{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co, 2008-08-25","title":"Failure Report- Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co 8/25/08","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2010-10-25","effective_on":"2008-08-25","summary":"Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co; Gas Transmission; MO; failure 2008-08-25; apparent cause: Corrosion External.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-panhandle-eastern-pipeline-co-82508.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-panhandle-eastern-pipeline-co-82508.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-panhandle-eastern-pipeline-co-82508","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-panhandle-eastern-pipeline-co-82508","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nPipeline System: Houstonia 200 Line Pipeline Failure Investigation Report\nOperator: Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company, LP\nLocation: Mile Post 21.6 Medium Released: Natural gas Date of Occurrence: 8/25/2008\nQuantity: 13,518,578 CF\nPHMSA Arrival Time & Date: 8/25/08 1:00 p.m. Total Damages $ 1,046,359\nInvestigation Responsibility: State PHMSA NTSB Other\nCompany Reported Apparent Cause: Corrosion Excavation\nNatural Forces Incorrect Operation Other Outside Force Damage\nMaterial and/or Welds Equipment and Operations Other\nRupture Yes No\nLeak Yes No\nFire Yes No\nExplosion Yes No\nEvacuation Yes No Number of Persons Area\nNarrative Summary\nShort summary of the Incident/Accident which will give interested persons sufficient information to make them aware of the basic scenario and\nfacts.\nPanhandle Eastern Pipeline Company (PEPL) experienced failure of the Houstonia 200 line near Mile Post 21.6. There were no\nevacuations, road closings, fires, injuries or fatalities as a result of the failure. The failure did not occur in a high consequence\narea (HCA).\nThe failure occurred on August 25, 2008, at approximately 8:51 a.m. CDT. The failure is located on a rocky hillside in a rural\narea west of Pilot Grove, Missouri in Cooper County. The failure was identified by PEPL when Houston Gas Control detected a\npressure drop in the Houstonia 200 Line. The failure was located at approximately 9:00 a.m. when a PEPL field technician\nreported gas blowing near Mile Post 21.6. PEPL isolated the segment at approximately 9:30 a.m., by manually closing mainline\nvalves 2 Gate and 3 Gate. The distance between 2 Gate and 3 Gate is approximately 16 miles.\nThe pipeline experienced a longitudinal rupture in the pipe body. The rupture created a 50 feet by 33 ft by 7 feet deep crater in\nthe ground. Two pipeline segments totalling 28 feet in length and a coupling were ejected from the crater a distance up to 300\nfeet from the rupture site. The failure origin was a 16 inch long area of reduced wall thickness located at the 6:00 orientation.\nThe portion of the pipeline containing the failure is comprised of 24-inch diameter by 0.281-inch wall thickness, API 5L-X48,\nmanufactured by A.O. Smith and contains a longitudinal electric flash welded (EFW) seam. The reported maximum allowable\noperating pressure (MAOP) is 800 psig, which corresponds to 71% of the specified minimum yield strength (SMYS). The\npressure at the time and location of failure was 795 psig, which corresponds to 70% of the SMYS (99% of MAOP). The MAOP\nwas established in accordance with 192.619 ( c ), the highest actual operating pressure to which the segment was subjected during\nthe five years preceding July 1, 1970. A hydrostatic test of the pipeline was performed in 1955. Details of the hydrostatic test are\nunknown.\nThe pipeline, installed in 1937, is joined by circumferential girth welds and Dresser couplings. The pipeline external coating is\ncoal tar. The pipeline has an impressed curent cathodic protection system that was reportedly energized in 1955.\nThe findings of PEPL's investigation are as follows:\n1) The failure occurred due to tensile overload at a region of wall thinning caused by external corrosion.\n2) The maximum wall loss measured at the rupture surface was 0.21 inches depth (75% of wall thickness).\n- 1 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nPEPL submitted a return to service plan to PHMSA that included a temporary 20% pressure reduction and remediation of\nanomalies found in a high resoultion MFL tool run. They subsequently remediated 30 anomalies with RPR less than 1.15 and\nreplaced 912 feet of pipe. On 12/19/2009 the temporary pressure restriction was removed.\nACTIVITY #: 122653\nOPERATOR ID #: 15105\nUNIT ID #: 4093\nNRC REPORT #: 881717\nINCIDENT REPORT # (FORM 7100.2): 20090030 -- 5319\nRegion/State __Central\n_______________________ Reviewed by: __David Barrett\n__original initialed\n_______\nPrincipal Investigator: _Roger Sneegas________ Title: __Director – Central Region___________________\nDate: _10/12/2010\n________________________ Date: __10/13/2010\n_________________________\n- 2 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nFailure Location & Response\nLocation (City, Township, Range, County/Parish): Pilot Grove, Missouri\n(Acquire Map)\nAddress or M.P. on Pipeline: 21.6 (1) Type of Area (Rural, City): Rural\n(1)\nDate: 8/25/2008 Time of Failure: 8:51 a.m.\nTime Detected: 9:00 a.m. Time Located: 9:10 a.m.\nHow Located: A technician - Jerry Miller - heard the pipeline blowing from the nearest road at about 9:00 a.m. Gas control\nhad previously noted a pressure drop at 8:51 a.m.\nNRC Report #: 881717 (Attach Report) Time Reported to NRC: 10:15 a.m. on 8/25/2008 Type of Pipeline:\nReported by:\nLiz Rutherford\nGas Distribution Gas Transmission Hazardous Liquid LNG\nLP Interstate Gas Interstate Liquid LNG Facility\nMunicipal Intrastate Gas Intrastate Liquid\nPublic Utility Jurisdictional Gas Gathering Offshore Liquid\nMaster Meter Offshore Gas Jurisdictional Liquid Gathering\nOffshore Gas - High H2S CO2\nPipeline Configuration (Regulator Station, Pump Station, Pipeline, etc.):\nMainline Houstonia 200\nOperator/Owner Information\nOwner: Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Address: 5444 Westheimer Road\nHouston TX\nCompany Official: Eric Amundsen Phone No.: 713-989-7460 Fax No.: Operator: Panhandle Eastern Pipeline\nAddress:\n5444 Westheimer Road\nHouston TX\nCompany Official: Eric Amundsen\nPhone No. 713-989-7460 Fax No.\nDrug and Alcohol Testing Program Contacts Drug Program Contact & Phone: Brett Laaser\nAlcohol Program Contact & Phone: 713-989-7549\nN/A\nDamages\nProduct/Gas Loss or Spill(2) 13,518,578 CF Estimated Property Damage $ 25,000\nAmount Recovered 0 Associated Damages(3) $ 628,063\n1 Photo documentation\n2 Initial volume lost or spilled\n3 Including cleanup cost\n- 3 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nDamages\nEstimated Amount $ 393,296\nDescription of Property Damage:\nThe failure caused a crater in the right-of-way measuring about 50 X 33 feet and 7 feet deep. Two segments of pipe (46 feet\ntotal) were ejected from the crater.\nCustomers out of Service: Yes No Number:\nSuppliers out of Service: Yes No Number:\nFatalities and Injuries\nFatalities: Yes No Company: Contractor: Public:\nInjuries - Hospitalization: Yes No Company: Contractor: Public:\nInjuries - Non-Hospitalization: Yes No Company: Contractor: Public:\nTotal Injuries (including Non-Hospitalization): Company: Contractor: Public:\nName Job Function Yrs w/\nComp.\nYrs.\nExp.\nType of Injury\nDrug/Alcohol Testing N/A\nWere all employees that could have contributed to the incident, post-accident tested within the 2 hour time frame for alcohol or\nthe 32 hour time frame for all other drugs?\nYes No\nResults\nJob Function Test Date & Time Location\nType of Drug\nPos Neg\nGas System Controller 8/25/2008 Houston TX\n- 4 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nSystem Description\nDescribe the Operator's System:\nThe Houstonia 200 line runs from Liberal KS to Howell MI. It is 24-inch diameter 0.281-inch wall X48 pipe installed in 1937.\nPipe Failure Description N/A\nLength of Failure (inches, feet, miles): 46 feet (1)\nPosition (Top, Bottom, include position on pipe, 6 O'clock): Bottom 6 O'clock (1)\n Description of Failure (Corrosion Gouge, Seam Split): (1)\nExternal corrosion.\nLaboratory Analysis: Yes No\nPerformed by: CC Technologies Inc.\nPreservation of Failed Section or Component: Yes No\nIf Yes - Method: Wrapped\nIn Custody of: Panhandle\nDevelop a sketch of the area including distances from roads, houses, stress inducing factors, pipe configurations, etc. Bar Hole\nTest Survey Plot should be outlined with concentrations at test points. Direction of Flow.\nComponent Failure Description N/A\nComponent Failed: (1)\nManufacturer: Model:\nPressure Rating: Size\nOther (Breakout Tank, Underground Storage):\nPipe Data N/A\nMaterial: steel Wall Thickness/SDR: 0.281- inch\nDiameter (O.D.): 24-inch Installation Date: 1937\nSMYS: 48,000 Manufacturer: A. O. Smith\nLongitudinal Seam: Electric Flash Weld Type of Coating: Coal Tar\nPipe Specifications (API 5L, ASTM A53, etc.): API 5L, X48\nJoining N/A\nType: Girth weld with Coupling every other joint Procedure:\nNDT Method: Unknown Inspected: Yes No\n- 5 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nPressure @ Time of Failure @ Failure Site N/A\nPressure @ Failure Site: 795 psig at the Houstonia Station Elevation @ Failure Site: 660\nPressure Readings @ Various Locations: Direction from Failure Site\nLocation/M.P./Station # Pressure (psig) Elevation (ft msl) Upstream Downstream\nN/A\nUpstream Pump Station Data N/A\nType of Product: API Gravity:\nSpecific Gravity: Flow Rate:\nPressure @ Time of Failure (4) Distance to Failure Site:\nHigh Pressure Set Point: Low Pressure Set Point:\nUpstream Compressor Station Data N/A\nSpecific Gravity: .55 Flow Rate:\nPressure @ Time of Failure (4) 795 psig Distance to Failure Site: 21.6 miles\nHigh Pressure Set Point: 830 psig Low Pressure Set Point:\nOperating Pressure N/A\nMax. Allowable Operating Pressure: 800 psig Determination of MAOP: 192.619 (c)\nActual Operating Pressure: 795 psig\nMethod of Over Pressure Protection: Engine safeties - first engine speed and torque, then shutdown.\nRelief Valve Set Point: 830 psig Capacity Adequate? Yes No\nIntegrity Test After Failure N/A\nPressure Test Conducted in place? (Conducted on Failed Components or Associated Piping): Yes No\nIf NO, Tested after removal? Yes No\nMethod: N/A\nDescribe any failures during the test.\nSoil/water Conditions @ Failure Site N/A\nCondition of and Type of Soil around Failure Site (Color, Wet, Dry, Frost Depth): Dry and very rocky\nType of Backfill (Size and Description): Rock\n4 Obtain event logs and pressure recording charts\n- 6 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nSoil/water Conditions @ Failure Site N/A\nType of Water (Salt, Brackish): N/A Water Analysis (5) Yes No\nExternal Pipe or Component Examination N/A\nExternal Corrosion? Yes No (1) Coating Condition (Disbonded, Non-existent):\nCoal tar - some disbonded\n(1)\nDescription of Corrosion:\nThe failed pipeline segments showed multiple areas of external corrosion with reduced wall thickness.\nDescription of Failure Surface (Gouges, Arc Burns, Wrinkle Bends, Cracks, Stress Cracks, Chevrons, Fracture Mode, Point of\nOrigin):\nA 23 foot section of pipe was ejected and completely ruptured by the failure. Chevrons along the rupture pointed toward the\norigin in an area of external corrosion with reduced wall thickness.\nAbove Ground: Yes No (1) Buried: Yes No (1)\nStress Inducing Factors: (1) Depth of Cover: 6 feet (1)\nCathodic Protection N/A\nP/S (Surface): Readings taken this Spring were adequate - > .85\nV - Recent reading in the area -2.1 V 3/26/08\nP/S (Interface): Not taken\nSoil Resistivity: No soil - rock pH: Date of Installation: 1955\nMethod of Protection: Rectifiers\nDid the Operator have knowledge of Corrosion before the Incident? Yes No\nHow Discovered? (Close Interval Survey, Instrumented Pig, Annual Survey, Rectifier Readings, ECDA, etc): A close interval\nsurvey was performed in 2000 from 2 Gate to 3 Gate. Some areas of low pipe to soil potential were found but not in the\narea of the failure. See Appendix D.\nInternal Pipe or Component Examination N/A\nInternal Corrosion: Yes No (1) Injected Inhibitors: Yes No\nType of Inhibitors: N/A Testing: Yes No\nResults (Coupon Test, Corrosion Resistance Probe): N/A\nDescription of Failure Surface (MIC, Pitting, Wall Thinning, Chevrons, Fracture Mode, Point of Origin):\nThe cause of the failure was external corrosion with reduced wall thickness.\nCleaning Pig Program: Yes No Gas and/or Liquid Analysis: Yes No\n5 Attach copy of water analysis report\n- 7 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nInternal Pipe or Component Examination N/A\nResults of Gas and/or Liquid Analysis (6) N/A\nInternal Inspection Survey: Yes No Results (7) ILI had been scheduled but not done.\nDid the Operator have knowledge of Corrosion before the Incident? Yes No\nHow Discovered? (Instrumented Pig, Coupon Testing, ICDA, etc.): N/A\nOutside Force Damage N/A\nResponsible Party: Telephone No.:\nAddress:\nWork Being Performed:\nEquipment Involved: (1) Called One Call System? Yes No\nOne Call Name: One Call Report # (8)\nNotice Date: Time:\nResponse Date: Time:\nDetails of Response:\nWas Location Marked According to Procedures? Yes No\nPipeline Marking Type: (1) Location: (1)\nState Law Damage Prevention Program Followed? Yes No No State Law\nNotice Required: Yes No Response Required: Yes No\nWas Operator Member of State One Call? Yes No Was Operator on Site? Yes No\nDid a deficiency in the Public Awareness Program contribute to the accident? Yes No\nIs OSHA Notification Required? Yes No\n6 Attach copy of gas and/or liquid analysis report\n7 Attach copy of internal inspection survey report\n8 Attach copy of one-call report\n- 8 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nNatural Forces N/A\nDescription (Earthquake, Tornado, Flooding, Erosion):\nFailure Isolation N/A\nSqueeze Off/Stopple Location and Method:\nPanhandle isolated the failure by manually closing 2 Gate and 3 Gate.\n(1)\nValve Closed - Upstream: 2 Gate Time: 9:38 AM I.D.:\nM.P.: 12.97\nValve Closed - Downstream: 3 Gate Time: 9:23 I.D.:\nM.P.: 28.43\nPipeline Shutdown Method: Manual Automatic SCADA Controller ESD\nFailed Section Bypassed or Isolated: Isolated\nPerformed By: Field Tech. Valve Spacing: 16 miles\nOdorization N/A\nGas Odorized: Yes No Concentration of Odorant (Post Incident at Failure Site):\nMethod of Determination: Yes No % LEL: Yes No % Gas In Air: Yes No\nTime Taken: Yes No\nWas Odorizer Working Prior to the Incident? Type of Odorizer (Wick, By-Pass):\nYes No\nOdorant Manufacturer: Model:\nType of Odorant:\nAmount Injected: Monitoring Interval (Weekly):\nOdorization History (Leaks Complaints, Low Odorant Levels, Monitoring Locations, Distances from Failure Site):\n- 9 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nOdorization N/A\nWeather Conditions N/A\nTemperature: 85 F Wind (Direction & Speed): light\nClimate (Snow, Rain): Sunny Humidity:\nWas Incident preceded by a rapid weather change? Yes No\nWeather Conditions Prior to Incident (Cloud Cover, Ceiling Heights, Snow, Rain, Fog):\nClear\nGas Migration Survey N/A\nBar Hole Test of Area: Yes No Equipment Used:\nMethod of Survey (Foundations, Curbs, Manholes, Driveways, Mains, Services) (9) (1)\nEnvironment Sensitivity Impact N/A\nLocation (Nearest Rivers, Body of Water, Marshlands, Wildlife Refuge, City Water Supplies that could be or were affected\nby the medium loss):\n(1)\nOPA Contingency Plan Available? Yes No Followed? Yes No\nClass Location/High Consequence Area N/A\nClass Location: 1 2 3 4\nDetermination:\nHCA Area? Yes No N/A\nDetermination:\nOdorization Required? Yes No N/A\nPressure Test History N/A\n(Expand List as Necessary)\n9 Plot on site description page\n- 10 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nPressure Test History N/A\n(Expand List as Necessary)\nReq’d (10)Assessment\nDeadline Date Test Date Test Medium Pressure\n(psig)\nDuration\n(hrs) % SMYS\nInstallation N/A\nNext N/A 1955 Water Unknown Unknown Unknown\nNext\nMost Recent\nDescribe any problems experienced during the pressure tests.\nHydrostatic test done in 1955 - details unknown.\nInternal Line Inspection/Other Assessment History N/A\n(Expand List as Necessary)\nReq’d (10) Assessment\nDeadline Date\nAssessment\nDate\nType of ILI\nTool (11)\nOther Assessment\nMethod (12)\nIndicated Anomaly\nIf yes, describe below\nInitial 2012 Yes No\nNext Yes No\nNext Yes No\nMost Recent Yes No\nDescribe any previously indicated anomalies at the failed pipe, and any subsequent pipe inspections (anomaly digs) and remedial\nactions.\nNot scheduled until 2012. Not in top 50%. Gauge tool run already.\nPre-Failure Conditions and Actions N/A\nWas there a known pre-failure condition requiring (10) the operator to schedule evaluation and remediation?\nYes (describe below or on attachment) No\nIf there was such a known pre-failure condition, had the operator established and adhered to a required (10) evaluation and\nremediation schedule? Describe below or on attachment. Yes No N/A\nPrior to the failure, had the operator performed the required (10) actions to address the threats that are now known to be related to\nthe cause of this failure? Yes No N/A\nList below or on an attachment such operator-identified threats, and operator actions taken prior to the accident.\nDescribe any previously indicated anomalies at the failed pipe, and any subsequent pipe inspections (anomaly digs) and remedial\nactions.\nN/A\nMaps & Records N/A\n10 As required of Pipeline Integrity Management regulations in 49CFR Parts 192 and 195\n11 MFL, geometry, crack, etc.\n12 ECDA, ICDA, SCCDA, “other technology,” etc.\n- 11 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nAre Maps and Records Current? (13) Yes No\nComments:\nLeak Survey History N/A\nLeak Survey History (Trend Analysis, Leak Plots):\nLeak survey on 6/25/2007. No leaks were found in the area of the failure.\nPipeline Operation History N/A\nDescription (Repair or Leak Reports, Exposed Pipe Reports):\nN/A\nDid a Safety Related Condition Exist Prior to Failure? Yes No Reported? Yes No\nUnaccounted For Gas: None before the incident.\nOver & Short/Line Balance (24 hr., Weekly, Monthly/Trend):\nOperator/Contractor Error N/A\nName: Job Function:\nTitle: Years of Experience:\nTraining (Type of Training, Background):\nWas the person “Operator Qualified” as applicable to a precursor abnormal operating condition? Yes No N/A\nWas qualified individual suspended from performing covered task Yes No N/A\nType of Error (Inadvertent Operation of a Valve):\nProcedures that are required:\nActions that were taken:\nPre-Job Meeting (Construction, Maintenance, Blow Down, Purging, Isolation):\nPrevention of Accidental Ignition (Tag & Lock Out, Hot Weld Permit):\nProcedures conducted for Accidental Ignition:\nWas a Company Inspector on the Job? Yes No\nWas an Inspection conducted on this portion of the job? Yes No\n13 Obtain copies of maps and records\n- 12 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nOperator/Contractor Error N/A\nAdditional Actions (Contributing factors may include number of hours at work prior to failure or time of day work being\nconducted):\nTraining Procedures:\nOperation Procedures:\nController Activities:\nName Title Years\nExperience\nHours on Duty\nPrior to Failure Shift\nAlarm Parameters:\nHigh/Low Pressure Shutdown:\nFlow Rate:\nProcedures for Clearing Alarms:\nType of Alarm:\nCompany Response Procedures for Abnormal Operations:\nOver/Short Line Balance Procedures:\nFrequency of Over/Short Line Balance:\nAdditional Actions:\nAdditional Actions Taken by the Operator N/A\nMake notes regarding the emergency and Failure Investigation Procedures (Pressure reduction, Reinforced Squeeze Off, Clean\nUp, Use of Evacuators, Line Purging, closing Additional Valves, Double Block and Bleed, Continue Operating downstream\nPumps):\n- 13 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nAdditional Actions Taken by the Operator N/A\nThe failure was detected by Gas Control in Houston at 8:51 a.m. on 8/25/2008. Field crews located the failure at 9:10\na.m. The failure was isolated by closing valves at about 9:30 a.m.\nPanhandle sent a team to investigate the failure on 8/26/08. After the initial investigation, the pipeline was repaired and\nreturned to service at 80% of the pressure at the time of the incident (795 psi) pending the results of the investigation.\n- 14 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nPhoto Documentation (1)\nOverall Area from best possible view. Pictures from the four points of the compass. Failed Component, Operator Action, Damages in Area,\nAddress Markings, etc.\nPhoto\nNo.\nDescription Roll\nNo.\nPhoto\nNo.\nDescription\nRoll\nNo.\n1 View looking west at the crater 1\n2 East view of exposed pipe in crater 2\n3 West view of exposed pipe in crater 3\n4 View of longer ejected pipe segment 4\n5 Close view of longer segment 5\n6 View of shorter ejected segment 6\n7 Another view of shorter segment 7\n8 Possible failure origin on shorter segment 8\n9 Side view of possible failure. 9\n10 View of coupling ejected into the woods 10\n11 Close up of corrosion at possible failure\norigin. 11\n12 View of another area of external corrosion\nnear the failure origin 12\n13 View of failure origin after the pipe was\nmoved. 13\n14 14\n15 15\n16 16\n17 17\n18 18\n19 19\n20 20\n21 21\n22 22\n23 23\n24 24\n25 25\n26 26\n27 27\n28 28\n29 29\n30 30\nType of Camera:\n- 15 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nPhoto Documentation (1)\nFilm ASA:\nVideo Counter Log (Attach Copy):\nAdditional Information Sources\nAgency Name Title Phone Number\nPolice: Cooper County Sheriff\nFire Dept.: Pilot Grove Fire Dept\nState Fire Marshall:\nState Agency: Missouri DOT Emergency\nResponse Team\nNTSB:\nEPA:\nFBI:\nATF:\nOSHA:\nInsurance Co.:\nFRA:\nMMS:\nTelevision: No\nNewspaper:\nOther:\n- 16 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nPersons Interviewed\nName Title Phone Number\nBrad Howard Operations Specialist 660-568-1221\nMike Dawson\nSteve Atkinson Technical Specialist Jerry Rau Director Pipeline Integrity 913-906-1522\n713-989-7417\nRob Wesch\nLiz Rutherford\nBrian Kraft Measurement Tech\nDan Corpening Area Director\nRoss Cummins CP Tech\nRichard Gifford Corrosion Tech\nGerald Moore Environmental Coordinator\n- 17 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nEvent Log\nSequence of events prior, during, and after the incident by time. (Consider the events of all parties involved in the incident, Fire Department and\nPolice reports, Operator Logs and other government agencies.)\nTime Event\n8:51 a.m. 8/25/08 Gas Control detects a pressure drop on the Houstonia 200 line and asks field techs to check for a leak.\n9:00 a.m. Filed techs hear blowing gas near mile post 21.6\n9:10 a.m. Field techs locate the failure\n9:23 a.m. 3 Gate at MP 28.43 is closed manually\n9:38 a.m. 2 Gate at MP 12.97 is closed manually\n9:00 -11:00 a.m. Panhandle, Fire and police check the area to see if evacuations are necessary\n1:00 p.m. PHMSA investigator arrives on site.\n1:00 - 8:00 p.m. Investigation by PHMSA and Panhandle\n12:00 p.m. 8/26 Panhandle investigation team from Houston arrives\n12:00 - 7:00 p.m. Investigation of the failure site by PHMSA and Panhandle.\n- 18 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nInvestigation Contact Log\nTime Date Name Description\n1:00\np.m.\n8/26/08 Brad Howard Operations Specialist\n1:30\np.m.\n8/26/08 Steve Atkinson Technical Specialist\n12:00\np.m.\n8/27/08 Jerry Rau Director Pipeline Integrity\n1:00\np.m.\n8/26-\n10/20\nBrad Howard Follow up on various issues\n10:00\na.m.\n9/26/08 David McQuilling Principal Engineer - conference call on cathodic protection\n10:00\na.m.\n9/26/08 Steve Atkinson Same conference call.\n- 19 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nFailure Investigation Documentation Log\nOperator: Unit #: CPF #: Date:\nAppendix Number Documentation Description\nDate FOIA\nReceived Yes No\nA Investigation Pictures 8/25/08 X\nB Panhandle Incident Report 9/18/08 X\nC Panhandle Laboratory Failure Analysis 10/29/08 X\nD Panhandle Close Interval Survey 9/18/08 X\n- 20 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nSite Description\nProvide a sketch of the area including distances from roads, houses, stress inducing factors, pipe configurations, etc. Bar Hole Test Survey Plot\nshould be outlined with concentrations at test points. Photos should be taken from all angles with each photo documented. Additional areas\nmay be needed in any area of this guideline.\nThe Failure location was about two miles northwest of Pilot Grove (Cooper County) Missouri near Highway HH.\nThe location was near milepost 21.6 on the Houstonia 200 line on a rocky hillside in a rural area. No structures were close to the\nfailure location. The following page shows a sketch of the location provided by Panhandle. The image below shows the Panhandle\nsystem map.\nPanhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, LP\nPanhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company operates a 6,500-mile\npipeline system with access to diverse supply sources and can\ndeliver 2.8 Bcf/d of natural gas to Midwest and East Coast\nmarkets. Tie-ins to Chicago, Dayton and Cincinnati have added\nto a Midwest customer base that includes some of the nation's\nlargest utility and industrial natural gas users. We lead the way\nin offering competitive rates and a constantly evolving array of\ncustomer-friendly service options.\nPanhandle Eastern provides:\n Access to diverse Midcontinent and Canadian supply\nsources and to major Midwest and Northeast markets.\n Access to 74 Bcf of storage facilities.\nTo request a receipt and delivery point map, please\ncontact Customer Service at 1-800-275-7375.\n- 21 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\n- 22 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nAppendix A\nHoustonia 200 failure Pictures – 8/25/08 near Pilot Grove MO.\n- 23 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\n8/25/08 – #1- views looking West at the crater caused by the Houstonia 200 failure.\n- 24 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\n8/25/08 #2 - East view of the exposed pipe.\n8/25/08 #3 -West close up.\n- 25 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 26>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\n8/25/08 #4 - One of two pipe sections ejected – the longer one – about 30 feet.\n8/25/08 #5 -Closer view of the longer ejected section.\n- 26 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 27>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\n8/25/08 #6 -View of the shorter section ejected – about 23 feet – ruptured full length.\n8/25/08 #7 -Another view of same looking north.\n- 27 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 28>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\n#8 - Areas with external corrosion and reduced wall thickness – possible failure origin.\n8/25/08 #9 -Side view of the failure origin site with reduced wall thickness.\n- 28 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 29>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\n8/25/08 #10 -View of coupling ejected from pipeline.\n8/25/08 #11 -Close up of external corrosion on the possible origin site.\n- 29 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 30>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\n8/25/08 #12 - Another area of external corrosion on the shorter section near the possible failure.\n8/26/08 #13 -Different view of the possible failure origin after the pipe was turned over.\n- 30 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 31>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nAppendix B\nPanhandle Incident Report\n- 31 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 32>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500,000 as provided in 49 USC 1678. Form Approved\nOMB No. 2137-0522\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nResearch and Special Programs\nAdministration\nINCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND\nGATHERING SYSTEMS\nReport Date\nNo.\n(DOT Use Only)\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the\ninformation requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you\ncan obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at http://ops.dot.gov .\nNearest street or road\nCity and County or Parrish\na.\nb.\nc.\nState and Zip Code\nd. Mile Post/Valve Station\ne. Survey Station No.\nf. Latitude: Longitude:\n(if not available, see instructions for how to provide specific location)\ng. Class location description\nOnshore: Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4\nOffshore: Class 1 (complete rest of this item)\nArea ___________________ Block # ___________\nState / / or Outer Continental Shelf\nh. Incident on Federal Land other than Outer Continental Shelf\nYes No\ni. Is pipeline Interstate Yes No\n4. Type of leak or rupture\nLeak: Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec. F5)\nPuncture, diameter (inches)\nRupture: Circumferential – Separation\nLongitudinal – Tear/Crack, length (inches)\nPropagation Length, total, both sides (feet)\nN/A\nOther:\nPART A – GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION\nOperator Name and Address\nOriginal Report Supplemental Report Final Report\na. Operator's 5-digit Identification Number (when known) / /\nb. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter Owner’s 5-digit Identification Number (when known) / /\nc. Name of Operator ______________________________ _______________________________________________________\nd. Operator street address ________________________________________________________________________________________\ne. Operator address _______________________\nCity, County or Parrish, State and Zip Code\n2. Time and date of the incident\n/ / / / / / / /\nhr. month day year\n3. Location of incident\n5. Consequences (check and complete all that apply)\na. Fatality Total number of people: / /\nEmployees: / / General Public: / /\nNon-employee Contractors: / /\nb. Injury requiring inpatient\nhospitalization Total number of people: / /\nEmployees: / / General Public: / /\nNon-employee Contractors: / /\nc. Property damage/loss (estimated) Total $\nGas loss $ Operator damage $\nPublic/private property damage $\nd. Release Occurred in a ‘High Consequence Area’\ne. Gas ignited – No explosion f. Explosion\ng. Evacuation (general public only) / / people\nReason for Evacuation:\nEmergency worker or public official ordered, precautionary\nThreat to the public Company policy\n6. Elapsed time until area was made safe:\n/ / hr. / / min.\n7. Telephone Report\n/ / / / / / / /\nNRC Report Number month day year\n8. a. Estimated pressure at point and time of incident:\nPSIG\nb. Max. allowable operating pressure (MAOP): PSIG\nc. MAOP established by 49 CFR section:\n192.619 (a)(1) 192. 619 (a)(2) 192. 619 (a)(3)\n192.619 (a)(4) 192. 619 (c)\nd. Did an overpressurization occur relating to the incident? Yes No\nPART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE\n(type or print) Preparer's Name and Title\nPreparer's E-mail Address Area Code and Telephone Number\nArea Code and Facsimile Number\nDate Area Code and Telephone Number\nAuthorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title\nForm RSPA F 7100.2 ( 01-2002 ) OPS Data Facsimile Page 1 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 33>>>\n\nPART C - ORIGIN OF THE INCIDENT\n1. Incident occurred on\nTransmission System\nGathering System\nTransmission Line of Distribution System\n2. Failure occurred on\nBody of pipe Pipe Seam\nJoint\nComponent\nOther:\n3. Material involved (pipe, fitting, or other component)\nSteel\nPlastic (If plastic, complete all items that apply in a-c)\nPlastic failure was: a.ductile b.brittle c.joint failure\nMaterial other than plastic or steel: _________\n4. Part of system involved in incident\nPipeline Regulator/Metering System\nCompressor Station Other:\n5. Year the pipe or component which failed was installed: / /\nPART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION (if applicable) 1. Nominal pipe size (NPS) / / in.\n2. Wall thickness / / in.\n3. Specification SMYS / /\n4. Seam type\n5. Valve type\n6. Pipe or valve manufactured by PART E – ENVIRONMENT\n1. Area of incident In open ditch\nUnder pavement Above ground\nUnder ground Under water\nInside/under building Other:\n2. Depth of cover: inches\nin year / /\nPART F – APPARENT CAUSE\nImportant: There are 25 numbered causes in this section. Check the box to the left of the primary\ncause of the incident. Check one circle in each of the supplemental items to the right of or below the\ncause you indicate. See the instructions for this form for guidance.\nF1 – CORROSION 1. External Corrosion\n2. Internal Corrosion\nIf either F1 (1) External Corrosion, or F1 (2) Internal Corrosion is checked, complete all subparts a – e.\na. Pipe Coating\nBare\nCoated\nb. Visual Examination\nc. Cause of Corrosion\nGalvanic Stray Current\nLocalized Pitting\nGeneral Corrosion\nImproper Cathodic Protection\nOther: ____________________\nMicrobiological\nStress Corrosion Cracking\nOther: ____________________\nd. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering incident?\nNo Yes, Year Protection Started: / /\ne. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion?\nNo Yes, How long prior to incident: / / years / / months\nF2 – NATURAL FORCES\n3. Earth Movement => Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other:\n4. Lightning\n5. Heavy Rains/Floods => Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other:\n6. Temperature => Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other:\n7. High Winds\nF3 - EXCAVATION\n8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractors) / Not Third Party\n9. Third Party Excavation Damage (complete a-d)\na. Excavator group\nGeneral Public Government Excavator other than Operator/subcontractor\nb. Type: Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer Phone/Cable Landowner Railroad\nOther:\nc. Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity?\nNo Yes: Date received: / / mo. / / day / / yr.\nNotification received from: One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner\nd. Was pipeline marked?\nNo Yes (If Yes, check applicable items i – iv)\ni. Temporary markings: Flags Stakes Paint\nii. Permanent markings: Yes No\niii. Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate\niv. Were marks made within required time? Yes No\nF4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE\n10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure => Fire/Explosion cause: Man made Natural\n11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe\n12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe\n13. Vandalism\nForm RSPA F 7100.2 ( 01-2002 ) Page 2 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 34>>>\n\nF5 – MATERIAL AND WELDS\nMaterial\n14. Body of Pipe => Dent Gouge Wrinkle Bend Arc Burn Other:\n15. Component => Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other:\n16. Joint => Gasket O-Ring Threads Other:\nWeld\n17. Butt => Pipe Fabrication Other:\n18. Fillet => Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other:\n19. Pipe Seam => LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld\nHF ERW SAW Spiral Other:\nComplete a-g if you indicate any cause in part F5.\na. Type of failure:\nConstruction Defect => Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures\nMaterial Defect\nb. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site? Yes No\nc. Was part which leaked pressure tested before incident occurred? Yes, complete d-g No\nd. Date of test: / / mo. / / day / / yr.\ne. Test medium: Water Natural Gas Inert Gas Other:\nf. Time held at test pressure: / / hr.\ng. Estimated test pressure at point of incident: PSIG\nF6 – EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS\n20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment => Valve Instrumentation Pressure Regulator Other:\n21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling => Nipples Valve Threads Mechanical Couplings Other:\n22. Ruptured or Leaking Seal/Pump Packing\n23. Incorrect Operation\na. Type: Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other:\nb. Number of employees involved who failed post-incident drug test: / / Alcohol test: / /\nc. Were most senior employee(s) involved qualified? Yes No d. Hours on duty: / /\nF7 – OTHER\n24. Miscellaneous, describe:\n25. Unknown\nInvestigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete)\nPART G – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)\nForm RSPA F 7100.2 ( 01-2002 ) OPS Data Facsimile Page 3 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 35>>>\n\nPipeline Failure Investigation Report\nAppendix C\nPanhandle Failure Analysis\n- 32 -\nForm 11 Pipeline Failure Investigation Report (Revised 03/07/08)\n\n<<<PAGE 36>>>\n\nMetallurgical Analysis of 24-Inch Houstonia\n200 Service Failure at MP 21.6 (8/25/08)\nPanhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, LP\nFinal Report – 813 8385 1\nOctober 29, 2008\n.\n\n<<<PAGE 37>>>\n\nCC TECHNOLOGIES, INC.\nMetallurgical Analysis of 24-Inch Houstonia\n200 Service Failure at MP 21.6 (8/25/08)\nfor\nPanhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, L.P.\n5444 Westheimer, Suite 432\nHouston, TX 77056\n5777 Frantz Road\nDublin, Ohio 43017-1386\nU.S.A.\nTel: (614) 761-1214\nFax: (614) 761-1633\nwww.dnv.com\nwww.cctechnologies.com\nSummary: Final Report\nPrepared by: Gregory T. Quickel, M.S.\nStaff Engineer\nReviewed by: John Beavers, Ph.D., FNACE .\nDirector – Failure Analysis\nApproved by: Patrick H. Vieth\nSenior VP – Integrity & Materials\nDate of Issue: October 29, 2008\nProject Number: 813 8385 1\nNo distribution without permission from the client or responsible organizational unit (however, free\ndistribution for internal use within DNV after 3 years)\nNo distribution without permission from the client or responsible organizational unit\nStrictly confidential\nUnrestricted distribution\nAll copyrights reserved CC Technologies, Inc. This publication, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced or\ntransmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying or recording, without the prior written consent of\nCC Technologies, Inc.\nReference to part of this report, which may lead to misinterpretation, is not permissible.\nQ:\\EAWUS813\\Anderson\\2008\\GREG QUICKEL\\PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE CO (813 8385 1) October 22\\Panhandle\nFinal Report (813 8385 1) (October 29).doc\n\n<<<PAGE 38>>>\n\nPage ii\nDisclaimer\nThis report documents work performed by CC Technologies, Inc. (CC Technologies) Dublin,\nOhio, for Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, L.P. (Panhandle) Houston, Texas. Neither\nCC Technologies nor any person acting on behalf of CC Technologies:\n• assumes any liability for consequences or damages resulting from the use, misuse, or\nreliance upon the information disclosed in this report.\n• makes any warranty or representations that the use of any information, apparatus,\nmethod, or process disclosed in this report may not infringe on privately-owned rights.\nCC TECHNOLOGIES, INC.\n\n<<<PAGE 39>>>\n\nPage iii\nExecutive Summary\nPanhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, L.P (Panhandle) retained CC Technologies, Inc.\n(CC Technologies) to perform a metallurgical analysis on a section of pipe from the 24-inch\ndiameter Houstonia 200 natural gas pipeline that failed during service. The failure occurred on\nAugust 25, 2008 near Pilot Grove (Cooper County), Missouri at milepost (MP) 21.6.\nThe portion of the pipeline containing the failure is comprised of 24-inch diameter by 0.281-inch\nwall thickness line pipe with an estimated yield strength (EYS) of 48.0 ksi that was\nmanufactured by A.O. Smith and contains an electric flash welded (EFW) ","truncated":true,"body_characters":89544}