{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Enterprise Products Operating LLC, 2009-08-04","title":"Failure Report- Enterprise Products Operating LLC 8/4/09","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-01-13","effective_on":"2009-08-04","summary":"Enterprise Products Operating LLC; Gas Gathering; OCS; failure 2009-08-04; apparent cause: Incorrect Operation.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-8409.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-8409.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-8409","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-enterprise-products-operating-llc-8409","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nSouthwest Region\nPrincipal Investigator Jon Manning\nRegion Director R.M. Seeley\nDate of Report 10/20/2011\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Enterprise Offshore Gas Platform Fire\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 8/4/2009\nCommodity Released Natural Gas\nCity/County & State Gulf of Mexico – Offshore\nOpID & Operator Name 31618 Enterprise Products Operating, LLC\nUnit # & Unit Name 12174 High Island Pipeline System Offshore Gas\nSMART Activity # 125757\nMilepost / Location High Island Off-Shore Platform 264B\nType of Failure Platform fire caused by Incorrect Operation\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nOffshore gas transportation platform\nProperty Damage $7,061\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Offshore Gas Platform Fire\n8/4/2009\nExecutive Summary\nOn August 4, 2009, Enterprise Products Operating, LLC (Enterprise, the Operator) reported to the NRC\n(No. 913841) a fire and explosion on their High Island Off-Shore (HIOS) 264B platform in the Gulf of\nMexico (GOM). There were no reported injuries but the incident required the platform to be evacuated.\nThe fire occurred just after Enterprise and contract personnel started a turbine/compressor set\ndesignated as the Number 2 Unit. This unit had been overhauled in March 2009 but operational\nconditions had not required the unit to be operated since that time. Several unsuccessful attempts\nwere made to start the unit and personnel bypassed some of the interlocks during this process.\nEnterprise personnel reported that the sixth attempt to start the Number 2 unit was successful.\nJust after the Number 2 Unit was started, Enterprise personnel noted a gas smell in the control room\nand observed that the hydrocarbon detectors were indicating readings of approximately 34% of the\nLower Explosive Limit (LEL) in the engine room. An Enterprise operations employee on the upper deck\nof the platform observed the 6-inch lubrication oil vent on the roof was discharging a stream of\nhydrocarbon vapors. The employee then went to the control room and ordered the Number 2 Unit shut\ndown.\nHeat from the exhaust stack is believed to have been the ignition source for the hydrocarbon vapors\ncoming from the lubrication oil vent. Enterprise personnel reported that they attempted to extinguish\nthe fire but migrating hydrocarbon vapors ignited and flames quickly engulfed the upper deck of the\nplatform. Personnel were ordered to activate the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system and evacuate the\nplatform.\nThe next series of events are not as certain, but the most probable scenario is that when the ESD system\nwas activated high pressure gas back-flowed into the Number 1 Unit starter turbine through a\nmalfunctioning check valve. The check valve was intended to isolate piping and equipment with a lower\npressure rating from the high pressure ESD gas. The high pressure gas ruptured the starter case\nallowing gas to flow into the engine room. An explosion and second fire then occurred on the main\ndeck. The explosion and fires on the main and upper decks resulted in extensive damage to the\nequipment and piping on the platform.\nEnterprise has decided to neither repair nor replace the damaged pipeline facilities. The reported\n$7,061 property damage represents only the cost of lost gas since the pipeline facilities were fully\ndepreciated and had no value.\nSystem Details\nThe Enterprise High Island pipeline system consists of approximately 233 miles of offshore natural gas\npipelines and eight platforms in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) that include PHMSA regulated equipment.\nThe incident occurred on the Enterprise High Island Off-Shore (HIOS) 264B platform. The HIOS 264\nfacility is located in approximately 150 feet of water approximately 87 miles off the coast of Sabine Pass,\nTX, and consists of three platforms designated as A, B, and C, interconnected with bridges. The 264A\nplatform receives gas and separates liquids from three upstream HIOS pipelines at approximately 800\npsig. The gas then flows to the 264B platform where it can be compressed to approximately 950 psig\nwhen operational conditions warrant. The compressed gas then is returned to the 264A platform where\nthe liquids are re-injected into the stream and transported downstream to the West Cameron 167\nplatform through a single 42-inch pipeline. The 264B platform includes two engine room buildings,\nmetering facilities, a warehouse, a control room, a communications shed, and a clerk’s office. The\n264C platform includes living quarters, a helicopter landing deck, and a survival craft. A partial map of\nthe HIOS system is included in Appendix A.\nPage 2 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Offshore Gas Platform Fire\n8/4/2009\nThe HIOS 264B platform includes two compressor buildings. One compressor building houses unit\nNumbers 1 and 2, the second houses unit Number 3. Numbers 1 and 2 are identical General Electric\n22,000 horsepower Frame 3 units, and Number 3 is a 33,000 horsepower General Electric Frame 5. Each\nunit consists of the basic components of a starter turbine, centrifugal compressor, and power turbine.\nThe incident involved unit Number 2.\nThe incident occurred on the HIOS 264B platform located at Latitude 28.4115 degrees; Longitude\n93.7393 degrees. Photographs showing the HIOS 264 platforms and incident damage on the HIOS 264B\nplatform are included in Appendix A.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nEnterprise personnel report that the platform was operating normally prior to the incident. The\nplatform normally receives approximately 250,000 – 300,000 Mcfd from three upstream pipelines and\noperates in a pressure range of approximately 800 psig – 950 psig. Accounts from Enterprise personnel\nindicate that Enterprise personnel and technicians from NAES Turbine Services had just started the\nNumber 2 turbine unit when the incident occurred.\nEmergency Response\nOn August 4, 2009, Enterprise Products Operating, LLC (Enterprise, the Operator) reported to the NRC\n(No. 913841) a fire and explosion on their High Island Off-Shore (HIOS) 264B platform in the Gulf of\nMexico (GOM) at approximately 11:00 PM (Appendix B). There were no reported injuries but the\nincident required the platform to be evacuated. A copy of the Enterprise incident report to PHMSA is\nAppendix C.\nThe fire occurred just after Enterprise and contract personnel from NAES Turbine Services started a\nturbine/compressor set designated as the Number 2 Unit. This unit had been overhauled in March 2009\nbut the unit had not operated since that time. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to start the\nunit and personnel bypassed some of the interlocks during this process. Enterprise personnel reported\nthat the sixth attempt to start the Number 2 unit was successful.\nJust after the Number 2 Unit was started, Enterprise personnel noted a gas smell in the control room\nand observed that the hydrocarbon detectors were indicating readings of approximately 34% of the\nLower Explosive Limit (LEL) in the engine room. An Enterprise operations employee on the upper deck\nof the platform observed the 6-inch lubrication oil vent on the roof was discharging a stream of\nhydrocarbon vapors. The employee then went to the control room and ordered the Number 2 Unit shut\ndown.\nThe venting hydrocarbon vapors ignited and the fire quickly spread over the upper deck of the platform.\nEnterprise operations personnel attempted to fight the fire using a wheeled fire extinguisher but were\nnot successful. There was initially no fire water pressure as the pump failed to start in automatic mode.\nThe fire quickly engulfed the upper deck and Enterprise operations personnel activated the ESD system\nand ordered the platform to be evacuated. The ESD system is designed to shut down the compressor\nunits and vent the gas to the flare located on a structure off of Platform B. Failure of a check valve after\nthe ESD system was activated is believed to have allowed high pressure gas to backflow into the low\npressure starter turbine piping and ruptured the starter turbine case. The escaping gas resulted in an\nexplosion and second fire on the main deck of the platform. The fire water pump did not initially start in\nautomatic mode and had to be manually started. Enterprise personnel initially mustered on Platform C,\nbut were not able to start the escape craft. The personnel then moved to Platform A and were\nevacuated by a nearby work boat, the Gulf Endeavor.\nPage 3 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Offshore Gas Platform Fire\n8/4/2009\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nEnterprise has decided to neither repair nor replace the damaged pipeline facilities. The reported\n$7,061 property damage represents only the cost of lost gas since the pipeline facilities were fully\ndepreciated and had no value.\nInvestigation Details\nAccording to responses provided by Enterprise personnel and the incident investigation performed by\nBakerRisk, a compressor drain valve was found to be in the open position. Enterprise personnel and\ncontractor accounts of the actions taken during the startup attempts for unit Number 2 indicate liquid\nwas drained from the compressor case using the drain valve. The open compressor case drain valve\nallowed high pressure gas to enter the condensate drain piping. The condensate drain piping is\ninterconnected with the lubrication oil/seal vent piping that terminates above the turbine exhaust\nstacks. It is likely that gas flowed through the interconnected piping to the vent above the turbine\nexhaust stack and was ignited, resulting in the fire on the upper deck.\nThe next series of events are not as certain and the determination is made more difficult as the piping\nassociated with various systems on the platform is complex, interconnected, and has several potential\nflow-paths depending on the specific operational mode. Based on the investigation performed by\nBakerRisk and responses provided by Enterprise personnel, the most probable scenario is that when\npersonnel activated the ESD system high pressure gas (>800 psig – 950 psig) from the discharge piping\nback-flowed into the Number 1 Unit starter turbine through a failed check valve. The starter gas piping\nis vented into the ESD flare system and a check valve designed to prevent the high pressure ESD gas\nfrom back-flowing into the lower pressure starter gas piping on unit Number 1 was determined to have\nfailed. The case of the starter turbine, which was rated for an operating pressure of 125 psig, was\nruptured by the high pressure ESD gas, causing gas to flow into the engine room. Ignition of this gas\nresulted in an explosion and second fire on the main deck of the platform.\nBakerRisk performed a forensic analysis of the major components that are suspected to have been\ninvolved in the failure, including the unit Number 2 case drain valve unit, the unit Number 1 pressure\nsafety valve (PSV, M838), and the Wheatley ANSI 600 check valve (M805). The unit Number 2 case drain\nvalve was found to be in the open position during the post incident investigation allowing high pressure\ngas to discharge through the lubrication oil vent piping that terminates above the turbine exhaust stack\non the upper deck. The pressure relief valve PSV M838 was determined to have been functional but was\napparently not sized adequately to relieve the unintended backflow of gas due to activation of the ESD\nsystem. The Wheatley check valve M805 was determined to have failed, allowing high pressure gas to\nbackflow into lower pressure starter turbine piping, rupturing the case. A photograph of the case drain\nvalve, photographs of the pressure relief valve, and photographs of the Wheatley check valve are\nincluded in Appendix D, E, and F respectively. A copy of the PHMSA question matrix submitted to\nEnterprise is included in Appendix G, and a complete copy of the BakerRisk Incident Investigation Report\nis included in Appendix H.\nThe forensic analysis concluded that rupture of the starter turbine case was caused by internal pressure\nrather than an external explosion. The starter piping is protected by a relief valve (PSV M838) that was\ntested and torn down after the incident. BakerRisk determined the relief valve was functioning\nproperly. Analysis of the check valve (M805) found the check valve clapper had dislodged from its\nnormal operating position and that the retainer pin had failed. The BakerRisk analysis determined that\nPage 4 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Enterprise Offshore Gas Platform Fire\n8/4/2009\nthe retainer pin was partially cracked prior to the incident and the sudden high pressure gas surge\nresulting from the ESD caused the remaining ligament to fail.\nAccording to accounts from Enterprise personnel and the BakerRisk report, Enterprise personnel\ngathered at the designated muster location on Platform C to evacuate the platform using the escape\nwatercraft but could not start the engine. Personnel abandoned the escape craft and mustered on\nPlatform A where they were evacuated by a nearby workboat, the Gulf Endeavor. A copy of the\noperator’s PHMSA 7100.2 Report is included in Appendix C.\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nThe incident was likely initiated when Enterprise and NAES Turbine Services personnel left a turbine\ncasing drain valve open during repeated restart attempts. This allowed gas to be vented through the\nlubricating oil vent on the roof. The initial fire on the top deck of the platform resulted from ignition of\nthe vented gas. The probable cause of the explosion and fire that occurred on the main deck of the\nplatform was failure of a check valve designed to prevent the backflow of high pressure ESD gas into low\npressure starter turbine piping. High pressure gas is believed to have ruptured the starter turbine case\nallowing gas to enter the engine room.\nContributing Factors include\n1. Tests performed by BakerRisk determined that the check valve clapper retaining pin was cracked\nprior to the incident and that the ESD event caused the remaining ligament to fail.\n2. The fire water pump did not automatically start as designed so there was no fire water pressure\non the upper deck during the initial fire.\nAppendices\nA System Map\nB NRC Report # 913841\nC Enterprise Incident Report to PHMSA\nD Case Drain Valve Photographs\nE Pressure Relief Valve Photographs\nF Check Valve Photographs\nH BakerRisk Report\nPage 5 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nAppendix A System Map\nThis document is on file at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nPage 1 of 3\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\n*** For Public Use ***\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 913841\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n**** THIS IS A POTENTIAL RELEASE ****\nIncident Type: PLATFORM\n*Report taken at 00:20 on 05-AUG-09\nAffected Area:\nIncident Cause: EXPLOSION\nThe incident occurred on 04-AUG-09 at 22:30 local time.\nAffected Medium: NON-RELEASE (N/A) PLATFORM FIRE\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization:\nHIGH ISLAND SYSTEMS\nHOUMA, LA 70301\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nBLOCK 64 County: HIGH ISLAND\nState: LA\nLatitude: 28° 28' 16\" N\nLongitude: 093° 44' 21\" W\nPLATFORM INCIDENT\nPOTENTIALLY RELEASED MATERIAL (S)\nCHRIS Code: OIL\n1so Known As\nOfficial Material Name: OIL: CRUDE\nty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUN\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nCALLER IS REPORTING A FIRE ON A PLATFORM DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES.\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPlatform Letter: B\nPlatform Rig Name:\nLocation Area ID: HIGH ISLAND\nBerth Slip Number:\nier Dock Number\ntate Lease Number\nINJURIES:\nFire Involved: YES\nDAMAGES\nFATALITIES:\nNO\nFire Extinguished: NO\nEVACUATIONS:\nNO\nHospitalized:\nPassenger:\nEmp1/Crew:\nPassenger:\nYES\nWho Evacuated:\nEMPLOYEES\nRadius/Area:\nOccupant:\nDamages:\nYES $\nLength of\nDirection of\nClosure Type\nAir:\nN\nDescription of Closure\nClosure\nClosure\nRoad:\nN\nArtery: N\nMajor\nhttp://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard web+inc seg=913841\n4/26/2011\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nPage 2 of 3\nWaterway:\nTrack: N\nPassengers Transferred: NO\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nALL PERSONNEL WERE EVACUATED AND ACCOUNTED FOR, EMERGENCY SYSTEM ACTIVATED.\nRelease Secured: UNKNOWN\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: CLEAR, ºF Wind speed: 15 MPH Wind direction: SW\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: USCG, MMS\nState/Local: NONE\nState/Local On Scene: NONE\nState Agency Number: NONE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nUSCG HSOC AT DHS (USCG HSOC DESK)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nFBI LOUISIANA ATN: HILLARY ROSSMAN (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nFBI NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFC (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nFBI STRATEGIC INFO OPERATIONS CNTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:33\nFLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM NEW ORLEANS (SUPERVISOR, FIST NEW ORLEANS)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nUSCG COMMAND CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:33\nJFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nJFO-LA (FEMA JFO LA)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nLA DEPT OF ENV QUAL (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nLA DEPT OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES (ATTN: VAUGHAN MCDONALD)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nLA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nLA OFFICE OF GOV (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nLA OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nNOAA RPTS FOR LA (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:33\nNTSB PIPELINE (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nHOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nMSU PORT ARTHUR (MAIN OFFICE)\nhttp://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard\nweb+inc\n_\n_\nseq=913841\n4/26/2011\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nPage 3 of 3\n05-AUG-09 00:35\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n05-AUG-09 00:29\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY WEEKDAYS (VERBAL))\n05-AUG-09 00:36\nLA STATE POLICE (MAIN OFFICE)\n05-AUG-09 00:29\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nCALLER HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.\n___________________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 913841 ***\nhttp://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard\nweb+inc\n_\n_\nseq=913841\n4/26/2011\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\nINCIDENT REPORT –\nGAS TRANSMISSION AND\nGATHERING SYSTEMS\nReport format corresponds to\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 (01-2002)\nReport Date September 8, 2009\nNo. 20090097 - 8541\nPART A – GENERAL INFORMATION\nN Original Report Y Supplemental\nReport Y Final Report\n1. Operator Name and Address\na. Operator's 5-digit Identification Number 31618\nb. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter\nOwner's 5-digit Identification Number (when\nknown)\nc. Name of Operator ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC\nd. Operator street address 1100 LOUISIANA\ne. Operator address City HOUSTON\nCounty or Parish HARRIS\nState TX\nZip code 77002\n2. Time and date of the incident\nHour 22:00\nDate of the incident 8/4/2009\n3. Location of incident\na. Street or nearest street or road\nb. City\nCounty or Parish\nc. State\nZip Code\nd. Mile Post/Valve Station\ne. Survey Station No\nf. Latitude 28.4115\nLongitude 93.7393\ng. Class location description\nOnshore (Class Location)\nOffshore Y\nArea HIGH ISLAND\nBlock # 264B\nState\nOuter Continental Shelf Y\nh. Accident on Federal Land other than Outer\nContinental Shelf N\ni. Is pipeline Interstate Y\n4. Type of leak or rupture\nLeak or Rupture OTHER\nType of Leak\n- Puncture, diameter (inches)\nType of Rupture\n- Tear/Crack, length (inches)\n- Propagation Length, total, both sides (feet)\nOther (specify) PLATFORM EXPLOSION AND FIRE\n5. Consequences\na. Fatality No\nTotal number of people 0\nEmployees 0\nGeneral Public 0\nNon-employee Contractors 0\nb. Injury requiring inpatient hospitalization No\nTotal number of people 0\nEmployees 0\n1\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nGeneral Public 0\nNon-employee Contractors 0\nc. Property damage/loss (estimated) Yes\nTotal $ 7,061\nGas loss $ 7,061\nOperator damage $ 0\nPublic/private property damage $ 0\nd. Release Occurred in a 'High Consequence\nArea' N\ne. Gas Ignited / Gas did not ignite Gas did not Ignite\nf. Explosion / No Explosion EXPLOSION\ng. Evacuation (general public only) Y\nNumber of people 39\nEvacuation Reason COMPANY POLICY\n6. Elapsed time until area was made safe\nHours 38\nMinutes 50\n7. Telephone Report\nNRC Report Number 913841\nDate 8/4/2009\n8. Pressure\na. Estimated pressure at point and time of\nincident (PSIG) 0.00\nb. Max. allowable operating pressure (MAOP)\n(PSIG)\nc. MAOP established by 49 CFR section\nd. Did an over pressurization occur relating to\nthe incident? N\nPART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE\nPreparer's Name JOEL E. KOHLER\nPreparer's Title\nArea Code and Telephone Number 7133814830\nPreparer's E-mail Address JKOHLER@EPROD.COM\nArea Code and Facsimile Number 7133816660\nPART C – ORIGIN OF THE INCIDENT\n1. Incident occurred on GATHERING\n2. Failure occurred on OTHER\nOther (specify) PLATFORM\n3. Material involved (pipe, fitting, or other\ncomponent) STEEL\nPlastic failure was\na. ductile N\nb. brittle N\nc. joint failure N\nMaterial other than plastic or steel\n4. Part of the system involved in incident COMPRESSOR\nOther (specify)\n5. Year the pipe or component which failed was\ninstalled 1978\nPART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION\n1.Nominal pipe size (NPS) (inches)\n2. Wall thickness inches\n3. Specification\nSMYS\n4. Seam type\n5. Valve type\n6. Pipe or valve manufactured by\nin year\nPART E - ENVIRONMENT\n1. Area of incident INSIDE/UNDER BUILDING\nOther (specify)\nDepth of cover (inches)\n2\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nPART F – APPARENT CAUSE\nF1 – CORROSION\n1. External Corrosion\n2. Internal Corrosion\nComplete items a-e where applicable\na. Pipe Coating\nb. Visual Examination\nOther (specify)\nc. Cause of Corrosion\nOther (specify)\nd. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to\nbe under cathodic protection prior to discovering\nincident?\nYear Protection Started\ne. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of\ncorrosion?\nHow long prior to incident? Years\nMonths\nF2 – NATURAL FORCES\n3. Earth Movement\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n4. Lightning\n5. Heavy Rains/Floods\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n6. Temperature\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n7. High Winds\nF3 - EXCAVATION\n8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their\ncontractors) / Not Third Party\n9. Third Party Excavation Damage\na. Excavator group\nb. Type\nOther (specify)\nc. Did operator get prior notification of\nexcavation activity?\nDate received mo. day yr.\nNotification received from\nd. Was pipeline marked?\nTemporary markings\nPermanent markings\nMarks were\nWere marks made within required time?\nF4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE\n10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure\nDescription\n11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to\nexcavation activity damaging pipe\n12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe\n13. Vandalism\nF5 – MATERIAL AND WELDS\nMaterial\n14. Body of Pipe\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n15. Component\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n16. Joint\n3\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nDescription\nOther (specify)\nWeld\n17. Butt\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n18. Fillet\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n19. Pipe Seam\nDescription\nOther (specify)\nComplete a-g if you indicate any cause in part F5\na. Type of failure\nConstruction Defect NO DATA\nDescription\nMaterial Defect NO DATA\nb. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in\ntransportation to the construction or fabrication site?\nc. Was part which leaked pressure tested before\nincident occurred?\nd. Date of test\nMonth\nDay\nYear\ne. Test medium\nOther (specify)\nf. Time held at test pressure hr\ng. Estimated test pressure at point of incident\n(PSIG)\nF6 – EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS\n20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n22. Ruptured or Leaking Seal/Pump Packing\n23. Incorrect Operation Yes\na. Type FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROPER PROCEDURES\nOther (specify)\nb. Number of employees involved who failed post-incident test\nDrug test 0\nAlcohol test 0\nc. Were most senior employee(s) involved\nqualified? Y\nd. Hours on duty 14\nF7 – OTHER\n24. Miscellaneous\nDescription\n25. Unknown\nDescription\nPART G – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT\nAN EXPLOSION AND FIRE OCCURRED ON HIGH ISLAND BLOCK 264 PLATFORM B (HI 264B) IN AND\nAROUND THE COMPRESSOR BUILDING. ACCORDING TO THE RECENTLY RECEIVED BAKERRISK\nREPORT, THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT IS AS FOLLOWS: A) THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARIO\nSUGGESTS THE INITIAL FIRE RESULTED FROM A GAS RELEASE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO START\nTHE NO. 2 TURBINE/COMPRESSOR SET. B) THE NO. 2 COMPRESSOR OUTBOARD CASE DRAIN\nWAS LEFT OPEN DURING STARTUP AND EVENTUAL LOADING OF THE COMPRESSOR.\nREPLACEMENT COST FOR THE COMPRESSOR PLATFORM AND EQUIPMENT IS ESTIMATED TO BE\nIN THE RANGE OF $35 - $70 MILLION, HOWEVER ENTERPRISE HAS ELECTED TO NOT REPAIR OR\n4\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nREPLACE AT THIS TIME.\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix D – HIOS 264 Platform Photographs\nPage 12 of 17\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\nAppendix F – Check Valve Photographs\nPage 14 of 17\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 26>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 27>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 28>>>\n\nAppendix G – Starter Turbine, Piping, and Pressure Relief Valve Photos\nPage 15 of 17\n\n<<<PAGE 29>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 30>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 31>>>\n\nS-235\nPSV M838 on\nSite #2634\nDescription + Location Startor\nBakerRisk Identification Tag\nItem #\nМИНИКАМИ\nName Dilet ute /on 2404/11:40 AN\nE - O15:\nWust side of renf ,t „.ll\nof CE Sit », (85 pig)\nturbine 4-t\n\n<<<PAGE 32>>>\n\nAppendix H BakerRisk Report\nThis document is on file at PHMSA","truncated":false,"body_characters":26106}