{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc., 2005-06-30","title":"Failure Report- Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc. 6/30/05","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-12-26","effective_on":"2005-06-30","summary":"Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.; Natural Gas; KS; failure 2005-06-30; apparent cause: Incorrect Operation.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-southern-star-central-gas-pipeline-inc-63005.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-southern-star-central-gas-pipeline-inc-63005.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-southern-star-central-gas-pipeline-inc-63005","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-southern-star-central-gas-pipeline-inc-63005","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nCentral Region\nPrincipal Investigator James Bunn\nRegion Director David Barrett\nDate of Report 5/25/2012\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Southern Star Central Rupture,\nOverpressure in KS\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 6/30/2005\nCommodity Released Natural Gas\nCity/County & State Lawrence/Douglas County, Kansas\nOpID & Operator Name 31711 Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.\nUnit # & Unit Name 15193 Tonganoxie Area\nSMART Activity # 116063\nMilepost / Location Pipeline Station 681+69 (Series 130 Station)\nType of Failure Rupture due to Operator Error\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nRural Area, Class 1, Non HCA\nProperty Damage $192,163\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Southern Star Central Rupture Due to\nOverpressure\nFailure Date 6/30/2005\nExecutive Summary\nOn June 30, 2005, Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline (SSCGP) Control Center received a SCADA system\nalarm at 7:52 pm. This alarm indicated electrical and communications power loss and was the result of a\nlightning strike at Ottawa Station. As a result, the programmable logic controller (PLC) for Ottawa\nStation powered down. When power was restored, the PLC placed the station in local control, and\nautomatically moved valves and set points to the last known positions. At 7:53 pm, the Control Center\nreceived a separate alarm that indicated the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) for the\nTopeka (ES 20-inch) pipeline had been exceeded. At 8:16 pm an SSCGP employee who worked in the\nTonganoxie, KS District was contacted by a family member who reported a potential pipeline rupture\nsouth of Lawrence, KS. The Control Center had not received any loss in pressure as of 8:20 pm. The\nfailure was confirmed by Douglas County Kansas Dispatch at 8:25 pm and was determined to be located\nbetween the towns of Lawrence and Ottawa, approximately three miles south of Lawrence, KS. The\nNational Response Center (NRC) was contacted at 9:56 pm (CT) and the operator provided a call to the\nPHMSA Central Region at 10:00 pm.\nAs designed, when power was lost at the Ottawa Station, the working regulator on the ES 20-inch line\nfailed in the open position. The monitor regulator however failed to operate (this regulator was\ndesigned to protect the ES 20-inch pipeline from overpressure in the event of any type of malfunction of\nthe working regulator). With the working monitor in the open position and the monitor regulator not\noperational, the ES 20-inch pipeline was exposed to a pressure above the maximum allowable operating\npressure (MAOP). The established MAOP was 450 psig. The maximum pressure experienced at Ottawa\nStation was 680 psig.\nAt approximately 8:15 pm, the ES-20-inch line ruptured in an agricultural field about 6.4 miles\ndownstream of the Ottawa station. The subsequent metallurgical investigation determined that the\noverpressure condition resulted in higher than usual membrane stresses in the pipeline and that “the\nfailure occurred just outside of the area of the lap-weld seam, in steel that was free of process or\nfabrication related defects.”\nNo fatalities or injuries occurred as a result of the rupture and there was no fire or explosion. The\nrupture occurred in a Class 1 rural area and was not in an HCA. Four individuals were evacuated by an\nemergency responder as a precautionary measure and twelve domestic customers were without gas\nservice for two days. The operator reported the total cost of the accident as $192,163.\nIt was later determined that the monitor regulator failed to operate due to the fact that the pneumatic\ncontroller supply valve was in a closed position. The supply valve was apparently left closed by a\ntechnician who had been performing maintenance activities on the monitor regulator on April 26, 2005.\nSystem Details\nThe SSCGP system consists of over 6,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines in the Midwest\nregion of the United States. The system serves several major market areas including the Kansas town of\nWichita, the greater Kansas City area (KS and MO) and St. Louis, Missouri. The ES 20-inch pipeline runs\nnorth from Ottawa to Lawrence Kansas, a distance of approximately 28 miles. This pipeline is fed\nthrough two regulator stations which are located at the Ottawa Station.\nThe pipeline was constructed in 1929 and the portion of the line that failed consisted of 20-inch\ndiameter line pipe with a wall thickness of 0.312 inch. The pipe was manufactured by Spang-Chalfont\nPage 2 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Southern Star Central Rupture Due to\nOverpressure\nFailure Date 6/30/2005\n(later known as National Supply and became part of US Steel) using the furnace lap weld process. The\ngrade of pipe was unknown but assumed to be 24,000 psi. The pipeline was joined by the oxyacetylene\nwelding process. The girth welds had not been radiographed during construction. The depth of cover at\nthe point of failure was 24 inches. The MAOP of the line (450 psig) was established based on the highest\nactual operating pressure of the pipeline during the previous five years prior to July 1, 1970. The\npressure at the time and location of the failure was determined to be between 520 psig and 680 psig.\nThe section of the line that contained the rupture had not been hydrostatically tested or inspected with\ninternal inspection devices prior to the failure.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nOn June 30, 2005 a lightning strike at the SSCGP Ottawa Station disrupted the electrical power and the\ncommunication systems at the station. The lightning strike apparently blew a fuse for the electrical\ncircuit that provided power to the PLC that controlled multiple working pressure regulators. The PLC did\nnot remain on battery power when the main power failed.\nThe loss of power caused the regulators to lose diaphragm pressure to the respective valve actuators.\nThis caused the regulators to fail in the open position. Each of the working regulators relied on an\nindividual monitor regulator as an overpressure protection device. Each of the monitor regulators\nperformed as designed except for monitor regulator 1137 RM, which should have provided overpressure\nprotection to the ES 20-inch line. The failure of the 1137 RM regulator led to an overpressure condition\nin the ES-20- inch pipeline and the subsequent rupture of the pipe (approximately ½ mile south of\nDouglas County Road 460 on East 1400 Road).\nElectrical surge suppression had not been implemented and unshielded instrumentation cable had been\nused. Transmitters had not been electrically isolated from the piping.\nEmergency Response\nThe SSCGP Control Center received a SCADA system alarm at 7:52 pm that indicated that the Ottawa\nStation lost electrical power and communications systems. The loss of power and communications\nsystems occurred when the Ottawa Station was struck by lightning. When the power was restored, the\nlocal PLC placed the station in local control and restored valves and set points to the last known\npositions. At 7:53 pm the Control Center received another alarm that indicated that the pressure in the\nES 20-inch line had exceeded the MAOP of the pipeline. The Control Center contacted the on-call\noperator for the Ottawa Station. An SSCGP employee arrived at Ottawa station at 8:09 pm. The Control\nCenter attempted to alleviate the overpressure condition on the pipeline by making a valve mode\nchange; however the attempt was unsuccessful because a PLC at the station had placed the station in\nthe local control mode. At 8:15 pm, the on-call operator and another employee arrived at the Ottawa\nstation and began lowering the pressure on the ES 20-inch line. At 8:16 pm, a Tonganoxie District\nemployee received a phone call from a family member who reported a possible pipeline rupture just\nsouth of Lawrence, KS.\nDouglas County Emergency personnel arrived at the site at 8:25 pm and confirmed the rupture to the\nDouglas County, KS Dispatch Office. At 9:09 pm, the first SSCGP responder arrived at the rupture\nlocation. The section of the line that ruptured was isolated at 9:42 pm by the Baldwin mainline gate\nvalve closure. SSCGP notified the NRC of the release at 9:56 pm on June 30, 2005 (NRC report number\n764055).\nPage 3 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Southern Star Central Rupture Due to\nOverpressure\nFailure Date 6/30/2005\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nSSCGP replaced the failed section of pipe with 60 feet of pre-tested pipe and reinforced four girth welds\non either side of the replacement pipe. All initial repair work was completed by July 3, 2005 and the\nreplaced pipeline was backfilled. The ES 20-inch line was pressurized in several increments (four 100\npsig increments in most locations) and after each incremental pressure increase, a leak survey was\nconducted. Additional leak surveys were done at road crossings and near residential dwellings. No\nleaks were found and the line was returned to service on July 19, 2005.\nAfter the line was returned to service SSCGP made a decision to replace the lap welded pipe in the line\nand also replace all portions of the line that contained oxyacetylene girth welds. Approximately ten\nmiles of pipe was replaced. The balance of the ES 20-inch line that was affected by the overpressure\ncondition is modern line pipe which has been hydrostatically tested to a pressure of 720 psig.\nInvestigation Details\nSSCGP sent the portion of the pipe that contained the rupture origin and several adjacent girthwelds to\nan independent metallurgical laboratory for analysis. The metallurgical investigation determined that\nthe overpressure condition resulted in higher than usual membrane stresses in the pipeline and that\n“the failure occurred just outside of the area of the lap-weld seam, in steel that was free of process or\nfabrication related defects.” Fractures propagated in both the upstream and downstream directions to\nthe girth welds at each end of the pipe joint. Both girth welds tore around the circumference of the pipe\nand the joint was ejected from the right-of-way. The joint of pipe was found approximately 150 feet\naway from the crater that was formed as a result of the rupture. The crater itself was approximately 20\nfeet in diameter.\nThe SSCGP Control Center notified appropriate field personnel of an overpressure condition\napproximately three minutes after the overpressure alarm had been received in the Control Center.\nSSCGP field and office personnel immediately began to respond. SSCGP personnel were at Ottawa\nStation by 8:09 pm and at 8:16 pm, an SSCGP employee was advised of a potential pipeline rupture by\nmembers of his family and he in turn contacted the Control Center at 8:20 pm. Douglas County\nEmergency responders arrived at the rupture site at 8:25 pm and confirmed the incident location with\nthe Douglas County, Kansas Dispatch Office. The Emergency Personnel also evacuated a residence that\nwas located approximately ¼ mile from the site.\nSSCGP conducted an internal investigation in order to determine the root cause of this accident.\nFindings & Contributing Factors\nSSCGP determined that the root cause of the failure was operator error and the result of an employee\nnot following procedures on April 26, 2005 when performing regulator maintenance. This error caused\nthe monitor regulator, 1137 RM, to be left in an inoperable condition as the SSCGP employee left the\nvalve in the pneumatic supply line to the regulator in the closed position (after performing a\nmaintenance operation). The technician had qualifications revoked and was then re-qualified through\nthe OQ process.\nThe lap welded pipe in the line was replaced (approximately 10 miles of pipeline) as were numerous\noxyacetylene girth welds.\nIn order to prevent this type of failure in the future SSCGP added several control revisions including high\nselect relays in an effort to provide pneumatic backup to the working regulators.\nPage 4 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Southern Star Central Rupture Due to\nOverpressure\nFailure Date 6/30/2005\nSSCGP personnel implemented additional measures to protect the electrical systems from lightning\nstrikes. This included improvements to the grounding systems, surge suppression, installation of\nshielded instrumentation cable, electrical isolation of transmitters from the pipeline, and relocation of a\ntransmitter.\nAppendices\nAppendix A Maps and Photographs\nAppendix B NRC Report Number 764055\nAppendix C Operator Incident Report\nAppendix D Metallurgical Laboratory Analysis\nPage 5 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nAppendix A Map\nThis document is on file at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 2 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 3 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 4 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 5 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 6 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 7 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 8 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 9 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 10 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 11 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nPage 12 of 12\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Report Number 764055\n*Report taken at 22:56 on 30-JUN-05\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: EQUIPMENT FAILURE\nAffected Area:\nThe incident occurred on 30-JUN-05 at 20:25 local time.\nAffected Medium: AIR ATMOSPHERE\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 764055\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n____________________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization: SOUTHERN STAR CENTRAL GAS PIPELINE\nOWENSBORO, KY 42301\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nCOUNTY RD 460 County: DOUGLAS\nEAST 1400 RD\nState: KS\n____________________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: ONG Official Material Name: NATURAL GAS\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nTHE CALLER IS REPORTING A NATURAL GAS RELEASE TO THE ATMOSPHERE FROM A RUPTURED 20\nINCH PIPELINE.\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: TRANSMISSION\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDAMAGES\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS: UNKN Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nClosure Type\nAir: N\nLength of Direction of\nDescription of Closure Closure Closure\nRoad: N\nWaterway: N\nTrack: N\nMajor\nArtery:\nN\nPage 1 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nPassengers Transferred: UNKNOWN\nAppendix B - NRC Report Number 764055\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material: NO\n____________________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nIN THE PROCESS OF ISOLATING THE LINE\nRelease Secured: NO\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: CLEAR, ºF\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal:\nState/Local:\nState/Local On Scene: POLICE AND THE FIRE DEPT.\nState Agency Number:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (PRIMARY)\n30-JUN-05 23:00\nU.S. EPA VII (PRIMARY)\n30-JUN-05 23:03\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (PRIMARY)\n30-JUN-05 23:00\nNOAA 1ST CLASS BB RPTS FOR KS (PRIMARY)\n30-JUN-05 23:00\nRSPA OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (PRIMARY)\n30-JUN-05 23:02\nDEPT HEALTH AND ENV ATTN:MR HENNING (PRIMARY)\n30-JUN-05 23:00\nDOI/OEPC DENVER (PRIMARY)\n30-JUN-05 23:00\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nNONE\n___________________________________________________________________________\n***\nEND INCIDENT REPORT # 764055 ***\nThe National Response Center is strictly an initial report taking agency and\ndoes not participate in the investigation or incident response. The NRC\nreceives initial reporting information only and notifies Federal and State\nOn-Scene Coordinators for response. The NRC does not verify nor does it take\nfollow-on incident information. Verification of data and incident response\nis the sole responsibility of Federal/State On-Scene Coordinators. Data\ncontained within the FOIA Web Database is initial information only. All\nreports provided via this server are for informational purposes only. Data\nto be used in legal proceedings must be obtained via written correspondence\nfrom the NRC.\nPage 2 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator Incident Report\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 for each violation Form Approved\nfor each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500,000 as provided in 49 USC 1678. OMB No. 2137-0522\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nResearch and Special Programs\nAdministration\nINCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND\nGATHERING SYSTEMS\nReport Date\nNo.\n(DOT Use Only)\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the\ninformation requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you\ncan obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at http://ops.dot.gov .\nPART A – GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION\nNearest street or road\nCity and County or Parrish\na.\nb.\nc.\nState and Zip Code\nd. Mile Post/Valve Station\ne. Survey Station No.\nf. Latitude: Longitude:\n(if not available, see instructions for how to provide specific location)\ng. Class location description\nOnshore: Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4\nOffshore: Class 1 (complete rest of this item)\nArea ___________________ Block # ___________\nState / / or Outer Continental Shelf\nh. Incident on Federal Land other than Outer Continental Shelf\nYes No\ni. Is pipeline Interstate Yes No\n4. Type of leak or rupture\nLeak: Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec. F5)\nPuncture, diameter (inches)\nRupture: Circumferential – Separation\nLongitudinal – Tear/Crack, length (inches)\nPropagation Length, total, both sides (feet)\nN/A\nOther:\nOperator Name and Address\nOriginal Report Supplemental Report Final Report\na. Operator's 5-digit Identification Number (when known) / /\nb. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter Owner’s 5-digit Identification Number (when known) / /\nc. Name of Operator ______________________________ _______________________________________________________\nd. Operator street address ________________________________________________________________________________________\ne. Operator address _______________________\nCity, County or Parrish, State and Zip Code\n2. Time and date of the incident\n/ / / / / / / /\nhr. month day year\n3. Location of incident\n5. Consequences (check and complete all that apply)\na. Fatality Total number of people: / /\nEmployees: / / General Public: / /\nNon-employee Contractors: / /\nb. Injury requiring inpatient\nhospitalization Total number of people: / /\nEmployees: / / General Public: / /\nNon-employee Contractors: / /\nc. Property damage/loss (estimated) Total $\nGas loss $ Operator damage $\nPublic/private property damage $\nd. Release Occurred in a ‘High Consequence Area’\ne. Gas ignited – No explosion f. Explosion\ng. Evacuation (general public only) / / people\nReason for Evacuation:\nEmergency worker or public official ordered, precautionary\nThreat to the public Company policy\n6. Elapsed time until area was made safe:\n/ / hr. / / min.\n7. Telephone Report\n/ / / / / / / /\nNRC Report Number month day year\n8. a. Estimated pressure at point and time of incident:\nPSIG\nb. Max. allowable operating pressure (MAOP): PSIG\nc. MAOP established by 49 CFR section:\n192.619 (a)(1) 192. 619 (a)(2) 192. 619 (a)(3)\n192.619 (a)(4) 192. 619 (c)\nd. Did an overpressurization occur relating to the incident? Yes No\nPART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE\nArea Code and Telephone Number\n(type or print) Preparer's Name and Title\nPreparer's E-mail Address Area Code and Facsimile Number\nDate Area Code and Telephone Number\nAuthorized Signature (type or print) Name and Title\nForm RSPA F 7100.2 ( 01-2002 ) OPS Data Facsimile Page 1 of 3\nPage 1 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator Incident Report\nPART C - ORIGIN OF THE INCIDENT\n1. Incident occurred on\nTransmission System\nGathering System\nTransmission Line of Distribution System\n2. Failure occurred on\nBody of pipe Pipe Seam\nJoint\nComponent\nOther:\n3. Material involved (pipe, fitting, or other component)\nSteel\nPlastic (If plastic, complete all items that apply in a-c)\nPlastic failure was: a.ductile b.brittle c.joint failure\nMaterial other than plastic or steel: _________\n4. Part of system involved in incident\nPipeline Regulator/Metering System\nCompressor Station Other:\n5. Year the pipe or component which failed was installed: / /\nPART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION (if applicable) PART E – ENVIRONMENT\n1. Nominal pipe size (NPS) / / in.\n2. Wall thickness / / in.\n3. Specification SMYS / /\n4. Seam type\n5. Valve type\n6. Pipe or valve manufactured by in year / /\n1. Area of incident In open ditch\nUnder pavement Above ground\nUnder ground Under water\nInside/under building Other:\n2. Depth of cover: inches\nPART F – APPARENT CAUSE\nImportant: There are 25 numbered causes in this section. Check the box to the left of the primary\ncause of the incident. Check one circle in each of the supplemental items to the right of or below the\ncause you indicate. See the instructions for this form for guidance.\nF1 – CORROSION If either F1 (1) External Corrosion, or F1 (2) Internal Corrosion is checked, complete all subparts a – e.\na. Pipe Coating\nb. Visual Examination\nc. Cause of Corrosion\nBare\nGalvanic Stray Current\n1. External Corrosion\nLocalized Pitting\nCoated\nGeneral Corrosion\nImproper Cathodic Protection\nOther: ____________________\n2. Internal Corrosion\nMicrobiological\nStress Corrosion Cracking\nOther: ____________________\nd. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering incident?\nNo Yes, Year Protection Started: / /\ne. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion?\nNo Yes, How long prior to incident: / / years / / months\nF2 – NATURAL FORCES\n3. Earth Movement => Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other:\n4. Lightning\n5. Heavy Rains/Floods => Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other:\n6. Temperature => Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other:\n7. High Winds\nF3 - EXCAVATION\n8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractors) / Not Third Party\n9. Third Party Excavation Damage (complete a-d)\na. Excavator group\nGeneral Public Government Excavator other than Operator/subcontractor\nb. Type: Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer Phone/Cable Landowner Railroad\nOther:\nc. Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity?\nNo Yes: Date received: / / mo. / / day / / yr.\nNotification received from: One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner\nd. Was pipeline marked?\nNo Yes (If Yes, check applicable items i – iv)\ni. Temporary markings: Flags Stakes Paint\nii. Permanent markings: Yes No\niii. Marks were (check one) Accurate Not Accurate\niv. Were marks made within required time? Yes No\nF4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE\n10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure => Fire/Explosion cause: Man made Natural\n11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe\n12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe\n13. Vandalism\nForm RSPA F 7100.2 ( 01-2002 ) Page 2 of 3\nPage 2 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator Incident Report\nF5 – MATERIAL AND WELDS\nMaterial\n14. Body of Pipe => Dent Gouge Wrinkle Bend Arc Burn Other:\n15. Component => Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other:\n16. Joint => Gasket O-Ring Threads Other:\nWeld\n17. Butt => Pipe Fabrication Other:\n18. Fillet => Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other:\n19. Pipe Seam => LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld\nHF ERW SAW Spiral Other:\nComplete a-g if you indicate any cause in part F5.\na. Type of failure:\nConstruction Defect => Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures\nMaterial Defect\nb. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site? Yes No\nc. Was part which leaked pressure tested before incident occurred? Yes, complete d-g No\nd. Date of test: / / mo. / / day / / yr.\ne. Test medium: Water Natural Gas Inert Gas Other:\nf. Time held at test pressure: / / hr.\ng. Estimated test pressure at point of incident: PSIG\nF6 – EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS\n20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment => Valve Instrumentation Pressure Regulator Other:\n21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling => Nipples Valve Threads Mechanical Couplings Other:\n22. Ruptured or Leaking Seal/Pump Packing\n23. Incorrect Operation\na. Type: Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures Other:\nb. Number of employees involved who failed post-incident drug test: / / Alcohol test: / /\nc. Were most senior employee(s) involved qualified? Yes No d. Hours on duty: / /\nF7 – OTHER\n24. Miscellaneous, describe:\n25. Unknown\nInvestigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete)\nPART G – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT (Attach additional sheets as necessary)\nForm RSPA F 7100.2 ( 01-2002 ) OPS Data Facsimile Page 3 of 3\nPage 3 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\nAppendix D\nMetallurgical Report\nThis document is on file at PHMSA","truncated":false,"body_characters":26331}