{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, SFPP LP, 2010-03-16","title":"Failure Report- SFPP LP 3/16/10","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-04-20","effective_on":"2010-03-16","summary":"SFPP LP; Hazardous Liquid; CA; failure 2010-03-16; apparent cause: Corrosion Internal.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-sfpp-lp-31610.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-sfpp-lp-31610.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-sfpp-lp-31610","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-sfpp-lp-31610","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nWestern Region\nPrincipal Investigator Doug Allen, CA SFM\nSenior Accident Investigator Peter Katchmar\nRegion Director Chris Hoidal\nDate of Report 11/9/2010\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – SFPP LP Bleed Fitting Corrosion\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 3/16/2010\nCommodity Released Refined Products\nCity/County & State Sacramento, CA\nOpID & Operator Name 18092 SFPP, LP\nUnit # & Unit Name 33725 CSFM #1410F\nSMART Activity # 129735\nMilepost / Location 1111 Exposition Blvd, Sacramento, CA\nType of Failure Leak from Bleed Fitting due to Internal Corrosion\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nMixed use suburban area\nProperty Damage $480,000\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – SFPP Bleed Fitting Failure\n3/16/2010\nExecutive Summary\nOn March 16, 2010 at 1108 hours (PST), Kinder Morgan discovered a release on their LS20 pipeline\n(CSFM 0325) located at 1111 Exposition Blvd east of Building 601. By averaging the concentration of\nproduct in soil, Kinder Morgan estimated 5.12 barrels of transmix product was released and recovered.\nThere were no injuries associated with the release. A leaking ½ inch body bleed fitting on a check valve\nbypass valve was the source of the leak.\nSystem Details\nThe Kinder Morgan LS20 12” pipeline transports refined product 23 miles from the Kinder Morgan\nSacramento Station to the Kinder Morgan Rocklin Station. The maximum operating pressure for LS20 is\n1,434 psi. At the time of the incident, the line pressure at the American River North Check Valve was\n417 psi. LS20 is classified as an Interstate pipeline.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nKinder Morgan discovered the release on March 16, 2010 while Kinder Morgan employees were\npreparing to repair an access point to the check valve bypass on LS20. The bypass is located just\nupstream of the American River North Block Valve at MP 76.75. Kinder Morgan inspects each check\nvalve bypass on the LS20 pipeline twice each calendar year. During these inspections, they operate the\nbypass valves to flush any contaminates out of the bypass line. Additionally, they test for indications of\nhydrocarbons at the bypass valve access point using a portable vapor detector. The last inspection of\nthis valve was on October 15, 2009 and while preparing for the April 2010 inspection Kinder Morgan\ndiscovered that sand and dirt had migrated in the access point preventing the inspection of the check\nvalve bypass. Jason Brothers, Kinder Morgan Right of Way Specialist, discovered product in the soil\nshortly after he arrived at the check valve to mark the pipeline at 1108 hours (PST). Kinder Morgan\nbegan shutting down the pipeline while an investigation was started. Mr. Brothers reported the\nincident to CalEMA at 1122 hours (PST) on A 16, 2010.\nAt the time of the accident, the Kinder Morgan Concord Station pumps were providing pressure to LS20.\nThese pumps were shutdown at 1116 hours (PST) on March 16, 2009. Kinder Morgan isolated the\nrelease site by closing the Sacramento MOV-4 (MP 70.12) at 1118 hours (PST), the American River South\nBlock Valve (MP 75.32) at 1206 hours (PST), and the American River North Block Valve (MP 76.75) at\n1208 hours (PST).\nEmergency Response\nKinder Morgan excavated around both the American River North Block Valve and the American River\nNorth Check Valve attempting to locate the source. As a vacuum truck drained the pipe section, a small\namount of product was seen dripping from a fitting on the Check Valve Bypass Valve. Further\nexcavation revealed a trail of product approximately 30 feet upstream of the Check Valve. There is a 1\npercent grade from the Check Valve to the end of the contaminated soil indicating a possible additional\nleak source. Kinder Morgan was unable to determine that the fitting was the only leak source. Because\nthey could not rule out the 30-foot section of line pipe, Kinder Morgan decided to remove a 41’ 3”\nsection of pipe that included the check valve, the bypass, and the pipe over the contaminated soil.\nKinder Morgan transported the removed pipe in two sections to their Rocklin Station.\nPage 2 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – SFPP Bleed Fitting Failure\n3/16/2010\nSummary of initial start-up plan and return-to-service, including preliminary safety\nmeasures\nAt 1800 hours (PST) on March 17, 2010, Kinder Morgan removed the pipe section. In its place, a straight\n12.75”, X60, 0.0250” pipe was installed. Before they installed this straight pipe section, Kinder Morgan\nengineers determined that LS20 was able to operate safety without the American River North Check\nValve in place. The new pipe had the CSFM hydrostatic test id #02-175 stenciled on the side. ARB\nContractors, Scott Rogers and Sam Wegner, welded the pipe section in place. Both welders were\ncertified on November 4, 2009 and had current operator qualifications. The weld successfully passed\nthe NDT (xray) examination at 2240 hours (PST).\nThe startup procedure included a stand up pressure test for 30 minutes. The pipe was pressured to 400\npsi at the Kinder Morgan Rocklin Station and was monitored at the release site and at the Kinder\nMorgan Orange Control Center. Kinder Morgan then conducted a running pressure test for an\nadditional 30 minutes. They held 300 psi at the Kinder Morgan Rocklin Station while monitoring the\nline. The line successfully passed the stand up pressure test and the running pressure test. LS20 was\nreturned to service at 0116 hours (PST) on March 18. I returned to the release site on March 18-19 to\nobserve the coating of the new pipe section. The pipe coating material was Denso-Protal, an epoxy\ncoating that was brush applied.\nInvestigation Findings & Contributing Factors\nKinder Morgan had Jose R. Rodriguez from the Mistras Group perform an examination on the removed\nsection of pipe from LS20 at the Rocklin Station on June 1-4, 2010. He assessed the coating and\nconducted an NDT examination prior to the hydrostatic test. The pipeline had a FBE coating that was\nwrapped with Polyken tape. The tape was well bonded and the only damage to the existing FBE coating\nwas attributed to the removal and transportation of the pipe. The NDT included magnet particle testing\nand ultrasonic examinations. Kinder Morgan contractor, ARB, sandblasted the pipeline and check valve\nwith a sand and walnut hull mix in preparation for a magnetic particle inspection. Prior to the\nexamination, Kinder Morgan reviewed the raw ILI data and found three areas that they wanted to\nreview during the examination. The examination found these areas to be small flat spots on the pipe.\nKinder Morgan believes they may be grind marks from the factory. A negligible amount of wall loss was\nfound in these areas but did not contribute to the release. No indications of cracks or corrosion were\nfound on the pipe, the check valve, or the check valve bypass. The hydrostatic test was performed on\nJune 3, 2010 by ARB. A drip developed on a ½ inch fitting on the 4” check valve bypass valve as the pipe\nsection was pressured to 83 psi. Kinder Morgan continued to pressure the pipe to 651 psi searching for\nadditional leak sources; however, no other leaks were found.\nThe March 16, 2010 release on the LS20 pipeline originated from a ½-inch body bleed fitting on a 4-inch\ncheck valve bypass valve. The release was caused by corrosion in the body bleed fitting. Residual water\nmay have been trapped in the fitting assembly initiating the corrosion. Kinder Morgan was unable to\ndetermine the source of the water.\nAppendices\nPhotographs\nNRC Report\nOperator Accident Written Report\nPage 3 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nRemoving 41' section of pipe\nSave\n03/17/2010\nPhotol by: D. Allen\n03/17/2010\nPhoto2 by: D. Allen\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nNew 41' section of pipe\nRhoto3 birD\n03/17/2010\nCoating new 41' section\n03/19/2010\nPhoto4 by: D. Allen.\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nvalve - after NDT and Hydrostatic test\nAmerican River North check valve and bypass\n1/2\" body bleed fitting\n(leak source)\nPhoto5 by: D. Allen\n06/04/2010\ndurin hydostatic test\nDrip developed here\n06/04/2010\nPhoto6 by: D. Allen\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nPage 1 of 2\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 934156\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 14:29 on 16-MAR-10\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: UNKNOWN\nAffected Area:\nThe incident was discovered on 16-MAR-10 at 11:10 local time.\nAffected Medium: SUBSURFACE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nXX\nType of Organization: UNKNOWN\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\n1111 EXPOSITION BLVD County: SACRAMENTO\nNEAR BUILDING 601\nCity: SACRAMENTO State: CA\n150 FT FROM ADDRESS LISTED BELOW\n____________________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: GAS Official Material Name: GASOLINE: AUTOMOTIVE (UNLEADED)\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\nCHRIS Code: ODS Official Material Name: OIL: DIESEL\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nWHILE DIGGING A CHECK VALVE ON A PIPELINE, A GAS / DIESEL MIXTURE WAS OBSERVED IN\nTHE SOIL. THE CAUSE HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: OTHER\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: ABOVE\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDAMAGES\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nLength of Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure\nAir: N\nRoad: N Major\nArtery: N\nWaterway: N\nhttp://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard\nweb+inc\n_\n_\nseq=934156\n4/11/2011\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nPage 2 of 2\nTrack: N\nPassengers Transferred: NO\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nCLEAN UP TBD\nRelease Secured: UNKNOWN\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: CLEAR, ºF\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: FEMA\nState/Local: NONE\nState/Local On Scene: NONE\nState Agency Number: NONE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nCA U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE NORTH (MAIN OFFICE)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nUSCG ICC (ICC ONI)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nCONTRA COSTA OFC OF SHERIFF (HOMELAND SECURITY UNIT)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nU.S. EPA IX (MAIN OFFICE)\n16-MAR-10 14:37\nU.S. EPA IX (SECONDARY)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nFEMA REGION 09 (SITUATION AWARENESS UNIT)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nNOAA RPTS FOR CA (MAIN OFFICE)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nPIPELINE & HAZMAT SAFETY ADMIN (OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (AUTO))\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nCA STATE EMERGENCY SERVICES (MAIN OFFICE)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nSTATE TERRORISM & THREAT ASSESS CTR (COMMAND CENTER SACRAMENTO)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\nCITY OF YUMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (COMMAND CENTER)\n16-MAR-10 14:35\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nNO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.\n___________________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 934156 ***\nhttp://www.nrc.uscg.mil/reports/rwservlet?standard\nweb+inc\n_\n_\nseq=934156\n4/11/2011\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 04/14/2010\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20100042 - 15676\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes Yes\nReport Status: Submitted\nCreate Date: 03/11/2011\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 18092\n2. Name of Operator SFPP, LP\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 500 DALLAS STREET\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code 77002\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 03/16/2010 11:10\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 38.5997\nLongitude: -121.4483\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 934156\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 03/16/2010 11:25\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nRefined and/or Petroleum Product (non-HVL) which is a\nLiquid at Ambient Conditions\n- Specify Commodity Subtype: Mixture of Refined Products (transmix or other mixture)\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 48.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 5.12\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\nPage 1 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown: 03/16/2010 11:16\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: 03/18/2010 01:16\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 03/16/2010 11:10\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 03/16/2010 11:10\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: California\n3. Zip Code: 95815\n4. City Sacramento\n5. County or Parish Sacramento\n6. Operator-designated location: Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: 76.75\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: LS 20\n8. Segment name/ID: LS 20\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 60\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: Valve\nPage 2 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n- If Pipe, specify:\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n3d. Pipe specification:\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify: Auxiliary or Other Valve\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1987\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Leak\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type: Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: Yes\n4. Anticipated remediation: Yes\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil Yes\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nYes\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? Yes\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\nPage 3 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area: Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\nYes\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n8. Estimated cost to Operator :\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator $ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 490\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 60,000\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 70,000\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 299,510\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 50,000\nDescribe: Testing/Investigation for cause\n8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) $ 480,000\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 417.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): 1,440.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nYes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Remotely Controlled\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 7,550\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools? Yes\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\nPage 4 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nNo\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? No\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operating Personnel, including contractors\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\nOperator employee\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nThe performance of an informal investigation into the pre-\nexisting condition of the pipeline (i.e. pressure, flow, line\nbalance, etc.) was shown to provide no evidence of an\nexisting problem the Controller(s) should have identified.\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\nPage 5 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G1 - Corrosion Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub Cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination: Other\n- Other: Galvanic\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other: Yes\n- If Other, Describe: Galvanic\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other: Yes\n- If Other, Describe: Metallurgist's evaluation\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other: Yes\nPage 6 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n- If Other, Describe: Fitting\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? No\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? No\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\nPage 7 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\nPage 8 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\nPage 9 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n- If Electrical Arcing from Other Equipment or Facility:\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n- If Intentional Damage:\n8. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other Outside Force Damage:\n9. Describe:\nPage 10 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nG5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nUse this section to report material failu","truncated":true,"body_characters":49488}