{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Sunoco Inc R&M, 2010-03-25","title":"Failure Report- Sunoco Inc R&M 3/25/10","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-06-09","effective_on":"2010-03-25","summary":"Sunoco Inc R&M; Hazardous Liquid; PA; failure 2010-03-25; apparent cause: Equipment Failure.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-sunoco-inc-rm-32510.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-sunoco-inc-rm-32510.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-sunoco-inc-rm-32510","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-sunoco-inc-rm-32510","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator Al Schoen\nRegion Director Byron Coy\nDate of Report 04/28/2011\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Sunoco R&M Flange Gasket\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 03/25/2010\nCommodity Released Vacuum Gas Oil and Light Cycle Oil\nCity/County & State Philadelphia, PA\nOpID & Operator Name 18779 Sunoco Inc, R&M\nUnit # & Unit Name 65981 Northeast Refinery Complex, PA\nSMART Activity # 129572\nMilepost / Location Latitude 39.91934, Longitude -75.20447\nType of Failure Flange Leak caused by deteriorated gasket. The loss of pipe support and\nleakage through a closed valve contributed to the failure.\nFatalities None\nInjuries None\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nArea designated as High Population Area in proximity to a Commercially\nNavigable Waterway ( Schuylkill River, Philadelphia). The area was under\nthe control of the Operator in a fenced off area that is off-limits to the\npublic.\nProperty Damage $100,000\nPage 1 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco R&M Flange Gasket\n03/25/2010\nExecutive Summary\nOn March 25, 2010, there was a release of 1700 barrels of Vacuum Gas Oil (VGO) from the FM-1 pipeline\ninto an open in-ground valve pit and the surrounding area in the West Yard of the Sunoco, R&M\nPhiladelphia refinery in Philadelphia, PA. The cause of the release was a failure of a flange gasket\ndownstream of a main line valve in a dead leg of pipe leading to the FM-1 pig trap. Loss of pipe support\nand leakage through a closed valve contributed to the failure. There were no fatalities or injuries, and\nthe incident did not result in a fire, explosion or evacuation.\nThe flange gasket failed during a shipment of VGO between the Schuylkill River Tank Farm (SRTF) and\nthe North Yard (NYOM) of the Refinery. The flange and pipe headers were located in a holding pit which\noverflowed during the release but was contained within the West Yard facility.\nSystem Details\nThe FM-1 pipeline is approximately 2 miles long and connects two Sunoco Inc, R&M (Sunoco) tank\nfarms. Appendix C is a schematic of the flow path at the West Yard. Product flows through the FM-1\nMOV against the Mainline Valve to the FM-1 trap through C Header and down to the N-8 piping in the\npit, through valve 1-22 and on to the North Yard. The Mainline Valve to the FM-1 trap is normally\nclosed.\nThe MOP of the pipeline system was 250 psig based on the ASME Class 150 valve and flanges operating\nat 200 degrees Fahreinheit. The pipe was 16” OD ASTM A53 Grade B Carbon Steel Seamless pipe, 0.312”\nwall thickness with Somastic coating. The pipeline was constructed in 1941. There is no reported\nhistory of failures on this line. There were no supply impacts as a new bypass piping was installed on\n3/28/2010 and Sunoco was able to resume shipments three days after the incident.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure (Appendix D)\n3/18/2010: A Hydrochem (contract vacuum truck) employee who routinely monitored and managed\nresidual oil accumulation in refinery sumps and the West Yard manifold pit reported heavy oil\naccumulation in the West Yard pit. This was believed to have been caused by ground water seepage\ninto the valve pit.\n03/21/2010, at 23:20 hrs: A shipment of VGO was started at 1000 bph from the Schuylkill River Tank\nFarm (SRTF) to the North Yard (NYOM) area of Sunoco’s Philadelphia Refinery (Appendix A) displacing\nLight Cycle Oil (LCO) from the pipeline.\n3/22/2010 at 03:30 hrs: The LCO was totally displaced from the line and the pressure at NYOM climbed\nto 58 psig. All pressure readings referred to in this report were recorded at NYOM which is 2500 feet\ndownstream of the valve pit at the West Yard (Appendix A).\n3/24/2010 08:00 hrs: Pressure stayed constant till 08:00 hrs when the flow was cut back to 1000 BPH.\nAt this point the pressure dropped to about 35 psi.\n3/24/2010 at 20:25 hrs: The flow rate was increased to 2000 BPH and pressure rose to 80 psig.\n3/25/2010 At 13:45 hrs: A contractor employee entered the West Yard and discovered a release of\nheavy oil in the valve pit. The pressure was noted at 35 psig.\n3/25/2010 14:00 hrs: The pressure rose slightly to 38 psig and the pipeline was shutdown to change the\nvalve lineup to allow flushing of the line with LCO.\n3/25/2010 18:00 hrs: Flush was complete and the line was shut down and the piping manifold was\nisolated using the FM1 MOV and N-8 main line valves.\nPage 2 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco R&M Flange Gasket\n03/25/2010\nEmergency Response\nThe leak was discovered at 13:45 and the line was shut down at 18:00 hrs, after the heavier VGO had\nbeen removed from the pipeline. Sunoco used a response contractor and its own resources to control\nand mitigate the leak. The area immediately around the valve pit was boomed off to contain the leaked\nproduct and prevent it from entering the surrounding water logged ground (Appendix B).\nThe area was under the control of Sunoco in a fenced off area that is off-limits to the public.\nSummary of initial start-up plan and return-to-service, including preliminary safety measures\nThe failed section of pipe was isolated. New piping was installed. The pipe was returned to service on\n03/28/2010.\nInvestigation Findings & Contributing Factors\nSunoco conducted a pressure integrity test on the failed piping to determine source of the leak. This\ntest identified the flange as the source.\nThe loss of pipe support and leakage through a closed valve contributed to the failure (Appendix B).\nThe mechanical failure of the Mainline valve seat and gate allowed product to pass into the section of\npiping including the failed flange. Failure of the paper gasket in the flange caused the flange to leak.\nAppendices\nA Sunoco Facility Maps\nB Photos\nC Flow Diagrams\nD Event Log Plot\nE PHMSA F7000-1 Report - Supplemental\nF NRC Report 935112\nPage 3 of 3\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nAppendix A – Sunoco Facility Maps\nSunoco Facility\nWest Yard Piping\nPage 1 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nAppendix A – Sunoco Facility Maps\nSunoco Facility\nPage 2 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photos\nPhoto 1 - Valve Pit Piping\nPage 1 of 9\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photos\nPhoto 2 - Bypass piping\nPage 2 of 9\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photos\nPhoto 3 – Flange Gasket\nPage 3 of 9\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photos\nPhoto 4 – Flange Face\nPage 4 of 9\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photos\nPhoto 5 – New Bypass Piping\nPage 5 of 9\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photos\nPhoto 6 – Spool Piece Support\nPage 6 of 9\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photos\nPhoto 7 – Trap Valves\nPage 7 of 9\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photos\nPhoto 8 – Trap Valve Test\nPage 8 of 9\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix B - Photos\nPhoto 9 – Spill Area 03272010\nPhoto 10– Spill Area 05192010\nPage 9 of 9\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix C – Flow Diagrams\nExisting Flow Diagram\nPage 1 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nAppendix C – Flow Diagrams\nNew Flow Diagram\nPage 2 of 2\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n129572 Appendix D - Event Log Plot\nDate Time Event\n3/21/2010 11:20 PM\nStarted North Tank Field (NTF) Pump P-226 from GP TK284 VGO, pushing FM-1 / N-8 line fill of\nLCO to North Yard Oil Movements (NYOM) TK668.\n3/22/2010 3:30 AM\nOpened VGO from GP TK284 into NYOM TK672 and cut away from TK668.\n3/24/2010 8:25 PM\nOpened P-226 discharge valve, increased rate from 1000 bph (min) to 2200 bph (max).\n3/25/2010 8:00 AM\nAdjusted (closed) P-226 discharge valve, decreased rate from 2200 bph (max) to 1000 bph (min).\n3/25/2010 1:45 PM\nDiscovered release from FM-1 / N-8 Manifold in West Yard.\n3/25/2010 2:00 PM\nShutdown P-226, manifold wash to ONT Line to GP TK284, started P-201A/B from GP South\nTank Field (STF) TK219 LCO, to complete VGO flush of FM-1 /N-8 to NYOM TK672 at 1700 bph.\n3/25/2010 4:25 PM\nLine wash rate reduced.\n3/25/2010 6:00 PM\nP-201A/B shutdown. FM-1 / N-8 Lines displaced with LCO. FM-1 / N-8 Main Line Valve isolated.\nPage 1 of 5\n1 of 1\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 05/24/2010\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20100054 - 15114\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes\nReport Status Submitted\nCreate Date 05/24/2010\nOperator Name and Address\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 18779\n2. Name of Operator SUNOCO, INC (R&M)\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address BOX 426\n3b. City MARCUS HOOK\n3c. State Pennslyvania\n3d. Zip Code 19061\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident:\nDate/Time 03/25/2010 13:42\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 39.91934\nLongitude: -75.20447\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 935112\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the National Response Center (if applicable):\nDate/Time 03/25/2010 15:20\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released)\nRefined and/or Petroleum Product (non-HVL) which is a\nLiquid at Ambient Conditions\nSpecify Commodity Subtype: Other\nIf \"Other\" Subtype, Describe: Vacuum Gas Oil (VGO)\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Ethanol\nBlend, then % Ethanol Blend: %\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Biodiesel,\nthen Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100): B\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally:\nBarrels: 1,700.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown:\nBarrels:\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered:\nBarrels: 1,699.00\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\nPage 1 of 14\n1 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? Yes\nIf No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\nDate/Time 03/25/2010 18:00\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\nDate/Time 03/28/2010 16:00\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident:\nDate/Time 03/25/2010 13:42\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site:\nDate/Time 03/25/2010 13:49\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Pennslyvania\n3. Zip Code: 19145\n4. City Philadelphia\n5. County or Parish Philadelphia\n6. Operator-designated location: (select only one) Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: Philadelphia\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Philadelphia Refinery - West Yard\n8. Segment name/ID: FM-1 Pipeline, ID# 11181\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: (select only one) Totally contained on Operator-controlled property\n11. Area of Accident (as found): (select only one) Aboveground\nIf Underground, Aboveground or Transition Area, specify: Other\n- If Other, Describe: Inside an open vault below grade\nIf Underground specify, Depth-of-Cover (in):\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\nIf Yes, specify below:\n- If \"Bridge crossing\"\n- Specify\n- If \"Railroad crossing\"\n- Specify\n- If \"Road crossing\"\n- Specify\n- If \"Water crossing\"\n- Specify\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\nState:\nArea:\nBlock/Tract #:\nNearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\nArea:\nBlock #:\n15. Area of Accident: (select only one)\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\nPage 2 of 14\n2 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Intrastate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: (select only one) Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify:\n3. Item involved in Accident: (select only one) Flange\n- If Pipe, specify:\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n3d. Pipe specification:\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify:\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed:\n5. Material involved in Accident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify:\n6. Type of Accident Involved: (select only one) Leak\n- If Mechanical Puncture,\nApprox. size: in. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type Seal or Packing\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation\nOther/Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other,\nDescribe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: Yes\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic Yes\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: Yes\n4. Anticipated remediation: Yes\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil Yes\n- Vegetation Yes\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water:\nBarrels:\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility Yes\nPage 3 of 14\n3 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? Yes\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway:\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- High Population Area: Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\nYes\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\nNo\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\n8. Estimated cost to Operator :\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator $ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 0\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 0\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 0\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 100,000\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) $\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): 80.00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident:\n250.00\n(psig):\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident: (select only one)\nPressure did not exceed MOP\n(psig):\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nYes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 2,340\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools? Yes\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\nPage 4 of 14\n4 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: (select only one) =< 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? No\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? No\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident?\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident?\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? (select only\none) Local Operating Personnel, including contractors\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following: (select\nonly one)\nContractor working for the Operator\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident? (Select only one)\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nReview of operating data did not indicate an Abnormal\nOperating Condition (AOC) existed and was apparent to the\ncontroller prior to discovery of the release.\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n(provide an explanation for why not)\n(provide an explanation for why not)\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\nPage 5 of 14\n5 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G6 - Equipment Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub Cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes, CP Annual Survey ---> Most recent year\nconducted:\n- If Yes, Close Interval Survey ---> Most recent year\nconducted:\n- If Yes, Other CP Survey ---> Most recent year\nconducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\nPage 6 of 14\n6 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection\n- No In-Service Inspection completed\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\nPage 7 of 14\n7 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply) -\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nPage 8 of 14\n8 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 26>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to\nCGA-DIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator: (select only one)\n10. Type of excavation equipment: (select only one)\n11. Type of work performed: (select only one)\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nPage 9 of 14\n9 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 27>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by: (select only one)\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Heavy Rains/Flood\n- Other\nDescribe:\n- If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation:\nComplete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n- If Intentional Damage:\n8. Specify:\n- Other/Describe:\nPage 10 of 14\n10 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 28>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\n- If Other Outside Force Damage:\n9. Describe:\nG5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nUse this section to report material failures ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is \"Pipe\" or \"\nWeld.\"\nMaterial Failure of Pipe or Weld – Sub-Cause:\n1. The sub-cause selected below is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field Examination\n- Determined by Metallurgical Analysis\n- Other Analysis\n- If \"Other Analysis\", Describe:\n- Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation\n(Supplemental Report required)\n- If Construction, Installation, or Fabrication-related:\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n- Fatigue or Vibration-related\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Mechanical Stress:\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Original Manufacturing-related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field):\n2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply)\n- Fatigue or Vibration-related:\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- Mechanical Stress:\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Environmental Cracking-related:\n3. Specify:\n- Other - Describe:\nComplete the following if any Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause is selected.\n4. Additional factors: (select all that apply):\n- Dent\n- Gouge\n- Pipe Bend\n- Arc Burn\n- Crack\n- Lack of Fusion\n- Lamination\n- Buckle\n- Wrinkle\n- Misalignment\n- Burnt Steel\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n5. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n5a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year run:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year run:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year run:\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\nPage 11 of 14\n11 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 29>>>\n\n129572 Appendix E - PHMSA F 7000-1 Report Supplemental\n- Other\nMost recent year run:\nDescribe:\n6. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n7. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident -\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site -\nMost recent year conducted:\n8. Has one or more non-destructive examination(s) been conducted at\nthe point of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n8a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted: -\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nG6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nEquipment Failure – Sub-Cause: Non-threaded Connection Failure\n- If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment:\n1. Specify: (select all that apply) -\n- Control Valve\n- Instrumentation\n- SCADA\n- Communications\n- Block Valve\n- Check Valve\n- Relief Valve\n- Power Failure\n- Stopple/Control Fitting\n- ESD System Failure\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n- If Pump or Pump-related Equipment:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other – Describe:\n- If Threaded Connection/Coupling Failure:\n3. Specify:\n- If Other – Describe:\n- If Non-threaded Connection Failure:\n4. Specify: Gasket\n- If Other – D","truncated":true,"body_characters":49883}