{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Marathon Pipe Line, LLC., 2008-09-03","title":"Marathon Pipe Line LLC-9/3/08","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2017-06-06","effective_on":"2008-09-03","summary":"Marathon Pipe Line, LLC.; Hazardous Liquid; IL; failure 2008-09-03; apparent cause: Material Failure Rupture.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-marathon-pipe-line-llc-9308.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-marathon-pipe-line-llc-9308.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-marathon-pipe-line-llc-9308","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/inspections-and-investigations/marathon-pipe-line-llc-9308","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT US Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nCentral Region\nPrincipal Investigator James Bunn/Karen Butler\nRegion Director Ivan Huntoon (Prior RD)\nDate of Report 1/14/2015\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material\nFailure, Rupture\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure 09/03/2008\nCommodity Released Hazardous Liquid (Refined Products, Diesel)\nCity/County & State Ashmore / Coles, Illinois\nOpID & Operator Name 32147 Marathon Pipe Line LLC\nUnit # & Unit Name 3703 Wabash System\nSMART Activity # 122652\nMilepost / Location MP 41.7 / 100 yards downstream of Ashmore Pump Station\nType of Failure Material Failure, Rupture - Crack in a dent, Deformation from poor\nconstruction practice\nFatalities 0\nInjuries 0\nDescription of Area\nimpacted\nTotal Costs $2,936,068\nRural farmland, non-High Consequence Area (HCA)\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture\nFailure Date 09/03/2008\nExecutive Summary\nAt approximately 9:43 a.m. CDT1 on September 3, 2008, a 12-inch diameter refined products pipeline\noperated by Marathon Pipe Line Company LLC (Marathon) ruptured downstream of the Ashmore\npumping station located in Coles County, Illinois. Marathon’s Findlay Operations Center received\nsuction and discharge pressure deviation alarms from the Ashmore Pump Station at 9:43. At 9:44 a.m.\nthe Operations Center received a CPM leak alarm, and the Wabash Pipeline System (12 inch) was shut\ndown. Marathon personnel were dispatched to locate the accident site. The National Response Center\n(NRC) was contacted at 12:58 p.m. (report number 882609). The rupture was confirmed at 5:12 p.m. to\nbe located approximately 100 yards downstream of the Ashmore Pump Station on the Robinson to\nChampaign section of the pipeline known as the East Leg. The pressure at the time of the failure was\n1,158 psig with a maximum operating pressure (MOP) of 1,211 psig. A second NRC report was filed\n(report number #882650) at 6.08 p.m., which increased the reported spill volume and provided\nadditional details on the location. No fatalities, injuries, fire, explosion, or evacuations resulted from the\nrupture, and it did not occur in a High Consequence Area (HCA). Surface water was impacted (1 barrel).\nApproximately 770 barrels of low sulfur diesel fuel were released as a result of the rupture, and an\nestimated 2,902 cubic yards of soil was contaminated. There were no service interruptions or supply\nimpacts as a result of the rupture. The total cost estimated by the operator as a result of the release was\n$2,936,068.\nThe pipeline was constructed in 1958 and was composed of 12-inch nominal diameter, 0.250-inch wall-\nthickness, low frequency electric resistance welded (LF ERW), X46 pipe made by Republic Steel. Prior to\nthe failure, the East Leg had experienced six hydrostatic tests in addition to that at original construction\n(starting in 1964 and ending in 2004). These six additional hydrostatic tests resulted in 26 ruptures and\nsix leaks.\nAt the rupture location, a deformation was present from original construction. Coating damage and\napproximately 5 percent through-wall external corrosion was identified at the center of a deformation.\nAfter the metallurgical report was completed, the operator engaged two additional subject matter\nexperts to review the failure and metallurgical analysis. Three subject matter experts arrived at a\n“consensus that the failure was caused by a crack located in a deformation. The deformation was\ncentered adjacent to the longitudinal ERW seam. Part of the deformation intersected the ERW seam.\nThe deformation likely occurred prior to the original commissioning of the pipeline. The shear crack\nformed on the outside diameter of the pipe due to a partial re-rounding of the deformation anomaly.\nEarly hydrotests may have imparted compressive stresses in the area of the crack that retarded\nsubsequent fatigue crack growth during operation. The fracture surfaces between the beach marks do\nnot look like those typical of high-cycle fatigue from operating pressure cycles. The apparent crack\nadvancement is indicative of low-cycle fatigue. The crack grew by tearing in one or more of the multiple\nhydrostatic tests between 1958 and 2004. The crack eventually grew to a large enough size that\noperational pressure continued to advance the crack to the point of failure.”2\nSystem Details\nMarathon Pipe Line Company LLC operates over 5,000 miles of hazardous liquid pipelines in 15 States.\n1 All times reference Central Daylight Time unless otherwise specifically noted.\n2 Information provided by Marathon during the follow-up from recommendations identified during the internal\nfailure investigation.\nPage 2 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture\nFailure Date 09/03/2008\nThe Wabash 12-inch Products Pipeline System originates at two points, Robinson, Illinois and Wood\nRiver, Illinois. The Wabash System terminates in Hammond, Indiana. The West Leg is 129.9 miles long\nand is located between Wood River, Illinois, and Champaign, Illinois. The North Leg is 128.4 miles long\nwith a 109.8 mile section located between Champaign, Illinois, and Griffith, Indiana, and another section\nthat is 18.6 miles long located between Griffith, Indiana, and Hammond, Indiana. The East Leg is 85.1\nmiles long and located between Champaign, Illinois, and Robinson, Illinois. This rupture occurred on the\nEast Leg of the system. The East Leg has pumping stations at Robinson, Martinsville, and Ashmore.\nProduct from Robinson, Illinois, can go into tankage at Champaign or can bypass Campaign and continue\non to Hammond, Indiana.\nThe East Leg was constructed with 12-inch nominal diameter pipe with a wall thickness of 0.250 inches.\nThe pipe was manufactured in 1958 by Republic Steel Corporation and is LF ERW, API 5LX, grade X-46\nline pipe. The pipeline was joined using the shielded metal arc welding process, and the welds were\ninspected by radiography. The pipe is coated with coal tar enamel, and the pipeline has been under\ncathodic protection since 1958. The pipeline was hydrostatically tested originally in 1958. A hydrostatic\ntest program was developed to manage the threat of manufacturing defects associated with the\nlongitudinal weld seam, and additional tests were performed in 1964, 1974, 1987, 1995, 1999, and\n2004. The MOP at the time of the failure was established as 1,211 psig and based on 80 percent of test\npressure. The pipeline was inspected with a High Resolution MFL and Geometry tool in 2002. There\nwere no anomalies identified at the failure location during this ILI inspection. The pipeline was\ninspected by PHMSA in 2006.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nJust prior to the incident, the East Leg was delivering an 80,000 bbl batch of ultra low sulfur diesel to the\nChampaign Terminal. The Hammond Terminal Headgate Valve was opened in preparation for a turn\ninto the North Leg out of the Champaign Terminal. Following the completion of the Champaign batch,\nthe East Leg was turned out of the Champaign Terminal northward toward the Hammond Terminal by\nopening the Champaign Bypass Valve. At this time, Robinson, Martinsville, and Ashmore pump stations\nhad one unit running at each location. After turning northward out of the Champaign Terminal, units\nwere started at Champaign, Buckley, and St. Anne pump stations (Buckley and St. Anne are on the North\nLeg).\nThe hydrostatic test pressure in 2004 was 1,562 psig with a spike test at 1,727 psig. The high pressure\nshutdown on discharge pressure was recorded as set at 1,220 psig for Ashmore station. The pressure at\nthe time of failure on the discharge of Ashmore pump station was approximately 1,158 psig. Spike tests\nwere used in the hydrostatic test program starting in 1995 and were 30 minutes long at approximately\n95 percent SMYS. As the years progressed, hydrostatic tests were performed in smaller sections of\npipeline on the East Leg in an effort to help locate releases or leaks. Each test starting in 1964 had more\nthan one failure in the Robinson to Champaign section. The six additional hydrotests starting in 1964\nresulted in 26 ruptures and six leaks and are summarized as follows:\nIn 1964 – Two ruptures occurred. This test was conducted with fuel oil but later water was used\nto complete the test.\nIn 1974 – Six ruptures and one leak occurred.\nIn 1987 – Three ruptures occurred.\nPage 3 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture\nFailure Date 09/03/2008\nIn 1995 – Four ruptures occurred during the spike test. No failures occurred during the 8-hour\ntest.\nIn 1999 – Six ruptures occurred on the spike test, and one leak occurred during the 8-hour test.\nThe causes of these failures were three hook cracks and four lack of fusion defects.\nIn 2004 – Five ruptures occurred on the spike test (three lack of fusion and two hook cracks) and\nfour leaks during the 8-hour test (associated with the longitudinal seams and repaired with Type\nB sleeves).\nA backpressure control valve did not exist at Champaign for the Robinson to Champaign segment.\nBackpressure control methods (check valves or control valves) were also not available at several other\nlocations on the North Leg (Ashkum Junction did not have a check valve; there was no backpressure\ncontrol valve was available at Hammond).\nEmergency Response\nThe Operations Center received a CPM leak alarm at 9:44 a.m. on September 3, 2008, and the\nOperations Center initiated shut down activities for the entire Wabash System within 47 seconds\naccording to report details. Field personnel were notified and dispatched to investigate. Information\nregarding the incident was reported by Marathon to the National Response Center (NRC) on September\n3, 2008, at 12:58 p.m. (Report No. 882609) even though detailed location information was not available\nand identified two creeks as possible locations for product (Deer Creek and Greasy Creek). At\napproximately 5:12 p.m. on September 3, 2008, field personnel reported that a rupture was discovered\napproximately 100 yards downstream of the Ashmore Pump Station. Additional time was required to\nlocate the leak as it was in a cornfield and the release could not be easily identified from the air. Field\npersonnel walked the right-of-way. Marathon filed a second NRC report on September 3, 2008, at 6:08\np.m. (Report No. 882650) providing additional information on the location of the release and an\nestimated spill volume of 900 barrels. This NRC report also stated that only soil was impacted.\nMarathon personnel immediately took steps to contain the product in the area where the release\noccurred. A series of interceptor trenches were dug in the cornfield at the release location, booms were\ndeployed, and the product was contained by 8:00 p.m. The remote control valves upstream and\ndownstream of the leak were closed. The length of the segment that was isolated was 79,200 feet (15\nmiles). The only emergency responders active at the response scene were Marathon employees.\nNo fatalities, injuries, fire, explosion, or evacuations resulted from the rupture, and it did not occur in a\nHigh Consequence Area (HCA). No significant road closures were reported. Surface water (1 barrel) was\nimpacted and approximately 2,902 cubic yards of soil were contaminated. There were no service\ninterruptions or supply impacts as a result of the rupture.\nSummary of Return to Service\nAfter the location of the release was confirmed and the area made safe, the failure site was excavated\nand the origin of the rupture was identified. The section of pipe that contained the origin was removed\nand protected, then shipped to a metallurgical laboratory for examination. A new section of pre-tested\npipe (51 feet long) was installed in the line where the rupture occurred and the line was returned to\nservice at 3:39 p.m. on September 4, 2008, with a 20 percent pressure reduction.\nPage 4 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture\nFailure Date 09/03/2008\nClean-up efforts continued at the site and soil continued to be remediated.\nInvestigation Details\nAt approximately 9:43 a.m. on September 3, 2008, Marathon Pipe Line Company LLC’s Findlay\nOperations Center received suction and discharge pressure deviation alarms from its Ashmore Pump\nStation located in Coles County, Illinois. At 9:44 a.m. the Operations Center received a CPM leak alarm\nand the Wabash Pipeline System was shut down and Marathon personnel were dispatched to locate the\nincident site. Control Center personnel responded to the events within 36 seconds according to report\ndata, and within 47 seconds, flow was stopped on the pipeline. Marathon personnel discovered the\nrupture location at 5:12 p.m. as the pipeline right-of-way was walked downstream of the Ashmore Pump\nStation. The rupture occurred on the pipeline right-of-way approximately 100 yards downstream of the\npump station at Survey Station Number 2207+54, MP 41.7.\nThe rupture was reported as 70 inches long with an opening approximately 3.0 inches in width at the\n5:30 circumferential position. The deformation measured approximately 0.150 inches deep (1.2 percent\nof pipe OD at the deepest location). Coating damage and approximately 5 percent through-wall external\ncorrosion was present at the center of the deformation. No indications of internal corrosion, stress\ncorrosion cracking, or other outside force damage were identified during metallurgical analysis.\nResidual stresses when the pipeline was cut were reported to be negligible.\nThe second NRC volume estimating 900 barrels would later be determined to be an estimated 770\nbarrels of low-sulfur diesel.\nInitially after the failure, the pressure setpoints were lowered on all three legs of the Wabash system.\nThe pressure de-rates remained in place while the operator ran ILI tools and completed the associated\nrehabilitation work.\nAfter the metallurgical analysis was completed, Marathon also completed an internal failure\ninvestigation, which resulted in three recommendations: 1) utilize ILI technology to identify other\npotential dents in the vicinity of the ERW seam and remediate any deformations as appropriate, 2)\ncollaborate with Scheduling and Hydraulics to perform an evaluation of potential changes to operating\nprocedures and/or engineering controls that would reduce the frequency and magnitude of pressure\ncycles, and 3) employ additional independent resources to obtain a second opinion on the metallurgical\nfindings.\n3\nBeginning in October of 2008 (10/26), deformation ILI assessments were completed on the North, East\nand West Legs. The results of these caliper runs were overlaid with circumferential MFL data in order to\nidentify any deformation at the long seam that might be similar to the release location. As a result, a\ntotal of 66 repairs were performed, 35 of which were on this same section (East Leg of the pipeline).\nAn additional hydrostatic test was completed in November of 2008 on a portion of the North Leg\n(Champaign to Griffith).\nThe operator hired two additional Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to review the metallurgical analysis.\nThe three SMEs agreed that “the failure was caused by a crack located in a deformation. The\n3 Identified in the Marathon investigation summary report.\nPage 5 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture\nFailure Date 09/03/2008\ndeformation was centered adjacent to the longitudinal ERW seam. Part of the deformation intersected\nthe ERW seam. The deformation likely occurred prior to the original commissioning of the pipeline. The\nshear crack formed on the outside diameter of the pipe due to a partial re-rounding of the deformation\nanomaly. Early hydrotests may have imparted compressive stresses in the area of the crack that\nretarded subsequent fatigue crack growth during operation. The fracture surfaces between the beach\nmarks do not look like those typical of high-cycle fatigue from operating pressure cycles. The apparent\ncrack advancement is indicative of low-cycle fatigue. The crack grew by tearing in one or more of the\nmultiple hydrostatic tests between 1958 and 2004. The crack eventually grew to a large enough size\nthat operational pressure continued to advance the crack to the point of failure.”4\nA pressure trending review did identify higher pressures at the Ashmore pump station versus other\nstations in the East line section just prior to the failure, which may indicate that the changes in\noperations that occurred at Champaign caused pressure to back into the Ashmore pump station\noperations even though the maximum MOP was not exceeded. Marathon conducted a detailed review\nof potential operational changes that could be made through scheduling similar batches of like product\ntogether in an effort to minimize starts and stops (reducing potential pressure cycles) and also\ndetermined that several control enhancements could assist in the reduction of amplitude regarding\npressure cycles. Suggested control revisions included replacement of the Griffith backpressure control\nvalve, a new check valve downstream of the Ashkum Junction, and new valves added at Hammond and\nChampaign on the East Leg. Pressure setpoints were also reviewed for possible changes.\nThe operator purchased the property that this rupture occurred on, both for clean-up efforts with\ncontinued soil remediation and for future ease of access.\nFindings & Contributing Factors\nThe metallurgical analysis determined that the fracture originated in a deformation in the pipe wall near\nthe longitudinal seam. The deformation occurred during the original construction of the pipeline. A\nshear crack formed on the outside diameter of the pipe due to re-rounding of the deformation, which\nlikely occurred during the initial pressure test.\nThree SMEs agreed that “early hydrotests may have imparted compressive stresses in the area of the\ncrack that retarded subsequent fatigue crack growth during operation. The fracture surfaces between\nthe beach marks did not look like those typical of high-cycle fatigue from operating pressure cycles. The\napparent crack advancement is indicative of low-cycle fatigue. The crack grew by tearing in one or more\nof the multiple hydrostatic tests between 1958 and 2004. The crack eventually grew to a large enough\nsize that operational pressure continued to advance the crack to the point of failure.”5\nThe lack of adequate back pressure controls may have been a contributing factor, and Marathon’s\ninternal failure investigation provided recommendations to minimize this potential and reduce pressure\ncycles.\nAs a result of additional ILI assessments, a total of 66 repairs were performed where deformation and\nlongitudinal seams may have overlapped, 35 of which were on this same segment.\n4 Marathon follow-up recommendations identified during the internal failure investigation.\n5 Information provided by Marathon during the follow-up from recommendations identified during the internal\nfailure investigation.\nPage 6 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture\nFailure Date 09/03/2008\nAn additional hydrostatic test was completed in 2008.\nThe six hydrostatic tests occurring in 1964 through 2004 resulted in 26 ruptures and six leaks. The\noperator’s management program involving hydrostatic tests removed defects from the pipeline, which\nalso could have resulted in additional safety and environmental consequences.\nAppendices\nA Maps and Photographs\nB NRC Reports\nC Operator’s Accident Report\nD Metallurgical Analysis\nPage 7 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nWabash 9-3-2008\n(b) (/)(F)|\nLegend\nPoint Of Release\n145 290\nLocation: llfdyrs981\\gis_datalwo\nPage 1 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\n1500m L\nKENDALL\nMUSCATINE\nLA PORTE:\nISLAND\nOCK\nBUREAU\nLA SALLE\nWILL\nJAKE\nJIRTER\nMERCER\nPUTNAM\nGRUNGY\n-STARKE\nES\nSTARK\nMARSHALE\nKANKAKEE\nST- ANNE P\nJASPER\nINES\nKNOX\nPULASKI\nWARREN\nWOODFORD\nLIYINGSTON\nPEORtA\nASHKUM\nTRODS\nWHITE\nBENTON\nCARROI\nMCDONOUG ILLINOIS CLEAN\n* BUCKLEY\nCHAMPATON\nFORD\nWARREN\nMASON:\nLOGAN\nDEWITT\nVERMICCION\nCLINT\nSCHUTLER\nGROWN\nCeSs\nMENARD I\nFOUNTAIN\nPIAT\n• CHAMPAIGN\nMACON\nMORGEN\nSANDAMON\n0OU5LAS\n104\nPARKE\n(SCOTT\nWEST LEG\n\"MACON RE\n• ASHORE\nEDGAr\nPUTNAM I\n(b) (7X(F)\nCOLES\nEAST LEG\nVIGO\nCUMBERLAND\nCLAY\nCLARK\nMARTINSVILLE\nOWEN\nLINCOLN\nULIVAN\nMOWAd\nHAM\nJASPEC\nCRAWF\nCHARLES\nLAWRE\nOPERATOR MAP\nPage 2 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\n(b) (7)(F)\nAshmore Incident Resnonse Man O\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nFailed Pipeline Joint\nPage 4 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nClose-up photo showing rupture site\nPage 5 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nField, north side of Ashmore station (provided by operator)\nInternal view of removed pipe (provided by operator)\nPage 6 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nAppendix A - Maps and Photographs\nImage of tie-in (provided by operator)\nPage 7 of 7\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Reports\nTeleDetail\nPage 1 of 2\nVPHMSA\nAdministration\nMaterials Safely\nPipeline & Hazardous\nHMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS\n(Version 4.0.0 PROD)\nRules of Behavior\nHome\nLogout\nMent.\nNRC Number:\nCall Date:\n882609\n[Retum to Search]\n09/03/2008\nCall Time:\n13:58:00\nCaller Information\nAddress\nCompany Name\nMARATHON PIPELINE\nLAURA\nPERRON\nCity\n539 S. MAIN ST.\nCountry\nFINDLAY\nPhone 1\nUSA\nConndental\nOrganization Type\nPRIVATE\n2172511885\nZIp\nPhone 2\n45840\nOres No O No Response\nIs caller the spller?\n© Yes O No O No Response\nFirst Name\nAddress\nCompany Name\nLAURA\nDischarger Information\nMARATHON PIPELINE\nLast Name\nPErroN\nCountry\nCity\nFINDLAY\n539 S. MAIN ST.\nPhone 1\nUSA\nzip\nState\nOH\nOrganization Type\nPRIVATE\n2172511885\nPhone 2\n45840\nNearest City\nState\nSpill Information\nLocation\nOAKLAND\nCounty\nZip Code\nCoLES\nDTG Type\nSpll Date\n09/03/2008(mmidayyy)\nIncident Type\nALL\n<- Select DTG Type -> v\nSpll Time\n09 45 00\n(24hh mm ss)\nDescriotion\nReported Incident Type PIPELINE\nTHE CALLER IS REPORTING A POTENTIAL RELEASE OF ULTRA LOW SULFUR DIESEL FUEL FROM\nPRESSURE.\nLOCATE ANY POSSIBLE LEAKS.\nAN UNDERGROUND 12 INCH FLOW LINE.\nTHE LINE HAS BEEN SHUT DOWN AND EMPLOYEES ARE CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING IO\nTHE POTENTIAL WAS CAUSED BY A DROP IN PIPELINE\nlaterals Invoive\nChris Code\nTotal Qty.\nWater Ory.\nMedium Type\nAddltional Medium Information\n-Select Medium\n[POTENTIAL RELEASE TO THE SOIL, DEER CREEK AND GREASY CREEK\nEvacuations\nInjures\nDamages\nFederal Agency Notted O Yes O No Unknown\nOther Agency Noted O Yes O No Unknown\nState Agency Noted O Yes No Unknown\nRemedal Actions\nPage 1 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Reports\nTeleDetail\nPage 2 of 2\nEMPLOYEES ARE IN THE PROCESS OF SEARCHING THE LINE FOR ANY SINGS OF A RELEASE\nNONE\nAdattonal Inte\nDegrees\nLatttude\nLenatude\nMinutes\nseconds\nQuadrant\nDistance from City\nDegrees\nSeconds\nRange\nSection\nTownship\nDirection\nquadrant\nMilepost\n• Rescinded Commenta (max 250 characters)\nex Previous\n1.1 of 1\nPage 2 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Reports\nTeleDetail\nPage 1 of 2\nVPHMSA\nAdministration\nMaterials Safely\nPipeline & Hazardous\nHMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS\n(Version 4.0.0 PROD)\nRules of Behavior\nHome\nLogout\nMent.\nNRC Number:\nCall Date:\n882650\n[Retum to Search]\n09/03/2008\nCall Time:\n19:08:59\nCaller Information\nAddress\nCompany Name\nMARATHON PIPELINE\nLAURA\nPERRON\nCity\n539 S. MAIN ST.\nCountry\nFINDLAY\nPhone 1\nUSA\nConndental\nOrganization Type\nPRIVATE\n2172511885\nZIp\nPhone 2\n45840\nOres No O No Response\nIs caller the spller?\n© Yes O No O No Response\nFirst Name\nAddress\nCompany Name\nLAURA\nDischarger Information\nMARATHON PIPELINE\nLast Name\nPERRON\nCity\n539 S. MAIN ST.\nPhone 1\nCountry\nUSA\nzip\nState\nOH\nOrganization Type\nPRIVATE\n2172511885\nPhone 2\nState\nSpill Information\nNearest Cly\nLocation\nASHMOORE\nZip Code\nCounty\n10151 NORTH COUNTY ROAD 2170 E\nSpll Date\nIncident Type\nDTG Type\n09/03/2008(mm/dayyy)\nALL\n<- Select DTG Type -> v\nSpll Time\n[15 00 00\n(24hh mm ss)\nReported Incident Type PIPELINE\nUNKNOWN CAUSES.\nCALLER IS REPORTING A DISCHARGE OF ULTRA LOW SULFER DIESEL FROM A PIPELINE DUE TO\nMatertals Involved\nMaterial / Chris Name\nDIL DIESEL\nloos\n\"Chris Code\n1900 BARRELS\nTotal Qty\nWater ory.\nAdational Medium Information\nMedium Type\n<- Select Medium\nSOIL\nEvacuations\nInjures\nFatalites\nDamages\nOres No Unknown\nFederal Agency Noted O yes O No ® Unknown\nOther Agency Notted\nOres ONo Unknown\nState Agency Noted O Yes O No Unknown\nBemedal Actions\nPage 3 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\nAppendix B - NRC Reports\nTeleDetail\nPage 2 of 2\nWAS SHUT IN.\nCAUSE OF DISCHARGE IS UNDER INVESTIGATION.\nBEGINNING CLEANUP OPERATIONS. LINE\nAdattonal Inte\nCALLER HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION\nDegrees\nLatitude\nLenatude\nMinutes\nseconds\nQuadrant\nDistance from City\nDegrees\nSeconds\nsection\nDirection\nQuadrant\nRange\nTownship\nMilepost\n• Rescinded Commenta (max 250 characters)\nex Previous\n1.1 of 1\nPage 4 of 4\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\nACCIDENT REPORT –\nHAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE\nSYSTEMS\nReport format corresponds to\nForm PHMSA F 7000-1 (01-2001)\nOriginal\nReport Date\nOctober 03, 2008\nNo. 20080292 - 14467\nPART A – GENERAL INFORMATION\nN Original Report Y Supplemental\nReport Y Final Report\nLast Revision Date 01/14/2015\n1. Operator Name and Address\na. Operator's 5-digit Identification Number 32147\nb. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter\nOwner's OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if\nknown)\nc. Name of Operator MARATHON PIPE LINE LLC\nd. Operator street address 539 SOUTH MAIN STREET\ne. Operator address City FINDLAY\nCounty or Parish HANCOCK\nState OH\nZip code 45840\n2. Time and date of the accident\nHour 09:44\nDate of the accident 09/03/2008\n3. Location of accident\na. Latitude 39.523801\nLongitude -88.070495\nb. City ASHMORE\nCounty or Parish COLES\nc. State IL\nZip Code 61912\nd. Mile Post/Valve Station\nSurvey Station No 2207+54\n4. Telephone Report\nNRC Report Number 882609\nDate 09/03/2008\n5. Losses (Estimated)\nPublic/Community Losses reimbursed by operator\nPublic/private property damage $ 118,587\nCost of emergency response phase $ 2,543,148\nCost of environmental remediation $ 38,875\nOther Costs $ 0\nDescribe\nOperator Losses\nValue of product lost $ 81,620\nValue of operator property damage $ 99,802\nOther Costs $ 54,036\nDescribe LAND PURCHASE SUPPORT\nTotal Costs $ 2,936,068\n6. Commodity Spilled\nCommodity spilled (yes/no) Y\na. Name of commodity spilled ULTRA LOW SULFUR DIESEL\nb. Classification of commodity spilled\nGASOLINE, DIESEL, FUEL OIL OR OTHER\nPETROLEUM PRODUCT WHICH IS A LIQUID AT\nAMBIENT CONDITIONS\nc. Estimated amount of commodity involved\nUnit of Measure BARRELS\nAmount Spilled 770.00\nAmount Recovered 770.00\nCAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS NO DATA\nPART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE\n1\nPage 1 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\nPreparer's Name JENNIFER RADER\nArea Code and Telephone Number 4194214631\nPreparer's E-mail Address JERADER@MARATHONOIL.COM\nArea Code and Facsimile Number 4194213917\nPART C – ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT\n1. Additional location information\na. Line segment name or ID ASHMORE-CHAMPAIGN 12\nb. Accident on Federal Land other than Outer\nContinental Shelf NO\nc. Is pipeline Interstate Y\nOffshore N\nd. Area\nBlock #\nState\nOuter Continental Shelf N\n2. Location of system involved\nOperator's Property NO\nPipeline Right of Way Y\nHigh Consequence Area (HCA) N\nDescribe HCA\n3. Part of system involved in accident ONSHORE PIPELINE, INCLUDING VALVE SITES\nOther (specify)\nIf failure occurred on Pipeline, complete items a-g\na. Leak or Rupture RUPTURE\nType of Leak\n- Puncture, diameter (inches)\nType of Rupture LONGITUDINAL-TEAR/CRACK\n- Tear/Crack, length (inches) 3\n- Propagation Length, total, both sides (feet) 6\nOther (specify)\nb. Type of block valve used for isolation immediate section\nUpstream\nManual NO\nAutomatic NO\nRemote Control YES\nCheck Valve NO\nDownstream\nManual NO\nAutomatic NO\nRemote Control YES\nCheck Valve NO\nc. Length of segment isolated (ft) 79200\nd. Distance between valves (ft) 316800\ne. Is segment configured for internal inspection\ntools? YES\nf. Had there been an in-line inspection device run\nat the point of failure? YES\ng. If Yes, type of device run\nHigh Resolution\nMagnetic Flux\ntool\nYES Year run 2002\nLow Resolution\nMagnetic Flux\ntool\nNO Year run\nUT tool NO Year run\nGeometry tool YES Year run 2002\nCaliper tool NO Year run\nCrack tool NO Year run\nHard Spot tool NO Year run\nOther tool NO Year run\n4. Failure occurred on PIPE SEAM\nOther (specify)\nYear the component that failed was installed 1958\n5. Maximum operating pressure (MOP)\n2\nPage 2 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\na. Estimated pressure at point and time of\naccident (PSIG) 1158\nb. MOP at time of accident (PSIG) 1211.00\nc. Did an over pressurization occur relating to the\naccident? N\nPART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION\n1. Nominal pipe size (NPS) (inches) 12.75\n2. Wall thickness (inches) .25\n3. Specification API 5L\nSMYS 46000\n4. Seam type ERW LOW FREQUENCY\n5. Valve type N/A\n6. Manufactured by REPUBLIC STEEL\nin year 1958\nPART E - ENVIRONMENT\n1. Area of accident UNDER GROUND\nOther (specify)\n2. Depth of cover (inches) 4\nPART F - CONSEQUENCES\n1. Consequences Fatalities Injuries\na. Number of operator employees 0 0\nContractor employees working for operator 0 0\nGeneral public 0 0\nTotals 0 0\nb. Was pipeline/segment shutdown due to leak? Y\nIf Yes, how long? Days 1\nHours 5\nMinutes 22\nc. Product ignited Gas did not Ignite\nd. Explosion NO EXPLOSION\ne. Evacuation (general public only) N\nNumber of people\nReason for Evacuation\nf. Elapsed time until area was made safe\nHours\nMinutes\n2. Environmental Impact\na. Wildlife Impact\nFish/aquatic N\nBirds N\nTerrestrial N\nb. Soil Contamination Y\nIf Yes, estimated number of cubic yards 2902\nc. Long term impact assessment performed N\nd. Anticipated remediation Y\nIf Yes, check all that apply\nSurface Water N\nGroundwater N\nSoil Y\nVegetation Y\nWildlife N\ne. Water Contamination Y\nAmount in water (barrels) 1\nOcean/Seawater N\nSurface Y\nGroundwater N\nDrinking water N\nDrinking water source\nPART G – LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION\n1. Computer based leak detection capability in\nplace? Y\n2. Was the release initially detected by? CPM/SCADA-BASED SYSTEM WITH LEAK\nDETECTION\n3\nPage 3 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\nOther (specify)\n3. Estimated leak duration Days 0\nHours 1\nPART H – APPARENT CAUSE\nH1 – CORROSION\n1. External Corrosion\n2. Internal Corrosion\nComplete items a-e where applicable\na. Pipe Coating\nb. Visual Examination\nOther (specify)\nc. Cause of Corrosion\nOther (specify)\nd. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be\nunder cathodic protection prior to discovering\naccident?\nYear Protection Started\ne. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of\ncorrosion?\nEstimated time prior to accident Years\nMonths\nH2 – NATURAL FORCES\n3. Earth Movement\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n4. Lightning\n5. Heavy Rains/Floods\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n6. Temperature\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n7. High Winds\nH3 – EXCAVATION DAMAGE\n8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their\ncontractors / Not Third Party)\n9. Third Party\na. Excavator group\nb. Type\nOther (specify)\nc. Excavation was\nd. Excavation was ongoing activity (Month or\nlonger)\nIf Yes, Date of last contact\ne. Did operator get prior notification of\nexcavation activity?\nIf Yes; Date received null\nNotification received from\nf. Was pipeline marked?\ni. Temporary markings\nii. Permanent markings\niii. Marks were\niv. Were marks made within required time?\nH4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE\n10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure\nFire/Explosion cause\n11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to\nexcavation activity damaging pipe\n12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe\n13. Vandalism\nH5 – MATERIAL AND/OR WELD FAILURES\nMaterial\n14. Body of Pipe\n4\nPage 4 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n15. Component\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n16. Joint\nDescription\nOther (specify)\nWeld\n17. Butt\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n18. Fillet\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n19. Pipe Seam Yes\nDescription LF ERV\nOther (specify)\nComplete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5\na. Type of failure\nConstruction Defect N\nDescription POOR WORKMANSHIP\nMaterial Defect Y\nb. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in\ntransportation to the construction or fabrication\nsite?\nN\nc. Was part which leaked pressure tested before\naccident occurred? Y\nd. Date of test\nYear 2004\nMonth 10\nDay 12\ne. Test medium WATER\nOther (specify)\nf. Time held at test pressure (hr) 8\ng. Estimated test pressure at point of incident\n(PSIG) 1514\nH6 – EQUIPMENT\n20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling\nDescription\nOther (specify)\n22. Seal Failure\nDescription\nOther (specify)\nH7 – INCORRECT OPERATION\n23. Incorrect Operation\na. Type\nOther (specify)\nb. Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test\nDrug test\nAlcohol test\nH8 - OTHER\n24. Miscellaneous\nDescribe\n25. Unknown\nDescribe\nPART I – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT\nTHE FINDLAY OPERATIONS CENTER RECEIVED A SUCTION AND DISCHARGE PRESSURE\nDEVIATION ALARMS AT ASHMORE STATION. A CPM LEAK ALARM FOLLOWED SHORTLY AFTER\nAND THE WABASH SYSTEM WAS IMMEDIATELY SHUTDOWN. SHUTDOWN OF THE SYSTEM WAS\n5\nPage 5 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\nAppendix C - Operator's Accident Report\nINITIATED 36 SECONDS AFTER CPM ALARM AND FLOW WAS STOPPED 11 SECONDS LATER. THE\nWABASH EXPERIENCED A FAILURE 100 YARDS DOWNSTREAM OF ASHMORE STATION. THE LINE\nWAS TURNED FROM CHAMPAIGN TO HAMMOND IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO FAILURE. ANALYSIS OF\nTHE PIPE REVEALED THAT THE FAILURE MECHANISM WAS A DEFORMATION ANOMALY THAT\nWAS CENTERED ADJACENT TO THE LONGITUDINAL ERW SEAM WITH A SHEAR CRACK THAT\nFORMED ON THE OUTSIDE DIAMTER OF THE PIPE DUE TO RE-ROUNDING OF THE DEFORMATION.\nA LONGITUDINAL SEAM SPLIT DID OCCUR, AND WAS THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTOR TO THE\nVOLUME RELEASED; HOWEVER, THE SEAM SPLIT WAS SECONDARY TO THE DEFORMATION\nANOMALY CENTERED ADJACENT TO THE LONGITUDINAL ERW SEAM. A REVISED FINAL REPORT\nIS BEING SUBMITTED THIS 23RD DAY OF MARCH, 2010 CHANGING THE CAUSE FROM\nMISCELLANEOUS TO RUPTURE, LONGITUDINAL SEAM SPLIT. THE DEFORMATION IS BELIEVED\nTO HAVE OCCURRED DURING THE ORIGINAL COMMISSIONING HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE TEST.\nTHEREFORE, CONSTRUCTION DEFECT WAS SELECTED THOUGH NEITHER OPTION AVAILABLE IS\nTRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SITUATION. POOR WORKMANSHIP WAS SELECTED AS THE\nSPECIFIC CONSTRUCTION DEFECT SINCE THE DEFORMATION OCCURRED DURING THE\nORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION AND THE CRACKING PROPAGATION OCCURRED FROM REROUNDING\nDURING HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE TESTS. BECAUSE THIS REPORTING FORM DOES NOT\nALLOW FOR REPORTING OF MINUTES IN QUESTION G3, THE DATA HAS BEEN INPUT AS LEAK\nDURATION OF 1 HOUR. HOWEVER, AS NOTED IN THIS NARRATIVE, THE LINE WAS SHUTDOWN\nUPON THE ALARM SIGNALING A FAILURE. WATER CONTAMINATION IS ESTIMATED AT LESS THAN\nA BARREL, BUT DUE TO THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE FORM, IT IS LOGGED AS 1 BARREL. RUPTURE\nPROPOGATION LENGTH WAS DETERMINED TO BE 70 INCHES, WHICH IS 5.8 FEET. DUE TO\nCONSTRAINTS ON THE FORM, PROPOGATION LENGTH WAS ROUNDED UP TO 6 FEET.\nMARATHON REPORTED A SECOND NRC REPORT (#882650) UPDATING SPILL VOLUME.\n6\nPage 6 of 6\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\nAppendix D\nMetallurgical Analysis\nThis document is on file at PHMSA","truncated":false,"body_characters":35454}