins\nGlen, NY, to the pipeline terminus in Selkirk, NY.\nInvestigation of the failure site revealed a crack in the bottom quadrant of the pipe, immediately adjacent to a\ngirth weld, in the heat affected zone. The failure point was located 36-inches downstream from a corrosion cluster\nwhich had been identified by an inline inspection in 2008 using a high resolution magnetic flux leakage tool.\nEnterprise records indicate that its contractor had conducted an integrity dig on this anomaly on August 18, 2010,\nnine days prior to the pipeline failure.\nThe metallurgic evaluation, performed by Kiefner and Associates, established the cause of the failure as a\ncircumferentially-oriented stress corrosion crack (C-SCC) that had grown to more than 70% through wall before\nfailure. Three other isolated C-SCC cracks were detected adjacent to the failure origin.\nKiefner’s evaluation of the likely failure mechanism is that disbonded tape coating shielded the cathodic protection\ncurrent from the pipe in the vicinity of the failure. In addition, the pipe was likely subjected to stresses caused by\nbending loads attributed to misalignment of the pipe immediately downstream of the casing combined with pipe\nsettlement from the recent integrity dig.\nSystem Details\nThe pipeline transports liquid propane from its origin in Watkins Glen, NY, to the pipeline terminus in Selkirk, NY; a\ndistance of approximately 165 miles (Appendix K). The P-41 line was constructed in 1963/1964 with 8-inch API 5L\nX-42 0.203 inch wall thickness and API 5L Grade B 0.375 inch wall thickness pipe. The pipe has a low frequency\nelectric resistance welded (ERW) longitudinal seam, a coal tar coating, and is cathodically protected by impressed\ncurrent. The pipeline has a Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of 1,359 psig which generates a hoop stress level\nof 68.7% of the Specified Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS).\nThe Watkins Glen to Selkirk pipeline represents a critical feed for transport of propane for the Northeastern United\nStates. The pipeline was out of service for five months while testing and repairs took place. During this time, there\nwas a dramatic increase in truck traffic to ensure that customers were supplied with propane.\nPage 2 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report Enterprise Products Propane Line Crack\nFailure Date 8/27/2010\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nIncluding the most recent failure on August 27, 2010, there have been four in‐service failures since the line was\ncommissioned. On February 12, 1980, there was a weld failure due to corrosion. On March 19, 1990, there was a\ncircumferential failure due to transverse Stress Corrosion Cracking. On January 25, 2004, there was a branch\nfitting failure due to front heave.\nOn August 18, 2010, nine days before the latest failure, Enterprise records (Appendix G) indicate that its contractor\nhad conducted an integrity dig on an anomaly 3 feet upstream of the failure location. An analysis of the corrosion\npitting anomaly indicated that no further action was required. The pipe was recoated and backfilled.\nOn August 27, 2010, product was being pumped from Oneonta to Selkirk, NY. The pumping began at 12:45 at a\nrate of 260 barrels per hour (bph) and was increased in steps up to 400 bph at a back pressure of 600 psig by\n15:26. At 16:24, the pressure at Jefferson was low (240 psig), so Enterprise left the valve at Selkirk closed and\nreduced the flow rate at Oneonta to build pressure on the line.\nEmergency Response\nAt 16:26, a 9-1-1 call was received by the Schoharie County Sheriff’s Department reporting a release from a\npipeline. The call was placed by a passing motorist. At this point Enterprise was not yet aware of the leak.\nAt 16:29 the Conesville Fire Department and Ambulance were dispatched. The Conesville Fire Department\nrequested that Middleburgh and Livingston Fire Departments respond.\nAt 16:34 EDT the Schoharie County Emergency Management Director called Enterprise to report the emergency.\nEnterprise responded by running checks of the system.\nAt 16:49 EDT, after observing a pressure drop in the pipeline, Enterprise opened the valve into Selkirk Terminal in\norder to draw down product from a possible leak site.\nAt 16:51, Enterprise bled the pressure off the line, closed in the system at Oneonta and isolated the failed pipe\nsegment by closing block valves at both the Oneonta and Selkirk Terminals.\nAt 16:52, Middleburgh Fire Department closed Keyserkill Road at the Guinea Road intersection, and began\nevacuations from north to south. Livingston Fire Department began evacuation of Keyserkill Road from the area of\nthe leak going north until they met up with Middleburgh Fire Department.\nAt 16:58, Schoharie County Emergency Management requested a reverse 9-1-1 call to the Keyserkill Road\nresidents.\nAt 17:04, all mainline valves between Jefferson and Selkirk were closed (with the exception of Preston Hollow\nwhich had experienced a communication failure earlier in the day). The inability to close in the system at Preston\nHollow did not impact the quantity of propane that leaked.\nAt 17:34 the Incident Commander received notification that the pipeline had been shut down.\nAt 17:45 the leak was determined to be from Enterprise line 0608.\nAt 18:52 the incident was reported to the NRC (#952238).\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nThe line was taken out of service pending implementation of action items identified in Corrective Action Order\n(CAO), CPF No. 1-2010-5008H (Appendix I). As required by the CAO, the company conducted a spike and\nhydrostatic test of the entire P-41 line. The line was divided into 12 test sections and each section was tested\nindependently. Three failures occurred, repairs were made and the sections were retested. Long seam corrosion\nor cracking, and corrosion pitting were observed on the failed sections. The sections of pipe that failed were sent\nout for analysis to determine the failure mechanism. The pipeline was out of service for five months while testing\nand repairs took place. Following successful spike and hydrostatic tests, as well as the other actions required by\nthe CAO, line P-41 returned to service on February 3, 2011.\nPage 3 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report Enterprise Products Propane Line Crack\nFailure Date 8/27/2010\nInvestigation Details\nEnterprise engineers calculated the operating pressure at Keyserkill Road at the time of failure to be approximately\n279 psig.\nThe failure occurred on the downstream side of the Keyserkill Road crossing approximately 36 inches from the end\nof the casing (MP133.9). It was a partial circumferential crack in the heat affected zone of the girth weld in the\nbottom quadrants of the pipe (approximately 4 O’clock to 8 O’clock position). This failure point was located 36\ninches downstream from a corrosion cluster which had been identified by an in line inspection in 2008 using a high\nresolution magnetic flux leakage tool. Enterprise records (Appendix G) indicate that its contractor had conducted\nan integrity dig on this anomaly on August 18, 2010, nine days prior to the pipeline failure. No issues were\nidentified in either the contractor’s operator qualification records or the One Call excavation notification tickets.\nThere was no evidence of mechanical damage to the pipe as a result of the August 18, 2010 excavation.\nThe pipe, as found, was coated and covered with rock shield, and surrounded by sand padding from the previous\nexcavation. A review of the Maintenance Report record from the previous anomaly excavation indicates that the\ncrew excavated, cleaned out around the pipe, and removed 24-inches of coating before sandblasting and\nconducting an evaluation of the existing anomalies. Records from the previous excavation indicated that no repair\nwas prescribed, and the pipe was recoated and backfilled.\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nThe metallurgic evaluation of the failed pipe section (Appendix E), conducted by Kiefner & Associates, established\nthe cause of the failure as a circumferentially-oriented stress corrosion crack (C-SCC) measuring 8.25-inches long\nby 0.134 inches deep adjacent to a circumferential weld. The crack had grown to more than 70% through wall\nbefore failure. Three other isolated C-SCC cracks were detected adjacent to the failure origin.\nKiefner’s evaluation of the likely failure mechanism is that disbonded tape coating shielded the cathodic protection\ncurrent from the pipe in the vicinity of the failure. In addition, the pipe was likely subjected to stresses caused by\nbending loads attributed to misalignment of the pipe immediately downstream of the casing combined with pipe\nsettlement from the recent integrity dig.\nCrack on bottom quadrant of pipe – 09/02/2011\nPage 4 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report Enterprise Products Propane Line Crack\nFailure Date 8/27/2010\nAppendices\nA Enterprise Accident Investigation Report (Form 7000-1)\nB Keyserkill Planimetric\nC NRC Report #952328\nD Profile of Road Crossing\nE Metallurgical Analysis Report, Kiefner & Associates, Inc.\nF Line P41 Return to Service Hydrostatic Test Plan (Enterprise)\nG Maintenance Report Dig 5 Line P41\nH RCS Dig 5 NDE Binder 8in Jefferson to Selkirk\nI Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO) CPF No. 1-2010-5008H\nJ Photographs\nK Incident Location Map\nPage 5 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 10/07/2010\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20100220 - 15823\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes Yes\nLast Revision Date: 05/26/2011\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 19237\n2. Name of Operator TE PRODUCTS PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address P.O. BOX 2521\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code 77252-6500\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 08/27/2010 16:30\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 42.46833\nLongitude: -74.3515\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 952328\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 08/27/2010 18:52\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nHVL or Other Flammable or Toxic Fluid which is a Gas at\nAmbient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) / NGL (Natural Gas\nLiquid)\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 3,283.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels):\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\nPage 1 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 08/27/2010 17:00\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: 02/02/2011 13:35\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 23\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 08/27/2010 16:30\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 08/27/2010 17:00\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: New York\n3. Zip Code: 12131\n4. City Gilboa\n5. County or Parish Schoharie\n6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: MP 133.87\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: P-41\n8. Segment name/ID: Watkins Glen to Selkirk\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 72\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? Yes\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing Yes\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled Cased\n- If Water crossing\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\nPage 2 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\n- If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 8.625\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .203\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 42,000\n3d. Pipe specification: APl-5L\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Longitudinal ERW - Low Frequency\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: Bethlehem Steel\n3g. Year of manufacture: 1963\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Coal Tar\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1963\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Other\n- If Mechanical Puncture Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other Describe: Crack\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: No\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: No\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nNo\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? No\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\nPage 3 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n8. Estimated cost to Operator :\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator $ 62,100\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 145,332\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 1,441,000\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 163,324\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 0\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) $ 1,811,756\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 279.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 1,359.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nYes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. 5f. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Manual\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Manual\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 53,986\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools? Yes\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\nPage 4 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nNo\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nYes\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nNo\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\nYes\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Notification From Public\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\nYes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nYes\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues Yes\n- Investigation identified no controller issues Yes\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nPage 5 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nYes\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested: 1\n1b. Specify how many failed: 0\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion:\nInternal Corrosion:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\nPage 6 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nPage 7 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage Sub-Cause:\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nPage 8 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nPage 9 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\nOther Outside Force Damage Sub-Cause:\n- If Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n- If Electrical Arcing from Other Equipment or Facility:\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\nPage 10 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n130938 Appendix A - Accident Report Form 7000\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n- If Intentional Damage:\n8. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other Outside Force Damage:\n9. Describe:\nG5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nUse this section to report material failures ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is \"Pipe\" or\n\"Weld.\"\nMaterial Failure of Pipe or Weld Sub-Cause: Environmental Cracking-related\n1. The sub-cause selected below is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field Examination\n- Determined by Metallurgical Analysis Yes\n- Other Analysis\n- If \"Other Analysis\", Describe:\n- Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation\n(Supplemental Report required)\n- If Construction, Installation, or Fabrication-related:\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n- Fatigue or Vibration-related\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Mechanical Stress:\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Original Manufacturing-related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field):\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n- Fatigue or Vibration-related:\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Mechanical Stress:\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Environmental Cracking-related:\n3. Specify: Stress Corrosion Cracking\n- Other - Describe:\nComplete the following if any Material Failure of Pipe or Weld","truncated":true,"body_characters":89530}