# Failure Report- Texas Eastern Transmission L.P.'s 4/13/12

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** PHMSA FIR, Texas Eastern Transmission L.P.'s, 2012-04-13
- **title:** Failure Report- Texas Eastern Transmission L.P.'s 4/13/12
- **source type:** incident
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2015-03-10
- **effective on:** 2012-04-13
- **summary:** Texas Eastern Transmission L.P.'s; Gas Transmission; PA; failure 2012-04-13; apparent cause: Equipment failure - Start Air Valve Malfunction.
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- **source url:** https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-texas-eastern-transmission-lps-41312
**body:**

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DOT US Department of Transportation
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
OPS Office of Pipeline Safety
Eastern Region
Principal Investigator Michael Yazemboski
Senior Accident Investigator Michael Yazemboski
Region Director Byron E. Coy
Date of Report 10/29/2012
Subject Failure Investigation Report – Texas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA)
Marietta Station Incident
Operator, Location, & Consequences
Date of Failure 04/13/2012
Commodity Released Air
City/County & State Marietta, Lancaster County, PA
OpID & Operator Name 19235 – Texas Eastern Transmission L.P. (Spectra)
Unit # & Unit Name 15091 – Eagle/Marietta/Chester-PA
SMART Activity # 139285
Milepost / Location Latitude: 40.0641275; Longitude: -76.5773285
Type of Failure Rupture of the starting air piping system due to check valve malfunctions
on Compressor Engine #1.
Fatalities 0
Injuries 1
Description of area
impacted
Total Costs Rural, Class 1 Area, Non-High Consequence Area
Property Damage: $250,000 ; Intentional Gas Lost (blowdown): $1,170

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Failure Investigation Report
Texas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident
[Failure Date 04/13/2012]
Executive Summary
On April 13, 2012, at approximately 1:20 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), an explosion occurred at
Texas Eastern Transmission L.P.’s (Texas Eastern) Marietta Compressor Station located in Marietta,
Pennsylvania. The explosion occurred on the starting air system during the startup of a reciprocating
engine located in the main compressor building. Texas Eastern made a notification to the National
Response Center reporting the incident.
The station operator was in the process of starting Engine Unit #1 when the air piping system exploded.
The station operator suffered injuries during the explosion and was taken to a local hospital for
treatment and overnight observation. He was released from the hospital on April 14, 2012. Damage to
the station was confined to the air piping within the main compressor building. There was no release of
gas and no fire resulting from this incident.
On April 16, 2012, an inspector from the Eastern Region was dispatched to the incident site to conduct
an investigation.
The incident was caused by a malfunction of the “Air Start Check Valve” and the “Air Start Valve” on
engine #1. The Air Start Valves are designed to regulate starting air into the engine cylinders during
startup, and the Air Start Check Valves are designed to prevent hot combustion gases and combustible
fuel/air mixtures from back flowing into the air supply piping during startup operations. The
malfunction of the valves allowed hot engine exhaust gases, during startup, to come in contact with an
explosive mixture of lubricating oils from the air compressor that had accumulated in the air piping
system.
System Details
The Marietta Compressor Station is comprised of one turbine unit and seven natural gas-fired
reciprocating compressor units that are used to maintain pressure and move natural gas through the
Texas Eastern System.
The air system was installed during the construction of the station in 1952 and consists of 2-inch-
diameter, 0.188-wall, Grade B steel pipe. The air system in the main reciprocating compressor building
consists of a 250 psig system that is used for starting the compressor engines, and a 150 psig system
that is used for service air only (crane, air tools). Each system is pressure-regulated and equipped with
an overpressure relief valve. The 250 psig system relief is set at 300 psig, and the 150 psig system is set
at 200 psig. The turbine building is only equipped with instrument/service air. The air compressor
servicing the station is an Ingersoll, 50 horsepower, 2-stage unit that was installed in 1990. Based on a
review of inspection/maintenance records and interviews with station personnel, there have been no
problems reported regarding the air system prior to this event.
Texas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 2 of 6

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Failure Investigation Report
Texas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident
[Failure Date 04/13/2012]
Events Leading up to the Failure
Prior to the incident, the station was utilizing the unit 7 turbine compressor to move natural gas on the
main transmission lines. The station received a request from the control center to bring the unit 7
turbine offline and to start the reciprocating units. The station operator was in the process of starting
engine unit #1, in accordance with the startup procedures (Appendix F), when the incident occurred.
The recycle valve to the compressor unit was open, and the unit was not loaded at the time of the
failure. The recycle valve allows the natural gas to circulate through the compressor during engine
startup, thus reducing the amount of load on the engine. The station operator indicated that he was in
the process of closing the starting air valve, after the engine start, when the air system exploded. He
also indicated that he did not notice anything out of the ordinary prior to the incident and that the
engine had run the day before without any problems (Appendix H Photos).
Emergency Response
On Friday April 13, 2012, at approximately 1:20 p.m. EST, an individual driving along River Road (SR 141)
near the Marietta Compressor Station heard an explosion and called 911. Two employees in the station
office approximately 300 feet from the main compressor building also contacted 911 when they heard
the explosion. The station operator was the only individual inside the main compressor building during
the incident. The emergency shutdown system was tripped manually by the mechanic who was one of
the individuals in the station office. The local police and fire department arrived on scene within 10
minutes. The station operator was taken by ambulance to a local hospital where he was treated for
facial and head injuries and kept overnight for observation.
Summary of Return-to-Service
As a result of the incident investigation, Texas Eastern took immediate action across its U.S. operations
at compressor stations with reciprocating engines and reciprocating air compressors. On April 20, 2012,
Texas Eastern distributed a system-wide safety alert requiring that specific action be taken at
reciprocating compressor stations that utilize starting air systems. The safety alert required station
personnel to inspect and overhaul the starting air check valves on all reciprocating units with starting air
systems. At locations where the units were not running, the alert stated that the units should not be
run until these maintenance activities were completed. If units in-service were shutdown, they were
not to be restarted until the requirements of the alert were met.
As part of the safety alert, locations were required to document all starting air check valve issues
identified during the inspection and overhaul activities. Each location was also required to identify any
units that had a history of sluggish/malfunctioning starting air check valves found during scheduled
maintenance activities or during start-up. Reciprocating compressor stations were required to review
and/or revise their unit start-up and shut-down procedures to ensure that the procedures included a
temperature check of the starting air piping at each cylinder head. Elevated temperatures indicate a
malfunctioning starting air check valve and require that the unit be shut down and the check valve
replaced or repaired.
Texas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 3 of 6

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Failure Investigation Report
Texas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident
[Failure Date 04/13/2012]
The safety alert also required that stations with reciprocating air compressors revise their routine
operating duties to require that all low-point drains on air systems be blown out once per shift when the
station is manned to prevent the accumulation of compressor lubricants in the air piping. Stations were
also required to identify and document the daily oil consumption rate of each reciprocating air
compressor, identify and document the manufacturer, type, and specification of the lube oil currently
used, and identify and document the historical data on previous lube oils used.
The Marietta Station will remain offline until remediation activities have been completed. Texas Eastern
will install a new air piping system at the Marietta Station that will include the addition of chillers, air
driers, and additional drains at low points throughout the air piping system to prevent fluids from
accumulating in the piping. In addition, an oil separator will be installed on the air compressor to aid in
removing oil and fluids from the air stream.
Investigation Details
On April 13, 2012, at approximately 1:20 p.m. EST, Texas Eastern reported an incident at their Marietta
Compressor Station in Marietta, Pennsylvania, (Appendix A) to the National Response Center (Appendix
B). The damage resulting from the incident was confined to the air piping system within the main
compressor building. Although this event did not involve an unintentional release of gas from the
facility, Texas Eastern reported this event as a reportable incident under 191.5 of the code because of
the significant nature of the event and the resulting injury to the station operator. The Marietta Station
is located in a rural, Class 1, non-High Consequence Area. The Marietta Station has no history of
reportable incidents or safety-related conditions.
An investigator from PHMSA’s Eastern Region was dispatched to the site and began the investigation on
April 16, 2012. Upon arriving at the station, a briefing meeting was held with Texas Eastern personnel.
Site drawings, procedures, pipe specifications, system schematics, and information related to the
incident were discussed.
The failure of the air system originated at Engine Unit #1 (unit ID 30501) (Appendix H, page 4). The
engine was a naturally aspirated reciprocating Clark Model HBA8, with a total output of 1760 HP. This
unit was installed in 1952. Prior to starting Engine #1 on April 13, the day of the incident, Engine #1 was
operated on April 12 with no reported problems. According to a Unit Maintenance and Operations Log,
Engine Unit #1 (unit ID 30501) logged a total of 720 hours for the 13 days in April 2012 prior to the
incident (Appendix E). The total accumulated hours of runtime for this unit was 169,662. There were no
reported maintenance or operational issues associated with this unit (Unit Maintenance/Operations
Log). Maintenance records for Engine Unit #1 showed that the Air Start Valves were inspected and
reconditioned every 2 years per the Preventative Maintenance Checklist outlined in Section 1, Volume 1,
of the Spectra Energy Transmission Maintenance Manual (Appendix D). Scheduled maintenance on the
Air Start Valves was completed on June 26, 2008, and July 27, 2010.
Texas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 4 of 6

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Failure Investigation Report
Texas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident
[Failure Date 04/13/2012]
The Air Start Valves are designed to regulate the starting air into the engine cylinders during startup, and
the Air Start Check Valves are designed to prevent hot combustion gases and combustible fuel/air
mixtures from back-flowing into the air supply piping during startup operations. Upon examining the Air
Start Valves on compressor engine No. 1, it was observed that the valve was slow to respond when
opened manually. Upon disassembly of the valve, coking deposits (a residue similar to creosote), were
found around the valve stem, preventing the valve from operating freely as designed (Appendix H, page
12). This indicates that hot exhaust gases had made it past the Air Start Check Valve and were in direct
contact with the Air Start Valve. It is believed that the residual lubricating oil from the air compressors
(500 °F flashpoint) that had accumulated in the air piping was ignited by the hot exhaust gases that were
impinging on the Air Start Valve, thus causing the incident.
The starting air systems for all six reciprocating engines located at the Marietta Station were inspected
by Texas Eastern immediately following the incident. As a result of the inspection, Engine #3, Cylinder
#4, was found to have a similar coking condition as was found on Engine #1.
The investigation also focused on the air collectors and the fluid collection system for the air system.
The collectors were located outside of the main compressor building (Appendix H, page 18). The
collectors store the compressed air for use throughout the station. Lubricating oils and fluids from the
air compressors that accumulate in these vessels are drained into a holding tank at the beginning of
each 12-hour shift. There were no additional drains at low points on the air piping located downstream
of the air collectors. It is believed that the accumulation of lubricating oil at these low points
downstream of the air collectors resulted in a combustible mixture that was a contributing factor in this
incident (Appendix H, page 1).
As part of the investigation, Operator Qualification records and Station Operating and Maintenance
procedures were reviewed. The station operator has been working at Texas Eastern for a total of 4
years, during all of which he has worked as a station operator. The station operator was successfully
qualified on September 13, 2011, for the following tasks related to this incident:
1. Covered Task 6030P-Compressor Units/Stations: Start-up, Operations, Shutdown, and Purging
Before Returning to Service (Qualification Expiration Date: 9/13/2014)
2. Covered Task 6020P- Monitoring Pipeline Pressure (Qualification Expiration Date: 9/13/2014)
3. Covered Task 0070P- Operate Valves (Qualification Expiration Date: 9/13/2014)
Findings and Contributing Factors
Based on the results of the incident investigation conducted by PHMSA’s Eastern Region, the cause of
the incident was due to the malfunction of the “Air Start Check Valve” and the “Air Start Valve” on
Compressor Engine No. 1. In addition, oil from the air compressors had accumulated in the air lines,
creating a combustible mixture that was ignited by the hot combustion gases.
Texas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 5 of 6

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Failure Investigation Report
Texas Eastern Transmission (SPECTRA) - Marietta Station Incident
[Failure Date 04/13/2012]
Appendices
Appendix Description
A 139285 Appendix A Aerial photo map
B 139285 Appendix B NRC report 1008605
C 139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final
D 139285 Appendix D Maintenance Checklist
E 139285 Appendix E Maintenance Operations Log
F 139285 Appendix F Unit Startup Procedures
G 139285 Appendix G Station Operating Pressure
H 139285 Appendix H Photos
Texas Easter FIR Summary Report 4-13-12 Final Page 6 of 6

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Appendix A
Map Removed
File Available at PHMSA

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139285 Appendix B NRC report 1008605
NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802
*** For Public Use ***
Information released to a third party shall comply with any
applicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws
Incident Report # 1008605
INCIDENT DESCRIPTION
*Report taken at 15:11 on 13-APR-12
Incident Type: FIXED
Incident Cause: EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Affected Area:
The incident occurred on 13-APR-12 at 13:20 local time.
Affected Medium: AIR ATMOSPHERE
____________________________________________________________________________
SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY
Organization: SPECTRA ENERGY
HOUSTON, TX 77056
Type of Organization: PUBLIC UTILITY
____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT LOCATION
HIGHWAY 30 County: LANCASTER
City: MARIETTA State: PA
____________________________________________________________________________
RELEASED MATERIAL(S)
CHRIS Code: ONG Official Material Name: NATURAL GAS
Also Known As:
Qty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT
____________________________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT
CALLER REPORTED A RELEASE OF NATURAL GAS DUE TO A BACKFIRE IN A COMPRESSOR UNIT.
____________________________________________________________________________
INCIDENT DETAILS
Package: N/A
Building ID:
Type of Fixed Object: OTHER
Power Generating Facility: UNKNOWN
Generating Capacity:
Type of Fuel:
NPDES:
NPDES Compliance: UNKNOWN
____________________________________________________________________________
DAMAGES
Fire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN
INJURIES: YES Hospitalized: 1 Empl/Crew: Passenger:
FATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:
EVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:
Damages: NO
Length of Direction of
Closure Type Description of Closure Closure Closure
Air: N
Road: N Major
Artery: N
Waterway: N
Track: N
Passengers Transferred: NO
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139285 Appendix B NRC report 1008605
Environmental Impact: UNKNOWN
Media Interest: NONE Community Impact due to Material:
____________________________________________________________________________
REMEDIAL ACTIONS
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
Release Secured: YES
Release Rate:
Estimated Release Duration:
____________________________________________________________________________
WEATHER
Weather: UNKNOWN, ºF
____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED
Federal: NONE
State/Local: PHMSA, DOT
State/Local On Scene: NONE
State Agency Number: NONE
____________________________________________________________________________
NOTIFICATIONS BY NRC
ATLANTIC STRIKE TEAM (MAIN OFFICE)
13-APR-12 15:19
CHEM SAFETY AND HAZARD INVEST BOARD (CSB AUTOMATIC NOTIFICATIONS)
13-APR-12 15:19
DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
13-APR-12 15:19
U.S. EPA III (MAIN OFFICE)
13-APR-12 15:19
FLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM PHILADELPHIA (MAIN OFFICE)
13-APR-12 15:19
USCG NATIONAL COMMAND CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)
13-APR-12 15:20
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)
13-APR-12 15:19
NJ STATE POLICE (MARINE SERVICES BUREAU)
13-APR-12 15:19
NOAA RPTS FOR PA (MAIN OFFICE)
13-APR-12 15:19
PA STATE POLICE (BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION)
13-APR-12 15:19
MD DEPT OF ENV (MAIN OFFICE)
13-APR-12 15:19
PA EMERG MGMT AGCY (MAIN OFFICE)
13-APR-12 15:19
____________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
NONE
___________________________________________________________________________
*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 1008605 ***
The National Response Center is strictly an initial report taking agency
and does not participate in the investigation or incident response. The
NRC receives initial reporting information only and notifies Federal and
State On-Scene Coordinators for response. The NRC does not verify nor
does it take follow-on incident information. Verification of data and
incident response is the sole responsibility of Federal/State On-Scene
Coordinators. Data contained within the FOIA Web Database is initial
information only. All reports provided via this server are for
informational purposes only. Data to be used in legal proceedings must be
obtained via written correspondence from the NRC.
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139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final
NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to
exceed 100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil
penalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.
OMB NO: 2137-0522
EXPIRATION DATE: 01/31/2014
Report Date: 05/11/2012
No. 20120048 - 15529
U.S Department of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
--------------------------------------------------
(DOT Use Only)
INCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND
GATHERING PIPELINE SYSTEMS
A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply
with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid
OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0522. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated
to be approximately 10 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, gathering the data needed, and completing and reviewing the
collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect
of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline
Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.
INSTRUCTIONS
Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific
examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.
PART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION
Report Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:
Yes
Last Revision Date: 05/29/2012
1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 19235
2. Name of Operator TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION LP (SPECTRA
ENERGY CORP)
3. Address of Operator:
3a. Street Address 5400 WESTHEIMER COURT 77056
3b. City HOUSTON
3c. State Texas
3d. Zip Code: 77056
4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Incident: 04/13/2012 13:20
5. Location of Incident:
Latitude: 40.0641275
Longitude: -76.5773285
6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1008605
7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the
National Response Center (if applicable): 04/13/2012 15:20
8. Incident resulted from: Reasons other than release of gas
9. Gas released: (select only one, based on predominant volume
released)
- Other Gas Released Name:
10. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally - Thousand
Cubic Feet (MCF):
11. Estimated volume of intentional and controlled release/blowdown -
Thousand Cubic Feet (MCF) 585.00
12. Estimated volume of accompanying liquid release (Barrels):
13. Were there fatalities? No
- If Yes, specify the number in each category:
13a. Operator employees
13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator
13c. Non-Operator emergency responders
13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT
associated with this Operator
13e. General public
13f. Total fatalities (sum of above)
14. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? Yes
- If Yes, specify the number in each category:
14a. Operator employees 1
14b. Contractor employees working for the Operator 0
14c. Non-Operator emergency responders 0
14d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT
associated with this Operator 0
14e. General public 0
14f. Total injuries (sum of above) 1
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139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final
15. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the incident? Yes
- If No, Explain:
- If Yes, complete Questions 15a and 15b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)
15a. Local time and date of shutdown 04/13/2012 13:20
15b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted
- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) Yes
16. Did the gas ignite? No
17. Did the gas explode? No
18. Number of general public evacuated: 0
19. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):
19a. Local time operator identified Incident 04/13/2012 13:20
19b. Local time operator resources arrived on site 04/13/2012 13:20
PART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION
1. Was the origin of the Incident onshore? Yes
- Yes (Complete Questions 2-12)
- No (Complete Questions 13-15)
If Onshore:
2. State: Pennsylvania
3. Zip Code: 17547
4. City Marietta
5. County or Parish York
6. Operator designated location Milepost/Valve Station
Specify: 1203.64
7. Pipeline/Facility name: Marietta Compressor Station
8. Segment name/ID: Marietta Compressor Station
9. Was Incident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS)? No
10. Location of Incident : Operator-controlled property
11. Area of Incident (as found) : Aboveground
Specify: Inside a building
Other – Describe:
Depth-of-Cover (in):
12. Did Incident occur in a crossing? No
- If Yes, specify type below:
- If Bridge crossing –
Cased/ Uncased:
- If Railroad crossing –
Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled
- If Road crossing –
Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled
- If Water crossing –
Cased/ Uncased
Name of body of water (If commonly known):
Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:
Select:
If Offshore:
13. Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:
14. Origin of Incident:
- If "In State waters":
- State:
- Area:
- Block/Tract #:
- Nearest County/Parish:
- If "On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)":
- Area:
- Block #:
15. Area of Incident:
PART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION
1. Is the pipeline or facility: - Interstate - Intrastate Interstate
2. Part of system involved in Incident: Onshore Compressor Station Equipment and Piping
3. Item involved in Incident: Auxiliary Piping (e.g. drain lines)
- If Pipe – Specify:
3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in):
3b. Wall thickness (in):
Form PHMSA F 7100.2 (Rev. 06-2011) Page 2 of 13
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139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final
3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi):
3d. Pipe specification:
3e. Pipe Seam – Specify:
- If Other, Describe:
3f. Pipe manufacturer:
3g. Year of manufacture:
3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Incident – Specify:
- If Other, Describe:
- If Weld, including heat-affected zone – Specify:
- If Other, Describe:
- If Valve – Specify:
- If Mainline – Specify:
- If Other, Describe:
3i. Mainline valve manufacturer:
3j. Year of manufacture:
- If Other, Describe:
4. Year item involved in Incident was installed: 1952
5. Material involved in Incident: Carbon Steel
- If Material other than Steel or Plastic – Specify:
6. Type of Incident involved: Other
- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:
Approx. size: in. (in axial) by
in. (circumferential)
- If Leak - Select Type:
- If Other – Describe:
- If Rupture - Select Orientation:
- If Other – Describe:
Approx. size: in. (widest opening):
by in. (length circumferentially or axially):
- If Other – Describe:
Starting air system failure
PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION
1. Class Location of Incident: Class 1 Location
2. Did this Incident occur in a High Consequence Area (HCA)? No
- If Yes:
2a. Specify the Method used to identify the HCA:
3. What is the PIR (Potential Impact Radius) for the location of this
Incident? Feet: 1
4. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged
due to heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No
5. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged
NOT by heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No
6. Were any of the fatalities or injuries reported for persons located
outside the PIR? No
7. Estimated Property Damage :
7a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private
property damage $ 0
7b. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 250,000
7c. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 0
7d. Estimated other costs $ 0
Describe:
7e. Total estimated property damage (sum of above) $ 250,000
Cost of Gas Released
7f. Estimated cost of gas released unintentionally $ 0
7g. Estimated cost of gas released during intentional and
controlled blowdown $ 1,170
7h. Total estimated cost of gas released (sum of 7.f & 7.g above) $ 1,170
PART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION
1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Incident (psig): 250.00
2. Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) at the point and
time of the Incident (psig): 250.00
3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the Pressure did not exceed MAOP
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139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final
Incident:
4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations
(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility
relating to the Incident operating under an established pressure
restriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the
MAOP?
No
- If Yes - (Complete 4a and 4b below)
4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure
restriction?
4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the
State?
5. Was "Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites" OR "Offshore Pipeline,
Including Riser and Riser Bend" selected in PART C, Question 2? No
- If Yes - (Complete 5a. - 5f. below):
5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source:
5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release
source:
5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft):
5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection
tools?
- If No – Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)
- Changes in line pipe diameter
- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves
- Tight or mitered pipe bends
- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting
instrumentation, etc.)
- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux
leakage internal inspection tools)
- Other
- If Other, Describe:
5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which
significantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool
run?
- If Yes, which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)
- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall build-up
- Low operating pressure(s)
- Low flow or absence of flow
- Incompatible commodity
- Other
- If Other, Describe:
5f. Function of pipeline system:
6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based
system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Incident? No
- If Yes:
6a. Was it operating at the time of the Incident?
6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Incident?
6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),
event(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the
detection of the Incident?
6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),
event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of
the Incident?
7. How was the Incident initially identified for the Operator? Local Operating Personnel, including contractors
- If Other – Describe:
7a. If "Controller", "Local Operating Personnel, including
contractors", "Air Patrol", or "Ground Patrol by Operator or its
contractor" is selected in Question 7, specify the following:
Operator employee
8. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or
control room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the
Incident?
No, the facility was not monitored by a controller(s) at the
time of the Incident
- If No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the
controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:
(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)
- If Yes, Describe investigation result(s) (select all that apply):
- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous
hours of service (while working for the operator), and other
factors associated with fatigue
- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,
continuous hours of service (while working for the Operator)
and other factors associated with fatigue
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139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final
- Provide an explanation for why not:
- Investigation identified no control room issues
- Investigation identified no controller issues
- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or
controller error
- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the
controller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)
response
- Investigation identified incorrect procedures
- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment
operation
- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected
control room operations, procedures, and/or controller
response
- Investigation identified areas other than those above –
Describe:
PART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION
1. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator employees tested
under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's
Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?
Yes
- If Yes:
1a. Describe how many were tested: 1
1b. Describe how many failed: 0
2. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator contractor employees
tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of
DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?
No
- If Yes:
2a. Describe how many were tested:
2b. Describe how many failed:
PART G - APPARENT CAUSE
Select only one box from PART G in the shaded column on the left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Incident, and answer the
questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing, or root causes of the Incident in the narrative (PART H).
Apparent Cause: G6 - Equipment Failure
G1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column
Corrosion Failure – Sub-cause:
- If External Corrosion:
1. Results of visual examination:
- If Other, Describe:
2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)
- Galvanic
- Atmospheric
- Stray Current
- Microbiological
- Selective Seam
- Other
- If Other – Describe:
3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)
- Field examination
- Determined by metallurgical analysis
- Other
- If Other – Describe:
4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?
- If Yes:
4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at
the time of the incident?
- If Yes, Year protection started:
4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the
point of the incident?
4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted
at the point of the incident?
If "Yes, CP Annual Survey" – Most recent year conducted:
If "Yes, Close Interval Survey" – Most recent year conducted:
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139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final
If "Yes, Other CP Survey" – Most recent year conducted:
- If No:
4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?
5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of
the corrosion?
- If Internal Corrosion:
6. Results of visual examination:
- If Other, Describe:
7. Cause of corrosion (select all that apply):
- Corrosive Commodity
- Water drop-out/Acid
- Microbiological
- Erosion
- Other
- If Other, Describe:
8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply):
- Field examination
- Determined by metallurgical analysis
- Other
- If Other, Describe:
9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply):
- Low point in pipe
- Elbow
- Drop-out
- Other
- If Other, Describe:
10. Was the gas/fluid treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides?
11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?
12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely
utilized?
13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?
Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the "Item Involved in Incident" (from PART C,
Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.
14. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point
of the Incident?
14a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:
- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool
Most recent year run:
- Ultrasonic
Most recent year run:
- Geometry
Most recent year run:
- Caliper
Most recent year run:
- Crack
Most recent year run:
- Hard Spot
Most recent year run:
- Combination Tool
Most recent year run:
- Transverse Field/Triaxial
Most recent year run:
- Other
Most recent year run:
If Other, Describe:
15. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted
since original construction at the point of the Incident?
- If Yes,
Most recent year tested:
Test pressure (psig):
16. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this
segment?
- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:
Most recent year conducted:
- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:
Most recent year conducted:
17. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at
the point of the Incident since January 1, 2002?
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139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final
17a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most
recent year the examination was conducted:
- Radiography
Most recent year examined:
- Guided Wave Ultrasonic
Most recent year examined:
- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool
Most recent year examined:
- Wet Magnetic Particle Test
Most recent year examined:
- Dry Magnetic Particle Test
Most recent year examined:
- Other
Most recent year examined:
If Other, Describe:
G2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column
Natural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:
- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:
1. Specify:
- If Other, Describe:
- If Heavy Rains/Floods:
2. Specify:
- If Other, Describe:
- If Lightning:
3. Specify:
- If Temperature:
4. Specify:
- If Other, Describe:
- If High Winds:
- If Other Natural Force Damage:
5. Describe:
Complete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.
6. Were the natural forces causing the Incident generated in conjunction
with an extreme weather event?
6a. If yes, specify: (select all that apply):
- Hurricane
- Tropical Storm
- Tornado
- Other
- If Other, Describe:
G3 - Excavation Damage only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column
Excavation Damage – Sub-Cause:
- If Excavation Damage by Operator (First Party):
- If Excavation Damage by Operator's Contractor (Second Party):
- If Excavation Damage by Third Party:
- If Previous Damage Due to Excavation Activity:
Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Incident" (From Part C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld.
1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of
the Incident?
1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:
- Magnetic Flux Leakage
Year:
- Ultrasonic
Year:
- Geometry
Year:
- Caliper
Year:
- Crack
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139285 Appendix C Marietta Incident 2012 final
Year:
- Hard Spot
Year:
- Combination Tool
Year:
- Transverse Field/Triaxial
Year:
- Other:
Year:
Describe:
2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was
completed BEFORE the damage was sustained?
3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted
since original construction at the point of the Incident?
- If Yes:
Most recent year tested:
Test pressure (psig):
4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline
segment?
- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:
Most recent year conducted:
- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:
Most recent year conducted:
5. Has one or more non-destructive ex
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