{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, KM Interstate Gas Transmission Co, 2010-03-09","title":"Failure Report- KM Interstate Gas Transmission Co 3/9/10","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-01-17","effective_on":"2010-03-09","summary":"KM Interstate Gas Transmission Co; Gas Transmission; NE; failure 2010-03-09; apparent cause: Material Failure Pipe.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-km-interstate-gas-transmission-co-3910.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-km-interstate-gas-transmission-co-3910.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-km-interstate-gas-transmission-co-3910","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-km-interstate-gas-transmission-co-3910","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nCentral Region\nPrincipal Investigator Judy Johnson\nRegion Director David Barrett\nDate of Report 12/15/2011\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – KMIGT 16” Franklin to Hastings Line\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 3/9/2010\nCommodity Released Natural Gas\nCity/County & State Roseland/Adams, NE\nOpID & Operator Name 1007 Kinder Morgan (KM) Interstate Gas Transmission Co.\nUnit # & Unit Name 573 Hastings (KN Energy)\nSMART Activity # 129404\nMilepost / Location MP 64 + 1055\nType of Failure Rupture due to weld defects in longitudinal seam at location of wrinkle\nbend\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nTotal Costs $55,297\nNon-HCA, Class 1, rural agricultural area\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – KMIGT 16” Franklin to Hastings Line\nFailure Date 3/9/2010\nExecutive Summary\nAt approximately 15:38 CST on March 9, 2010, a pipeline rupture resulted in an unintentional release of\nnatural gas from a Kinder Morgan (KM) Interstate Gas Transmission Company (“KMIGT”) 16” pipeline\nlocated in Adams County, Roseland, Nebraska (the “Incident”). An estimated 3,352 thousand cubic feet\n(MCF) of natural gas was released from the pipeline, 2,535 MCF was unintentional. The Incident\noccurred in a Class 1 Location. The total cost of the Incident is estimated at $55,297. Gas service was\ninterrupted to approximately 200 private residences for about 24 hours. The Incident was caused by\nweld defects in the pipeline longitudinal weld seam at the location of a wrinkle bend.\nSystem Details\nKMIGT’s Franklin to Hastings line is a 16-inch diameter natural gas pipeline that runs from Franklin,\nNebraska, to Hastings, Nebraska. The KMIGT pipeline interconnects with KM Rockies Express West (REX\nWest) Pipeline south of the Incident location and KM Trailblazer Pipeline north of the Incident location.\nAt the Incident location, the pipeline is constructed of material having the characteristics of API 5L Grade\nB line pipe. The specified minimum yield strength (SMYS), 35,000 psig, has been established by\nmetallurgical laboratory testing. The line pipe, installed in 1946, consists of reclaimed pipe that was\noriginally part of the Kansas City Power and Light system. The pipe manufacture date is circa 1929.\nThere are no records that identify the pipe manufacturer or the type of longitudinal seam. Metallurgical\nanalysis indicates the longitudinal seam consists of “two OD weld passes with filler metal added and an\nautogenous (no filler metal added) ID weld.” The pipeline is 16-inch diameter by 0.250-inch wall\nthickness, coated with a coal tar enamel type system.\nThe pipeline maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) was established by hydrostatic test in\nconformance with 49CFR 192.619(a)(2) on October 8, 1976. The test pressure was 902 psig establishing\nan MAOP of 720 psig.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nAt the Incident location, the pipeline lies in the flood plain of nearby Scott Creek. On March 9, 2010\nheavy rainfall combined with snow melt caused flooding along Scott Creek. The pipeline ROW was\nsubmerged at the time of the incident.\nAt the time of the incident, pipeline operating pressure was approximately 644 psig.\nEmergency Response\nAt 15:38 CST, KMIGT gas control received a low pressure alarm on the Franklin to Hastings system. At\n15:40 CST, a third party reported a pipeline leak to the KMIGT field office located in Hastings, Nebraska.\nThe Hastings field office immediately dispatched a technician to the Incident site to confirm the leak. At\n15:55 CST, gas control determined that an abnormal operating condition (AOC) existed on the pipeline\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – KMIGT 16” Franklin to Hastings Line\nFailure Date 3/9/2010\nsystem. The determination was based on review and analysis of SCADA information. Gas control\nnotified the Hastings field office of the AOC.\nHastings field office personnel were dispatched to confirm the AOC and initiate isolation of the system.\nThere were no remotely operated emergency valves on the Franklin to Hastings system. The KMIGT\ntechnician arrived at the Incident site at 16:02 CST, confirmed a leak and notified gas control. The\naffected section of pipeline was isolated by manually closing the upstream mainline valve (Roseland) at\n16:20 CST and the downstream mainline valve (Hastings West) at 16:55 CST. The approximate 11 mile\nlong pipeline segment was blown down to 0 psig by 18:40 CST.\nKMIGT notified Adams County emergency responders of the pipeline leak at 16:41 CST and conducted\nan Incident coordination call at 16:45 CST. KMIGT notified the National Response Center (NRC) and the\nincident was assigned NRC Number 933460 and the notification was logged at 18:18 EST.\nFollowing the Incident, KMIGT voluntarily limited the Franklin to Hastings segment operating pressure to\n550 psig. The reduced operating pressure represented 85% of the operating pressure at the time of\nfailure. KMIGT indicated 550 psig was the minimum pressure required to maintain gas supply to\ncustomers.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nAfter the field investigation was complete, replacement pipe was installed in the area where the\nIncident occurred.\nThe pipeline was returned to service at reduced pressure. As of the date of writing, the pressure\nreduction remains in place.\nAfter the pipeline was returned to service, KMIGT ran an in line inspection (ILI) high resolution geometry\ntool in the 16-inch diameter Franklin to Hastings North Check segment, approximately 45 pipeline miles.\nThe purpose of the ILI was to identify the number and location of wrinkle bends in the segment.\nApproximately 1200 locations containing wrinkle bends were identified by the ILI. On average, each\nlocation contained two to three wrinkle bends. Based on the ILI results, KMIGT decided to replace\napproximately 11.4 miles of 16-inch diameter piping with new 20-inch diameter piping. The\nreplacement piping is located in Class 2 and Class 3 areas. Pipeline replacement was completed and the\n20-inch diameter pipeline was placed into service in April 2011\nApproximately 33 miles of 16-inch diameter wrinkle bend construction type pipe remains in service.\nKMIGT will perform metallurgical laboratory testing on approximately 20 wrinkle bends taken from the\n11.4 miles of pipeline that has been replaced. KMIGT will evaluate the results of the laboratory testing\nto determine if the remaining 33 miles of 16-inch diameter pipeline will require replacement.\nInvestigation Details\nOn March 11, 2010, a PHMSA Central Region inspector conducted an on-site investigation of the\nIncident. In situ visual inspection of the damaged pipe joint revealed a circumferential fracture located\nnear the centerline of a wrinkle bend. The fracture extended circumferentially from the approximate\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – KMIGT 16” Franklin to Hastings Line\nFailure Date 3/9/2010\n9:00 o’clock position, around the top of the pipe, to the approximate 3:00 o’clock position. The fracture\nwas approximately 24 inches in length and approximately ¼ inch wide. The pipeline longitudinal seam\nwas located between the 11:00 and 12:00 o’clock circumferential position. The wrinkle bend was part\nof an under bend in the pipeline.\nKMIGT removed a five foot section of pipe near survey station number 3389+75. The pipeline segment\ncontained the fractured wrinkle bend and an additional wrinkle bend located approximately two feet\ndownstream of the failure. This section of pipe was transported to a metallurgical laboratory for further\nanalysis. The analysis concluded the fracture was caused by weld defects, primarily slag inclusion and\nnon-fusion, in the pipeline longitudinal weld seam at the location of the wrinkle bend. The wrinkle bend\nlocated two feet downstream of the failure also contained circumferential cracks in the wrinkle bend\ninitiating at the longitudinal weld seam. Wrinkle bend construction is currently prohibited in new\npipelines by 192.315. However, it was common practice at the time the Franklin to Hastings pipeline\nwas constructed and 192 Subpart G is not retroactive.\nA review of KMIGT leak records identified a 1997 pipeline rupture associated with wrinkle bend\nconstruction. The wrinkle bend was cut out and replaced, however there are no records of a\nmetallurgical analysis of the failure.\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nThe KMIGT 16-inch diameter Franklin to Hastings Incident was caused by weld defects in the pipeline\nlongitudinal weld seam at the location of a wrinkle bend. The weld defects consist of slag inclusions and\nnon-fusion. A wrinkle bend located two feet downstream of the failure also contained circumferential\ncracks in the wrinkle bend initiating at the longitudinal weld seam.\nAppendices\nA Map and Photographs\nB NRC Report\nC Kinder Morgan Incident Report to PHMSA\nD Kinder Morgan Loss Causation Report, 3/10/2010\nE Kinder Morgan Metallurgical Investigation Report, 4/22/2010\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – KMIGT 16” Franklin to Hastings Line, Failure Date\n03/09/2010, Appendix A – Maps and Photographs\nFailure site, looking west toward Roseland Avenue. Tree line in background marks the location\nof Scott Creek.\nFailure Site\nPage 1 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – KMIGT 16” Franklin to Hastings Line, Failure Date\n03/09/2010, Appendix A – Maps and Photographs\nFailure site, looking east. Grasses laid over in foreground due to flooding of Scott Creek.\nFailure Site\nPage 2 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – KMIGT 16” Franklin to Hastings Line, Failure Date\n03/09/2010, Appendix A – Maps and Photographs\nFailure site, looking northeast (downstream). Pipeline markers in background indicate Scott\nCreek crossing.\nFailure Site\nPage 3 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – KMIGT 16” Franklin to Hastings Line, Failure Date\n03/09/2010, Appendix A – Maps and Photographs\nPipeline rupture at wrinkle bend (underbend), looking southeast.\nPage 4 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – KMIGT 16” Franklin to Hastings Line, Failure Date 03/09/2010, Appendix A – Maps and Photographs\nPage 5 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 1 of 2\nAppendix B - NRC Report No. 933460\nHMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS\n(Version 3.4.05 PROD ) Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu\n[Return to Search]\n<< Previous << Previous 1..1 of 1 << Save >>\nRescinded Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters)\nNRC Number: 933460\nCall Date: 03/09/2010 Call Time: 18:18:55\nCaller Information\nFirst Name: LARRY Last Name: KEPPLER\nCompany Name: KINDER MORGAN- KMIGT\nAddress: 500 DALLAS ST.\nCity: HOUSTON State: TX\nCountry: USA Zip: 77082\nPhone 1: 8325964128 Phone 2:\nOrganization Type: PRIVAT Is caller the spiller? Yes Yes No No No Response No Response\nConfidential: Yes Yes No No No Response No Response\nDischarger Information\nFirst Name: LARRY Last Name: KEPPLER\nCompany Name: KINDER MORGAN- KMIGT\nAddress: 500 DALLAS ST.\nCity: HOUSTON State: TX\nCountry: USA Zip: 77082\nPhone 1: 8325964128 Phone 2:\nOrganization Type: PRIVAT\nSpill Information\nState: NE County: ADAMS\nNearest City: HASTINGS Zip Code:\nLocation\nSpill Date: (mm/dd/yyyy)\n16:02:00\n03/09/2010 Spill Time: (24hh:mm:ss)\nDTG Type: DISCOVERED\nIncident Type PIPELINE Reported Incident Type PIPELINE\nDescription\nhttps://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=...\n11/19/2010\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 2 of 2\nAppendix B - NRC Report No. 933460\nCALLER STATED THAT THERE WAS A GAS LEAK REPORTED BY A PRIVATE CITIZEN. PERSONNEL\nINVESTIGATED AND CONFIRMED A RUPTURE IN THE PIPELINE DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES.\nMaterials Involved\nMaterial / Chris Name Chris Code Total Qty. Water Qty.\nNATURAL GAS ONG 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\nMedium Type: AIR\nAdditional Medium Information:\nATMOSPHERE\nInjuries: Fatalites:\nEvacuations: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown No. of Evacuations:\nDamages: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Damage Amount:\nFederal Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown State Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown\nOther Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown\nRemedial Actions\nPERSONNEL BLOCKED IN THE PIPELINE SEGMENT. THE PIPELINE WILL LEAK DOWN. THE\nPIPELINE IS UNDERWATER DUE TO SNOW MELT, PERSONNEL MAY NEED TO DAM A CREEK IN\nORDER TO FIX THE PIPELINE.\nAdditional Info\nCALLER WILL NOTIFY LOCAL AUTHORITIES.\nLatitude\nDegrees: 40 Minutes: 29 Seconds: 0 Quadrant: N\nLongitude\nDegrees: 98 Minutes: 30 Seconds: 0 Quadrant: W\nDistance from City: Direction:\nSection: Township:\nRange: Milepost:\nhttps://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=...\n11/19/2010\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed 100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0522\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 04/07/2010\nNo. 20100012 - 15129\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n--------------------------------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nINCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND\nGATHERING PIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0522. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the\ncollection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect\nof this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline\nSafety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes Yes\nReport Status: Submitted\nCreate Date: 12/02/2010\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 1007\n2. Name of Operator KM INTERSTATE GAS TRANSMISSION CO\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 500 DALLAS ST. (ONE ALLEN CENTER)\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code: 77002\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Incident: 03/09/2010 16:02\n5. Location of Incident:\nLatitude: 40.48771\nLongitude: -98.55188\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 933460\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 03/09/2010 17:26\n8. Incident resulted from: Unintentional release of gas\n9. Gas released: (select only one, based on predominant volume\nreleased) Natural Gas\n- Other Gas Released Name:\n10. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally - Thousand\nCubic Feet (MCF): 2,535.00\n11. Estimated volume of intentional and controlled release/blowdown -\nThousand Cubic Feet (MCF) 3,352.00\n12. Estimated volume of accompanying liquid release (Barrels):\n13. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n14. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n14a. Operator employees\n14b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n14c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n14d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n14e. General public\n14f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n15. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the incident? Yes\nPage 1 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 15a and 15b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n15a. Local time and date of shutdown 03/09/2010 16:20\n15b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted 03/23/2010 18:30\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n16. Did the gas ignite? No\n17. Did the gas explode? No\n18. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n19. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n19a. Local time operator identified Incident 03/09/2010 16:02\n19b. Local time operator resources arrived on site 03/09/2010 16:02\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Incident onshore? Yes\n- Yes (Complete Questions 2-12)\n- No (Complete Questions 13-15)\nIf Onshore:\n2. State: Nebraska\n3. Zip Code: 68973\n4. City Roseland\n5. County or Parish Adams\n6. Operator designated location Survey Station No.\nSpecify: 3389+75\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: 16\" Franklin to Hastings\n8. Segment name/ID: 710-005-00-00\n9. Was Incident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Incident : Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Incident (as found) : Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\nOther – Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 41\n12. Did Incident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\nName of body of water (If commonly known):\nApprox. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\nSelect:\nIf Offshore:\n13. Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\n14. Origin of Incident:\n- If \"In State waters\":\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- If \"On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)\":\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Incident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: - Interstate - Intrastate Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Incident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n3. Item involved in Incident: Pipe\n- If Pipe – Specify: Pipe Body\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 16\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .25\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 35,000\n3d. Pipe specification: API 5L - Grade B\nPage 2 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\n3e. Pipe Seam – Specify: Other\n- If Other, Describe: Electric Welded\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: Unknown\n3g. Year of manufacture: 1929\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Incident – Specify: Coal Tar\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve – Specify:\n- If Mainline – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Mainline valve manufacturer:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Year item involved in Incident was installed: 1946\n5. Material involved in Incident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Steel or Plastic – Specify:\n6. Type of Incident involved: Rupture\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nApprox. size: in. (in axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other – Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation: Circumferential\n- If Other – Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening): .2\nby in. (length circumferentially or axially): 21.5\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Class Location of Incident: Class 1 Location\n2. Did this Incident occur in a High Consequence Area (HCA)? No\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify the Method used to identify the HCA:\n3. What is the PIR (Potential Impact Radius) for the location of this\nIncident? Feet: 296\n4. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\ndue to heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n5. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\nNOT by heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n6. Were any of the fatalities or injuries reported for persons located\noutside the PIR? No\n7. Estimated cost to Operator :\n7a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator $ 0\n7b. Estimated cost of gas released unintentionally $ 14,450\n7c. Estimated cost of gas released during intentional and\ncontrolled blowdown $ 19,107\n7d. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 21,200\n7e. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 540\n7f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n7g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) $ 55,297\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Incident (psig): 644.00\n2. Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) at the point and\ntime of the Incident (psig): 720.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nIncident: Pressure did not exceed MAOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Incident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMAOP?\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 4a and 4b below)\nPage 3 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore Pipeline,\nIncluding Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question 2? Yes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. - 5f. below):\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source: Manual\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 56,726\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection\ntools? Yes\n- If No – Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting\ninstrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux\nleakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall build-up\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: Transmission System\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Incident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Incident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Incident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the\ndetection of the Incident?\nYes\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of\nthe Incident?\nYes\n7. How was the Incident initially identified for the Operator? Notification From Public\n- If Other – Describe:\n7a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel, including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Ground Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 7, specify the following:\n8. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nIncident?\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\n- If No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nSCADA system was functioning normally at the time of the\nincident. Line pressure was within normal operating range\nat the time of the incident. Gas controller responded\nappropriately.\n- If Yes, Describe investigation result(s) (select all that apply):\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous\nhours of service (while working for the operator), and other\nfactors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the Operator)\nand other factors associated with fatigue\n- Provide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\nPage 4 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above –\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Describe how many were tested:\n1b. Describe how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Describe how many were tested:\n2b. Describe how many failed:\nPART G - APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in the shaded column on the left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Incident, and answer the\nquestions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing, or root causes of the Incident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub-cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes:\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at\nthe time of the incident?\n- If Yes, Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the\npoint of the incident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted\nat the point of the incident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\nPage 5 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n7. Cause of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply):\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Drop-out\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the gas/fluid treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n14. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point\nof the Incident?\n14a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year run:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year run:\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\n- Other\nMost recent year run:\nIf Other, Describe:\n15. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes,\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n16. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n17. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at\nthe point of the Incident since January 1, 2002?\n17a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year examined:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year examined:\nPage 6 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year examined:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\n- Other\nMost recent year examined:\nIf Other, Describe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Incident generated in conjunction\nwith an extreme weather event?\n6a. If yes, specify: (select all that apply):\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Previous Damage Due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (From Part C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Incident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nYear:\n- Ultrasonic\nYear:\n- Geometry\nYear:\n- Caliper\nYear:\n- Crack\nYear:\n- Hard Spot\nYear:\n- Combination Tool\nYear:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nYear:\n- Other:\nYear:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes:\nPage 7 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Incident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nYear:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nYear:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nYear:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nYear:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nYear:\n- Other\nYear:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from (select all that apply):\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred (select all that apply):\n- Public\n- If Public, Specify:\n- Private\n- If Private, Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator :\n10. Type of excavation equipment :\n11. Type of work performed :\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified? - Yes - No\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption: (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, then one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\n- Predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, Specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, Specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, Specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, Explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nPage 8 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Incident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year run:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year run:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year run:\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\n- Other:\nMost recent year run:\nDescribe:\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident :\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Incident since January 1, 2002?\n7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nPage 9 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nIf - If Intentional Damage:\n8. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other Outside Force Damage:\n9. Describe:\nUse this section to report material failures ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in\nIncident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is \"Pipe\" or \"Weld.\"\nG5 - Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure\nOnly one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nPipe, Weld or Join Failure – Sub-Cause: Construction-, Installation-, or Fabrication-related\n1. The sub-case selected below is based on the following (select all that apply):\n- Field Examination\n- Determined by Metallurgical Analysis Yes\n- Other Analysis\n- If \"Other Analysis\", Describe\n- Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation\n(Supplemental Report required)\n- If Construction-, Installation- or Fabrication- related:\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n- If Fatigue or Vibration related:\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Mechanical Stress\n- Other Yes\n- If Other, Describe: Long seam weld defect at wrinkle bend and soil heaving.\n- If Original Manufacturing-related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field):\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n- If Fatigue or Vibration related:\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Mechanical Stress\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Environmental Cracking-related:\n3. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\nComplete the following if any Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause is selected.\n4. Additional Factors (select all that apply):\n- Dent\n- Gouge\n- Pipe Bend\n- Arc Burn\n- Crack\n- Lack of Fusion\n- Lamination\n- Buckle\n- Wrinkle Yes\n- Misalignment\n- Burnt Steel\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Incident? Yes\n5a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year run:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year run:\n- Caliper Yes\nPage 10 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\nAppendix C - Incident Report No. 20200012\nMost recent year run: 2001\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\n- Other\nMost recent year run:\nDescribe:\n6. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident? Yes\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested: 1976\nTest pressure","truncated":true,"body_characters":44309}