{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Magellan Ammonia Pipeline, 2010-07-23","title":"Failure Report- Magellan Ammonia Pipeline 7/23/10","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-08-10","effective_on":"2010-07-23","summary":"Magellan Ammonia Pipeline; Hazardous Liquid; NE; failure 2010-07-23; apparent cause: Material Failure - Pipe.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-magellan-ammonia-pipeline-72310.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-magellan-ammonia-pipeline-72310.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-magellan-ammonia-pipeline-72310","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-magellan-ammonia-pipeline-72310","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nCentral Region\nPrincipal Investigator Roger Sneegas\nRegion Director David Barrett\nDate of Report July 1, 2011\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Magellan Ammonia Line 501 Buckle\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure July 23, 2010\nCommodity Released Anhydrous Ammonia\nCity/County & State Pickrell/Gage, Nebraska\nOpID & Operator Name 12105 Magellan Ammonia Pipeline, L.P.\nUnit # & Unit Name 32773 (MAPCO) NH3 NEBRASKA\nSMART Activity # 130689\nMilepost / Location Milepost 153.4/5 miles east of Pickrell, NE\nType of Failure Leak, pipe buckle and crack resulting from compressive overload\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted Non HCA, rural cropland\nProperty Damage $163,161 including repairs and lost product\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Magellan Ammonia Pipeline Line 501 Buckle\nJuly 23, 2010\nExecutive Summary\nMagellan’s 8-inch, Line 501 Beatrice to Greenwood Nebraska, anhydrous ammonia pipeline leaked on\nJuly 23, 2010 during maintenance activities to dislodge cleaning pigs. The pigs were being used to\nremove the commodity (anhydrous ammonia) from the pipeline prior to conducting a planned\nhydrostatic test. Air had leaked past the pigs, resulting in a vapor lock which caused the pigs to become\nlodged in the pipeline upstream of Beatrice pump station. The air in the pipeline made it difficult to\npush the pigs without exceeding the maximum operating pressure (MOP). This occurred in Gage\nCounty, Nebraska near the town of Pickrell. At the time and location of the failure, Magellan personnel\nwere working to install a 2 inch Thread-O-Ring (TOR) fitting at milepost 153.4, a high point in the\npipeline. The TOR fitting was being installed to bleed air out of the pipeline and remove the vapor lock.\nIn preparation for attaching the TOR fitting, approximately 10 feet of pipeline was excavated from the\ntop of the pipe only (the pipeline remained partially embedded in the ground). When the contract\nwelder started to weld on the TOR, the pipe began moving upward in the ditch and buckled. When the\npipe buckled, a corresponding wrinkle formed (located upstream of the buckle 10.5 ft). The pipe\ncracked in the buckle area. The pipe moved vertically upward at the failure location for 3.19 feet. The\nbuckle occurred 62 feet from a road crossing. According to the metallurgical analysis, the pipe had\nphysical and chemical properties consistent with the vintage of pipe, had no pre-existing defects, and\nfailed as the result of compressive overload.\nThe total amount of anhydrous ammonia lost was reported by Magellan to be 0.48 barrels. As the\nrelease occurred, the anhydrous ammonia formed a white vapor cloud that damaged about 4 acres of\ncrops before it dispersed in the wind. No unusual weather or geological components were determined\nto be a factor. The release did not ignite, and no one was killed or injured although 9 were evacuated.\nAir and water monitoring was performed at the site and no water impact was found. Minor soil\ncontamination was found and remediated.\nSystem Details\nMagellan’s Line 501, West Leg Ammonia Line is an 8-inch diameter pipeline that moves anhydrous\nammonia from Conway, Kansas to Mankato, Minnesota. This portion of the pipeline was referred to as\nthe Beatrice to Greenwood, Nebraska (MP 147 to MP 195) segment.\nAt the incident location, the pipeline is constructed of carbon steel pipe meeting API 5L characteristics\nfor Grade X46, and was 8- 5/8 inch in diameter with a 0.156 inch wall thickness, a seam type of low\nfrequency ERW, and was manufactured by Lone Star Steel. The pipeline was installed in 1968 and\ncoated with black Polyken tape coating. The MOP of the pipeline was 1,198 psig.\nNo supply disruptions resulted from the failure as the pipeline was shutdown for planned maintenance.\nA review of Magellan (portions previously reported under Enterprise) leak records identified four other\nleaks on this system in Nebraska. Previous leaks ranged in size from 3 gallons to 43 barrels. Failure\ncause history does indicate repeated material and weld failures for this pipeline.\nPage 2 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Magellan Ammonia Pipeline Line 501 Buckle\nJuly 23, 2010\nEvents Leading up to the Failure and the Failure\nThe pipeline segment had been idle since June 15, 2010 in preparations for hydrostatic testing. On the\nday of the leak, the pipeline was at a pressure of 633 psig at the failure location. Multiple cleaning pigs,\nEnduro (neoprene with disks including a wire brush section), had been used to prepare the pipeline for\nthe hydrotest.\nExcavation activities started approximately at noon CT on July 23, 2010 (Friday) in order to install the\nTOR fitting at MP 153.4 to remove the vapor lock and dislodge the cleaning pigs. Magellan’s internal\naccident report indicated that excavation activities included hand digging and exposing the pipeline\n“halfway”. The pipeline depth was approximately 48 inches. Magellan’s internal accident investigation\nindicates that this pipeline area had been uncovered for less than 1.25 hours before welding began. The\nwelder first completed several tack welds to assist with stabilizing the fitting position and then shortly\nafter beginning welding on the TOR, the pipeline began to rise up from the bottom of the ditch. The\npipeline started to bow and then buckled, cracked and leaked in the course of approximately a minute.\nThe Magellan contract welder and welder helper were in the excavated area at the time. The welder\nreported feeling the pipe start to move as he started to weld on the fitting. The TOR fitting was located\napproximately 1 foot away from the point where the pipe buckled and cracked. Magellan reports the\nfailure to have occurred at 2:05 PM CT.\nThe pipeline moved up a total of approximately 3.19 feet indicating the existence of very high\ncompressive force. Through interviews and the Magellan internal accident report, PHMSA learned that\nthe pipe movement was gradual enough that the welders and others in the vicinity had time to evacuate\nupwind without injury. Those present reported that approximately three slugs of liquid ammonia\nescaped from the pipe, each forming vapor clouds. After the liquid ammonia escaped, air vented from\nthe release location.\nThe accident occurred in an agricultural area (corn and soy beans) and about 4 acres of crops were\ndamaged by the vapor cloud which identified the wind pattern. The wind was gusting up to 20 mph\naccording to weather data. The mean temperature on this day was 84 degrees F with a high of 92\ndegrees F.\nIn subsequent interviews, PHMSA asked about the excavation activities prior to the accident in an effort\nto determine if the track hoe had damaged the pipe. Multiple witnesses said the hoe had not contacted\nthe pipe and the metallurgical report supported this information.\nThe pipeline maximum operating pressure (MOP) of 1198 psig was established by a hydrostatic test\ndone in 1968 at original construction to 1,628 psig (97.8 % SMYS). Overpressure protection for the\npipeline is controlled by the upstream Beatrice pump station. The high set point is 942 psig with the\nmaximum discharge pressure at the upstream pump station of 941 psig. Based on original hydrotest,\nthe point of failure was calculated to have a maximum MOP of 1546 psig. At the time of the accident,\nthe pipeline pressure at the point of failure was approximately 633 psig.\nPage 3 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Magellan Ammonia Pipeline Line 501 Buckle\nJuly 23, 2010\nNo external corrosion was visible in the area of the buckle and the pipe-to-soil reading near the leak on\nthe day of the failure was -1.480 V (on). The pipeline has an impressed current cathodic protection\nsystem.\nA review of the control center information and the SCADA controller response was not conducted. This\nwas not performed for this accident because the pipeline was not in operation at the time. The contract\nwelder was tested for drug and alcohol and tests proved that this was not a contributory factor to the\nfailure.\nEmergency Response\nMagellan personnel were already on site at the time of the accident due to the planned maintenance\nactivity. Magellan personnel isolated the failure using upstream and downstream manual valves\n(milepost 150.2 and 158.7) within a half hour of the accident (2:30 PM CT). Contact with the Magellan\ncontrol room by field personnel was ongoing. While isolation activities were underway, initial calls to\nlocal emergency response were made. NRC contact was performed thereafter.\nThe Gage County Sheriff and Pickerell Fire department both responded to the accident and assisted with\ntemporary evacuations and road closures (East Dogwood Road was located within 62 feet of the buckle\nfailure location). Six adjacent farm houses were temporarily evacuated for a total of 9 people.\nA creek was located within 0.5 miles (north) of the failure. Creeks and ponds in the area were sampled\nby Apex, an environmental contractor, and no contamination was found. Some soil was impacted and\nremediated.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nOn July 24th, Magellan started installing stopple fittings upstream and downstream of the failure location\nbut within the isolated segment (between manual closed valve locations) in an effort to further secure\nisolation of the pipeline. According to the Magellan internal accident report when the north end of the\npipeline (farthest point from East Dogwood road crossing) was being cut for stopple installation,\nmovement was also observed and the pipe actually peeled off and broke loose. At the failure location,\nthe buckle was located 17.85 feet from the upstream girth weld and centered at 6:00 orientation while\nthe wrinkle was located 7.42 feet from the upstream girth weld and centered at the 12:00 orientation.\nThe buckle had a circumference ratio (buckle versus adjacent pipe) of 1.14 while that of the wrinkle was\n1.09 (wrinkle versus adjacent pipe). Magellan had removed and replaced the damaged section of pipe a\nweek after the failure. Approximately 300 feet of new pipe was required to replace the area between\nthe stopple fittings. The failure pipe and adjacent pipe (46 feet) were sent to Det Norske Veritas\nColumbus (DNV) for analysis. DNV concluded that there were no pre-existing pipe defects at the failure\nlocation and that the pipe failed due to buckling and resulting cracking caused by compressive overload.\nDNV also noted that the physical and chemical properties of the pipe were consistent with the\nspecifications of this vintage pipe.\nPage 4 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Magellan Ammonia Pipeline Line 501 Buckle\nJuly 23, 2010\nMetallurgical analysis of the buckle and wrinkle revealed several cracks in the buckle area: a through\nwall axial crack; a through wall circumferential crack; and several other circumferential cracks. All were\nindicative of overload conditions. The cracks did not cross a long seam or a girth weld.\nA review of field measurements and the observed pipeline movement indicated that this portion of the\npipeline was laid with an approximate 6 degree bend. Available data did not indicate the presence of a\nfield bend. Review of evidence indicates that this 6 degree bend was accomplished as the pipe was\ninstalled to fit the ditch.\nThe United States Geological Service (USGS) was contacted and assisted PHMSA with a review of\nhistorical data regarding geological activity for the area of the failure. On Dec. 17, 2009, a geological\nevent was recorded by the USGS and listed as minor. The event was so low in magnitude (3.6 Lg’s at 79\nkm/49 miles) that information parameters local to the failure area (such as felt where elements) were\nnot available in the USGS database. Geological activity did not cause the failure.\nA review of the high-resolution MFL and deformation (Magpie) tool run data from 8/4/2006 was\nconducted. The data provided as a result of the tool run did not contain any anomaly indications that\nmet Magellan’s repair criteria in the area of the failure. A unique pipe element associated with joint\nlength was discovered during the review of the in-line inspection (ILI) data. A joint of pipe located closer\nto the road crossing and just upstream of the failed pipe was significantly shorter in length than all of\nthe other joints (8.75 feet versus 30-59 ft in length). Repairs were not noted by the operator for this\nsegment. It is possible that this shorter joint of pipe was installed to line up with the road crossing. This\nmay serve as additional evidence regarding increased compression stress at original construction.\nMagellan submitted a return-to-service plan to PHMSA for approval on August 13, 2010. On October\n1, 2010 the Central Region Director approved the pipeline to resume service, with the condition of\nsuccessful completion of hydrostatic testing that was planned as a part of the Magellan ongoing\nintegrity verification program.\nInvestigation Findings & Contributing Factors\nThe release of anhydrous ammonia was caused by through wall axial cracks in the pipe (centered at the\n6:00 orientation) resulting from a pipe buckle at a high point that had recently been excavated. The\npipe moved and buckled due to unstable compressive overload. The tensile properties of samples\nremoved from the pipe met the specifications of carbon steel, API 5L, Grade X46 line pipe at the time of\nmanufacture. The failure was not due to a pre-existing pipe defect.\nThe pipe was installed in an area where a six degree bend was present. This required the pipe to flex to\nmeet the ditch since a field bend or fitting was not utilized at the time of construction.\nThe amount of total force required to produce this buckling action was not determined during the\nMagellan internal accident investigation process nor included in the DNV metallurgical analysis report.\nPage 5 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Magellan Ammonia Pipeline Line 501 Buckle\nJuly 23, 2010\nMagellan did review elevations in the valve section used to isolate the pipeline and the minimum\nelevation is 1287 feet and the maximum elevation is 1425 feet. In the area of the buckle, an elevation\nchange of 61 feet was present (1363 feet and 1424 feet).\nThe pipeline exhibited additional stress when the north end of the segment was cut as the pipe peeled\noff and broke (approximately 205 feet from the failure location with a slight downward slope).\nMagellan performed an internal accident investigation regarding the failure and determined that\nrevisions were needed in a pressure testing procedure. Magellan changed System Integrity Plan (SIP)\ndocument 7.03-ADM-001 in two areas. This procedure now requires the Project Manager to evaluate\nand rule out any alternative methods to installing a tap for venting. Magellan also requires that land\ntopography be reviewed and an evaluation prior to excavating activities associated with a tap\ninstallation in order to determine potential for existing mechanical stress in the pipeline. If the potential\nfor existing mechanical stress is determined based on the review, then the area excavated will be\nincreased in length and width. This extra area of excavation will be performed to allow the pipe\nopportunity to flex and relieve existing stresses prior to additional work being performed. PHMSA\nreviewed this procedure and addressed additional guidance requirements.\nPHMSA contacted DNV and Magellan as a final metallurgical analysis report from DNV was not provided\nat the time of this report. Magellan indicated that a final report had never been prepared. No\nsignificant changes were communicated by Magellan to the draft DNV report.\nAppendices\nAppendix A NRC Report No. 948671\nAppendix B Accident Report Submitted to PHMSA No. 20100179-15904\nAppendix C Pipeline System Map\nAppendix D Photographs\nAppendix E Metallurgical Report\nPage 6 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nAppendix A NRC Report No. 948671\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 948671\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 15:42 on 23-JUL-10\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: OPERATOR ERROR\nAffected Area:\nThe incident occurred on 23-JUL-10 at 14:30 local time.\nAffected Medium: AIR ATMOSPHERE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization: MAGELLAN PIPELINE\nTULSA, OK 74172\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nMP: 153 County: GAGE\nCity: PICKERALL State: NE\n3/10 OF A MILES WEST OF S-54 AND EAST DOGWOOD\n____________________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: AMA Official Material Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 250 BARREL(S)\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nA WELDER WAS WORKING ON A FITTING AND BURNED A HOLE THROUGH THE PIPE WHICH RESULTED\nIN A RELEASE OF AMMONIA.\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: DISTRIBUTION\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDAMAGES\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nClosure Type\nAir: N\nLength of Direction of\nDescription of Closure Closure Closure\nRoad: N\nWaterway: N\nTrack: N\nPassengers Transferred: NO\nMajor\nArtery:\nN\nPage 1 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nAppendix A NRC Report No. 948671\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nONE VALVE CLOSED ON THE NORTH SIDE, WAITING TO CLOSE VALVE ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE\nPIPELINE\nRelease Secured: UNKNOWN\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: PARTLY CLOUDY, 93ºF Wind speed: 13 MPH Wind direct\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: NONE\nState/Local: SHERIFF\nState/Local On Scene: NONE\nState Agency Number: NONE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nCOLORADO INFO ANALYSIS CENTER (FUSION CENTER)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nDHS PROTECTIVE SECURITY ADVISOR (PSA DESK)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nU.S. EPA VII (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-JUL-10 15:50\nNEBRASKA DEPT OF ENV QUALITY (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nNE INFORMATION ANALYSIS CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nNOAA RPTS FOR NE (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nPIPELINE\n& HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nDEPT HEALTH AND ENV (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\nDOI/OEPC DENVER (MAIN OFFICE)\n23-JUL-10 15:48\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nNO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.\n___________________________________________________________________________\n***\nEND INCIDENT REPORT # 948671 ***\nPage 2 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix B Accident Report Submitted to PHMSA No. 20100179-15904\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 08/19/2010\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20100179 - 15904\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes Yes\nLast Revision Date: 06/30/2011\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 12105\n2. Name of Operator MAGELLAN AMMONIA PIPELINE, L.P.\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address P.O. Box 22186, MD 27\n3b. City TULSA\n3c. State Oklahoma\n3d. Zip Code 74121\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 07/23/2010 14:05\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 40.36468\nLongitude: -96.65431\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 948671\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 07/23/2010 14:39\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nHVL or Other Flammable or Toxic Fluid which is a Gas at\nAmbient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Anhydrous Ammonia\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): .36\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels): .12\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels):\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nPage 1 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix B Accident Report Submitted to PHMSA No. 20100179-15904\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? No\n- If No, Explain: Line had been down since June 15 for Hydrostatic Testing\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 9\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident:\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site:\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Nebraska\n3. Zip Code: 68422-8125\n4. City Pickrell\n5. County or Parish Gage\n6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: 153.4\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Anhydrous Ammonia Pipeline\n8. Segment name/ID: Line Segment 501\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 48\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\n- If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body\nPage 2 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nAppendix B Accident Report Submitted to PHMSA No. 20100179-15904\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 8.625\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .156\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 46,000\n3d. Pipe specification: API 5LX-46\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Longitudinal ERW - Low Frequency\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: Lone Star Steel\n3g. Year of manufacture: 1968\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Cold Applied Tape\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1968\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Other\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe: Buckle that resulted in a release\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: No\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nNo\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? No\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nPage 3 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nAppendix B Accident Report Submitted to PHMSA No. 20100179-15904\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n8. Estimated cost to Operator :\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator $ 2,500\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 50\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 113,311\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 41,800\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 5,000\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 500\nDescribe: Lodging and Food for Evacuees while away from their\nhomes\n8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) $ 163,161\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 633.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 1,198.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nYes\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction? No\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState? PHMSA\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nYes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 44,526\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools? Yes\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\nPage 4 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nAppendix B Accident Report Submitted to PHMSA No. 20100179-15904\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nNo\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nNo\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operating Personnel, including contractors\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\nContractor working for the Operator\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nThis section of the liine was out of service due to\nHydrostatic Testing at the time the release occurred. The\nController was not involved in monitoring or operating the\nline during the Hydrostatic Test.\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\nPage 5 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix B Accident Report Submitted to PHMSA No. 20100179-15904\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nYes\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested: 1\n2b. Specify how many failed: 0\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub Cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other:\nPage 6 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix B Accident Report Submitted to PHMSA No. 20100179-15904\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of","truncated":true,"body_characters":56054}