{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Jayhawk Pipeline, 2005-04-12","title":"Failure Report- Jayhawk Pipeline 4/12/05","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-10-13","effective_on":"2005-04-12","summary":"Jayhawk Pipeline; Hazardous Liquid; KS; failure 2005-04-12; apparent cause: Corrosion Internal.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-jayhawk-pipeline-41205.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-jayhawk-pipeline-41205.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-jayhawk-pipeline-41205","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-jayhawk-pipeline-41205","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nCentral Region\nPrincipal Investigator Judy Johnson\nSenior Accident Investigator Bryan Louque\nRegion Director David Barrett\nDate of Report 09/01/2011\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Jayhawk Taloga to Liberal Internal\nCorrosion\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 04/12/2005\nCommodity Released Crude Oil\nCity/County & State Hugoton/Stevens, Kansas\nOpID & Operator Name 9175 - Jayhawk Pipeline, LLC\nUnit # & Unit Name 3613 – Liberal\nSMART Activity # 115713\nMilepost / Location 36.7\nType of Failure Leak From Internal Corrosion\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nNon HCA Rural Area, Farm Field\nProperty Damage $16,500\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Jayhawk Taloga to Liberal Internal Corrosion\n04/12/2005\nExecutive Summary\nOn April 12, 2005 a farmer was preparing for planting activities and discovered that crude oil had leaked\nfrom the Jayhawk Pipeline. The release was located in southwestern Kansas (Stevens County),\napproximately 6 miles south of Hugoton. The leak was confirmed to be on the Taloga to Liberal\ninterstate pipeline system (Mile post 36.7). No fatalities or injuries occurred as a result of the release\nand it did not occur in a High Consequence Area (HCA). Evacuations and road closures were not\nrequired. The product did not ignite or explode. An estimated 70 barrels of crude oil was released from\nthe underground pipeline on the right of way. Approximately 10 cubic yards of soil were contaminated\nand remediated but no surface water was affected. The total cost of the accident was estimated as\n$16,500 including the product lost and repair costs.\nAfter the pipeline was shutdown and the upstream mainline valve closed, Jayhawk personnel excavated\nthe pipeline (72 inches deep) and determined by visual inspection that a small hole was located on the\nbottom of the pipe (6 o’clock position). The external coating on the pipeline was intact. Another\npipeline (4 inch in diameter and part of the Anadarko gas pipeline system) was located approximately 21\ninches above the Jayhawk line near the area of the leak. At the time of the release, a PHMSA Central\nRegion inspector was performing inspection activities on other Jayhawk Pipeline facilities. This PHMSA\ninspector was made aware of the release during the inspection and responded to the accident location.\nUpon cutout of the damaged pipe section, deposits and pitting were observed on the internal pipe\nsurface. Metallurgical analysis of the damaged pipe indicated that “the pipe leaked due to internal\ncorrosion”. The deposits found internal to the pipeline segment were analyzed. Sand and saltwater had\ncollected in a low point in the pipeline resulting in corrosive conditions on the internal pipe surface that\nled to the development of a pin hole allowing crude oil to be released.\nSystem Details\nThe Jayhawk Pipeline system in 2005 contained approximately 700 miles of crude oil pipeline. The\nsystem transported crude across Kansas and parts of Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas. Jayhawk’s Taloga\nto Liberal pipeline system runs approximately 80 miles, originating in Morton County, KS and\nterminating in Meade County, KS. In 2005, Jayhawk moved crude oil from wellhead gathering systems\nto refineries or tankage.\nAt the accident location, the pipeline was constructed of API 5L Grade B line pipe manufactured in 1958\nby Acme Newport. The pipeline was 6.625 inch in diameter with a 0.188 inch wall thickness. The pipe\nhas a seam type of ERW LF (electric resistance welded low frequency) and was coated with AGF-7\n(Asphalt-Glass-Felt). The pipeline system was cathodically protected by an impressed current system.\nThere were no service interruptions or supply impacts as a result of the accident.\nA review of Jayhawk’s leak history records for the 2000-2005 time periods indicated several failures due\nto internal corrosion. These failures were not limited to line pipe. Several of the identified internal\ncorrosion failures involved station piping.\nPage 2 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Jayhawk Taloga to Liberal Internal Corrosion\n04/12/2005\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nThe Taloga to Liberal maximum operating pressure (MOP) was 1160 psig as established by hydrostatic\ntest in 2001. The operator initially reported that the operating pressure at the location and time of the\nfailure was 572 psig. The pressure at the time of the failure was later updated and reported to have\nbeen approximately 508 psig.\nPrevious maintenance projects relevant to the failure involved ineffective maintenance activities\nassociated with pipeline cleaning. In 1996 a Hazardous Facility Order (CPF No. 36505H) was issued\nregarding the Jayhawk Pipeline system in response to two failures resulting from internal corrosion\noccurring between Meade and Chase stations.\nJayhawk Pipeline did inject corrosion inhibitor (JaCam 1902C) in this affected pipeline segment prior to\nthis 2005 failure and it was understood that internal corrosion coupons were also in place.\nEmergency Response\nThe Jayhawk Pipeline control center was notified by the farmer who obtained the phone number from a\npipeline marker located in the vicinity of the release. Telephonic notification to the National Response\nCenter was made on April 13, 2005. However, a PHMSA Central Region inspector was already working\nwith the operator at the time of the control center notification. Jayhawk Pipeline personnel were\ndispatched to the accident site and the pipeline was shut down with manual valve closures.\nApproximately 10 cubic yards of contaminated soil were remediated. There were no wildlife or water\nimpacts. Long term environmental impact assessment was not required.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nAfter the field investigation was complete, the damaged pipeline segment was cut out and replaced with\npre-tested pipe. Jayhawk Pipeline completed the repair and returned the pipeline to service at a\nreduced operating pressure approximately 2.5 days after the release. A Corrective Action Order (CAO),\nCPF 3-2005-5020H, was issued by Central Region on April 26, 2005. This CAO required an MOP pressure\nreduction from Taloga (MP 12.8) to Liberal (MP 58.8) of 470 psig, quarterly reports providing CAO status\nupdates, metallurgical analysis of the failed pipe, and the submission of a written plan including\ncorrective measures that required an integration of data regarding all integrity threat conditions\nincluding a review of previous failure and leak history, ILI testing from Interstate to Meade stations, an\nevaluation for internal corrosion of all pump stations and breakout tanks in the entire Jayhawk Pipeline\nsystem (this included the identification of areas of possible internal corrosion such as dead legs, low\nspots, areas not subjected to cleaning pig intervals within facilities). The CAO required proposed\nsolutions to internal corrosion with completion schedules for the identified solutions as a result of\nfacility evaluations, repairs, and testing.\nSince this 2005 failure the frequency of cleaning pigs was increased to weekly runs. Water samples are\nreported by the operator to be pulled during cleaning pig runs and based on the results, biocide trains\nare run as necessary. When culture counts increase, the operator reports that trains of biocide and\nPage 3 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Jayhawk Taloga to Liberal Internal Corrosion\n04/12/2005\ncorrosion inhibitor are run with contact time such that microbiological growth can be more effectively\ncontrolled. The style, design, wear and manufacturer of the cleaning pigs used are reviewed by the\noperator to identify possible improvements. Corrosion coupons continue to be monitored. Internal\npipeline coating and breakout tank treatments with biocide balls that dissolve or melt on contact with\nwater are ongoing activities.\nInvestigation Details\nMetallurgical analysis was performed on a 39-inch long segment of the damaged pipe which included\nthe pin hole (approximately 1/8” in diameter) and internal pitted area. Two pits were confirmed\nthrough the metallurgical analysis but only one was thru wall. The deposits also found internal to the\npipeline segment were sampled and analyzed for composition information. The metallurgical report\nincluded information about the deposit samples and stated that “quartz, feldspar, and calcite were from\nsand that apparently collected in a low spot in the line. A small amount of saltwater also collected at\nthat location and the combination created corrosive conditions that led to the development of the pit\nresponsible for the leak”. Further information provided by the metallurgical report revealed that “the\ncomposition of the deposit indicated that acid gasses such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide had\nnot contributed significantly to the corrosion.”\nOn June 2, 2005, Jayhawk Pipeline completed an in-line inspection (ILI) assessment of the pipeline from\nInterstate Station to Meade Station as required by the CAO. Jayhawk prepared and implemented a plan\nto repair the pipeline based on the ILI results. Forty-one sections of pipe were replaced and fifty-six\nrepair sleeves were installed. Following completion of repairs, the Taloga to Liberal pipeline segment\nwas hydrostatically tested in December 2005. On December 20, 2005, the Taloga to Liberal pipeline\nsegment was restarted with the Taloga Station maximum discharge pressure limited to 976 psig.\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nJayhawk Pipeline had several failures due to internal corrosion prior to the accident of April 12, 2005.\nPrior knowledge of internal corrosion threats did exist for the operator. The Jayhawk Pipeline Taloga to\nLiberal accident of April 12, 2005 was caused by internal corrosion. Prior to the accident cleaning pigs\nwere not run on a frequent enough basis to prevent accumulation of sand and saltwater at a low point\nin the pipeline. Sand and saltwater in the low point created corrosive conditions that facilitated the\ndevelopment of corrosion pits on the internal steel pipe surface. One of two corrosion pits identified in\nthe failed segment sent for metallurgical analysis grew until it reached critical depth in the pipe wall and\nresulted in a pin hole in the pipe that allowed crude oil to be released.\nPage 4 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Jayhawk Taloga to Liberal Internal Corrosion\n04/12/2005\nAppendices\nA Map and Photographs\nB NRC Report #755621\nC Operator Accident Report\nD Metallurgical Report\nPage 5 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nMap showing failure location\nThis document is on file at PHMSA\nPage 1 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nPage 2 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nPage 3 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nPage 4 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nPage 5 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nPage 6 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 1 of 2\nAppendix B NRC Report #755621\nHMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS\n(Version 3.4.05 PROD ) Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu\n[Return to Search]\n<< Previous << Previous 1..1 of 1 << Save >>\nRescinded Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters)\nNRC Number: 755621\nCall Date: 04/13/2005 Call Time: 09:54:00\nCaller Information\nFirst Name: RICHARD Last Name: PETERSEN\nCompany Name: JAY HAWK PIPELINE\nAddress: 2000 SOUTH MAIN\nCity: MCPHERSON State: KS\nCountry: USA Zip: 67460\nPhone 1: 6202419271 Phone 2:\nOrganization Type: PE Is caller the spiller? Yes Yes No No No Response No Response\nConfidential: Yes Yes No No No Response No Response\nDischarger Information\nFirst Name: RICHARD Last Name: PETERSEN\nCompany Name: JAY HAWK PIPELINE\nAddress: 2000 SOUTH MAIN\nCity: MCPHERSON State: KS\nCountry: USA Zip: 67460\nPhone 1: 6202419271 Phone 2:\nOrganization Type: PE\nSpill Information\nState: KS County: STEVENS\nNearest City: HOUGTON Zip Code:\nLocation\nSpill Date: (mm/dd/yyyy)\n08:00:00\n04/13/2005 Spill Time: (24hh:mm:ss)\nDTG Type: Occured\nIncident Type PIPELINE Reported Incident Type Pipeline\nDescription\nPage 1 of 2\nhttps://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=&...\n3/11/2011\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 2 of 2\nAppendix B NRC Report #755621\nCALLER STATED THAT LAND OWNER REPORTED CRUDE OIL ON THE GROUND THAT MAYBE COMING\nFROM A PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES.\nMaterials Involved\nMaterial / Chris Name Chris Code Total Qty. Water Qty.\nOIL: CRUDE OIL: CRUDE OIL 70 BBL\nMedium Type: Land\nAdditional Medium Information:\nGROUND\nInjuries: 0 Fatalites: 0\nEvacuations: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown No. of Evacuations: 0\nDamages: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Damage Amount: 0\nFederal Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown State Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown\nOther Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown\nRemedial Actions\nIN THE PROCESS OF MOBILIZING RESPONSE TEAM,INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY\nAdditional Info\nKDHE WILL BE NOTIFIED\nLatitude\nDegrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant:\nLongitude\nDegrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant:\nDistance from City: Direction:\nSection: 1634S37W Township:\nRange: Milepost:\nPage 2 of 2\nhttps://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=&...\n3/11/2011\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix C Operator Accident Report\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 for each violation Form Approved\nfor each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122 OMB No. 2137-0047\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nResearch and Special Programs\nAdministration\nACCIDENT REPORT – HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nReport Date\nNo.\n(DOT Use Only)\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the\ninformation requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions,\nyou can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at http://ops.dot.gov.\nPART A – GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION\nOriginal Report Supplemental Report Final Report\n1. a. Operator's OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) / ____________/\n2. b. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter Owner’s OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) / ___ /\nc. Name of Operator ______________________________________________________________________________________\nd. Operator street address _______________________________________________________________________________\ne. Operator address ______________________________________________________________________________________\nCity, County, State and Zip Code\nIMPORTANT: IF THE SPILL IS SMALL, THAT IS, THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS,\nCOMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY, UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR §195.52(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE\nREPORTABLE UNDER §195.50 AS REVISED IN CY 2001.\n2. Time and date of the accident\n/ / / / / / / /\nhr. month day year\n3. Location of accident\n(If offshore, do not complete a through d. See Part C.1)\na. Latitude: _____ Longitude:\n__________\n(if not available, see instructions for how to provide specific location)\nb. _________________________________________________\nCity, and County or Parish\nc. _________________________________________________\nState and Zip Code\nd. Mile post/valve station or survey station no.\n(whichever gives more accurate location)\n_________________________________\n4. Telephone report\n/ / / / / / / /\nNRC Report Number month day year\n5. Losses (Estimated)\nPublic/Community Losses reimbursed by operator:\nPublic/private property damage $_______________\nCost of emergency response phase $_______________\nCost of environmental remediation $_______________\nOther Costs $_______________\n(describe) _____________________________________\nOperator Losses:\nValue of product lost $_______________\nValue of operator property damage $_______________\nOther Costs $_______________\n(describe) _____________________________________\nTotal Costs $_______________\n6. Commodity Spilled Yes No\n(If Yes, complete Parts a through c where applicable)\na. Name of commodity spilled ___________________________\nb. Classification of commodity spilled:\nHVLs /other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions\nCO2 or other non-flammable, non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions\nGasoline, diesel, fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions\nCrude oil\nc. Estimated amount of commodity\ninvolved :\nBarrels\nGallons (check only if spill is\nless than one barrel)\nAmounts:\nSpilled : ____________\nRecovered: ____________\nCAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) : (For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)\nCorrosion Natural Forces Excavation Damage Other Outside Force Damage\nMaterial and/or Weld Failures Equipment Incorrect Operation Other\nPART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE\n(type or print) Preparer's Name and Title Area Code and Telephone Number\nPreparer's E-mail Address Area Code and Facsimile Number\nAuthorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title Date Area Code and Telephone Number\nForm RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 1 of 4\nOPS Data Facsimile\nPage 1 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix C Operator Accident Report\nPART C – ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)\n1. Additional location information\na. Line segment name or ID _______________________\nb. Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental\nShelf Yes No\nc. Is pipeline interstate? Yes No\nOffshore: Yes No (complete d if offshore)\nd. Area ___________________ Block # ______________\nState / / or Outer Continental Shelf\n2. Location of system involved (check all that apply)\nOperator’s Property\nPipeline Right of Way\nHigh Consequence Area (HCA)?\nDescribe HCA____________________________________\n3. Part of system involved in accident\nAbove Ground Storage Tank\nCavern or other below ground storage facility\nPump/meter station; terminal/tank farm piping and\nequipment, including sumps\nOther Specify: _________________________________\nOnshore pipeline, including valve sites\nOffshore pipeline, including platforms\nIf failure occurred on Pipeline, complete items a - g:\n4. Failure occurred on\nBody of Pipe Pipe Seam Scraper Trap\nPump Sump Joint\nComponent Valve Metering Facility\nRepair Sleeve Welded Fitting Bolted Fitting\nGirth Weld\nOther (specify)\nYear the component that failed was installed: / /\n5. Maximum operating pressure (MOP)\na. Estimated pressure at point and time of accident:\n____ PSIG\nb. MOP at time of accident:\n___________PSIG\nc. Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident?\nYes No\na. Type of leak or rupture\nLeak: Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec. H5)\nPuncture, diameter (inches) _________\nRupture: Circumferential – Separation\nLongitudinal – Tear/Crack, length (inches) __________\nPropagation Length, total, both sides (feet) _________\nN/A\nOther _______________________________\nb.Type of block valve used for isolation of immediate section:\nUpstream: Manual Automatic Remote Control\nCheck Valve\nDownstream: Manual Automatic Remote Control\nCheck Valve\nc. Length of segment isolated _______ ft\nd. Distance between valves _______ ft\ne. Is segment configured for internal inspection tools? Yes No\nf. Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of\nfailure? Yes No Don’t Know\nNot Possible due to physical constraints in the system\ng. If Yes, type of device run (check all that apply)\nHigh Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: ______\nLow Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: ______\nUT tool Year run: ______\nGeometry tool Year run: ______\nCaliper tool Year run: ______\nCrack tool Year run: ______\nHard Spot tool Year run: ______\nOther tool Year run: ______\nPART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION PART E – ENVIRONMENT\n1. Nominal pipe size (NPS) / / in.\n2. Wall thickness / / in.\n3. Specification SMYS / /\n4. Seam type\n5. Valve type\n6. Manufactured by in year / /\n1. Area of accident In open ditch\nUnder pavement Above ground\nUnderground Under water\nInside/under building Other ____________\n2. Depth of cover: inches\nPART F – CONSEQUENCES\n1. Consequences (check and complete all that apply)\na. Fatalities Injuries c. Product ignited Yes No d. Explosion Yes No\nNumber of operator employees: _______ _______ e. Evacuation (general public only) / / people\nContractor employees working for operator: _______ _______ Reason for Evacuation:\nGeneral public: _______ _______ Precautionary by company\nTotals: _______ _______ Evacuation required or initiated by public official\nb. Was pipeline/segment shutdown due to leak? Yes No f. Elapsed time until area was made safe:\nIf Yes, how long? ______ days ______ hours _____ minutes / / hr. / / min.\n2. Environmental Impact\na. Wildlife Impact: Fish/aquatic Yes No e. Water Contamination: Yes No (If Yes, provide the following)\nBirds Yes No Amount in water _________ barrels\nTerrestrial Yes No Ocean/Seawater No Yes\nb. Soil Contamination Yes No Surface No Yes\nIf Yes, estimated number of cubic yards: _________\nGroundwater No Yes\nc. Long term impact assessment performed: Yes No Drinking water No Yes (If Yes, check below.)\nd. Anticipated remediation Yes No Private well Public water intake\nIf Yes, check all that apply: Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife\nForm RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 2 of 4\nOPS Data Facsimile\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nAppendix C Operator Accident Report\nPART G – LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION\n1. Computer based leak detection capability in place? Yes No\n2. Was the release initially detected by? (check one): CPM/SCADA-based system with leak detection\nStatic shut-in test or other pressure or leak test\nLocal operating personnel, procedures or equipment\nRemote operating personnel, including controllers\nAir patrol or ground surveillance\nA third party Other (specify) _________________\n3. Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____\nPART H – APPARENT CAUSE\nImportant: There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H. Check the box corresponding to the\nprimary cause of the accident. Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories\ncorresponding to the cause you indicate. See the instructions for guidance.\nb. Visual Examination\nLocalized Pitting\nGeneral Corrosion\nOther ____________________\nH1 – CORROSION\na. Pipe Coating\nc. Cause of Corrosion\n1. External Corrosion\nBare\nGalvanic Atmospheric\nCoated\nStray Current Microbiological\nCathodic Protection Disrupted\n2. Internal Corrosion\nStress Corrosion Cracking\nSelective Seam Corrosion\n(Complete items a – e\nOther ____________________\nwhere applicable.) d. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident?\nNo Yes, Year Protection Started: / /\ne. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion?\nNo Yes => Estimated time prior to accident: / / years / / months Unknown\nH2 – NATURAL FORCES\n3. Earth Movement => Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other\n4. Lightning\n5. Heavy Rains/Floods => Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other\n6. Temperature => Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other\n7. High Winds\nH3 – EXCAVATION DAMAGE\n8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractors/Not Third Party)\n9. Third Party (complete a-f)\na. Excavator group\nGeneral Public Government Excavator other than Operator/subcontractor\nb. Type: Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer Phone/Cable\nLandowner-not farming related Farming Railroad\nOther liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor\nNautical Operations Other ________\nc. Excavation was: Open Trench Sub-strata (boring, directional drilling, etc…)\nd. Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes, Date of last contact /_________/\ne. Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity?\nYes; Date received: / / mo. / / day / ______/ yr. No\nNotification received from: One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner\nf. Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation? No Yes (If Yes, check applicable items i - iv)\ni. Temporary markings: Flags Stakes Paint\nii. Permanent markings:\niii. Marks were (check one) : Accurate Not Accurate\niv. Were marks made within required time? Yes No\nH4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE\n10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure => Fire/Explosion cause: Man made Natural\n11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe\n12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe\n13. Vandalism\nForm RSPA F 7000-1 ( 01-2001 ) Page 3 of 4\nOPS Data Facsimile\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nAppendix C Operator Accident Report\nH5 – MATERIAL AND/OR WELD FAILURES\nMaterial\n14. Body of Pipe => Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other\n15. Component => Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other\n16. Joint => Gasket O-Ring Threads Other\nWeld\n17. Butt => Pipe Fabrication Other\n18. Fillet => Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other\n19. Pipe Seam => LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld\nHF ERW SAW Spiral Other\nComplete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5.\na. Type of failure:\nConstruction Defect => Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures\nMaterial Defect\nb. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site? Yes No\nc. Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred? Yes, complete d-g No\nd. Date of test: / / yr. / / mo. / / day\ne. Test medium: Water Inert Gas Other\nf. Time held at test pressure: / / hr.\ng. Estimated test pressure at point of accident: PSIG\nH6 – EQUIPMENT\n20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment => Control valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications\nBlock valve Relief valve Power failure Other\n21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling => Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other\n22. Seal Failure => Gasket O-Ring Seal/Pump Packing Other\nH7 – INCORRECT OPERATION\n23. Incorrect Operation\na. Type: Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures\nOther _______________________________________\nb. Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test: drug test: / / alcohol test /_________/\nH8 – OTHER\n24. Miscellaneous, describe:\n25. Unknown\nInvestigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete)\nPART I – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)\nForm RSPA F 7000-1 (01-2001 ) Page 4 of 4\nOPS Data Facsimile\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nAppendix D Metallurgical Report\nThis document is on file at PHMSA","truncated":false,"body_characters":26601}