# Failure Report- Northern Natural Gas Co 5/23/08

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** PHMSA FIR, Northern Natural Gas Co, 2008-05-23
- **title:** Failure Report- Northern Natural Gas Co 5/23/08
- **source type:** incident
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2016-04-08
- **effective on:** 2008-05-23
- **summary:** Northern Natural Gas Co; Gas Transmission; MN; failure 2008-05-23; apparent cause: Natural Forces Damage.
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- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-northern-natural-gas-co-52308
- **source url:** https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-northern-natural-gas-co-52308
**body:**

<<<PAGE 1>>>

DOT US Department of Transportation
PHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
OPS Office of Pipeline Safety
Central Region
Principal Investigator MNOPS/James Bunn/Karen Butler
Region Director Allan Beshore
Date of Report 11/14/2014
Subject Failure Investigation Report – Northern Natural Gas Co (NNG) –
Natural Force Damage
Operator, Location, & Consequences
Date of Failure 05/23/2008
Commodity Released Natural Gas
City/County & State Beaver Bay / Lake, Minnesota
OpID & Operator Name 13750 Northern Natural Gas Co
Unit # & Unit Name 903 Carlton [IA] (NNG) (NNG)
SMART Activity # 124375
Milepost / Location MP 59.5, Reserve Mining Branch Line MNB72701
Type of Failure Natural Force Damage, crack in a dent
Fatalities 0
Injuries 0
Description of Area
impacted
Rural, Class 1, Non-HCA
Total Costs $530,000

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Failure Investigation Report – Northern Natural Gas Co – Natural Force Damage
Failure Date 05/23/2008
Executive Summary
On May 23, 2008, an instrumented aerial leak survey was in progress by a contracted service for
Northern Natural Gas Company (NNG). During this leak survey, a leak was discovered in the Reserve
Mining Branch Line (MNB72701) at approximately 2:57 p.m. CDT. Local field personnel were notified
directly from the contracted leak survey service. The NNG control center was contacted by field
personnel and began to reduce operating pressure (405 psig to approximately 275 psig). This pipeline
serves the Reserve Mine and three additional towns in Minnesota. The leak was physically located at
approximately 7:00 p.m. CDT by NNG field personnel at MP 59.5 in Lake County, Minnesota,
approximately 1.1 miles northeast of the intersection of County Road 3 and County Road 4. The leak
was not located in an HCA. There were no reported evacuations, road closings, fires, injuries or fatalities
as a result of the leak. The state partner, Minnesota Office of Pipeline Safety (MNOPS), investigated the
release on-site. The leak originated at a 1-inch long crack that was located in a dent on the bottom of
the pipe. The pipe was found to be resting on a sharp piece of granite. The original construction of the
pipeline was in 1961. Ground subsidence was reported to have caused the dented pipe to fail. Weather
and contract resource availability delayed the installation of a 16-inch Type B repair sleeve. The pipeline
repair work was completed on June 3, 2008. The operator has estimated the cost of this incident to be
$530,000.
After the incident, NNG ran High Resolution MFL and Caliber tools on the Reserve Mining Branch Line
and discovered six dents with metal loss. MNOPS completed a follow-up inspection in 2009 and
confirmed that all six dents with metal loss were scheduled for repair by May of 2010. All repairs have
been completed.
System Details
The Northern Natural Gas Pipe Line system consists of approximately 15,000 miles of pipelines and
storage facilities. The system transports natural gas from the gathering fields in New Mexico, Texas,
Oklahoma and Kansas to market areas in the upper Midwest. The Reserve Mining Branch Line is part of
the Northern Branch System and provides natural gas to the mine as well as three towns including
Beaver Bay and Silver Bay, Minnesota. The portion of the pipeline containing the failure was composed
of 16-inch diameter by 0.219-inch wall thickness, API 5L X52, low frequency ERW line pipe manufactured
by Republic Steel with coal tar enamel as the external coating and was cathodically protected. The
pipeline was installed in 1961.
Events leading up to the Failure
The maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline is 425 psig, which corresponds to a
hoop stress level of 30 percent of the specified minimum yield strength (SMYS) of the pipe. The
pressure at the time and location of failure was 405 psig, which corresponds to a hoop stress of 29
percent (95 percent of MAOP). The MAOP for the Reserve Mining pipeline was reported to be
established in accordance with 192.619 (a) (4), the pressure determined by the operator to be the
maximum safe pressure after considering the history of the segment.
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Failure Investigation Report – Northern Natural Gas Co – Natural Force Damage
Failure Date 05/23/2008
Emergency Response
The pressure in the line at the time of detection of the leak was 405 psig. When the Control Center was
notified of the potential leak, actions to reduce line pressure were implemented. The pressure in the
pipeline was ultimately reduced to a pressure of approximately 275 psig. The area around the leak was
secured until repairs could be made. NNG reported the incident to the NRC at 6:27 p.m. CDT on May 23,
2008.
Return to Service
Between May 23, 2008, and May 29, 2008, delays to repair activities occurred due to weather and
contract resource availability. On May 29, 2008, NNG began excavation activities in order to install
stopple fittings. After the fittings were installed, a bypass was constructed around the leak area. The
section of the line that contained the leak was blown down and the line was excavated to expose the
leak. The pipe was resting on a piece of granite at the leak location. A dent had formed in the pipe
where it was resting on the rock. The dent was approximately 11 inches long, 7 inches wide and 0.903
inches deep. The bottom of the dent contained a thru-wall crack that was approximately 1 inch long.
The repair to the failed section of pipe was made with a 16-inch Type B weld sleeve approximately 24
inches long. On June 3, 2008, repair work was completed and the pipeline returned to normal service.
Investigation Details
Angel Service ITT was conducting an aerial leak survey on the Reserve Mining Branch Pipeline on March
23, 2008. The aerial leak survey contractor identified a potential leak site on the pipeline route and
notified NNG personnel at the NNG Carlton Compressor Station of the findings at approximately 2:57
p.m. CDT. Carlton personnel notified the NNG Control Center of the potential leak and the Control
Center began to reduce the pressure in the line. NNG dispatched a crew to the site of the potential leak
with a flame ionization unit. When the crew reached the area of the leak, the leak was confirmed when
an area of dead vegetation was observed and a reading of 5 percent Lower Explosive Limit was
measured. NNG secured the site and continued to monitor the atmosphere until a stopple bypass could
be installed and the leak site could be excavated. After the line was excavated it was found to be resting
on a sharp piece of granite at the leak location. A dent had been formed in the pipe body where the
pipe was resting on the granite. A 1-inch long thru-wall crack was found in the bottom of the dent. The
repair to the failed section of pipe was made with a 16-inch Type B weld sleeve approximately 24 inches
long. On June 3, 2008, repair work was completed and the pipeline returned to normal service.
In February of 2009, NNG completed High Resolution MFL and Caliber tools on the Reserve Mining
Branch pipeline. MNOPS reviewed the information associated with the Inline inspection (ILI) during an
inspection in May of 2009 (inspection was called the Welcome audit). The ILI run determined that there
were no immediate repairs required, 28 scheduled repairs, and six dents with metal loss (wall loss less
than or equal to 5 percent). All six dents were reported by the operator as occurring outside of a High
Consequence Area and were repaired by May of 2010.
Findings & Contributing Factors
The failure origin was a 1-inch crack located in a dent in the pipe body. The crack was located in the
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<<<PAGE 4>>>

Failure Investigation Report – Northern Natural Gas Co – Natural Force Damage
Failure Date 05/23/2008
bottom of a dent that measured approximately 11 inches in length, 7 inches circumferentially and 0.903
inches deep. A rock that was impinging on the pipeline at the 6 o’clock position caused the dent.
Ground subsidence, combined with the impinging rock, caused the dented pipe to fail.
Appendix Description
A Maps and Photographs
B NRC Report
C Operator’s Incident Report
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Appendix A
Map Removed
File Available at PHMSA

<<<PAGE 6>>>

Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Wide-angle image showing impinging rock
Closeup of impinging rock
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Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Hilly area leading up to failure site
Additional broad view of site
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Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Excavation site
Alternate angle
Page 4 of 8

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Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Constructing bypass
Page 5 of 8

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Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Bypass from alternate angle
Area after rain
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Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Closeup of damage to pipe wall
Hand excavation
Page 7 of 8

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Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Completed repair
Page 8 of 8

<<<PAGE 13>>>

Appendix B - NRC Report
NAT FOR PUBLIC US ENTER 1-800-421-8302
pocatie ediator third party hat commith a Privacy lans
Incident Report # 871912
INCIDENT DESCRIPTION
Repoet Type: $ 12i27 On 23-MAX-08
The sheddent vas discovered on 23-MAY -08 at 17:30 Local time.
Incident Cause: UNKNOWN
Affected Medium: AIR / ATMOPSHERE
SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY
Organization:
NORTHERN NATURAL GAS COMPANY
OMAHA, NE 68124
Type of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
County: LAKE
INCIDENT LOCATION
City: SILVER BAY State: MI
*** CALLER HAD VERY LITTLE INFORMATION***
RELEASED MATERIAL (S)
Also Known As:
CHRIS Code: ONG
Official Material Name: NATURAL GAS
Qty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT
CALLER IS REPORTING THAT NATURAL GAS RONASED FROM AN UNDERGROUND PIPELINE DUE TO
UNKNOWN CAUSES.
INCIDENT DETAILS
Do Regulated: TRAITON
Pipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW
DAMAGES
INJURIES:
Fire Involved: No
FATALITIES:
NO
NO
Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN
Hospitalized:
EVACUATIONS:
NO
Emp1/Crew:
Emp1/Crew:
Damages:
NO
Who Evacuated:
Passenger:
Passenger:
Occupant:
Radius/Area:
Closure Type
Length of
Direction of
Air:
N
Description of Closure
Closure
Closure
Road:
N
Artery: N
Major
Waterway:
N
Track:
N
Passengers Iransferred: NO
Page 1 of 2

<<<PAGE 14>>>

Appendix B - NRC Report
Environmental Impact: NO
Media Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:
____________________________________________________________________________
REMEDIAL ACTIONS
LOWERING PRESSURE ON THE LINE
Release Secured: YES
Release Rate:
Estimated Release Duration:
____________________________________________________________________________
WEATHER
Weather: OVERCAST, ºF
____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED
Federal: NONE
State/Local: NONE
State/Local On Scene: NONE
State Agency Number: NO REPORT #
____________________________________________________________________________
NOTIFICATIONS BY NRC
ATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)
23-MAY-08 19:33
USCG ICC (ICC ONI)
23-MAY-08 19:33
DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
23-MAY-08 19:33
U.S. EPA V (MAIN OFFICE)
23-MAY-08 19:37
FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM DETROIT (COMMAND CENTER)
23-MAY-08 19:33
MN BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPREHENSION (OPERATIONS CENTER)
23-MAY-08 19:33
MN DEPT OF HEALTH (MAIN OFFICE)
23-MAY-08 19:33
MN U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (ATTN: CARL WAHL)
23-MAY-08 19:33
NTL ENVMTL EMERG CENTRE CANADA (MAIN OFFICE)
23-MAY-08 19:33
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)
23-MAY-08 19:33
NOAA RPTS FOR MN (MAIN OFFICE)
23-MAY-08 19:33
SECTOR SAULT ST MARIE (MSO DULUTH)
23-MAY-08 19:36
MSD ST. PAUL (CGIS)
23-MAY-08 19:33
SURFACE TRANS SECURITY INSPECT PROG (COMMAND CENTER)
23-MAY-08 19:33
USCG DISTRICT 9 (COMMAND CENTER)
23-MAY-08 19:33
____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
CALLER HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
___________________________________________________________________________
***
END INCIDENT REPORT # 871912 ***
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Appendix C - Operator's Incident Report
NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 for each violation Form Approved
for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500,000 as provided in 49 USC 1678. OMB No. 2137-0522
U.S. Department of Transportation
Research and Special Programs
Administration
INCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND
GATHERING SYSTEMS
Report Date
Jun 05, 2008
No.
20080058 -- 4441
(DOT Use Only)
INSTRUCTIONS
Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the
information requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you
can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at http://ops.dot.gov .
0
PART A – GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION
Check one or more boxes as appropriate:
Operator Name and Address
Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report
13750
a. Operator's 5-digit Identification Number (when known) / /
b. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter Owner’s 5-digit Identification Number (when known) / /
NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO
c. Name of Operator ______________________________ _______________________________________________________
1111 SOUTH 103RD STREET
d. Operator street address ________________________________________________________________________________________
OMAHA, DOUGLAS, NE, 68124
e. Operator address _______________________
City, County or Parrish, State and Zip Code
2. Time and date of the incident
5. Consequences (check and complete all that apply)
05 1457 23
2008
/ / / / / / / /
0
hr. month day year
0
3. Location of incident
Non-employee Contractors: / /
a.
APPROXIMATELY 1 MILE WEST OF LA
b. Injury requiring inpatient
Nearest street or road
b.
BEAVER BAY LAKE
0
City and County or Parrish
0
Non-employee Contractors: / /
c.
MN 55601
State and Zip Code
d. Mile Post/Valve Station
APPROX 59.5
e. Survey Station No.
f. Latitude: Longitude:
(if not available, see instructions for how to provide specific location)
g. Class location description
Onshore: Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
47.27101 -91.34526
c. Property damage/loss (estimated) Total $
Gas loss $ Operator damage $
Public/private property damage $
d. Release Occurred in a ‘High Consequence Area’
e. Gas ignited – No explosion f. Explosion
Offshore: Class 1 (complete rest of this item)
Area ___________________ Block # ___________
State / / or Outer Continental Shelf
h. Incident on Federal Land other than Outer Continental Shelf
Yes No
i. Is pipeline Interstate Yes No
4. Type of leak or rupture
0
Leak: Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec. F5)
Puncture, diameter (inches)
Rupture: Circumferential – Separation
Longitudinal – Tear/Crack, length (inches)
Propagation Length, total, both sides (feet)
N/A
Other:
PART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
BYRON H. WOOD
(type or print) Preparer's Name and Title
(402) 398-7606
0
a. Fatality Total number of people: / /
0
Employees: / / General Public: / /
0
hospitalization Total number of people: / /
0
Employees: / / General Public: / /
530000
15800 514200
g. Evacuation (general public only) / / people
Reason for Evacuation:
Emergency worker or public official ordered, precautionary
Threat to the public Company policy
6. Elapsed time until area was made safe:
1
/ / hr. / / min.
7. Telephone Report
871912 05 23 2008
/ / / / / / / /
NRC Report Number month day year
8. a. Estimated pressure at point and time of incident:
1 405
PSIG
b. Max. allowable operating pressure (MAOP): PSIG
c. MAOP established by 49 CFR section:
192.619 (a)(1) 192. 619 (a)(2) 192. 619 (a)(3)
192.619 (a)(4) 192. 619 (c)
425
d. Did an overpressurization occur relating to the incident? Yes No
(402) 398-7396
Area Code and Telephone Number
BYRON.WOOD@NNGCO.COM
Preparer's E-mail Address Area Code and Facsimile Number
Date Area Code and Telephone Number
Authorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title
Form RSPA F 7100.2 ( 01-2002 ) OPS Data Facsimile Page 1 of 3
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Appendix C - Operator's Incident Report
PART C - ORIGIN OF THE INCIDENT
1. Incident occurred on
Transmission System
Gathering System
Transmission Line of Distribution System
2. Failure occurred on
Body of pipe Pipe Seam
Joint
Component
Other:
Plastic (If plastic, complete all items that apply in a-c)
PART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION (if applicable) PART E – ENVIRONMENT
3. Material involved (pipe, fitting, or other component)
Steel
Plastic failure was: a.ductile b.brittle c.joint failure
Material other than plastic or steel: _________
4. Part of system involved in incident
Pipeline Regulator/Metering System
Compressor Station Other:
1961
5. Year the pipe or component which failed was installed: / /
16
1. Nominal pipe size (NPS) / / in.
.22
2. Wall thickness / / in.
5LX
52000
3. Specification SMYS / /
4. Seam type
ERW
5. Valve type
REPUBLIC
1. Area of incident In open ditch
Under pavement Above ground
Under ground Under water
Inside/under building Other:
PART F – APPARENT CAUSE
cause you indicate. See the instructions for this form for guidance.
a. Pipe Coating
b. Visual Examination
Bare
Localized Pitting
1. External Corrosion
Coated
General Corrosion
Other: ____________________
No Yes, Year Protection Started: / /
2. Internal Corrosion
e. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion?
F2 – NATURAL FORCES
3. Earth Movement => Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other:
4. Lightning
5. Heavy Rains/Floods => Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other:
38
2. Depth of cover: inches
6. Pipe or valve manufactured by in year / /
Important: There are 25 numbered causes in this section. Check the box to the left of the primary
cause of the incident. Check one circle in each of the supplemental items to the right of or below the
F1 – CORROSION If either F1 (1) External Corrosion, or F1 (2) Internal Corrosion is checked, complete all subparts a – e.
c. Cause of Corrosion
Galvanic Stray Current
Improper Cathodic Protection
Microbiological
Stress Corrosion Cracking
Other: ____________________
d. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering incident?
No Yes, How long prior to incident: / / years / / months
6. Temperature => Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other:
7. High Winds
F3 - EXCAVATION
8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractors) / Not Third Party
9. Third Party Excavation Damage (complete a-d)
a. Excavator group
General Public Government Excavator other than Operator/subcontractor
b. Type: Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer Phone/Cable Landowner Railroad
Other:
c. Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity?
No Yes: Date received: / / mo. / / day / / yr.
Notification received from: One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner
d. Was pipeline marked?
No Yes (If Yes, check applicable items i – iv)
i. Temporary markings: Flags Stakes Paint
ii. Permanent markings: Yes No
iii. Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate
iv. Were marks made within required time? Yes No
F4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE
10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure => Fire/Explosion cause: Man made Natural
11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13. Vandalism
Form RSPA F 7100.2 ( 01-2002 ) Page 2 of 3
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Appendix C - Operator's Incident Report
F5 – MATERIAL AND WELDS
Material
14. Body of Pipe => Dent Gouge Wrinkle Bend Arc Burn Other:
15. Component => Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other:
16. Joint => Gasket O-Ring Threads Other:
Weld
17. Butt => Pipe Fabrication Other:
18. Fillet => Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other:
19. Pipe Seam => LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld
HF ERW SAW Spiral Other:
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part F5.
a. Type of failure:
Construction Defect => Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures
Material Defect
b. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site? Yes No
c. Was part which leaked pressure tested before incident occurred? Yes, complete d-g No
d. Date of test: / / mo. / / day / / yr.
e. Test medium: Water Natural Gas Inert Gas Other:
f. Time held at test pressure: / / hr.
g. Estimated test pressure at point of incident: PSIG
F6 – EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS
20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment => Valve Instrumentation Pressure Regulator Other:
21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling => Nipples Valve Threads Mechanical Couplings Other:
Form RSPA F 7100.2 ( 01-2002 ) OPS Data Facsimile Page 3 of 3
22. Ruptured or Leaking Seal/Pump Packing
23. Incorrect Operation
a. Type: Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other:
b. Number of employees involved who failed post-incident drug test: / / Alcohol test: / /
c. Were most senior employee(s) involved qualified? Yes No d. Hours on duty: / /
F7 – OTHER
24. Miscellaneous, describe:
25. Unknown
Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete)
PART G – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)
ON MAY 23, AT APPROXIATELY 14:57 THE CARLTON LOCATION WAS NOTIFIED BY ANGEL SERVICE ITT CORP, THAT THEY HAD
COMPLETED THEIR AERIAL LEAK SURVEYING. UPON REVIEW OF THE INFORMATION IT APPEARED THAT THERE WAS A DETECTION
OF A SINGLE METHANE INDICATION IN LAKE COUNTY, MN ON THE 16-INCH RESERVE (MNB69801) BRANCH LINE ON THE
PIPELINE RIGHT OF WAY APPROXIMATELY 1.1 MILES WEST OF LAX LAKE ROAD @ APPROXIMATE MILEPOST 59.5. NORTHERN
PERSONNEL PROCEEDED TO REDUCE THE PRESSURE FROM 405 TO 300 PSIG AND SENT PERSONNEL TO THE SITE TO UTILIZE
PORTABLE LEAK DETECTION EQUIPMENT TO VERIFY IF THERE WAS A LEAK. A LEAK WAS DETECTED @ THE APPROXIMATE
LOCATION INDICATED. A STRONG HYDRO CARBON SMELL WAS DETECTED, A READING OF 5% LEL WAS INDICATED AND A PATCH
OF DEAD VEGETATION APPROXIMATELY 15 FT IN DIAMETER WAS NOTED. ACTIONS WERE TAKEN TO ACQUIRE THE SERVICES OF A
CONTRACTOR AND ARRANGE FOR NORTHERN'S STOPPLE CREW TO PROCEED TO THE SITE. AN 8-INCH STOPPLE AND BYPASS WAS
INSTALLED AROUND THE LEAK AREA, THEN THE SECTION OF LINE WAS BLOWN DOWN AND EXCAVATED. A ROCK WAS FOUND TO
HAVE IMPINGED ON THE PIPELINE AT THE 6 O'CLOCK POSITION. THE IMPINGMENT RESULTED IN A DENT MEASURING
APPROXIMATELY 11 INCHES LONGITUDINALLY, SEVEN INCHES CIRCUFERENTIALLY AND 0.903 INCHES DEEP. THERE WAS A
CRACK LOCATED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE DENT MEASURING APPROXIMATELY 1-INCH LONG. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE LEAK
COULD BE REPAIRED BY INSTALLATION OF A 2-FOOT BY 16-INCH TYPE B PRESSURIZED CONTAINING SLEEVE. INSTALLATION
OF THE SLEEVE WAS COMPLETED ON JUNE 3. ALL WELDS WERE INSPECTED USING MAGNETIC PARTICLE AND ULTRASONIC
THICKNESS METHODS. THE PIPELINE BETWEEN THE STOPPLE FITTINGS WAS PURGED, PRESSURE TESTED AND RETURNED TO
NORMAL 405 PSIG SERVICE. THERE WAS NO FIRE, NO INJURIES AND NO LOSS OF SERVICE TO ANY CUSTOMERS. THE ROOT
CAUSE OF THE LEAK WAS A ROCK IMPINING ON THE LINE AND GROUND SUBSIDENCE. A FINAL REPORT WILL BE COMPLETED
UPON DETERMINATION OF THE TOTAL COST OF REPAIRS.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT: IN THE NARRATIVE IT WAS INDICATED THAT THE LINE NUMBER WAS MNB69801, WHICH IS INCORRECT
AND SHOULD INSTEAD BE MNB72701.
SUPPLEMENTAL/FINAL REPORT TOTAL COST OF REPAIRS ESTIMATES INCLUDING GAS LOSS HAVE BEEN UPDATED THE ROOT
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