{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Texas Eastern Transmission L.P.'s, 2012-04-13","title":"Failure Report- Texas Eastern Transmission L.P.'s 4/13/12","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-03-10","effective_on":"2012-04-13","summary":"Texas Eastern Transmission L.P.'s; Gas Transmission; PA; failure 2012-04-13; apparent cause: Equipment failure - Start Air Valve Malfunction.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-texas-eastern-transmission-lps-41312.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-texas-eastern-transmission-lps-41312.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-texas-eastern-transmission-lps-41312","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-texas-eastern-transmission-lps-41312","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal Investigator Michael Yazemboski\nSenior Accident Investigator Michael Yazemboski\nRegion Director Byron E. Coy\nDate of Report 10/29/2012\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Texas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA)\nMarietta Station Incident\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 04/13/2012\nCommodity Released Air\nCity/County & State Marietta, Lancaster County, PA\nOpID & Operator Name 19235 – Texas Eastern Transmission L.P. (Spectra)\nUnit # & Unit Name 15091 – Eagle/Marietta/Chester-PA\nSMART Activity # 139285\nMilepost / Location Latitude: 40.0641275; Longitude: -76.5773285\nType of Failure Rupture of the starting air piping system due to check valve malfunctions\non Compressor Engine #1.\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 1\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nTotal Costs Rural, Class 1 Area, Non-High Consequence Area\nProperty Damage: $250,000 ; Intentional Gas Lost (blowdown): $1,170\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report\nTexas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident\n[Failure Date 04/13/2012]\nExecutive Summary\nOn April 13, 2012, at approximately 1:20 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), an explosion occurred at\nTexas Eastern Transmission L.P.’s (Texas Eastern) Marietta Compressor Station located in Marietta,\nPennsylvania. The explosion occurred on the starting air system during the startup of a reciprocating\nengine located in the main compressor building. Texas Eastern made a notification to the National\nResponse Center reporting the incident.\nThe station operator was in the process of starting Engine Unit #1 when the air piping system exploded.\nThe station operator suffered injuries during the explosion and was taken to a local hospital for\ntreatment and overnight observation. He was released from the hospital on April 14, 2012. Damage to\nthe station was confined to the air piping within the main compressor building. There was no release of\ngas and no fire resulting from this incident.\nOn April 16, 2012, an inspector from the Eastern Region was dispatched to the incident site to conduct\nan investigation.\nThe incident was caused by a malfunction of the “Air Start Check Valve” and the “Air Start Valve” on\nengine #1. The Air Start Valves are designed to regulate starting air into the engine cylinders during\nstartup, and the Air Start Check Valves are designed to prevent hot combustion gases and combustible\nfuel/air mixtures from back flowing into the air supply piping during startup operations. The\nmalfunction of the valves allowed hot engine exhaust gases, during startup, to come in contact with an\nexplosive mixture of lubricating oils from the air compressor that had accumulated in the air piping\nsystem.\nSystem Details\nThe Marietta Compressor Station is comprised of one turbine unit and seven natural gas-fired\nreciprocating compressor units that are used to maintain pressure and move natural gas through the\nTexas Eastern System.\nThe air system was installed during the construction of the station in 1952 and consists of 2-inch-\ndiameter, 0.188-wall, Grade B steel pipe. The air system in the main reciprocating compressor building\nconsists of a 250 psig system that is used for starting the compressor engines, and a 150 psig system\nthat is used for service air only (crane, air tools). Each system is pressure-regulated and equipped with\nan overpressure relief valve. The 250 psig system relief is set at 300 psig, and the 150 psig system is set\nat 200 psig. The turbine building is only equipped with instrument/service air. The air compressor\nservicing the station is an Ingersoll, 50 horsepower, 2-stage unit that was installed in 1990. Based on a\nreview of inspection/maintenance records and interviews with station personnel, there have been no\nproblems reported regarding the air system prior to this event.\nTexas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 2 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report\nTexas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident\n[Failure Date 04/13/2012]\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nPrior to the incident, the station was utilizing the unit 7 turbine compressor to move natural gas on the\nmain transmission lines. The station received a request from the control center to bring the unit 7\nturbine offline and to start the reciprocating units. The station operator was in the process of starting\nengine unit #1, in accordance with the startup procedures (Appendix F), when the incident occurred.\nThe recycle valve to the compressor unit was open, and the unit was not loaded at the time of the\nfailure. The recycle valve allows the natural gas to circulate through the compressor during engine\nstartup, thus reducing the amount of load on the engine. The station operator indicated that he was in\nthe process of closing the starting air valve, after the engine start, when the air system exploded. He\nalso indicated that he did not notice anything out of the ordinary prior to the incident and that the\nengine had run the day before without any problems (Appendix H Photos).\nEmergency Response\nOn Friday April 13, 2012, at approximately 1:20 p.m. EST, an individual driving along River Road (SR 141)\nnear the Marietta Compressor Station heard an explosion and called 911. Two employees in the station\noffice approximately 300 feet from the main compressor building also contacted 911 when they heard\nthe explosion. The station operator was the only individual inside the main compressor building during\nthe incident. The emergency shutdown system was tripped manually by the mechanic who was one of\nthe individuals in the station office. The local police and fire department arrived on scene within 10\nminutes. The station operator was taken by ambulance to a local hospital where he was treated for\nfacial and head injuries and kept overnight for observation.\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nAs a result of the incident investigation, Texas Eastern took immediate action across its U.S. operations\nat compressor stations with reciprocating engines and reciprocating air compressors. On April 20, 2012,\nTexas Eastern distributed a system-wide safety alert requiring that specific action be taken at\nreciprocating compressor stations that utilize starting air systems. The safety alert required station\npersonnel to inspect and overhaul the starting air check valves on all reciprocating units with starting air\nsystems. At locations where the units were not running, the alert stated that the units should not be\nrun until these maintenance activities were completed. If units in-service were shutdown, they were\nnot to be restarted until the requirements of the alert were met.\nAs part of the safety alert, locations were required to document all starting air check valve issues\nidentified during the inspection and overhaul activities. Each location was also required to identify any\nunits that had a history of sluggish/malfunctioning starting air check valves found during scheduled\nmaintenance activities or during start-up. Reciprocating compressor stations were required to review\nand/or revise their unit start-up and shut-down procedures to ensure that the procedures included a\ntemperature check of the starting air piping at each cylinder head. Elevated temperatures indicate a\nmalfunctioning starting air check valve and require that the unit be shut down and the check valve\nreplaced or repaired.\nTexas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 3 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report\nTexas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident\n[Failure Date 04/13/2012]\nThe safety alert also required that stations with reciprocating air compressors revise their routine\noperating duties to require that all low-point drains on air systems be blown out once per shift when the\nstation is manned to prevent the accumulation of compressor lubricants in the air piping. Stations were\nalso required to identify and document the daily oil consumption rate of each reciprocating air\ncompressor, identify and document the manufacturer, type, and specification of the lube oil currently\nused, and identify and document the historical data on previous lube oils used.\nThe Marietta Station will remain offline until remediation activities have been completed. Texas Eastern\nwill install a new air piping system at the Marietta Station that will include the addition of chillers, air\ndriers, and additional drains at low points throughout the air piping system to prevent fluids from\naccumulating in the piping. In addition, an oil separator will be installed on the air compressor to aid in\nremoving oil and fluids from the air stream.\nInvestigation Details\nOn April 13, 2012, at approximately 1:20 p.m. EST, Texas Eastern reported an incident at their Marietta\nCompressor Station in Marietta, Pennsylvania, (Appendix A) to the National Response Center (Appendix\nB). The damage resulting from the incident was confined to the air piping system within the main\ncompressor building. Although this event did not involve an unintentional release of gas from the\nfacility, Texas Eastern reported this event as a reportable incident under 191.5 of the code because of\nthe significant nature of the event and the resulting injury to the station operator. The Marietta Station\nis located in a rural, Class 1, non-High Consequence Area. The Marietta Station has no history of\nreportable incidents or safety-related conditions.\nAn investigator from PHMSA’s Eastern Region was dispatched to the site and began the investigation on\nApril 16, 2012. Upon arriving at the station, a briefing meeting was held with Texas Eastern personnel.\nSite drawings, procedures, pipe specifications, system schematics, and information related to the\nincident were discussed.\nThe failure of the air system originated at Engine Unit #1 (unit ID 30501) (Appendix H, page 4). The\nengine was a naturally aspirated reciprocating Clark Model HBA8, with a total output of 1760 HP. This\nunit was installed in 1952. Prior to starting Engine #1 on April 13, the day of the incident, Engine #1 was\noperated on April 12 with no reported problems. According to a Unit Maintenance and Operations Log,\nEngine Unit #1 (unit ID 30501) logged a total of 720 hours for the 13 days in April 2012 prior to the\nincident (Appendix E). The total accumulated hours of runtime for this unit was 169,662. There were no\nreported maintenance or operational issues associated with this unit (Unit Maintenance/Operations\nLog). Maintenance records for Engine Unit #1 showed that the Air Start Valves were inspected and\nreconditioned every 2 years per the Preventative Maintenance Checklist outlined in Section 1, Volume 1,\nof the Spectra Energy Transmission Maintenance Manual (Appendix D). Scheduled maintenance on the\nAir Start Valves was completed on June 26, 2008, and July 27, 2010.\nTexas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 4 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report\nTexas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident\n[Failure Date 04/13/2012]\nThe Air Start Valves are designed to regulate the starting air into the engine cylinders during startup, and\nthe Air Start Check Valves are designed to prevent hot combustion gases and combustible fuel/air\nmixtures from back-flowing into the air supply piping during startup operations. Upon examining the Air\nStart Valves on compressor engine No. 1, it was observed that the valve was slow to respond when\nopened manually. Upon disassembly of the valve, coking deposits (a residue similar to creosote), were\nfound around the valve stem, preventing the valve from operating freely as designed (Appendix H, page\n12). This indicates that hot exhaust gases had made it past the Air Start Check Valve and were in direct\ncontact with the Air Start Valve. It is believed that the residual lubricating oil from the air compressors\n(500 °F flashpoint) that had accumulated in the air piping was ignited by the hot exhaust gases that were\nimpinging on the Air Start Valve, thus causing the incident.\nThe starting air systems for all six reciprocating engines located at the Marietta Station were inspected\nby Texas Eastern immediately following the incident. As a result of the inspection, Engine #3, Cylinder\n#4, was found to have a similar coking condition as was found on Engine #1.\nThe investigation also focused on the air collectors and the fluid collection system for the air system.\nThe collectors were located outside of the main compressor building (Appendix H, page 18). The\ncollectors store the compressed air for use throughout the station. Lubricating oils and fluids from the\nair compressors that accumulate in these vessels are drained into a holding tank at the beginning of\neach 12-hour shift. There were no additional drains at low points on the air piping located downstream\nof the air collectors. It is believed that the accumulation of lubricating oil at these low points\ndownstream of the air collectors resulted in a combustible mixture that was a contributing factor in this\nincident (Appendix H, page 1).\nAs part of the investigation, Operator Qualification records and Station Operating and Maintenance\nprocedures were reviewed. The station operator has been working at Texas Eastern for a total of 4\nyears, during all of which he has worked as a station operator. The station operator was successfully\nqualified on September 13, 2011, for the following tasks related to this incident:\n1. Covered Task 6030P-Compressor Units/Stations: Start-up, Operations, Shutdown, and Purging\nBefore Returning to Service (Qualification Expiration Date: 9/13/2014)\n2. Covered Task 6020P- Monitoring Pipeline Pressure (Qualification Expiration Date: 9/13/2014)\n3. Covered Task 0070P- Operate Valves (Qualification Expiration Date: 9/13/2014)\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nBased on the results of the incident investigation conducted by PHMSA’s Eastern Region, the cause of\nthe incident was due to the malfunction of the “Air Start Check Valve” and the “Air Start Valve” on\nCompressor Engine No. 1. In addition, oil from the air compressors had accumulated in the air lines,\ncreating a combustible mixture that was ignited by the hot combustion gases.\nTexas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 5 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report\nTexas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident\n[Failure Date 04/13/2012]\nAppendices\nAppendix Description\nA 139285 Appendix A Aerial photo map\nB 139285 Appendix B NRC report 1008605\nC 139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final\nD 139285 Appendix D Maintenance Checklist\nE 139285 Appendix E Maintenance Operations Log\nF 139285 Appendix F Unit Startup Procedures\nG 139285 Appendix G Station Operating Pressure\nH 139285 Appendix H Photos\nTexas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 6 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nAppendix A\nMap Removed\nFile Available at PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nPage 1 of 2\n139285 Appendix B NRC report 1008605\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n*** For Public Use ***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 1008605\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken at 15:11 on 13-APR-12\nIncident Type: FIXED\nIncident Cause: EQUIPMENT FAILURE\nAffected Area:\nThe incident occurred on 13-APR-12 at 13:20 local time.\nAffected Medium: AIR ATMOSPHERE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nOrganization: SPECTRA ENERGY\nHOUSTON, TX 77056\nType of Organization: PUBLIC UTILITY\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nHIGHWAY 30 County: LANCASTER\nCity: MARIETTA State: PA\n____________________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: ONG Official Material Name: NATURAL GAS\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nCALLER REPORTED A RELEASE OF NATURAL GAS DUE TO A BACKFIRE IN A COMPRESSOR UNIT.\n____________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPackage: N/A\nBuilding ID:\nType of Fixed Object: OTHER\nPower Generating Facility: UNKNOWN\nGenerating Capacity:\nType of Fuel:\nNPDES:\nNPDES Compliance: UNKNOWN\n____________________________________________________________________________\nDAMAGES\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: YES Hospitalized: 1 Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\nDamages: NO\nLength of Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure\nAir: N\nRoad: N Major\nArtery: N\nWaterway: N\nTrack: N\nPassengers Transferred: NO\nPage 1 of 2\nfile:///C:/Users/Stephen.Gliebe/Documents/0000/Reports/139285/Appendix%20B-13928...\n10/29/2012\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nPage 2 of 2\n139285 Appendix B NRC report 1008605\nEnvironmental Impact: UNKNOWN\nMedia Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nSHUTDOWN SYSTEM\nRelease Secured: YES\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n____________________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: UNKNOWN, ºF\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal: NONE\nState/Local: PHMSA, DOT\nState/Local On Scene: NONE\nState Agency Number: NONE\n____________________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nCHEM SAFETY AND HAZARD INVEST BOARD (CSB AUTOMATIC NOTIFICATIONS)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nU.S. EPA III (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nFLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PHILADELPHIA (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nUSCG NATIONAL COMMAND CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-APR-12 15:20\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nNJ STATE POLICE (MARINE SERVICES BUREAU)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nNOAA RPTS FOR PA (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nPA STATE POLICE (BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nMD DEPT OF ENV (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-APR-12 15:19\nPA EMERG MGMT AGCY (MAIN OFFICE)\n13-APR-12 15:19\n____________________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nNONE\n___________________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 1008605 ***\nThe National Response Center is strictly an initial report taking agency\nand does not participate in the investigation or incident response. The\nNRC receives initial reporting information only and notifies Federal and\nState On-Scene Coordinators for response. The NRC does not verify nor\ndoes it take follow-on incident information. Verification of data and\nincident response is the sole responsibility of Federal/State On-Scene\nCoordinators. Data contained within the FOIA Web Database is initial\ninformation only. All reports provided via this server are for\ninformational purposes only. Data to be used in legal proceedings must be\nobtained via written correspondence from the NRC.\nPage 2 of 2\nfile:///C:/Users/Stephen.Gliebe/Documents/0000/Reports/139285/Appendix%20B-13928...\n10/29/2012\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed 100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0522\nEXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2014\nReport Date: 05/11/2012\nNo. 20120048 - 15529\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n--------------------------------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nINCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND\nGATHERING PIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0522. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated\nto be approximately 10 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the\ncollection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect\nof this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline\nSafety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes\nLast Revision Date: 05/29/2012\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 19235\n2. Name of Operator TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION LP (SPECTRA\nENERGY CORP)\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 5400 WESTHEIMER COURT 77056\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code: 77056\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Incident: 04/13/2012 13:20\n5. Location of Incident:\nLatitude: 40.0641275\nLongitude: -76.5773285\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1008605\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 04/13/2012 15:20\n8. Incident resulted from: Reasons other than release of gas\n9. Gas released: (select only one, based on predominant volume\nreleased)\n- Other Gas Released Name:\n10. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally - Thousand\nCubic Feet (MCF):\n11. Estimated volume of intentional and controlled release/blowdown -\nThousand Cubic Feet (MCF) 585.00\n12. Estimated volume of accompanying liquid release (Barrels):\n13. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n14. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? Yes\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n14a. Operator employees 1\n14b. Contractor employees working for the Operator 0\n14c. Non-Operator emergency responders 0\n14d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator 0\n14e. General public 0\n14f. Total injuries (sum of above) 1\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 (Rev. 06-2011) Page 1 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 1 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final\n15. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the incident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\n- If Yes, complete Questions 15a and 15b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n15a. Local time and date of shutdown 04/13/2012 13:20\n15b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) Yes\n16. Did the gas ignite? No\n17. Did the gas explode? No\n18. Number of general public evacuated: 0\n19. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n19a. Local time operator identified Incident 04/13/2012 13:20\n19b. Local time operator resources arrived on site 04/13/2012 13:20\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Incident onshore? Yes\n- Yes (Complete Questions 2-12)\n- No (Complete Questions 13-15)\nIf Onshore:\n2. State: Pennsylvania\n3. Zip Code: 17547\n4. City Marietta\n5. County or Parish York\n6. Operator designated location Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: 1203.64\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Marietta Compressor Station\n8. Segment name/ID: Marietta Compressor Station\n9. Was Incident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Incident : Operator-controlled property\n11. Area of Incident (as found) : Aboveground\nSpecify: Inside a building\nOther – Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in):\n12. Did Incident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\nName of body of water (If commonly known):\nApprox. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\nSelect:\nIf Offshore:\n13. Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\n14. Origin of Incident:\n- If \"In State waters\":\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- If \"On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)\":\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Incident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: - Interstate - Intrastate Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Incident: Onshore Compressor Station Equipment and Piping\n3. Item involved in Incident: Auxiliary Piping (e.g. drain lines)\n- If Pipe – Specify:\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):\n3b. Wall thickness (in):\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 (Rev. 06-2011) Page 2 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 2 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\n139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):\n3d. Pipe specification:\n3e. Pipe Seam – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer:\n3g. Year of manufacture:\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Incident – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve – Specify:\n- If Mainline – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Mainline valve manufacturer:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Year item involved in Incident was installed: 1952\n5. Material involved in Incident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Steel or Plastic – Specify:\n6. Type of Incident involved: Other\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nApprox. size: in. (in axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other – Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation:\n- If Other – Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening):\nby in. (length circumferentially or axially):\n- If Other – Describe:\nStarting air system failure\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Class Location of Incident: Class 1 Location\n2. Did this Incident occur in a High Consequence Area (HCA)? No\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify the Method used to identify the HCA:\n3. What is the PIR (Potential Impact Radius) for the location of this\nIncident? Feet: 1\n4. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\ndue to heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n5. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\nNOT by heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n6. Were any of the fatalities or injuries reported for persons located\noutside the PIR? No\n7. Estimated Property Damage :\n7a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage $ 0\n7b. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 250,000\n7c. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 0\n7d. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n7e. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $ 250,000\nCost of Gas Released\n7f. Estimated cost of gas released unintentionally $ 0\n7g. Estimated cost of gas released during intentional and\ncontrolled blowdown $ 1,170\n7h. Total estimated cost of gas released (sum of 7.f & 7.g above) $ 1,170\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Incident (psig): 250.00\n2. Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) at the point and\ntime of the Incident (psig): 250.00\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the Pressure did not exceed MAOP\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 (Rev. 06-2011) Page 3 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 3 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final\nIncident:\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Incident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMAOP?\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 4a and 4b below)\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore Pipeline,\nIncluding Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question 2? No\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. - 5f. below):\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source:\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection\ntools?\n- If No – Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting\ninstrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux\nleakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\n- If Yes, which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall build-up\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system:\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Incident? No\n- If Yes:\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Incident?\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Incident?\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the\ndetection of the Incident?\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of\nthe Incident?\n7. How was the Incident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operating Personnel, including contractors\n- If Other – Describe:\n7a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel, including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Ground Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 7, specify the following:\nOperator employee\n8. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nIncident?\nNo, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the\ntime of the Incident\n- If No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\n- If Yes, Describe investigation result(s) (select all that apply):\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous\nhours of service (while working for the operator), and other\nfactors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the Operator)\nand other factors associated with fatigue\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 (Rev. 06-2011) Page 4 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 4 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\n139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final\n- Provide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above –\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nYes\n- If Yes:\n1a. Describe how many were tested: 1\n1b. Describe how many failed: 0\n2. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. Describe how many were tested:\n2b. Describe how many failed:\nPART G - APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in the shaded column on the left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Incident, and answer the\nquestions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing, or root causes of the Incident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G6 - Equipment Failure\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub-cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes:\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at\nthe time of the incident?\n- If Yes, Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the\npoint of the incident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted\nat the point of the incident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 (Rev. 06-2011) Page 5 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 5 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\n139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n7. Cause of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply):\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Drop-out\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the gas/fluid treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n14. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point\nof the Incident?\n14a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year run:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year run:\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\n- Other\nMost recent year run:\nIf Other, Describe:\n15. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes,\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n16. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n17. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at\nthe point of the Incident since January 1, 2002?\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 (Rev. 06-2011) Page 6 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 6 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\n139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final\n17a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year examined:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year examined:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year examined:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\n- Other\nMost recent year examined:\nIf Other, Describe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If High Winds:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Incident generated in conjunction\nwith an extreme weather event?\n6a. If yes, specify: (select all that apply):\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):\n- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:\n- If Previous Damage Due to Excavation Activity:\nComplete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (From Part C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Incident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nYear:\n- Ultrasonic\nYear:\n- Geometry\nYear:\n- Caliper\nYear:\n- Crack\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 (Rev. 06-2011) Page 7 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 7 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\n139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final\nYear:\n- Hard Spot\nYear:\n- Combination Tool\nYear:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nYear:\n- Other:\nYear:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n5. Has one or more non-destructive ex","truncated":true,"body_characters":58880}