{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 2011-08-02","title":"Failure Report- Sunoco Pipeline L.P. 8/2/11","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-03-22","effective_on":"2011-08-02","summary":"Sunoco Pipeline L.P.; Hazardous Liquid; PA; failure 2011-08-02; apparent cause: Corrosion Internal.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-sunoco-pipeline-lp-8211.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-sunoco-pipeline-lp-8211.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-sunoco-pipeline-lp-8211","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-sunoco-pipeline-lp-8211","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank Leak\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator Christian Sellu\nSenior Accident Investigator Michael Yazemboski\nRegion Director Byron Coy\nDate of Report 7/12/2013\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P.,\nDarby Creek Tank Leak\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 2/8/2011\nCommodity Released Crude Oil\nCity/County & State Folcroft, Delaware County, Pennsylvania\nOpID & Operator Name 18718 - Sunoco Pipeline L.P.\nUnit # & Unit Name 20041 - Fort Mifflin-PA/NJ\nSMART Activity # 133500\nMilepost / Location Latitude: 39.89810181, Longitude: 75.26255272\nType of Failure Corrosion Leak in Tank DC9 tank bottom\nFatalities None\nInjuries None\nDescription of Area\nImpacted\nLeak contained to tank dike area. Facility located in a High Consequence\nArea (HCA).\nTotal Costs $257,250\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank DC9 Leak\nFailure Date 02/08/2011\nExecutive Summary\nAt 12:13 p.m. on February 8, 2011, crude oil was\ndiscovered in the dike area of Tank DC9 in the Sunoco\nLogistics (Sunoco) Darby Creek Tank Farm (DCTF). Tank\nDC9 is designated as a break-out tank and is regulated\nunder Part 195 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).\nThe leak originated from a hole in the bottom of the\ntank resulting in a spill of approximately 38 barrels of\ncrude oil within the tank dike area. The cause of the\nleak was due to corrosion located on the internal topside and underside of the tank floor. The Tank is\nlocated in a designated high consequence area (HCA) and an Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) per\nSunoco’s Integrity Management program (IMP). The tank area is approximately 500 feet from a local\nhighway and 600 feet from a residential community. There were no injuries or fatalities, evacuations, or\nsupply disruptions as a result of the incident. The tank will remain out-of-service until remediation\nefforts can be completed.\nAn inspector from PHMSA’s Eastern Region was dispatched to the location on February 14, 2011, to\nconduct an investigation into the cause of the release.\nSystem Details\nSunoco Pipeline L.P. operates more than 7,500 miles of hazardous liquid pipelines. The Darby Creek\nTank Farm (DCTF) is a crude oil storage terminal for Sunoco’s Philadelphia refinery. This facility has a\ntotal storage capacity of approximately three million barrels. Darby Creek receives crude oil from the\nFort Mifflin Terminal and Hog Island Wharf through its pipelines. The tank farm stores the crude oil and\npumps it to the Philadelphia refinery.\nThe DCTF comprises 30 above-ground atmospheric breakout tanks that are utilized for transit, storing,\nand blending crude oils. The crude oils are sent to the tank farm from the 3-mile-long, 24-inch-diameter\nNorth and South Ship lines. These lines are supplied with products from barges and ships at Fort Mifflin\nDock and Hog Island Wharf near the Philadelphia International Airport. The products are blended at the\nDCTF and are pumped to the Sunoco Girard Point refinery through a 4-mile, 16-inch-diameter crude line.\nThe 24-inch-diameter ship lines and the 16-inch-diameter crude line are under PHMSA’s jurisdiction\n(Appendix A).\nTank DC9 is a 96,000-barrel break-out tank, measures 48 feet high by 120 feet in diameter, and was\nconstructed in 1948 (Appendix A,\n-4).\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nPrior to the leak that was discovered on February 8, 2011, Tank DC9 was in normal service. There were\nno leaks or operational issues reported since the tank bottom was replaced following the 1992 out-of-\nservice inspection.\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank DC9 Leak\nFailure Date 02/08/2011\nEmergency Response\nOn February 8, 2011, at approximately 12:13 p.m., a company utility operator discovered product in the\ndike area around Tank DC9 at the DCTF. Upon confirming the leak, Sunoco began immediately\ntransferring product from Tank DC9 to Tank 35. At approximately 12:49 p.m., a vacuum truck was\ndispatched to the location to begin removing spilled product from the dike area. On February 11, 2011,\nfresh product was found in a runoff trench near the outer wall of Tank DC9. Arrangements were made\nby Sunoco to have the DC9 tank bottom inspected using a Magnetic Flux Leakage Examination Scanner\n(MFE). An American Petroleum Institute (API) 653 out-of-service inspection was conducted by DJA\nInspection Services Inc., and a report was issued on April 20, 2011 (Appendix E).\nRemediation of the area in which the product was spilled continued through February 14, 2011\n(Appendix A-6 / Appendix A-7 / Appendix A-8). Sunoco notified the National Response Center (NRC) of\nthe incident on February 11, 2011 (Appendix B), at approximately 4:20 p.m. Sunoco successfully\nimplemented their Emergency Plan and Oil Pollution Act Plan in response to the tank leakage and\nresulting spill.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nTank DC9 will remain out of service until Sunoco can complete the repairs as outlined in the out of\nservice inspection report, dated April 20, 2011, and provided by DJA Inspection Services.\nInvestigation Details\nTank DC9 is located in a designated High Consequence Area (HCA) and an Unusually Sensitive Area (USA)\nas described in Sunoco’s Integrity Management Plan (IMP). The tank dike area is within approximately\n500 feet from a local highway and 600 feet from a residential community. The investigation conducted\nby PHMSA’s Eastern Region consisted of a review of the operating and maintenance history, tank\ninspection procedures, and records. Tank DC 9 was constructed in 1948 and was originally owned and\noperated by Chevron. Sunoco assumed ownership in 2003. The bottom of the tank consists of 3/8-inch\nannual ring plates and ¼-inch-thick inner bottom plates. The tank is insulated with no heating coils and\nstores crude at approximately 90 degrees Fahrenheit. The tank is currently sitting on soil over a High\nDensity Polyethylene Liner (HDPE) with a 4-inch concrete base, and the original steel bottom. The HDPE\nliner was reported to be in good condition. The tank was under cathodic protection prior to 1992, but\ndue to the installation of a double bottom in 1992, the cathodic protection was rendered ineffective.\nThe inspection history for tank DC9 consists of the following API Standard 653 Inspections:\nType Appendix\nCertification Date May 11, 1992 Out-of-Service D4\nSept 28, 1993 D5\nAugust 5, 1997 In-Service D1\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank DC9 Leak\nFailure Date 02/08/2011\nAugust 1, 2002 In-Service D2\nJune 5, 2007 In-Service D3\nThe most recent API Standard 653 out-of-service inspection was performed on December 9, 1992\n(Appendix D-4). This report identified a total of five deficiencies that required remediation. As a result\nof this out-of-service Inspection, the entire tank bottom was replaced and a new protective fiberglass\nreinforcement plastics (FRP) coating was added.\nThe most recent API Standard 653 in-service inspection was performed on June 5, 2007. This inspection\nwas conducted to collect data to evaluate the structural integrity of the tank and fitness for continued\nservice. The results of the 2007 in-service inspection identified a total of six deficiencies. These\ndeficiencies were external in nature and did not affect the overall integrity of the tank. The report\nidentified the remaining life of the tank shell and nozzles to be greater than 20 years based on\ncalculations using ultra-sonic thickness measurements.\nA post-accident inspection conducted by DJA Inspection Services, dated April 20, 2011, identified\nsignificant topside corrosion on the floor plates in tank DC9 due to a failure of the FRP coating that was\napplied in 1992 (Appendix E). The report also indicated that approximately 60 percent of the floor could\nnot be accurately MFE scanned during the post-accident inspection due to the severity of the topside\ncorrosion and the FRP disbondment. The report also indicated that minor soil-side corrosion was found\naround the outside of the inner bottom plates against the annular ring. The report recommended\nreplacing the entire bottom of the tank or repairing the tank by replacing approximately 60% of the\nbottom and performing various other procedures. The report also recommended that all of the annual\nrings be re-welded due to the amount of corrosion that was identified in these locations.\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nThe primary immediate cause of this release was due to a hole in the tank bottom caused by a\ncombination of internal topside corrosion and external underside soil-side corrosion. The topside\ncorrosion was due to the failure of the FRP protective coating material that was applied when the tank\nbottom was replaced in 1992.\nAs a result of the investigation, PHMSA’s Eastern Region findings are consistent with those identified in\nthe post-accident inspection that was performed by DJA Inspection Services and the recommendations\noutlined in the subsequent report dated April 20, 2011.\nAppendices\nAppendix Description\nA 133500 Appendix A Maps and Photos\nB 133500 Appendix B NRC Report 967232\nC 133500 Appendix C Operator Liquid Accident Report ID 20110080\nD 133500 Appendix D (D-1 to D-5) Operator Inspection Records\nE 133500 Appendix E Post incident tank inspection\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nAppendix A\nMap Removed\nFile Available at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\n130058 Appendix A Map and Photographs\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank Leak (Activity #133500)\nAccident Date 02/08/2011\nPhoto 1 – Oil Water Box\nPage 4 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\n130058 Appendix A Map and Photographs\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank Leak (Activity #133500)\nAccident Date 02/08/2011\nPhoto 2 ‐ Apparent Leakage from tank bottom\nPage 5 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\n130058 Appendix A Map and Photographs\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank Leak (Activity #133500)\nAccident Date 02/08/2011\nPhoto 3 – Tank Piping\nPage 6 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\n130058 Appendix A Map and Photographs\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank Leak (Activity #133500)\nAccident Date 02/08/2011\nPhoto 4 – Tank Dike\nPage 7 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n130058 Appendix A Map and Photographs\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank Leak (Activity #133500)\nAccident Date 02/08/2011\nPhoto 5 – Traces of Crude – Tank Dike\nPage 8 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n130058 Appendix A Map and Photographs\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank Leak (Activity #133500)\nAccident Date 02/08/2011\nPhoto 6 – Tank Dike\nPage 9 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n130058 Appendix A Map and Photographs\nFailure Investigation Report – Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Darby Creek Tank Leak (Activity #133500)\nAccident Date 02/08/2011\nPhoto 7 – Hole on bottom of tank DC9. Floor Plate #35.\nPage 10 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 1 of 2\n133500 Appendix B NRC Report 967232\nHMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS\n(Version 3.4.06 PROD ) Rules of Behavior Home Logout Menu\n[Return to Search]\nNRC Number: 967232\nCall Date: 02/11/2011 Call Time: 16:20:08\nCaller Information\nFirst Name: CLAUDIA Last Name: PANKOWSKI\nCompany Name: SUNOCO LOGISTICS\nAddress: 1824 HORSESHOE PIKE\nCity: HONEY BROOK State: PA\nCountry: USA Zip: 19344\nPhone 1: 6109992879 Phone 2:\nOrganization Type: PRIVAT Is caller the spiller? Yes Yes No No No Response No Response\nConfidential: Yes Yes No No No Response No Response\nDischarger Information\nFirst Name: CLAUDIA Last Name: PANKOWSKI\nCompany Name: SUNOCO LOGISTICS\nAddress: 1824 HORSESHOE PIKE\nCity: HONEY BROOK State: PA\nCountry: USA Zip: 19344\nPhone 1: 6109992879 Phone 2:\nOrganization Type: PRIVAT\nSpill Information\nState: PA County: DELAWARE\nNearest City: SHARON HILL Zip Code: 19079\nLocation\n1207 CALCON HOOK ROAD\nSpill Date: (mm/dd/yyyy)\n12:13:00\n02/08/2011 Spill Time: (24hh:mm:ss)\nDTG Type: DISCOVERED\nIncident Type PIPELINE Reported Incident Type PIPELINE\nDescription\nCOMPANY PERSONNEL DISCOVERED A SPILL OF CRUDE OIL INTO TANK DIKE. PRODUCT\nCONTAINED INSIDE THE FACILITY. NO FIRE, NO EXPLOSION, NO INJURIES, NO\nFATALITIES, NO WATERWAYS AFFECTED. SOURCE OF SPILL STILL UNDETERMINED AND COULD\nBE A NON-PHMSA JURISDICTIONAL LINE. NO ADDITIONAL PRODUCT WAS BEING SPILLED AT\nDISCOVERY.\nMaterials Involved\nMaterial / Chris Name Chris Code Total Qty. Water Qty.\nOIL: CRUDE OIL 1600 GALLON(S)\nPage 1 of 2\nhttps://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=02...\n8/8/2011\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 2 of 2\n133500 Appendix B NRC Report 967232\nMedium Type: LAND\nAdditional Medium Information:\nTANK DIKE\nInjuries: Fatalites:\nEvacuations: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown No. of Evacuations:\nDamages: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown Damage Amount:\nFederal Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown State Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown\nOther Agency Notified: Yes Yes No No Unknown Unknown\nRemedial Actions\nREMOVAL OF PRODUCT. TANK BEING EMPTIED. EXPLORATORY DIGS INTO WATER LINES.\nAdditional Info\nWEB REPORT.\nLatitude\nDegrees: 39 Minutes: 53 Seconds: 42 Quadrant: N\nLongitude\nDegrees: 75 Minutes: 15 Seconds: 38 Quadrant: W\nDistance from City: Direction:\nSection: Township: DARBY\nRange: Milepost:\nRescinded Rescinded Comments (max 250 characters)\n<< Previous << Previous 1..1 of 1 << Save >>\nPage 2 of 2\nhttps://phmhqnwas003/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?showresult=Y&ReceivedDate=02...\n8/8/2011\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0047\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2013\nReport Date: 03/07/2011\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20110080 - 16865\n--------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nACCIDENT REPORT - HAZARDOUS LIQUID\nPIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0047. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response (5 hours for a small release), including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and\ncompleting and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this\nburden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance\nOfficer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes Yes\nLast Revision Date: 08/28/2012\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 18718\n2. Name of Operator SUNOCO PIPELINE L.P.\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 525 FRITZTOWN ROAD\n3b. City SINKING SPRING\n3c. State Pennsylvania\n3d. Zip Code 19608\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: 02/08/2011 12:13\n5. Location of Accident:\nLatitude: 39.897834\nLongitude: -75.262507\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 967232\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 02/11/2011 16:20\n8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant\nvolume released) Crude Oil\n- Specify Commodity Subtype:\n- If \"Other\" Subtype, Describe:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nEthanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend:\n%:\n- If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is\nBiodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend (e.g. B2, B20, B100):\nB\n9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): 38.00\n10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown\n(Barrels):\n11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): 38.00\n12. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n12a. Operator employees\n12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n12c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n12e. General public\n12f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nPage 1 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 1 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? No\n- If No, Explain: Facility was on scheduled shut down. Facility resumed\noperations on 2/23/11\n- If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n14a. Local time and date of shutdown:\n14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted:\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n15. Did the commodity ignite? No\n16. Did the commodity explode? No\n17. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n18a. Local time Operator identified Accident: 02/08/2011 12:13\n18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: 02/08/2011 12:49\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of Accident onshore? Yes\nIf Yes, Complete Questions (2-12)\nIf No, Complete Questions (13-15)\n- If Onshore:\n2. State: Pennsylvania\n3. Zip Code: 19079\n4. City Sharon Hill\n5. County or Parish Delaware\n6. Operator-designated location:\nSpecify:\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Darby Creek Tank Farm\n8. Segment name/ID:\n9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Accident: Totally contained on Operator-controlled property\n11. Area of Accident (as found): Tank, including attached appurtenances\nSpecify:\n- If Other, Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in):\n12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\n- Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n- Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n- Select:\n- If Offshore:\n13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident:\n14. Origin of Accident:\n- In State waters - Specify:\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify:\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Accident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Accident: Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, including\nAttached Appurtenances\n- If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached\nAppurtenances, specify: Atmospheric or Low Pressure\nPage 2 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 2 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\n3. Item involved in Accident: Tank/Vessel\n- If Pipe, specify:\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n3d. Pipe specification:\n3e. Pipe Seam , specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve, specify:\n- If Mainline, specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Manufactured by:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Tank/Vessel, specify: Double Bottom System\n- If Other - Describe:\n- If Other, describe:\n4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: 1948\n5. Material involved in Accident: Material other than Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify: Steel\n6. Type of Accident Involved: Leak\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type: Other\n- If Other, Describe: Hole in tank floor\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other, Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening) by\nin. (length circumferentially or axially)\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Wildlife impact: No\n1a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Fish/aquatic\n- Birds\n- Terrestrial\n2. Soil contamination: Yes\n3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: No\n4. Anticipated remediation: No\n4a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Surface water\n- Groundwater\n- Soil\n- Vegetation\n- Wildlife\n5. Water contamination: No\n5a. If Yes, specify all that apply:\n- Ocean/Seawater\n- Surface\n- Groundwater\n- Drinking water: (Select one or both)\n- Private Well\n- Public Water Intake\n5b. Estimated amount released in or reaching water (Barrels):\n5c. Name of body of water, if commonly known:\n6. At the location of this Accident, had the pipeline segment or facility\nbeen identified as one that \"could affect\" a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) as determined in the Operator's Integrity Management Program?\nYes\n7. Did the released commodity reach or occur in one or more High\nConsequence Area (HCA)? Yes\n7a. If Yes, specify HCA type(s): (Select all that apply)\n- Commercially Navigable Waterway: Yes\nPage 3 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 3 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\nYes\n- High Population Area: Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\"\ndetermination for this Accident site in the Operator's\nIntegrity Management Program?\nYes\n- Other Populated Area\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\n- Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological Yes\nWas this HCA identified in the \"could affect\" determination\nfor this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity\nManagement Program?\nYes\n8. Estimated Property Damage:\n8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property\ndamage $ 0\n8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost $ 0\n8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 0\n8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 257,250\n8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation $ 0\n8f. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe: This includes emergency response and cleaning of the tank\nto investigate cause.\n8g. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $ 257,250\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): .00\n2. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the\nAccident (psig): .00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nAccident (psig): Pressure did not exceed MOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Accident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMOP?\nNo\n- If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below:\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore\nPipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question\n2?\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f. below)\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal\ninspection tools?\n- If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's,\nprojecting instrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic\nflux leakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nPage 4 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 4 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\n- If Yes, Which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other -\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system:\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? Yes\nIf Yes -\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe detection of the Accident?\nNo\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s),\nalert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with\nthe confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility\ninvolved in the Accident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? Yes\n7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the detection of the Accident?\nNo\n7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as\nalarm(s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist\nwith the confirmation of the Accident?\nNo\n8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operating Personnel, including contractors\n- If Other, Specify:\n8a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel\", including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Guard Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 8, specify the following:\nOperator employee\n9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nAccident?\n- If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\nThe facility was down for maintenance at the time of the\naccident\n- If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply)\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the\nOperator), and other factors associated with fatigue\nProvide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above:\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\nPage 5 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 5 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\n1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. Specify how many were tested:\n1b. Specify how many failed:\n2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify how many were tested:\n2b. Specify how many failed:\nPART G – APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in shaded column on left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Accident, and answer\nthe questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root causes of the Accident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G1 - Corrosion Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExternal Corrosion:\nInternal Corrosion: Yes\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes :\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic\nprotection at the time of the Accident?\nIf Yes - Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at\nthe point of the Accident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been\nconducted at the point of the Accident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination: Localized Pitting\n- Other:\n7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion Yes\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply): -\n- Field examination\nPage 6 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 6 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis Yes\n- Other:\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): -\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Other: Yes\n- If Other, Describe: Tank Floor\n10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? No\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? Yes\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? Not applicable - Not mainline pipe\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Tank/Vessel.\n14. List the year of the most recent inspections:\n14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection Yes\n- No Out-of-Service Inspection completed 2011\n14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection Yes\n- No In-Service Inspection completed 2011\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the\nAccident?\n15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year:\n- Crack\nMost recent year:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year:\n- Other\nMost recent year:\nDescribe:\n16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\nIf Yes -\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure:\n17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident::\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nPage 7 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 7 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\nDescribe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in\nconjunction with an extreme weather event?\n6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply)\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Accident\" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Accident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run: -\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Crack\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since\noriginal construction at the point of the Accident?\n- If Yes:\nPage 8 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 8 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the\npoint of the Accident since January 1, 2002?\n5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year conducted:\n- Other\nMost recent year conducted:\nDescribe:\nComplete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected as the sub-cause.\n6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity?\n6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) -\n- One-Call System\n- Excavator\n- Contractor\n- Landowner\nComplete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected.\n7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA-\nDIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)?\n8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) -\n- Public\n- If \"Public\", Specify:\n- Private\n- If \"Private\", Specify:\n- Pipeline Property/Easement\n- Power/Transmission Line\n- Railroad\n- Dedicated Public Utility Easement\n- Federal Land\n- Data not collected\n- Unknown/Other\n9. Type of excavator:\n10. Type of excavation equipment:\n11. Type of work performed:\n12. Was the One-Call Center notified?\n12a. If Yes, specify ticket number:\n12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center\nexists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified:\n13. Type of Locator:\n14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation?\n15. Were facilities marked correctly?\n16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service?\n16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours)\n17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predominant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where\navailable as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root Cause as well):\nRoot Cause:\n- If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify:\n- If Other/None of the Above, explain:\nG4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column\nPage 9 of 14\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 9 of 14\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\n133500 Appendix C Sunoco 7000-1 DC9 - Final Report\nOther Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause of Incident:\n- If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NOT Engaged in Excavation:\n1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by:\n- If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipment or Vessels Set Adrift or Which Have Otherwise Lost\nTheir Mooring:\n2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a factor:\n- Hurrican","truncated":true,"body_characters":49574}