{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Mid-Valley Pipeline Co, 2010-03-01","title":"Failure Report- Mid-Valley Pipeline Co 3/1/10","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-08-10","effective_on":"2010-03-01","summary":"Mid-Valley Pipeline Co; Hazardous Liquid; TX; failure 2010-03-01; apparent cause: Corrosion Internal.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-mid-valley-pipeline-co-3110.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-mid-valley-pipeline-co-3110.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-mid-valley-pipeline-co-3110","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-mid-valley-pipeline-co-3110","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nSouthwest Region\nPrincipal Investigator Gene Roberson\nRegion Director R. M. Seeley\nDate of Report 7/ 11/2011\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Mid-Valley Pipeline Internal Corrosion\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 3/1/2010\nCommodity Released Crude Oil\nCity/County & State Longview/Gregg County, TX\nOpID & Operator Name 12470 Mid-Valley Pipeline Company\nUnit # & Unit Name 9754 Haynesville Area\nSMART Activity # 129379\nMilepost / Location Mid-Valley Tank Farm, Longview, TX\nType of Failure Internal corrosion in manifold area of tank farm\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nOperator’s facility only. In HCA for surface water, but no water affected.\nProperty Damage $16,018\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Mid-Valley Pipeline Internal Corrosion\n3/1/2010\nExecutive Summary\nOn March 1, 2010 Sunoco Pipeline Company made a notification to the National Response Center\nreporting a crude oil release on their Mid-Valley Pipeline (Mid-Valley) system. Upon review of the\ninformation an investigator from the Southwest Region was dispatched to the accident site.\nAt approximately 8:10 am CST, March 1, 2010, Mid-Valley identified a release of crude oil in the\nmanifold area of the Mid-Valley tank farm in Longview, TX. The header consisted of 8.625” diameter,\n0.350” wall, Grade A (24,000 SMYS) pipe. The Mid-Valley facility is manned during normal business\nhours and all line ups for deliveries are performed manually. Only emergency valves have automatic\nactuation. Mid-Valley employees had lined up the manifold for the days deliveries and product was\nbeing received into the station. At approximately 8:10 am, crude oil was observed “gushing” from the\nsoil in the manifold area. Mid-Valley responded by calling Lion Oil to shut down their pump, stopping\nthe delivery. The flow was stopped at approximately 8:18 am. Observations in the manifold area\nindicated that a buried section of the manifold piping that delivered crude oil to tanks # 13 and #14 was\nreleasing product due to an unknown reason. The section of manifold piping had an MOP of 275 psig,\nand was operating at less than 150 psig when the release occurred.\nOne hundred ninety eight (198) barrels of crude oil were estimated to have been released and 196\nbarrels were recovered from the secondary containment area with-in Mid-Valley’s site. Mid-Valley\nisolated the underground section of the manifold piping and installed blind flanges to isolate it from the\nabove ground header. Once the spill was controlled, approximately 25 feet of 8” buried header was\nthen excavated for evaluation and/or removal. Upon excavation, it was determined that the release\noriginated from two localized spots of internal corrosion in the header. Mid-Valley has determined that\ncrude oil feed to tanks #13 and #14 is not essential to their operations and has chosen to not replace\nthis section of the header. It was established that the section of piping that failed was subject to\npressure as a dead leg with no flow during normal operations.\nPage 2 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Mid-Valley Pipeline Internal Corrosion\n3/1/2010\nSystem Details\nMid-Valley provides Midwest refiners with access to various crude streams available at Longview, Texas,\nincluding West Texas intermediate (WTI) and West Texas sour via West Texas Gulf Pipe Line Company\nand foreign and Gulf of Mexico crude sourced from Beaumont/Nederland, Texas. Mid-Valley includes\napproximately 1,100 miles of pipe (mostly 20” and 22”).\nMid-Valley is 55.3% owned and operated by Sunoco Logistics Partners, L. P., which is a master limited\npartnership formed to acquire, own and operate refined product and crude oil pipelines and terminal\nfacilities, including those of Sunoco, Inc. Sunoco Logistics, through Sunoco Pipeline and another\nsubsidiary, Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P., transport, terminal, and store refined products\nand crude oil in 12 states.\nThe unit consists of approximately 228 miles of 20” mainline, a 44 mile 12” lateral, and a 20 mile 8”\nlateral, eight mainline pump stations, two lateral pump stations and two breakout tank facilities\n(Longview and Haynesville).\nThe Longview breakout tank facility consists\nof 14 tanks and the manifold system where\nthe accident occurred. Mid-Valley identified\nthis facility as an HCA-could-affect area due\nto the proximity near the Sabine River. Mid-\nValley had constructed secondary on-site\ncontainment as preventative and mitigative\nmeasure to lessen the impact of any releases\nin the facility. This containment prevented\nthe spill from leaving the Longview Tank\nfacility and thus mitigating its impact to the\nassociated HCA. (See Appendix C)\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nThe Longview Tank Facility has a common header that interconnects the 14 breakout tanks. The station\nis aligned manually to deliver product into the appropriate tank. This morning Mid-Valley employees\nhad manually lined up the manifold valves to receive a shipment of crude oil from Lion Oil into the #7\ntank. Upon start up at approximately 8:10 am, crude oil was observed gushing from the soil in the\nmanifold area. Mid-Valley responded by calling Lion Oil to shut down their pump, stopping the delivery\nto Mid-Valley. The flow was stopped at approximately 8:18 am. The release had occurred from one of\nseveral buried lines within the manifold area.\nSunoco reported the release to the NRC at approximately 11:41 CDT on March 1, 2010. (See Appendix\nA)\nEmergency Response\nMid-Valley’s technician activated the Emergency Response Plan for the local site. All flows into and out\nof the site were shut down. The rupture resulted in the release of 198 barrels of crude oil, which was\ncontained in secondary containment on Mid-Valley’s site. No explosion or fire occurred. Emergency\ncontractors were on site recovering released crude oil within 45 minutes of the release.\nPage 3 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Mid-Valley Pipeline Internal Corrosion\n3/1/2010\nSummary of Return-to-service\nFollowing the emergency response, Mid Valley isolated the failed section of manifold pipe from the\nsystem. Upon isolation with blind flanges, the manifold was pressured up, monitored and visually\ninspected for system integrity. The manifold was returned to service the evening of March 1, 2010\nwhen Mid-Valley was confident that all systems were safe.\nInvestigation Details\nAt approximately 8:10 am CST, March 1, 2010, Mid-Valley Pipeline Co. (Mid-Valley) reported to the\nNational Response Center a release of crude oil in the manifold area of the Mid-Valley tank farm in\nLongview, TX. PHMSA’s Southwest Region received the incident notification and dispatched an\ninvestigator to the site. The investigator arrived on site at 3 pm that afternoon. Vacuum trucks had\npicked up most of the released product by the time an inspector arrived on site. It was observed that no\ncrude oil had been released beyond Mid-Valley’s facility site. Clean up was continuing for a very small\namount of crude that remained in the secondary containment area. The operator’s written report can\nbe seen in Appendix B.\nThe MOP of the manifold is 275 psig and the incident occurred at less than 150 psig. The leak was\nobserved at approximately 8:10 am and the station was shut down by 8:18 am. The investigation\nshowed that the incident was initially discovered by the technician on site who observed the release and\nacted promptly to shut in and secure the manifold.\nThrough the investigation we learned that there is a common header at this facility and depending on\nthe product movement some sections would see product movement and some sections would not. The\nentire header does see a common pressure. The investigation was unable to determine why this section\nleaked when it did. This specific section was not flowing product and it has not for a long time. The\npressures were consistent with other times and no other operational anomalies were identified.\nThe operator removed approximately 25 feet of 8 5/8 inch pipe that contained the failure section to\nevaluate the cause. According to the operator, this section of line will not be replaced.\nThe PHMSA Investigator was able to view the release site on the pipe, but close examination was limited\ndue to its location. Further review was to be done after removal was complete. Cause appeared to be\nfrom internal corrosion. Photos of the failed section can be seen in Appendix D.\nMid-Valley will monitor the manifold system for conditions conducive to internal corrosion with the\ninstallation of internal coupons. To address conditions of Mid-Valley’s IMP program, coupon holders\nhad been installed prior to the release for monitoring internal corrosion and local procedures for\noperation and monitoring were being developed. This coupon monitoring system has since been placed\nin-service. Additionally, Mid-Valley has completed a facility piping review to identify other potential no\nflow/low flow areas in the manifold that pose a risk of internal corrosion and developed corrective\naction plans where appropriate.\nMetallurgical Analysis\nThe section of pipe was not sent to a lab for analysis. Direct observation determined the failure was due\nto two localized spots of internal corrosion in the buried header. The failed section was a dead leg of\npipe that was subject to pressure fluctuations with no flow during normal operations.\nPage 4 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Mid-Valley Pipeline Internal Corrosion\n3/1/2010\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nThe leak occurred at approximately 8:10 on March 1, 2010. The discovery and isolation was prompt and\noperator’s actions were appropriate.\nWhile the leak occurred at a facility that could impact an HCA no product reached the HCA.\nThe failure initiated from 2 isolated incidences of internal spot corrosion, at the 6:00 o’clock position in\nthe header. No other indications of internal corrosion were found in the header after it was removed\nand investigated.\nAppendices\nA Telephonic Notice Report – NRC #932647\nB Written Accident Report 20100014\nC Operator and System Maps\nD Failure Site Photos\nPage 5 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nAppendix A Telephonic Notice Report – NRC#932647\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\n-----Original Message-----\nFrom: HQS-PF-fldr-NRC@uscg.mil [mailto:HQS-PF-f1dr-NRC@uscg.mil]\nSent: Monday, March 01, 2010 10:49 AM\nTo: PHP Accident/Incident Cadre <PHMSA>: CMC-01 (OST)\nSubject: NRC#932647\n***GOVERNMENT USE ONLY***GOVERNMENT USE ONLY***\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\nIncident Report # 932647\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken by: CIV NYDIA RAWLS at 11:41 on 01-MAR-10\nIncident Cause: UNKNOWN\nIncident Type: FIXED\nAffected Area:\nIncident occurred on 01-MAR-10 at 08:15 local incident time.\nAffected Medium: LAND\nREPORTING PARTY\nDAVID BORN\nOrganization: SUNOCO PIPELINE CO.\nONE FLOUR DANIEL DRIVE\nSUGARLAND, TX 77478\nBLDG A, LEVEL 3\nSUNOCO PIPELINE CO. reported for the responsible party.\nPRIMARY Phone: (281)6376497\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\nName:\nDAVID BORN\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization:\nMID-VALLEY PIPELINC CO.\nAddress:\n1010 COX DAIRY ROAD\nPRIMARY Phone: (281)6376497\nLONGVIEW, TX 75604\nCELLULAR Phone: (713) 7022091\nINCIDENT LOCATION\n1010 COX DAIRY ROAD\nCounty: GREGG\nPUMP STATION\nCity: LONGVIEW\nState: TX\nZip: 75604\nRELEASED MATERIAL (S)\nCHRIS Code: OIL\nOfficial Material Name: OIL: CRUDE\nQty Released: 190 BARREL (S)\nAlso Known As:\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nCALLER IS REPORTING A RELEASE OF CRUDE OIL FROM AN ON SHORE PIPELINE\nDUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES. MATERIAL RELEASED ONTO LAND AT THE LONGVIEW\nSTATION.\n________________________________________________________________________\nSENSITIVE INFORMATION\n________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPackage: N/A\nBuilding ID:\nType of Fixed Object: OTHER\nPower Generating Facility: NO\nGenerating Capacity:\nType of Fuel:\nNPDES:\nNPDES Compliance: UNKNOWN\n______________________________________________________________________\nIMPACT\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS:NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nHours Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closed Closure\nN\nAir:\nN Major\nRoad: Artery:N\nN\nWaterway:\nTrack:\nN\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n______________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nPIPELINE WAS SHUT DOWN, RELEASE WAS CONTAINED TO THE PROPERTY AND\nTHE RETENTION DEPRESSION (POND AREA).\nRelease Secured: YES\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n______________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: PARTLY CLOUDY, 58ºF Wind speed: 5 MPH Wind directi\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\n______________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: NONE\nState/Local: NONE\nState/Local On Scene: NONE\nState Agency Number: NONE\n_______________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nDHS PROTECTIVE SECURITY ADVISOR (PSA DESK)\n01-MAR-10 11:49 (703)2355724\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n01-MAR-10 11:49 (202)3661863\nU.S. EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)\n(866)3727745\nGULF STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)\n01-MAR-10 11:49 (251)4416601\nJFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)\n01-MAR-10 11:49 (225)3366513\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n01-MAR-10 11:49 (202)2829201\nNOAA RPTS FOR TX (MAIN OFFICE)\n01-MAR-10 11:49 (206)5264911\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n01-MAR-10 11:49 (202)3660568\nTCEQ (MAIN OFFICE)\n01-MAR-10 11:49 (512)2392507\nTEXAS STATE OPERATIONS CENTER (COMMAND CENTER)\n01-MAR-10 11:49 (512)4242208\n_______________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nCALLER WILL NOTIFY THE TX RAILROAD COMMISSION (TRRC) AND THE OIL\nAND GAS DIVISION NEXT.\n______________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT #932647 ***\nReport any problems by calling 1-800-424-8802\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT http://www.nrc.uscg.mil\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix B Written Accident Report – 20100014\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date:\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20100014 - 15090\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes Yes\nReport Status: Submitted\nCreate Date: 05/12/2010\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 12470\n2. Name of Operator MID - VALLEY PIPELINE CO\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 525 FRITZTOWN ROAD\n3b. City SINKING SPRING\n3c. State Pennslyvania\n3d. Zip Code 19608\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 03/01/2010 08:10\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 32.48325\nLongitude: -94.83034\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 932647\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 03/01/2010 11:41\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released) Crude Oil\n- Specify Commodity Subtype:\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 198.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 196.00\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\nPage 1 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 03/01/2010 08:12\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: 03/01/2010 14:00\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 03/01/2010 08:10\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 03/01/2010 08:10\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Texas\n3. Zip Code: 75604\n4. City Longview\n5. County or Parish Gregg\n6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: MP 0\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Longview Station\n8. Segment name/ID: Lion Oil Manifold Header\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Totally contained on Operator-controlled property\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 18\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pump/Meter Station Equipment and Piping\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Pipe\nPage 2 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n- If Pipe, specify: Pipe Body\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 8.625\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .35\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 25,000\n3d. Pipe specification: Grade A\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify: Longitudinal ERW - Unknown Frequency\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: Unknown\n3g. Year of manufacture: 1976\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: Coal Tar\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1976\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Rupture\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation: Circumferential\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by 2\nin. (length circumferentially or axially) 2\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: Yes\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil Yes\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nYes\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? Yes\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\nPage 3 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\nYes\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n8. Estimated cost to Operator :\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator $\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 150\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 1,134\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 11,470\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 3,264\n8f. Estimated other costs $\nDescribe:\n8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) $ 16,018\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 140.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 150.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools?\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\nPage 4 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system:\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nNo\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? No\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operating Personnel, including contractors\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\nOperator employee\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\nYes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nYes\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues Yes\n- Investigation identified no controller issues Yes\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nPage 5 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nYes\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested: 1\n1b. Specify how many failed: 0\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G1 - Corrosion Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub Cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination: Localized Pitting\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological Yes\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination Yes\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\nPage 6 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe Yes\n- Elbow\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? Yes\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? No\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident? No\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident? No\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment? No\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002? No\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nPage 7 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\nPage 8 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- Other\nPage 9 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Tr","truncated":true,"body_characters":48647}