{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company, 2015-06-09","title":"Failure Report- Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company 6/9/15","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2016-06-09","effective_on":"2015-06-09","summary":"Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company; Gas Transmission; PA; failure 2015-06-09; apparent cause: Material Failure - Cracking.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-transcontinental-gas-pipeline-company-6915.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-transcontinental-gas-pipeline-company-6915.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-failure-report-transcontinental-gas-pipeline-company-6915","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-reports/failure-report-transcontinental-gas-pipeline-company-6915","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nEastern Region\nPrincipal\nInvestigator\nMichael Yazemboski\nSenior Accident\nInvestigator\nMichael Yazemboski\nRegion Director Byron E. Coy\nDate of Report 1/13/2016\nSubject Failure Investigation Report –\nWilliams Partners L.P./Transco 24”\nLeidy Line B Failure, Unityville, PA\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 6/9/2015\nCommodity Released Natural Gas\nCity/County & State Unityville, Lycoming County, Pennsylvania\nOpID & Operator Name 19570 Williams Pipeline L.P./ Transcontinental Gas\nUnit # & Unit Name 2841 White Haven\nSMART Activity # 150663\nMilepost / Location Station # 4693+50 (MP 118.6) ; ‐\nType of Failure Fatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of area\nimpacted\nTotal Costs $751,154\nRupture; Near‐neutral Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)\nNon‐HCA, Rural Class 1 Area\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Williams Partners L.P./Transco 24” Leidy Line B Failure, Unityville, PA\n6/9/2015\nExecutive Summary\nOn June 9, 2015, at approximately 21:30 Eastern Standard\nTime (EST), a rupture occurred on the Transcontinental’s Leidy\nline B, resulting in the release of approximately 96,379 Mcf1 of\nnatural gas in a rural class 1 area near Unityville, PA.\nApproximately 150 people in the surrounding area were\nevacuated by local emergency response personnel as a\nprecaution. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of\nPipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation on June 10,\n2015. As a result of the investigation, PHMSA issued a\nCorrective Action Order on June 12, 2015, requiring Williams\nPartners, L.P, operator of the Transcontinental Pipeline, to take\ncertain corrective actions with respect to the Leidy line B failure (CPF No. 1‐2015‐1013H). The cause of\nthe failure was near‐neutral stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of the pipe. Localized shielding and coating\nfailure, in addition to cyclic pressures during bidirectional flow, were identified as possible contributing\nfactors to the incident. The incident caused minimal environmental damage to the surrounding area.\nDamage consisted of soil and rock debris ejected onto the right‐of‐way by the pipeline rupture.\nWaterways were not impacted. Williams Partners L.P., operator of the Transcontinental Pipeline\n(Transco) made a notification to the National Response Center reporting the incident. There were no\nfires, injuries, or significant property damage resulting from the release.\nSystem Details\nTranscontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. LLC, an affiliate of Williams Partners, L.P., is a 10,500‐mile interstate\nnatural gas pipeline system extending from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Gulf of Mexico through\nAlabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey to\nthe New York City metropolitan area. The system's total delivery capacity is approximately 8.4 million\ndekatherms.\nLeidy line B is a 24‐inch diameter pipeline, 194.06 miles in length, that originates at station 505 at\nmilepost (mp) 0.14 and terminates at the Leidy Storage Field located in Tamarack, PA. Line B passes\nthrough Potter, Clinton, Lycoming, Columbia, Luzerne, and Monroe Counties in Pennsylvania and\nWarren, Hunterdon, and Somerset Counties in New Jersey (Appendix A).\nThe “Affected Segment”, a term used throughout this report, is the segment of Leidy line B from\ncompressor station 517 main line valve to Leidy Storage Field (MP\n194.06). The length of Affected Segment is 78.9 miles.\nThe “Isolated Segment” is the 14.3‐mile segment of Leidy line B from compressor station 517 main line\nvalve MLV 517LB0 to MLV 517LB10. The Isolated Segment is the portion of the Affected Segment that\nwas shut‐in after the failure.\nThere is no history of previous incidents or significant releases from the failed pipeline.\n1 Mcf = thousand cubic feet\nPage 2 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report - Williams Partners L.P./Transco 24\" Leidy Line B Failure, Unityville, PA\n6/9/2015\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nOn the morning of Tuesday, June 9, 2015,\nWilliams' personnel repositioned valves on\nline B to allow gas to flow west to Leidy\nStorage. According to SCADA pressure\nrecords, the switch took place at 09:24. Prior\nto the incident, gas was flowing east under\ncompression from the turbines at station\n520. When the turbines are not in operation,\ngas from producers flows into line B, moving\nwest toward Leidy. The records also show station 520 was shut down on Monday, June 8, 2015, and\nbypassed in preparation for the flow reversal on June 9. A review of the pressure records leading\nup to the failure showed pressure slowly increasing in line B throughout the day on June 9. The\noperating pressure in line B at the time of failure was 1,141 psig, which was below the 1,200 psig\nMaximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP).\nEmergency Response\nOn June 9, 2015, at approximately 21:30 EST, Pipeline Control in Houston, Texas was alerted by a SCADA\nlow pressure alarm on line B, and proceeded to isolate the line by remotely closing\nnear the town of Benton, PA. Local operations responded and verified that\nvalves 517LB0 and S4 at station 517 were closed, and confirmed that the failed section of pipeline had\nbeen isolated. Valves 517LBO and S4 had been closed prior to the incident due to construction activities\nat station 517. Isolation of the failed pipeline segment was completed within approximately 30 minutes\nand Transco personnel, including emergency managers, were on-site within 1 hour. Emergency\nresponders, including seven local fire companies, responded and began evacuating a 2-mile radius\naround the failure site. The nearest home was located approximately 0.2 miles away from the failure\nlocation. Approximately 150 people were evacuated as a precaution due to the escaping natural gas.\nState Routes 118 and 42 were temporarily closed to traffic in the affected area. There were no fires or\ninjuries reported as a result of the pipeline rupture. Williams Pipeline notified the National Response\nCenter (NRC) at 22:41 EST on June 9, 2015 (NRC No. 1119244).\nSummary of Return-to-Service\nThere are three pipelines, lines A, B, and C, within\nthe Transco Pipeline right-of-way. Due to the\nproximity of line C to the line B rupture, Williams\nconducted an integrity assessment of line C on June\n11, 2015, by exposing 100 feet of line closest to the\nfailure location. No damage was identified. Line A\nwas not exposed. Lines A and C were returned to\nnormal operating pressures on June 12, 2015.\nFollowing the assessment of lines A and C, PHMSA\nissued a corrective action order (CAO) on June 12,\n2015, requiring Williams Partners, L.P, operator of\nthe Transcontinental Pipeline, to take certain corrective actions with respect to Leidy line B (CPF No. 1-\n2015-1013H). The CAO imposed a 20% reduction in pressure on the Affected Segment and imposed an\noperating restriction on the Isolated Segment of Leidy line B. The CAO also required the development\nPage 3 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Williams Partners L.P./Transco 24” Leidy Line B Failure, Unityville, PA\n6/9/2015\nand submittal of a restart plan, prior to operation of the isolated segment. The order also required an\ninstrumented leakage survey, confirmation of MAOP, review of prior inline inspection (ILI) results,\nmechanical and metallurgical testing, failure analysis of the failed pipe, root cause failure analysis, and a\nreview of the effectiveness of its Emergency Response Plan and Public Awareness Program with regards\nto the failure.\nThe Isolated Segment of line B will remain out of operation and the 20% reduction in operating pressure\non the Affected Segment will remain in place pending completion of the CAO requirements and PHSMA\napproval to remove the operating restrictions.\nInvestigation Details\nThe failure occurred on line B in a rural, non‐HCA area within Transco’s right‐of‐way approximately\n1,000 feet west of Bradley Road at mile post 118.6. There are 3 Transco pipelines, line A (24 inch\ndiameter), line B (24‐inch diameter), and line C (36‐inch diameter), within the common right‐of‐way at\nthis location. The section of line B that failed was constructed in 1963, and consists of 24‐inch diameter,\n0.344 inch wall thickness, Grade X60, electric flash welded (EFW) seam pipe.\nAt the time of the failure, line B was operating at a pressure of 1,141 psig, which is below the Maximum\nAllowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of 1,200 psig, as established by a hydrostatic test in 1987.\nThe rupture consisted of a 34‐foot longitudinal fracture originating at the one‐o'clock position on the\npipeline. Based on visual and laboratory examination of the pipe, the failure was not near or associated\nwith the longitudinal weld seam on the pipe. The incident occurred between stations 4701+33 and\n4683+36. Minimum cover over the pipe was measured to be 43 inches on the upper slope of the failure\nsite.\nOperation and Maintenance records for line B were reviewed from 2010 through 2015. The records\nincluded Cathodic Protection, Leak Survey/Patrolling, performed by Eagle Sky Patrol Inc. No issues were\nidentified. Launchers and receivers are located at station 515 at mp 68.95, Picture Rocks at mp 129.52,\nand station 520 at mp 157.68\nLine B was installed in 1963 and is EFW X60 pipe with an external coal tar coating. There is no history of\ninternal corrosion. Based on a review of the SCADA system pressure data, there is no excessive pressure\ncycling. The majority of the line B is located in a class 1‐2 area with some class 3 areas between station\n515 and station 505. There are no class 3 areas west of station 515.\nLine A was installed in the 1950’s and it has an external coal tar coating. According to the Williams Root\nCause Analysis (Appendix E) “the Leidy A and B Lines on the Pennsylvania System should be assessed\nwith in line inspection crack (Electro Magnetic Acoustic Transducer or EMAT) tools as the pipeline and\ncoating vintage are all similar on the west side of the Delaware River.”\nLine C was installed in 1987 and it has a 3 layer external phenolic epoxy coating.\nPrior Assessments of the Failed Pipeline:\nThe original hydrostatic test on line B was conducted in 1963. The pipe was retested in 1987 from mile\npost 113.76 to 123.79 due to a class location change from 1 to 2 on the segment. The minimum\npressure during the retest was 1,795 psig.\nOn September 30, 2010, a mag flux leakage tool (MFL), caliper tool, and internal mapping unit tool (IMU)\nwas run on 88.73 miles of the Leidy loop line B from station 515 to station 520. A total of 29 locations\nwere selected for digs (mp 0 to 44.84, and mp 113.74 to 157.63 for total of 87.73 miles). Remediation\nwork was completed in 2011.\nPage 4 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Williams Partners L.P./Transco 24” Leidy Line B Failure, Unityville, PA\n6/9/2015\nA third‐party review of the ILI run from 2010 was performed by Enduro Pipeline Services on June 10,\n2015. The results of the data review did not show any metal loss, cracking, or denting that would have\ncontributed to the failure. There were no anomalies identified associated with seams, wrinkles, buckles\nor strain in the area of the failure.\nFindings and Contributing Factors\nRoot Cause:\nThe SES metallurgical analysis report, dated August 25, 2015, identified the cause of the rupture to be\nthe result of near‐neutral pH SCC that initiated on the external surface of the pipe (Appendix D). The\nreport also indicates that groups of SCC colonies were found adjacent to the rupture origin, as well as\nseveral locations remote from the rupture origin. Pits of depths that were less than 10% of the wall\nthickness of the pipe were present on the outside surface of the pipe in the vicinity of the SCC colonies.\nThe pits were observed in areas where the exterior coating had locally disbonded from the pipe. The\ncombination of transgranular cracking, corrosion of the crack sides, external corrosion pitting, and\ncorrosion deposits containing iron carbonate (siderite) indicates that the cracking was the result of near‐\nneutral pH SCC. The pipe analysis found no evidence of mechanical or third party damage that could\nhave contributed to the failure, and the properties of the pipe material met the requirements of API 5LX,\nGrade X60, confirming that the pipe properties did not contribute to the rupture.\nContributing Factors:\nLocalized Coating Failure Combined with Shielding: Corrosion and rust staining on the area surrounding\nthe cracks were observed, indicating areas of coating failure. The coating failure could be due to\ninadequate surface preparation prior to applying the coating or soil stresses on the coating.\nCyclical Stresses and Bidirectional Flow: In the past, the Leidy System was utilized as a storage lateral\nmoving gas from the southwestern United States to storage fields in Pennsylvania. The gas would then\nbe sent back to markets on the East Coast at times of peak delivery. Currently, the Leidy System is used\nmore as a Transmission pipeline moving gas from the Marcellus Shale production to New Jersey and\nNew York. The bidirectional flow and pressure variations may have been a contributing factor to the\nformation of near‐neutral pH SCC on the pipeline.\nAppendices\nA\nB\nC\nD\nE\nMaps and Photographs\nNRC Report 1119244\nIncident Report Form 7100.2 20150091 - 16805\nStress Engineering Services, Inc. Metallurgical Analysis Report\nWilliams Root Cause Analysis\nPage 5 of 5\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nBrantford\nCatharines\nKocnester\nBuffalo\nSyracuse\nUtica\nSystem 1287\n20\nErie.\nake\nUnit 2841\nApprox Failure\nAlbany\nNashua\nlocation\nMASSACHUSETTS\nLowell®\nWorcester\nBinghamsten\nSpringfield\n/ 62\nHartford\nProvidence New E\n49.\nPENNSY\nWIA\n15\nScranton.\n• Waterbury\nCONNECTICUT\nRHODE\n/Fal\nYoungstown\n180\nBridgeport\nISLAND\nState College\nPittsburgh\nAltoona\n22\n111\nAllen town\nNew York\n219\n99\nHarrisburg\nReading\n222\nTrenton\nEdison\n115\nPhiladelphia\nToms River\nMARYLAND\nJERSEY\nNEW\nAdantic City\nesri\nOlean\nElmira\nBinghamton®\nBradford\nKingston\n220\n219\nPoughke\nSaint Marys\nPENNSYLVANIA\nScranton o\nMiddletown, Newburst Beacon\nWilliamsport\n206\n209\nJERSEY\nNEW\n68\n11\nHazleton\nState College\n209\nPaterson\nWhite Plainso\nYonke\nParsippany\n281\nAltoona\nAllentown\nNew Yorko ass\nElizabeth\n0930°k\n202\n•Edison\nReading\ncos noi destin\nPage 1 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nColumbia\nPenn Twp\nSL\n239-PA 239-State Route 239\nJackson\nTwp\n78037-3000\nJordan\nLairdsville\nFranklin\nTWp\nTwp\n(239\n487\nUnityville\n(118)\nBeach Glen Rd:\n21830),\nesni\nBiggertown\nMordan Hollow Ra\nBobbons Spring In\nBradey Ro\nWilson Rd\nPage 2 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nPage 3 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nOlean\nElmira\nJamestown\nBinghamton\nBradford\nWarren\n220\n219\n62\n44\n11\nPENNSYLVANIA\n(15\nil Gity\nSaint Marys\nMiddletown Newburgh™\nScranton o\nWillamsport\n80\n380\n206\nNEW\n80\n209\nJERSEY\n73°w\nWhite PI\n11\nHazleton\n209\nPaterson\n80\nState College\n46\nParsippany\n(422\nNew Yorko\nAllentown\n78\nElizabeth\nAlto on a\n22\nOEdison\n202\nPENNSYLVANIA\n99\nHarrisburg\nReading\n130\n1 9\nLo\n222\nTrenton\nLancaster\n322\nChamb ersbura\n/15\n(30-\nPhiladelphia\nToms Rii\n31km\nPage 4 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nмеге\n220\nCreek Twp\nPlunketts\nPA-3005\nShrewsbury\nTwp\n42\n41022°30N\nMuncy\nValley\nGlen State\nRicketts\nDavidson\nPark\nMill\nTwp\nCreek\nFairfield\nUpper\n(864)\nTwp\n118\nTwp\nFairm ount\nWolf Twp\nTwp\nPicture\nSugarloaf\nRocks\nPenn Twp\nTwp\n(220)\n(239\nFairfield\nJackson\nMossvilleRdRedHill Ra\nTwp\nJordan\nTwp\nBethel Hill Ru\nBroadway!\nMuncy\nLyconing Mall Dr\nIwp\n76°37 30\"VF ranklin\nTwp\n7653'30\"W\nHughesville\nLairdsville\nTwp\n-118\n*Ro\nUnityville\nMoreland\nLarasville Rd\n(42)\nexdı eton po\nTwp\nPuntock Harveyvin. Rd\nMuncy\nreek Twi\nBentor\nTwp\nPine Twp\nBenton\nshickshinny Rd\nHuntington\non\nMills\n(442)\nUni\nMontgomery\nLycoming\nNew\nTw\nColum bus\nNor thumberlun d\nSunshine Rd\nStillwater\nGreenwood\nWaterton Rd\n405\nTwp\nShickshinny Valley\nDelaware\nTwp\nAnthony\nMil |V199°30°N\nRoge Rd\nTwp\nWhite Hall Ro\nMadison\nRohroburg Rd\nWinding Rd\nDewart\nTwp\nBriar\nung/e int\nTurbotville\n487\nCreek\nLewis\nTwp\na Nasr\nWatsontown\nTwp\nMt Pleasant\nAlsup\nPage 5 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\n118\nWoods Rd\nKeller Hollow.Rd,\nKellen Hollow Rd.\n118\n165 m\nPage 6 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nBradley Rd\nAppalachian Mountains\nBradley Rd\nPage 7 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\n\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nPage 9 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nPage 10 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nPage 11 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nPage 12 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nPage 13 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nPage 14 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\nPage 15 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\nPage 16 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\nPage 17 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\nPage 18 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\nPage 19 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\nPage 20 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 26>>>\n\nPage 21 of 21\n\n<<<PAGE 27>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 1 of 4\n150663 Appendix B NRC Report 1119244\nHMIS->INCI\nPipeline & Hazardous\nPHMSA\nMaterials Safety\n(Version 4.0.0\nAdministration\nPROD)\nRules of Beha\n[Return to Search]\nNRC Number:\n1119244\nCall Date:\n06/09/2015\nCall Time:\n22:41:00\nCaller Information\nFirst Name:\nWILLIAM\nLast Name: NEUBAUER\nCompany Name: WILLIAMS GAS PIPELINE\nAddress:\n2800 POST OAK BLVD\nCity:\nHOUSTON\nState:\nCountry:\nUSA\nZip:\n77056\nPhone 1:\n8002311290\nPhone 2:\n7135918409\nOrganization\nType:\nPRIVA\nIs caller the\n@ Yes ONo ONo\nspiller?\nResponse\nConfidential:\n•Yes •No ONo Response\nDischarger Information\nFirst Name:\nWILLIAM\nLast Name: NEUBAUER\nCompany Name: WILLIAMS GAS PIPELINE\nAddress:\n2800 POST OAK BLVD\nCity:\nHOUSTON\nState:\nTX\nCountry:\nUSA\nZip:\n77056\nPhone 1:\n8002311290\nPhone 2:\n7135918409\nOrganization\nType:\nPRIVAT\nPage 1 of 4\nhttp://hmis.phmsa.dot.gov/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?sho... 11/12/2015\n\n<<<PAGE 28>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 2 of 4\n150663 Appendix B NRC Report 1119244\nSpill Information\nState:\nPA\nCounty:\nMERCER\nNearest City:\nUNITYVILLE\nZip Code:\nLocation\nSpill Date:\n06/09/2015 (mm/dd/yyyy) Spill Time:\n20:40:00\n_ (24hh:mm:ss)\nDTG Type:\n<- Select DTG Type -> V\nReported\nIncident Type\nALL\nIncident\nPIPELINE\nType\nDescription\nNATURAL GAS RELEASED FROM A 24 INCH PIPELINE DUE TO AN UNKNOWN CAUSE AT THIS\nMaterials Involved\nMaterial / Chris Name\nChris Code Total Qty.\nWater Qty.\nNATURAL GAS\nONG\nO UNKNOWN AMOUNT\nMedium Type:\n<- Select Medium Type V\nAdditional Medium Information:\nATMOSPHERE\nInjuries:\nFatalites:\nEvacuations:\n• Yes • No O Unknown\nNo. of\nEvacuations:\nPage 2 of 4\nhttp://hmis.phmsa.dot.gov/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?sho. 11/12/2015\n\n<<<PAGE 29>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 3 ot 4\n150663 Appendix B NRC Report 1119244\nDamages:\n• Yes O No • Unknown\nDamage\nAmount:\nFederal Agency\nState\nNotified:\n• Yes O No • Unknown Agency\n• Yes O No • Unknown\nNotified:\nOther Agency\nNotified:\n• Yes O No • Unknown\nRemedial Actions\nTHEY CLOSED REMOTE VALVES TO ISOLATE THE SECTION.\nAdditional Info\nTHE ROAD CLOSURE IS STILL ONGOING.\nLatitude\nDegrees: L\nMinutes:\nSeconds:\nQuadrant:\nLongitude\nDegrees: L\nMinutes:\nSeconds:\nQuadrant: |\nDistance from\nCity:\nDirection:\nSection:\nTownship:\nRange:\nMilepost:\n]Rescinded\nComments (max 250 characters)\n^\n1..1 of 1\nPage 3 of 4\nhttp://hmis.phmsa.dot.gov/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?sho... 11/12/2015\n\n<<<PAGE 30>>>\n\nTeleDetail\nPage 4 of 4\n150663 Appendix B NRC Report 1119244\n<< Previous\n<< Save >>\nPage 4 of 4\nhttp://hmis.phmsa.dot.gov/hmis/telephonics/Teledetail.aspx?sho... 11/12/2015\n\n<<<PAGE 31>>>\n\n150663 Appendix C Incident Report Form 7100.2 20150091-16805\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed 100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0522\nEXPIRATION DATE: 10/31/2016\nOriginal Report\nDate: 07/09/2015\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20150091 - 16805\n--------------------------------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nINCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND\nGATHERING PIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0522. All responses to this collection of information are\nmandatory. Send comments regarding the burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the\nburden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Final:\nYes\nLast Revision Date:\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 19570\n2. Name of Operator TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE COMPANY\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 2800 POST OAK BLVD\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code: 77056\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Incident: 06/09/2015 21:30\n5. Location of Incident:\nLatitude:\nLongitude:\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1119244\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 06/09/2015 22:41\n8. Incident resulted from: Unintentional release of gas\n9. Gas released: (select only one, based on predominant volume\nreleased) Natural Gas\n- Other Gas Released Name:\n10. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally - Thousand\nCubic Feet (MCF): 96,379.00\n11. Estimated volume of intentional and controlled release/blowdown -\nThousand Cubic Feet (MCF) 16,812.00\n12. Estimated volume of accompanying liquid release (Barrels):\n13. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n14. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n14a. Operator employees\n14b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n14c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n14d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n14e. General public\n14f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n15. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the incident? Yes\n- If No, Explain:\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 1 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 1 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 32>>>\n\n150663 Appendix C Incident Report Form 7100.2 20150091-16805\n- If Yes, complete Questions 15a and 15b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n15a. Local time and date of shutdown 06/09/2015 22:07\n15b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) Yes\n16. Did the gas ignite? No\n17. Did the gas explode? No\n18. Number of general public evacuated: 150\n19. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n19a. Local time operator identified Incident– effective 10-2014,\nchanged from \"Incident\" to \"failure\" 06/09/2015 21:30\n19b. Local time operator resources arrived on site 06/09/2015 23:03\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Incident onshore? Yes\n- Yes (Complete Questions 2-12)\n- No (Complete Questions 13-15)\nIf Onshore:\n2. State: Pennsylvania\n3. Zip Code: 17814-7935\n4. City Benton\n5. County or Parish Lycoming County\n6. Operator designated location Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: MP 118.6\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Leidy Line B\n8. Segment name/ID: 517LB10 to 517LB0\n9. Was Incident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Incident : Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Incident (as found) : Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\nOther – Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 43\n12. Did Incident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\nName of body of water (If commonly known):\nApprox. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\nSelect:\nIf Offshore:\n13. Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\n14. Origin of Incident:\n- If \"In State waters\":\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- If \"On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)\":\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Incident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: - Interstate - Intrastate Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Incident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n3. Item involved in Incident: Pipe\n- If Pipe – Specify: Pipe Body\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 24\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .344\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 1,720\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 2 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 2 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 33>>>\n\n150663 Appendix C Incident Report Form 7100.2 20150091-16805\n3d. Pipe specification: 60000\n3e. Pipe Seam – Specify: Flash Welded\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: AO SMITH\n3g. Year of manufacture: Unknown\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Incident – Specify: Coal Tar\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve – Specify:\n- If Mainline – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Mainline valve manufacturer:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Year item involved in Incident was installed: 1963\n5. Material involved in Incident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel or Plastic – Specify:\n6. Type of Incident involved: Rupture\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other – Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation: Longitudinal\n- If Other – Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening): 408\nby in. (length circumferentially or axially): 24\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Class Location of Incident: Class 1 Location\n2. Did this Incident occur in a High Consequence Area (HCA)? No\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify the Method used to identify the HCA:\n3. What is the PIR (Potential Impact Radius) for the location of this\nIncident? Feet: 574\n4. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\ndue to heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n5. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\nNOT by heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n6. Were any of the fatalities or injuries reported for persons located\noutside the PIR? No\n7. Estimated Property Damage :\n7a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator – effective 6-\n2011, \"paid/reimbursed by the Operator\" removed\n$ 0\nEstimated cost of gas released unintentionally – effective 6-2011,\nmoved to item 7f\nEstimated cost of gas released during intentional and controlled\nblowdown – effective 6-2011, moved to item 7g\n7b. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 420,000\n7c. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 10,000\n7d. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n7e. Property damage subtotal (sum of above) $ 430,000\nCost of Gas Released\n7f. Estimated cost of gas released unintentionally $ 273,454\n7g. Estimated cost of gas released during intentional and\ncontrolled blowdown $ 47,700\n7h. Total estimated cost of gas released (sum of 7.f & 7.g above) $ 321,154\nTotal of all costs $ 751,154\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 3 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 3 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 34>>>\n\n150663 Appendix C Incident Report Form 7100.2 20150091-16805\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Incident (psig): 1,141.00\n2. Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) at the point and\ntime of the Incident (psig): 1,200.00\nAdded 10-2014 2a. MAOP established by 49 CFR section: 192.619(a)(1)\n- If Other, specify:\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nIncident: Pressure did not exceed MAOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Incident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMAOP?\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 4a and 4b below)\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore Pipeline,\nIncluding Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question 2? Yes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5e. below):\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source: Remotely Controlled\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource: Remotely Controlled\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 75,504\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection\ntools? Yes\n- If No – Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting\ninstrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux\nleakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall build-up\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: Transmission System\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Incident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Incident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Incident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the\ndetection of the Incident?\nYes\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of\nthe Incident?\nYes\n7. How was the Incident initially identified for the Operator? SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume or pack calculations)\n- If Other – Describe:\n7a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel, including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Ground Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 7, specify:\n8. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nIncident?\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 4 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 4 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 35>>>\n\n150663 Appendix C Incident Report Form 7100.2 20150091-16805\ninvestigate)\n- If No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nController Actions did not appear to cause the incident\n- If Yes, Descr be investigation result(s) (select all that apply):\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous\nhours of service (while working for the operator), and other\nfactors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the Operator)\nand other factors associated with fatigue\n- Provide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above –\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nYes\n- If Yes:\n1a. How many were tested: 3\n1b. How many failed: 0\n2. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nYes\n- If Yes:\n2a. How many were tested: 3\n2b. How many failed: 0\nPART G - APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in the shaded column on the left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Incident, and answer the\nquestions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing, or root causes of the Incident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub-cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 5 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 5 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 36>>>\n\n150663 Appendix C Incident Report Form 7100.2 20150091-16805\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\n- If Yes:\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at\nthe time of the incident?\n- If Yes, Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the\npoint of the incident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted\nat the point of the incident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n7. Cause of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply):\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Drop-out\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the gas/fluid treated with corrosion inh bitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n14. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point\nof the Incident?\n14a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year run:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year run:\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\n- Other\nMost recent year run:\nIf Other, Describe:\n15. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 6 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 6 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 37>>>\n\n150663 Appendix C Incident Report Form 7100.2 20150091-16805\n- If Yes,\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n16. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n17. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at\nthe point of the Incident since January 1, 2002?\n17a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year examined:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year examined:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year examined:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\n- Other\nMost recent year examined:\nIf Other, Describe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Incident generated in conjunction\nwith an extreme weather event?\n6a. If yes, specify: (select all that apply):\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Previous Damage Due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (From Part C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Incident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nYear:\n- Ultrasonic\nYear:\n- Geometry\nYear:\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 7 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\nPage 7 of 13\n\n<<<PAGE 38>>>\n\n150663 Appendix C Incident Report Form 7100.2 20150091-16805\n- Caliper\nYear:\n- Crack\nYear:\n- Hard Spot\nYear:\n- Combination Tool\nYear:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nYear:\n- Other:\nYear:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year","truncated":true,"body_characters":51810}