{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Harbor Pipeline Co, 2010-10-11","title":"Failure Report- Harbor Pipeline Co 10/11/10","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-12-26","effective_on":"2010-10-11","summary":"Harbor Pipeline Co; Hazardous Liquid; NJ; failure 2010-10-11; apparent cause: Incorrect Operation.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-harbor-pipeline-co-101110.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-harbor-pipeline-co-101110.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-harbor-pipeline-co-101110","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-harbor-pipeline-co-101110","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator Al Schoen\nRegion Director Byron Coy\nDate of Report 7/5/2012\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Harbor Pipeline Fire Incident, Mansfield\nTownship, NJ\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 10/11/2010\nCommodity Released ULSD Diesel Fuel\nCity/County & State Mansfield Township/Burlington County, NJ\nOpID & Operator Name 7063 Harbor Pipeline Co\nUnit # & Unit Name 20001 Harbor System - NJ\nSMART Activity # 135547\nMilepost / Location MP 1661 + 20 / Latitude: 40.0893, Longitude: -74.7366\nType of Failure Fire – Incorrect Operation\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area HCA area\nimpacted\nProperty Damage 0\nPage 1 of 3 135547 Harbor Pipeline CO I03 7063 Harbor System - NJ 20001 10112010 Summary\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Harbor Pipeline Co – Pipeline Fire Incident\n[Failure Date 10/11/2010]\nExecutive Summary\nOn October 11, 2010, Sunoco Pipeline reported a fire in a section of pipe that had been severed from an\nactive pipeline as part of a relocation project. The 16 inch line was part of the Harbor Pipeline Co system\nin Mansfield Township, NJ. Sunoco Pipeline is part owner and operates the Harbor Pipeline Co\njurisdictional assets. The fire occurred in a right-of-way along the New Jersey Turnpike near Mill Lane.\nThe fire started when contractor personnel on the “NJ Turnpike Relocation Project” were using a torch\nto cut a 50 feet length of out-of-service pipe in the ditch approximately 300 feet away from newly\ninstalled in-service relocated pipe and approximately 130 feet from the NJ Turnpike edge of pavement.\nResidual product in the out of service pipe ignited inside the pipe. A small amount of product dripped\nout of the pipe and burned in the trench. The fire was extinguished and contaminated soil was\nremoved.\nSystem Details\nThe 80 mile pipeline transports liquid petroleum products from Woodbury, NJ to Linden, NJ. The Pipe is\na 16 inch diameter pre-1970 ERW pipe. The fire occurred on a portion of the pipeline running along the\nNew Jersey Turnpike in Burlington County that was in the process of being relocated to accommodate\nthe widening of the turnpike lanes. There was no supply impact since the piping had been severed from\nthe active line in preparation for removal.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nThe piping where the fire occurred had been severed from the active line and removed from service in\nSeptember 2010. This segment was being cut into sections for transport to a recycler.\n1. 2. On Saturday, October 9, 2010, the contractor removed a mainline valve adjacent to Mill Lane.\nThe project inspector performed gas testing and determined that it was safe to proceed with\nhot work. The pipe flanges were then removed by cutting with an oxy-acetylene torch.\nOn Monday, October 11, 2010 the welder then made an initial cut on pipe to be removed.\nLiquid came out and the welder thought it was water.\nThe welder continued to cut the pipe.\nThe fire watch noticed smoke coming from the cut.\nThe plastic cap at the end of the pipe blew off.\nThe liquid that dripped from the pipe formed a puddle that burned in the bottom of the trench\nwith an 18” high flame.\n9. The fire watch stopped the job\n10. On October 11, 2010 at 19:35, the incident was reported to the NRC by Sunoco\nEmergency Response\n3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. The welder and fire watch attempted unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire with two dry powder fire\nextinguishers. An inspector working for the construction management contractor supervising the\nconstruction contractor instructed an equipment operator to cover the burning pipe with soil which\nPage 2 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Harbor Pipeline Co – Pipeline Fire Incident\n[Failure Date 10/11/2010]\nextinguished the fire. The soil that was contaminated by the small amount of product that had leaked\nfrom the pipeline was removed.\nThe NJ Turnpike Authority was notified. There was no impact on the public.\nSummary of Return to Service\nThe pipeline was being permanently removed. No return to service plan was warranted.\nInvestigation Details\nThe operator was contacted by PHMSA to follow up on the NRC. Based on the initial information\nreceived, PHMSA did not visit the accident location. Additional information was requested and received\nfrom the operator. Based on an analysis of this information, it was determined that the failure occurred\nin a wooded area adjacent to the NJ Turnpike in Burlington County, NJ. There was no HCA impact. The\nfirefighting equipment on site was inadequate to extinguish the fire.\nFindings & Contributing Factors\nThe fire was caused because there was product present in the pipe where hot work was being\nperformed. Based on work at other locations on the pipeline, the operator did not anticipate product.\nThe procedures called for mechanical cutting of the pipe. The pipe was being cut out with an oxy-\nacetylene torch. The personnel performing the work did not follow the hazard assessment or work\npermit process. There was no work permit issued for the pipe cutting and removal. The work permit\nreferenced was written for a different job site with different tasks. No gas testing was performed prior\nto performing the hot work. Sunoco concluded that an immediate cause of the incident was less than\nadequate supervisory oversight regarding hazard assessment, work permit, excavation, hot work and\ngas monitoring practice and equipment availability. Personnel knew, but didn’t follow details of safety\nprocedures or OQ procedures that require hazard assessment, work permit and gas monitoring.\nAppendices\nAppendix Description\nA 135547 Appendix A Map\nB 135547 Appendix B - Photographs\nC 135547 Appendix C NRC Report 956654\nD 135547 Appendix D Operator Accident Report HL # 20100241 - 16556\nE 135547 Appendix E INC Analysis Final Report 11OCt2010 Harbor Line Relocation Fire\nPage 3 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\n135547 Appendix A Map\n660\nTo Linden\ntighway.206,\nYork Rd\n206\n678\n• Mansfield Twp\nAccident location\nPublic Rd\nWoodbury\nFrom\nJersey T\nColumbus\nNJ Turnpike\nNorth\n500 Foot buffer\nAccident Location\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\n135547 Appendix A Map\nJERSEY\nHazleton\n•\n41-.White Plains •\nStamford\nPaterson\n\"Greenwich\n•\n•Yonkers\nParsip pany\nNEW YORK\nNew York\nHicksville\n• Brentwood\nAllentown\nElizabeth •\nLevittown\nYORK\nNEW\nWest Babylon\nEdison\nReading\nLong Branch\nTrentonow\n73-30-W\nLancaster\nLocation\nAccident\nPhiladelphia\nWilmington\nJERSEY\nNEW\nDoylestown\nLawrenceville\nClearbrook Park\nYorketown\nEwing\n133) Hightstown\nColts Neck\nsmeryville Warrington\nNewtown Grant\nTwin Rivers\nLower Makefield Twp\nHamilton\n33\nFreehold\nWeapons\nNaval\nWarminster\nRichboro\nNewtown\nMorrisville\nTrenton\nSquare\n•West Freehold\nStation\nEarle\nlaple Glen\nnedd\nHorsham\n413 Fairless Hills\nWhite Horse\n537\nAmbler\nWillow Grove\nHatboro\nLevittown\n13\n• Industrial\nUS Steel Groveville\nAllentown:\nHowell\nVhitemarsh\nFeasterville\nreting\nmouth\nAbington\nChesterfield:\nGlenside\nPlumsted Twp Plumsted Twp\n539\nCheltenham\n68\nLakewood\nRiverside\nMcGuire\nAir\nLeisure Village\nFort l\nFort Dix\nMilitary\nLakehurst\nReservation\nNaval Air\nStation\nLakehurst\n70\ntown\nStation\nCinnaminson\nSilvertor\nMoorestown\nMount Holly\nDo\nhiladelphia Maple Shade\nLumberton\n206\nPemberton Browns Mills\nHeights\n520\nDarby\nCherry Hill\nAccident Location\nToms River\nRamblewood\nBeachwood\nGloucester City\nHaddonfield\nMariton\n70 Leisuretowne\n_ 72)\nTrouble\nDouble\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\n135547 Appendix B - Photographs\nFire and pipe cut were in this\n*excavation. (South Side of\nValve was removed\nValve)\nfrom this area\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nPage 1 of 2\n135547 Appendix C NRC Report 956654\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 956654\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 19:35 on 11-OCT-10\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: OTHER\nAffected Area:\nThe incident occurred on 11-OCT-10 at 16:10 local time.\nAffected Medium: OTHER GROUND/AIR\n____________________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization: HARBOR PIPELINE\nHONEYBROOK, PA\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nNEW JERSEY TURNPIKE & MILL LANE County: BURLINGTON\nCity: MANSFIELD TOWNSHIP State: NJ\n____________________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: OTW Official Material Name: OIL, FUEL: NO. 2\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 1 GALLON(S)\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nCALLER IS REPORTING A PIPELINE WAS BEING DECOMMISSIONED WHEN RESIDUAL MATERIAL\nINSIDE THE PIPELINE CAUGHT FIRE. CALLER STATED THERE WAS A 1 GALLON DISCHARGE OF\nMATERIAL TO THE GROUND AND VAPORS THAT RELEASED FROM MATERIAL BURN-OFF.\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: TRANSMISSION\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDAMAGES\nFire Involved: YES\nINJURIES: NO\nFATALITIES: NO\nEVACUATIONS: NO\nDamages: NO\nFire Extinguished: YES\nHospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nEmpl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nWho Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nLength of Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure\nAir: N\nRoad: N Major\nArtery: N\nWaterway: N\nTrack: N\nPassengers Transferred: NO\nEnvironmental Impact: NO\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n____________________________________________________________________________\n1/27/2012\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nPage 2 of 2\n135547 Appendix C NRC Report 956654\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nCLEAN UP WILL BE CONDUCTED ON 12OCT2010.\nRelease Secured: YES\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: UNKNOWN, ºF\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: NONE\nState/Local: NJ DEP\nState/Local On Scene: NONE\nState Agency Number: NONE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nCT DEPT OF EMERGENCY MGMT (COMMISSIONER)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nU.S. EPA II (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:47\nFLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PHILADELPHIA (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nUSCG NATIONAL COMMAND CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:44\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nNJ DEPT OF HEALTH & SENIOR SVC (COMMAND CENTER)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nNJ OFC HMLND SECURITY & PREPAREDNES (COMMAND CENTER)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nNJ STATE POLICE (MARINE SERVICES BUREAU)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nNOAA RPTS FOR NJ (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:44\nPA STATE POLICE (BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nNJ DEP POC: DUTY OFFICER (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nPA EMERG MGMT AGCY (MAIN OFFICE)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\nUSCG DISTRICT 1 (COMMAND CENTER)\n11-OCT-10 19:42\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nCALLER HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.\n___________________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 956654 ***\nThe National Response Center is strictly an initial report taking agency\nand does not participate in the investigation or incident response. The\nNRC receives initial reporting information only and notifies Federal and\nState On-Scene Coordinators for response. The NRC does not verify nor\ndoes it take follow-on incident information. Verification of data and\nincident response is the sole responsibility of Federal/State On-Scene\nCoordinators. Data contained within the FOIA Web Database is initial\ninformation only. All reports provided via this server are for\ninformational purposes only. Data to be used in legal proceedings must be\nobtained via written correspondence\nfrom the NRC.\n1/27/2012\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix D\nIncident Analysis for NJ Turnpike Fire in Pipe\nThis document is on file at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 11/11/2010\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20100241 - 16556\n-------------------------(DOT\nUse Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Yes Final:\nYes\nLast Revision Date: 04/18/2012\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 7063\n2. Name of Operator HARBOR PIPELINE CO\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 525 FRITZTOWN ROAD\n3b. City SINKING SPRING\n3c. State Pennsylvania\n3d. Zip Code 19608\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 10/11/2010 16:10\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 40.091758\nLongitude: -74.738542\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 956654\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 10/11/2010 19:35\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nRefined and/or Petroleum Product (non-HVL) which is a\nLiquid at Ambient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Diesel, Fuel Oil, Kerosene, Jet Fuel\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels):\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels):\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nPage 1 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? No\n- If No, Explain: This pipeline had been disconnected from both ends from\nthe main line on 9/21/10\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? Yes\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n10/11/2010 16:10\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 10/11/2010 16:10\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: New Jersey\n3. Zip Code: 08022\n4. City MANSFIELD TOWNSHIP\n5. County or Parish BURLINGTON\n6. Operator-designated location:\nSpecify:\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Harbor Pipeline\n8. Segment name/ID:\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Other\n- If Other, Describe: Inactive ROW: exposed for decommission\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 48\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Intrastate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\nPage 2 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\n- If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 16\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .281\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 52,000\n3d. Pipe specification: X-52\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Longitudinal ERW - Unknown Frequency\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company\n3g. Year of manufacture: 1955\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Fusion Bonded Epoxy\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1955\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Other\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nSegment had been disconnected at both ends and purged\nweeks prior to this fire. Segment was being cut to be sold\nas scrap metal.\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: No\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nNo\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? No\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\nPage 3 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n8. Estimated Property Damage:\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage $ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 0\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 0\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 0\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 0\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n8g. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): .00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): .00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nYes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools? Yes\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\nPage 4 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\nIf Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? No\nIf Yes 6a.\nWas it operating at the time of the Accident?\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? No\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operating Personnel, including contractors\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\nContractor working for the Operator\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nSegment had been disconnected from active pipeline.\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nPage 5 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nYes\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested: 1\n2b. Specify how many failed: 0\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G7 - Incorrect Operation\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion:\nInternal Corrosion:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\nCorrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\nField examination\nPage 6 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\nLow point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\nMagnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes Most\nrecent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nPage 7 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\nMagnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nPage 8 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\nOne-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGADIRT\n(www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\nPublic\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nPage 9 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n135547 Appendix E Operator Accident Report HL 201000241-16556\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n- If Electrical Arcing from Other Equipment or Facility:\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Y","truncated":true,"body_characters":48400}