{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, 2010-03-02","title":"Failure Report- Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline 3/2/10","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-02-15","effective_on":"2010-03-02","summary":"Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline; Gas Transmission; KS; failure 2010-03-02; apparent cause: Material Failure Weld.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-southern-star-central-gas-pipeline-3210-0.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-southern-star-central-gas-pipeline-3210-0.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-southern-star-central-gas-pipeline-3210-0","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-southern-star-central-gas-pipeline-3210-0","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nCentral Region\nPrincipal Investigator Roger Sneegas\nRegion Director David Barrett\nDate of Report 1/11/2012\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Southern Star Butt Weld Failure in KS\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 3/2/2010\nCommodity Released Natural Gas\nCity/County & State Abbyville/Reno, Kansas\nOpID & Operator Name 31711 Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline Co. Inc.\nUnit # & Unit Name 853 Lyons\nSMART Activity # 129328\nMilepost / Location Station 140 – 260+06, milepost 161, About 10 miles downstream of\nStafford Station.\nButt weld separated due to crack in weld and external forces\nType of Failure Fatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nProperty Damage $953,905\nClass 1 rural pasture land – wetland near a river\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Southern Star Butt Weld Failure in KS\nFailure Date 3/2/2010\nExecutive Summary\nAt approximately 4:20 am on March 2, 2010, a pipeline rupture resulted in an unintentional release of\nnatural gas from a Southern Star gas pipeline located in Reno County, KS. An estimated 91,089\nthousand cubic feet (Mcf) of natural gas was released from the pipeline. The incident occurred on the\npipeline right-of-way near milepost 161 in a wetland in a Class 1 Location. No fatalities or injuries\noccurred as a result of the incident and the gas did not ignite. The total cost of the incident is estimated\nat $953,905. Gas service was temporarily interrupted to the town of Partridge, Kansas until Southern\nStar could provide a temporary connection from another line. The 26-inch butt weld failure was caused\nby tensile overload in the presence of a large crack in the girth weld.\nSystem Details\nSouthern Star’s RA line is a 26-inch diameter natural gas loop pipeline that parallels the R Line for about\n26 miles southwest of Hesston, Kansas. The R Line moves natural gas from the Hugoton, Kansas gas\nproduction fields to Hesston, Kansas and eventually to the Kansas City area.\nAt the incident location, the pipeline is constructed of material having the characteristics of API 5L line\npipe. The specified minimum yield strength (SMYS), 60,000 psig, has been established by supplier\nreceipts. The pipeline was installed in 1968 and consists of new pipe manufactured by National Tube.\nThe pipe is 0.281-inch wall thickness, coated with coal tar enamel and glass felt and the longitudinal\nseam is double submerged arc welded (DSAW).\nThe pipeline maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) was established by hydrostatic test in\nconformance with 49CFR 192.619(a) (1) and (2) in 1968. The test pressure was 1,260 psig and Southern\nStar established an MAOP of 900 psig after considering the weakest component of the pipeline. A\nreview of Southern Star leak records identified no pipeline leaks on the RA Line in the last 5 years.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nOn the day of the failure, Southern Star was operating the pipeline at 833 psig, which corresponds to a\nhoop stress of 64.2% of SMYS.\nEmergency Response\nOn March 2, 2010 at 4:20 am, Southern Star gas control received a low pressure indication (100 psig\ndrop) on the R and RA line system. At 4:30 am the controller contacted field operations and asked them\nto check for any problems in the vicinity of Hesston Station. Although the failure was closer to the\nStafford Station, Southern Star has a field office at the Station in Hesston, so personnel were available to\nrespond. At 5:08 am a third party reported a pipeline leak to Reno County Kansas Emergency Services.\nSouthern Star employees were dispatched to the Incident site starting at 5:08 am. Reno County fire,\npolice and emergency services were already on site and starting evacuations. The Southern Star field\noffice immediately dispatched the District Manager who arrived on site at 6:06 am and confirmed the\nleak.\nThe affected section of pipeline was isolated by manually closing the upstream mainline valve (Langdon\nMLV) and the downstream mainline valve (RA Arkansas River MLV). Both valves were operated at about\n7:45 am. The 24 mile long pipeline segment was blown down to 0 psig by about 8:30 am.\nSothern Star notified the National Response Center (NRC) at 9:02 am (Appendix B).\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Southern Star Butt Weld Failure in KS\nFailure Date 3/2/2010\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nAfter the field investigation at the failure site was complete, replacement pipe was installed in the area\nwhere the Incident occurred. Gas service to the town of Partridge was provided through a crossover\nvalve from the R Line. This temporary system did not include a pressure regulating device, so Southern\nStar personnel manually operated the crossover valve to regulate the pressure to Partridge. Southern\nStar also hydrotested an isolated one-mile segment of the pipeline that included the failure location.\nSouthern Star presented a return to service plan for the RA line on April 20, 2010. As a part of the plan,\nthey engaged Kiefner and Associates to analyze 2008 magnetic flux leakage (MFL) in-line inspection (ILI)\nresults for the RA line. The analysis was intended to find correlations between crack features in the ILI\nresults and actual cracks in girth welds. After reviewing the ILI results, Southern Star excavated girth\nwelds to physically inspect for cracks. After several iterations Southern Star and Kiefner developed a\nprocess that accurately identified girth weld cracks about 50% of the time. The metallurgical analysis of\nthe failed weld determined that external forces were required, in addition to a crack, to cause failure of\nthe weld. The locations of ILI crack indications were prioritized based on the presence external stresses\nsuch as buoyant forces or soil subsidence. The indications in the higher priority areas were then\nexcavated and repaired. A geotechnical consultant was also engaged to identify the high risk areas.\nBased on the analysis and repairs on the RA line, PHMSA Central Region approved the return to service\nplan and the RA line was re-started on December 12, 2011. After re-start Southern Star also agreed to\ndo an instrumented leak survey and another ILI run with geospatial capability. The ILI run will then be\ncompared with a previous run to determine areas where the pipeline has moved enough to cause\nadditional stress on the welds.\nInvestigation Details\nOn March 3, 2010, PHMSA Central Region inspectors conducted an on-site investigation of the incident.\nIn situ visual inspection of the damaged pipe joint revealed a circumferential separation of a girth weld.\nThe pipe ends were horizontally separated by about 2 inches and vertically offset about 6 inches. The\npipeline longitudinal seams were located between 12:00 and 3:00. See pictures in Appendix A.\nAt the failure location, the pipeline lies in a wetland near the Ninnescaw River. Preceding the incident,\nthe weather had begun to warm and the snow at the site was starting to melt. However, subsequent\nexcavations showed that the ground was still frozen over the pipeline. At the time of the incident the\nwetland was dry at the surface. However the water table in the area was high enough that Southern\nStar needed to continually pump water out of the excavation. Pipeline anchors were noted in the area\nof the failure during the field investigation. Southern Star reported that screw anchors were at 30 foot\ncenters in the area of the failure; indicating that buoyant forces were considered during the pipeline\nconstruction. The soil in the area was sandy so stress from clay soil expansion was not a factor in the\nfailure. The Ninnescaw River is about 300 feet northeast of the failure site so soil subsidence on the\nriver bank is another possible contributing factor.\nSouthern Star removed a section of pipe containing the failed weld (#17330) near milepost 161. This\nsection of pipe was transported to Kiefner and Associates for metallurgical analysis (Appendix D). The\nanalysis concluded the failure originated in a hydrogen-assisted crack in the girth weld. The crack was\ncircumferentially oriented, 16.5 inches long, and centered at approximately the 9:00 position, and had a\nmaximum depth of about 71% of the pipe wall.\nSouthern Star also excavated and x-rayed 10 welds adjacent to the failure; 4 upstream and 6\ndownstream. Circumferential cracks were found in 8 of the 10 additional welds x-rayed. These cracks\nwere almost evenly distributed at every clock position except 9:00. In addition to the 10 welds in the\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Southern Star Butt Weld Failure in KS\nFailure Date 3/2/2010\nvicinity of the failure, Southern Star has excavated and x-rayed 22 other welds in the area. Of the 32\nwelds x-rayed, all were either cut out and replaced or repaired with a weld wrap.\nA high-resolution MFL tool was run on the pipeline in 2008. The tool indicated an 11% metal loss\nanomaly at the failed girth weld. The circumferential feature length was 1.5 inches. This indication did\nnot meet Southern Star’s repair criteria at the time.\nSouthern Star updated its incident report to PHMSA after the completion of the metallurgical analysis\n(Appendix C).\nInvestigation Findings & Contributing Factors\nThe Southern Star 26-inch diameter RA Line Incident was caused by tensile overload in the presence of a\nlarge crack in a girth weld. The crack initiated during construction in 1968. The metallurgical analysis\ncalculated that the longitudinal stress on the pipeline from temperature variations and line pressure was\nnot enough to cause the weld failure. The calculated failure stress on the weld indicated an additional\n10 ksi was required to cause the failure. The most likely source is additional bending stress from pipe\nbuoyancy in a rising water table. The screw anchors used in the area of the failure were apparently not\neffective in the wetland soil surrounding the pipeline.\nAppendices\nA Map and Photographs\nB NRC Report No. 932729\nC Incident Report 20100006\nD Kiefner Laboratory Analysis\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\n6” Vertical Offset\nAPPENDIX A Maps and Photographs\nPhoto number 1 of failure and site map March 4, 2010\nCrater\n26” “RA” Loop Line\nGirth Weld Failure,\nLooking North\n2” Longitudinal\nSeparation\n26” “R” Line\n26” “RA” Loop Line\n“RA” Loop Line Girth Weld Failure\nLocation\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nAppendix B NRC Report\nHMIS->INCiDENTs->TELEPhONiCs\n(Version 3.4.05 PROD ) Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu\n[Return to Search]\n1..1 of 1\nRescinded Comments (max 250 characters)\nNRC Number: 932729\nCall Date: 03/02/2010Call Time: 09:02:29\nCaller Information\nFirst Name: Last Name:\nCompany Name:\nAddress:\nCity: State:\nCountry: Zip:\nPhone 1: Phone 2:\nOrganization Type: Is caller the spiller? Yes No No Response\nConfidential: Yes No No Response\nDischarger Information\nFirst Name: Last Name:\nCompany Name:\nAddress:\nCity: State:\nCountry: Zip:\nPhone 1: Phone 2:\nOrganization Type:\nSpill Information\nState: County:\nNearest City: Zip Code:\nLocation\nSpill Date: (mm/dd/yyyy) Spill Time: (24hh:mm:ss)\nDTG Type: DISCOVERED\nIncident Type PIPELINE Reported Incident Type\nDescription\nPage 1 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nMaterials Involved\nAppendix B NRC Report\nMaterial / Chris Name Chris Code Total Qty. Water Qty.\nNATURAL GAS ONG 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\nMedium Type: AIR\nAdditional Medium Information:\nInjuries: Fatalites:\nEvacuations: Yes No Unknown No. of Evacuations:\nDamages: Yes No Unknown Damage Amount:\nFederal Agency Notified: Yes No Unknown State Agency Notified: Yes No Unknown\nOther Agency Notified: Yes No Unknown\nRemedial Actions\nAdditional Info\nLatitude\nDegrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant:\nLongitude\nDegrees: Minutes: Seconds: Quadrant:\nDistance from City: Direction:\nSection: Township:\nRange: Milepost:\nPage 2 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed 100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0522\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 03/26/2010\nNo. 20100006 - 15418\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n--------------------------------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nINCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND\nGATHERING PIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0522. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the\ncollection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect\nof this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline\nSafety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Yes Final:\nYes\nLast Revision Date: 01/10/2012\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 31711\n2. Name of Operator SOUTHERN STAR CENTRAL GAS PIPELINE, INC\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 4700 HIGHWAY 56; BOX 20010\n3b. City OWENSBORO\n3c. State Kentucky\n3d. Zip Code: 42301\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Incident: 03/02/2010 04:20\n5. Location of Incident:\nLatitude: 37.94216\nLongitude: -98.25881\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 932729\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 03/02/2010 08:00\n8. Incident resulted from: Unintentional release of gas\n9. Gas released: (select only one, based on predominant volume\nreleased) Natural Gas\n- Other Gas Released Name:\n10. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally - Thousand\nCubic Feet (MCF): 91,089.00\n11. Estimated volume of intentional and controlled release/blowdown -\nThousand Cubic Feet (MCF)\n12. Estimated volume of accompanying liquid release (Barrels):\n13. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n14. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n14a. Operator employees\n14b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n14c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n14d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n14e. General public\n14f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n15. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the incident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\nPage 1 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\n- If Yes, complete Questions 15a and 15b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n15a. Local time and date of shutdown 03/02/2010 08:00\n15b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) Yes\n16. Did the gas ignite? No\n17. Did the gas explode? No\n18. Number of general public evacuated: 20\n19. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n19a. Local time operator identified Incident 03/02/2010 04:20\n19b. Local time operator resources arrived on site 03/02/2010 06:03\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Incident onshore? Yes\n- Yes (Complete Questions 2-12)\n- No (Complete Questions 13-15)\nIf Onshore:\n2. State: Kansas\n3. Zip Code: 67510\n4. City Abbyville\n5. County or Parish Reno\n6. Operator designated location Survey Station No.\nSpecify: 140/26053\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Hugoton 26\" Loop\n8. Segment name/ID: RA\n9. Was Incident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Incident : Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Incident (as found) : Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\nOther – Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 40\n12. Did Incident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\nName of body of water (If commonly known):\nApprox. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\nSelect:\nIf Offshore:\n13. Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\n14. Origin of Incident:\n- If \"In State waters\":\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- If \"On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)\":\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Incident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: - Interstate - Intrastate Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Incident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n3. Item involved in Incident: Weld, including heat-affected zone\n- If Pipe – Specify:\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n3d. Pipe specification:\n3e. Pipe Seam – Specify:\nPage 2 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Incident – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone – Specify: Pipe Girth Weld\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve – Specify:\n- If Mainline – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Mainline valve manufacturer:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Year item involved in Incident was installed: 1968\n5. Material involved in Incident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Steel or Plastic – Specify:\n6. Type of Incident involved: Rupture\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nApprox. size: in. (in axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other – Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation: Circumferential\n- If Other – Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening):\nby in. (length circumferentially or axially): 81.6\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Class Location of Incident: Class 1 Location\n2. Did this Incident occur in a High Consequence Area (HCA)? No\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify the Method used to identify the HCA:\n3. What is the PIR (Potential Impact Radius) for the location of this\nIncident? Feet: 538\n4. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\ndue to heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n5. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\nNOT by heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n6. Were any of the fatalities or injuries reported for persons located\noutside the PIR? No\n7. Estimated cost to Operator :\n7a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator $ 0\n7b. Estimated cost of gas released unintentionally $ 313,880\n7c. Estimated cost of gas released during intentional and\ncontrolled blowdown $ 0\n7d. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 638,025\n7e. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 2,000\n7f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n7g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) $ 953,905\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Incident (psig): 833.00\n2. Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) at the point and\ntime of the Incident (psig): 900.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nIncident: Pressure did not exceed MAOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Incident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMAOP?\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 4a and 4b below)\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\nPage 3 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore Pipeline,\nIncluding Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question 2? Yes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. - 5f. below):\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source: Manual\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 128,139\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection\ntools? Yes\n- If No – Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting\ninstrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux\nleakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall build-up\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: Transmission System\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Incident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Incident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Incident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the\ndetection of the Incident?\nYes\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of\nthe Incident?\nYes\n7. How was the Incident initially identified for the Operator? Controller\n- If Other – Describe:\n7a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel, including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Ground Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 7, specify the following:\nOperator employee\n8. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nIncident?\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\n- If No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nThe incident was not identified as a controller failure\npossibility.\n- If Yes, Describe investigation result(s) (select all that apply):\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous\nhours of service (while working for the operator), and other\nfactors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the Operator)\nand other factors associated with fatigue\n- Provide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\nPage 4 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above –\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Describe how many were tested:\n1b. Describe how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Describe how many were tested:\n2b. Describe how many failed:\nPART G - APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in the shaded column on the left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Incident, and answer the\nquestions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing, or root causes of the Incident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub-cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes:\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at\nthe time of the incident?\n- If Yes, Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the\npoint of the incident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted\nat the point of the incident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n7. Cause of corrosion (select all that apply):\nPage 5 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply):\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Drop-out\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the gas/fluid treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n14. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point\nof the Incident?\n14a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year run:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year run:\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\n- Other\nMost recent year run:\nIf Other, Describe:\n15. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes,\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n16. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n17. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at\nthe point of the Incident since January 1, 2002?\n17a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year examined:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year examined:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year examined:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\nPage 6 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\n- Other\nMost recent year examined:\nIf Other, Describe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Incident generated in conjunction\nwith an extreme weather event?\n6a. If yes, specify: (select all that apply):\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage Due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (From Part C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Incident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nYear:\n- Ultrasonic\nYear:\n- Geometry\nYear:\n- Caliper\nYear:\n- Crack\nYear:\n- Hard Spot\nYear:\n- Combination Tool\nYear:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nYear:\n- Other:\nYear:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\nPage 7 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Incident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nYear:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nYear:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nYear:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nYear:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nYear:\n- Other\nYear:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from (select all that apply):\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred (select all that apply):\n- Public\n- If Public, Specify:\n- Private\n- If Private, Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator :\n10. Type of excavation equipment :\n11. Type of work performed :\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified? - Yes - No\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption: (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, then one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\n- Predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, Specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, Specify:\nPage 8 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, Specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, Explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Routine or Normal Fishing or Other Maritime Activity NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n- If Electrical Arcing from Other Equipment or Facility:\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Incident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year run:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year run:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year run:\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\n- Other:\nMost recent year run:\nDescribe:\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident :\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Incident since January 1, 2002?\n7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nPage 9 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nIf - If Intentional Damage:\n8. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other Outside Force Damage:\n9. Describe:\nUse this section to report material failures ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in\nIncident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is \"Pipe\" or \"Weld.\"\nG5 - Pipe, Weld, or Joint Failure\nOnly one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nPipe, Weld or Join Failure – Sub-Cause: Construction-, Installation-, or Fabrication-related\n1. The sub-case selected below is based on the following (select all that apply):\n- Field Examination Yes\n- Determined by Metallurgical Analysis Yes\n- Other Analysis\n- If \"Other Analysis\", Describe\n- Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation\n(Supplemental Report required)\n- If Construction-, Installation- or Fabrication- related:\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n- If Fatigue or Vibration related:\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Mechanical Stress Yes\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Original Manufacturing-related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field):\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n- If Fatigue or Vibration related:\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Mechanical Stress\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Environmental Cracking-related:\n3. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\nComplete the following if any Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause is selected.\n4. Additional Factors (select all that apply):\n- Dent\n- Gouge\n- Pipe Bend\n- Arc Burn\n- Crack Yes\n- Lack of Fusion\n- Lamination\n- Buckle\n- Wrinkle\n- Misalignment\n- Burnt Steel\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Incident? Yes\nPage 10 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nAppendix C Incident Report 20100006\n5a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Yes\nMost recent year run: 2008\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry Yes\nMost recent year run: 2008\n- Caliper Yes\nMost recent year run: 2008\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\n- Other\nMost recent year run:\nDescribe:\n6. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident? No\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n7. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment? No\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n8. Has one or more non-destructive examination(s) been conducted at\nthe point of the Incident since January 1,2002? No\n8a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conduc","truncated":true,"body_characters":44733}