# Marathon Pipe Line LLC-9/3/08

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** PHMSA FIR, Marathon Pipe Line, LLC., 2008-09-03
- **title:** Marathon Pipe Line LLC-9/3/08
- **source type:** incident
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2017-06-06
- **effective on:** 2008-09-03
- **summary:** Marathon Pipe Line, LLC.; Hazardous Liquid; IL; failure 2008-09-03; apparent cause: Material Failure Rupture.
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-marathon-pipe-line-llc-9308.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-marathon-pipe-line-llc-9308.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-marathon-pipe-line-llc-9308
- **source url:** https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/inspections-and-investigations/marathon-pipe-line-llc-9308
**body:**

<<<PAGE 1>>>

DOT US Department of Transportation
PHMSA Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
OPS Office of Pipeline Safety
Central Region
Principal Investigator James Bunn/Karen Butler
Region Director Ivan Huntoon (Prior RD)
Date of Report 1/14/2015
Subject Failure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material
Failure, Rupture
Operator, Location, & Consequences
Date of Failure 09/03/2008
Commodity Released Hazardous Liquid (Refined Products, Diesel)
City/County & State Ashmore / Coles, Illinois
OpID & Operator Name 32147 Marathon Pipe Line LLC
Unit # & Unit Name 3703 Wabash System
SMART Activity # 122652
Milepost / Location MP 41.7 / 100 yards downstream of Ashmore Pump Station
Type of Failure Material Failure, Rupture - Crack in a dent, Deformation from poor
construction practice
Fatalities 0
Injuries 0
Description of Area
impacted
Total Costs $2,936,068
Rural farmland, non-High Consequence Area (HCA)

<<<PAGE 2>>>

Failure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture
Failure Date 09/03/2008
Executive Summary
At approximately 9:43 a.m. CDT1 on September 3, 2008, a 12-inch diameter refined products pipeline
operated by Marathon Pipe Line Company LLC (Marathon) ruptured downstream of the Ashmore
pumping station located in Coles County, Illinois. Marathon’s Findlay Operations Center received
suction and discharge pressure deviation alarms from the Ashmore Pump Station at 9:43. At 9:44 a.m.
the Operations Center received a CPM leak alarm, and the Wabash Pipeline System (12 inch) was shut
down. Marathon personnel were dispatched to locate the accident site. The National Response Center
(NRC) was contacted at 12:58 p.m. (report number 882609). The rupture was confirmed at 5:12 p.m. to
be located approximately 100 yards downstream of the Ashmore Pump Station on the Robinson to
Champaign section of the pipeline known as the East Leg. The pressure at the time of the failure was
1,158 psig with a maximum operating pressure (MOP) of 1,211 psig. A second NRC report was filed
(report number #882650) at 6.08 p.m., which increased the reported spill volume and provided
additional details on the location. No fatalities, injuries, fire, explosion, or evacuations resulted from the
rupture, and it did not occur in a High Consequence Area (HCA). Surface water was impacted (1 barrel).
Approximately 770 barrels of low sulfur diesel fuel were released as a result of the rupture, and an
estimated 2,902 cubic yards of soil was contaminated. There were no service interruptions or supply
impacts as a result of the rupture. The total cost estimated by the operator as a result of the release was
$2,936,068.
The pipeline was constructed in 1958 and was composed of 12-inch nominal diameter, 0.250-inch wall-
thickness, low frequency electric resistance welded (LF ERW), X46 pipe made by Republic Steel. Prior to
the failure, the East Leg had experienced six hydrostatic tests in addition to that at original construction
(starting in 1964 and ending in 2004). These six additional hydrostatic tests resulted in 26 ruptures and
six leaks.
At the rupture location, a deformation was present from original construction. Coating damage and
approximately 5 percent through-wall external corrosion was identified at the center of a deformation.
After the metallurgical report was completed, the operator engaged two additional subject matter
experts to review the failure and metallurgical analysis. Three subject matter experts arrived at a
“consensus that the failure was caused by a crack located in a deformation. The deformation was
centered adjacent to the longitudinal ERW seam. Part of the deformation intersected the ERW seam.
The deformation likely occurred prior to the original commissioning of the pipeline. The shear crack
formed on the outside diameter of the pipe due to a partial re-rounding of the deformation anomaly.
Early hydrotests may have imparted compressive stresses in the area of the crack that retarded
subsequent fatigue crack growth during operation. The fracture surfaces between the beach marks do
not look like those typical of high-cycle fatigue from operating pressure cycles. The apparent crack
advancement is indicative of low-cycle fatigue. The crack grew by tearing in one or more of the multiple
hydrostatic tests between 1958 and 2004. The crack eventually grew to a large enough size that
operational pressure continued to advance the crack to the point of failure.”2
System Details
Marathon Pipe Line Company LLC operates over 5,000 miles of hazardous liquid pipelines in 15 States.
1 All times reference Central Daylight Time unless otherwise specifically noted.
2 Information provided by Marathon during the follow-up from recommendations identified during the internal
failure investigation.
Page 2 of 7

<<<PAGE 3>>>

Failure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture
Failure Date 09/03/2008
The Wabash 12-inch Products Pipeline System originates at two points, Robinson, Illinois and Wood
River, Illinois. The Wabash System terminates in Hammond, Indiana. The West Leg is 129.9 miles long
and is located between Wood River, Illinois, and Champaign, Illinois. The North Leg is 128.4 miles long
with a 109.8 mile section located between Champaign, Illinois, and Griffith, Indiana, and another section
that is 18.6 miles long located between Griffith, Indiana, and Hammond, Indiana. The East Leg is 85.1
miles long and located between Champaign, Illinois, and Robinson, Illinois. This rupture occurred on the
East Leg of the system. The East Leg has pumping stations at Robinson, Martinsville, and Ashmore.
Product from Robinson, Illinois, can go into tankage at Champaign or can bypass Campaign and continue
on to Hammond, Indiana.
The East Leg was constructed with 12-inch nominal diameter pipe with a wall thickness of 0.250 inches.
The pipe was manufactured in 1958 by Republic Steel Corporation and is LF ERW, API 5LX, grade X-46
line pipe. The pipeline was joined using the shielded metal arc welding process, and the welds were
inspected by radiography. The pipe is coated with coal tar enamel, and the pipeline has been under
cathodic protection since 1958. The pipeline was hydrostatically tested originally in 1958. A hydrostatic
test program was developed to manage the threat of manufacturing defects associated with the
longitudinal weld seam, and additional tests were performed in 1964, 1974, 1987, 1995, 1999, and
2004. The MOP at the time of the failure was established as 1,211 psig and based on 80 percent of test
pressure. The pipeline was inspected with a High Resolution MFL and Geometry tool in 2002. There
were no anomalies identified at the failure location during this ILI inspection. The pipeline was
inspected by PHMSA in 2006.
Events Leading up to the Failure
Just prior to the incident, the East Leg was delivering an 80,000 bbl batch of ultra low sulfur diesel to the
Champaign Terminal. The Hammond Terminal Headgate Valve was opened in preparation for a turn
into the North Leg out of the Champaign Terminal. Following the completion of the Champaign batch,
the East Leg was turned out of the Champaign Terminal northward toward the Hammond Terminal by
opening the Champaign Bypass Valve. At this time, Robinson, Martinsville, and Ashmore pump stations
had one unit running at each location. After turning northward out of the Champaign Terminal, units
were started at Champaign, Buckley, and St. Anne pump stations (Buckley and St. Anne are on the North
Leg).
The hydrostatic test pressure in 2004 was 1,562 psig with a spike test at 1,727 psig. The high pressure
shutdown on discharge pressure was recorded as set at 1,220 psig for Ashmore station. The pressure at
the time of failure on the discharge of Ashmore pump station was approximately 1,158 psig. Spike tests
were used in the hydrostatic test program starting in 1995 and were 30 minutes long at approximately
95 percent SMYS. As the years progressed, hydrostatic tests were performed in smaller sections of
pipeline on the East Leg in an effort to help locate releases or leaks. Each test starting in 1964 had more
than one failure in the Robinson to Champaign section. The six additional hydrotests starting in 1964
resulted in 26 ruptures and six leaks and are summarized as follows:
In 1964 – Two ruptures occurred. This test was conducted with fuel oil but later water was used
to complete the test.
In 1974 – Six ruptures and one leak occurred.
In 1987 – Three ruptures occurred.
Page 3 of 7

<<<PAGE 4>>>

Failure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture
Failure Date 09/03/2008
In 1995 – Four ruptures occurred during the spike test. No failures occurred during the 8-hour
test.
In 1999 – Six ruptures occurred on the spike test, and one leak occurred during the 8-hour test.
The causes of these failures were three hook cracks and four lack of fusion defects.
In 2004 – Five ruptures occurred on the spike test (three lack of fusion and two hook cracks) and
four leaks during the 8-hour test (associated with the longitudinal seams and repaired with Type
B sleeves).
A backpressure control valve did not exist at Champaign for the Robinson to Champaign segment.
Backpressure control methods (check valves or control valves) were also not available at several other
locations on the North Leg (Ashkum Junction did not have a check valve; there was no backpressure
control valve was available at Hammond).
Emergency Response
The Operations Center received a CPM leak alarm at 9:44 a.m. on September 3, 2008, and the
Operations Center initiated shut down activities for the entire Wabash System within 47 seconds
according to report details. Field personnel were notified and dispatched to investigate. Information
regarding the incident was reported by Marathon to the National Response Center (NRC) on September
3, 2008, at 12:58 p.m. (Report No. 882609) even though detailed location information was not available
and identified two creeks as possible locations for product (Deer Creek and Greasy Creek). At
approximately 5:12 p.m. on September 3, 2008, field personnel reported that a rupture was discovered
approximately 100 yards downstream of the Ashmore Pump Station. Additional time was required to
locate the leak as it was in a cornfield and the release could not be easily identified from the air. Field
personnel walked the right-of-way. Marathon filed a second NRC report on September 3, 2008, at 6:08
p.m. (Report No. 882650) providing additional information on the location of the release and an
estimated spill volume of 900 barrels. This NRC report also stated that only soil was impacted.
Marathon personnel immediately took steps to contain the product in the area where the release
occurred. A series of interceptor trenches were dug in the cornfield at the release location, booms were
deployed, and the product was contained by 8:00 p.m. The remote control valves upstream and
downstream of the leak were closed. The length of the segment that was isolated was 79,200 feet (15
miles). The only emergency responders active at the response scene were Marathon employees.
No fatalities, injuries, fire, explosion, or evacuations resulted from the rupture, and it did not occur in a
High Consequence Area (HCA). No significant road closures were reported. Surface water (1 barrel) was
impacted and approximately 2,902 cubic yards of soil were contaminated. There were no service
interruptions or supply impacts as a result of the rupture.
Summary of Return to Service
After the location of the release was confirmed and the area made safe, the failure site was excavated
and the origin of the rupture was identified. The section of pipe that contained the origin was removed
and protected, then shipped to a metallurgical laboratory for examination. A new section of pre-tested
pipe (51 feet long) was installed in the line where the rupture occurred and the line was returned to
service at 3:39 p.m. on September 4, 2008, with a 20 percent pressure reduction.
Page 4 of 7

<<<PAGE 5>>>

Failure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture
Failure Date 09/03/2008
Clean-up efforts continued at the site and soil continued to be remediated.
Investigation Details
At approximately 9:43 a.m. on September 3, 2008, Marathon Pipe Line Company LLC’s Findlay
Operations Center received suction and discharge pressure deviation alarms from its Ashmore Pump
Station located in Coles County, Illinois. At 9:44 a.m. the Operations Center received a CPM leak alarm
and the Wabash Pipeline System was shut down and Marathon personnel were dispatched to locate the
incident site. Control Center personnel responded to the events within 36 seconds according to report
data, and within 47 seconds, flow was stopped on the pipeline. Marathon personnel discovered the
rupture location at 5:12 p.m. as the pipeline right-of-way was walked downstream of the Ashmore Pump
Station. The rupture occurred on the pipeline right-of-way approximately 100 yards downstream of the
pump station at Survey Station Number 2207+54, MP 41.7.
The rupture was reported as 70 inches long with an opening approximately 3.0 inches in width at the
5:30 circumferential position. The deformation measured approximately 0.150 inches deep (1.2 percent
of pipe OD at the deepest location). Coating damage and approximately 5 percent through-wall external
corrosion was present at the center of the deformation. No indications of internal corrosion, stress
corrosion cracking, or other outside force damage were identified during metallurgical analysis.
Residual stresses when the pipeline was cut were reported to be negligible.
The second NRC volume estimating 900 barrels would later be determined to be an estimated 770
barrels of low-sulfur diesel.
Initially after the failure, the pressure setpoints were lowered on all three legs of the Wabash system.
The pressure de-rates remained in place while the operator ran ILI tools and completed the associated
rehabilitation work.
After the metallurgical analysis was completed, Marathon also completed an internal failure
investigation, which resulted in three recommendations: 1) utilize ILI technology to identify other
potential dents in the vicinity of the ERW seam and remediate any deformations as appropriate, 2)
collaborate with Scheduling and Hydraulics to perform an evaluation of potential changes to operating
procedures and/or engineering controls that would reduce the frequency and magnitude of pressure
cycles, and 3) employ additional independent resources to obtain a second opinion on the metallurgical
findings.
3
Beginning in October of 2008 (10/26), deformation ILI assessments were completed on the North, East
and West Legs. The results of these caliper runs were overlaid with circumferential MFL data in order to
identify any deformation at the long seam that might be similar to the release location. As a result, a
total of 66 repairs were performed, 35 of which were on this same section (East Leg of the pipeline).
An additional hydrostatic test was completed in November of 2008 on a portion of the North Leg
(Champaign to Griffith).
The operator hired two additional Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to review the metallurgical analysis.
The three SMEs agreed that “the failure was caused by a crack located in a deformation. The
3 Identified in the Marathon investigation summary report.
Page 5 of 7

<<<PAGE 6>>>

Failure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture
Failure Date 09/03/2008
deformation was centered adjacent to the longitudinal ERW seam. Part of the deformation intersected
the ERW seam. The deformation likely occurred prior to the original commissioning of the pipeline. The
shear crack formed on the outside diameter of the pipe due to a partial re-rounding of the deformation
anomaly. Early hydrotests may have imparted compressive stresses in the area of the crack that
retarded subsequent fatigue crack growth during operation. The fracture surfaces between the beach
marks do not look like those typical of high-cycle fatigue from operating pressure cycles. The apparent
crack advancement is indicative of low-cycle fatigue. The crack grew by tearing in one or more of the
multiple hydrostatic tests between 1958 and 2004. The crack eventually grew to a large enough size
that operational pressure continued to advance the crack to the point of failure.”4
A pressure trending review did identify higher pressures at the Ashmore pump station versus other
stations in the East line section just prior to the failure, which may indicate that the changes in
operations that occurred at Champaign caused pressure to back into the Ashmore pump station
operations even though the maximum MOP was not exceeded. Marathon conducted a detailed review
of potential operational changes that could be made through scheduling similar batches of like product
together in an effort to minimize starts and stops (reducing potential pressure cycles) and also
determined that several control enhancements could assist in the reduction of amplitude regarding
pressure cycles. Suggested control revisions included replacement of the Griffith backpressure control
valve, a new check valve downstream of the Ashkum Junction, and new valves added at Hammond and
Champaign on the East Leg. Pressure setpoints were also reviewed for possible changes.
The operator purchased the property that this rupture occurred on, both for clean-up efforts with
continued soil remediation and for future ease of access.
Findings & Contributing Factors
The metallurgical analysis determined that the fracture originated in a deformation in the pipe wall near
the longitudinal seam. The deformation occurred during the original construction of the pipeline. A
shear crack formed on the outside diameter of the pipe due to re-rounding of the deformation, which
likely occurred during the initial pressure test.
Three SMEs agreed that “early hydrotests may have imparted compressive stresses in the area of the
crack that retarded subsequent fatigue crack growth during operation. The fracture surfaces between
the beach marks did not look like those typical of high-cycle fatigue from operating pressure cycles. The
apparent crack advancement is indicative of low-cycle fatigue. The crack grew by tearing in one or more
of the multiple hydrostatic tests between 1958 and 2004. The crack eventually grew to a large enough
size that operational pressure continued to advance the crack to the point of failure.”5
The lack of adequate back pressure controls may have been a contributing factor, and Marathon’s
internal failure investigation provided recommendations to minimize this potential and reduce pressure
cycles.
As a result of additional ILI assessments, a total of 66 repairs were performed where deformation and
longitudinal seams may have overlapped, 35 of which were on this same segment.
4 Marathon follow-up recommendations identified during the internal failure investigation.
5 Information provided by Marathon during the follow-up from recommendations identified during the internal
failure investigation.
Page 6 of 7

<<<PAGE 7>>>

Failure Investigation Report – Marathon Pipe Line LLC – Material Failure, Rupture
Failure Date 09/03/2008
An additional hydrostatic test was completed in 2008.
The six hydrostatic tests occurring in 1964 through 2004 resulted in 26 ruptures and six leaks. The
operator’s management program involving hydrostatic tests removed defects from the pipeline, which
also could have resulted in additional safety and environmental consequences.
Appendices
A Maps and Photographs
B NRC Reports
C Operator’s Accident Report
D Metallurgical Analysis
Page 7 of 7

<<<PAGE 8>>>

Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Wabash 9-3-2008
(b) (/)(F)|
Legend
Point Of Release
145 290
Location: llfdyrs981\gis_datalwo
Page 1 of 7

<<<PAGE 9>>>

Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
1500m L
KENDALL
MUSCATINE
LA PORTE:
ISLAND
OCK
BUREAU
LA SALLE
WILL
JAKE
JIRTER
MERCER
PUTNAM
GRUNGY
-STARKE
ES
STARK
MARSHALE
KANKAKEE
ST- ANNE P
JASPER
INES
KNOX
PULASKI
WARREN
WOODFORD
LIYINGSTON
PEORtA
ASHKUM
TRODS
WHITE
BENTON
CARROI
MCDONOUG ILLINOIS CLEAN
* BUCKLEY
CHAMPATON
FORD
WARREN
MASON:
LOGAN
DEWITT
VERMICCION
CLINT
SCHUTLER
GROWN
CeSs
MENARD I
FOUNTAIN
PIAT
• CHAMPAIGN
MACON
MORGEN
SANDAMON
0OU5LAS
104
PARKE
(SCOTT
WEST LEG
"MACON RE
• ASHORE
EDGAr
PUTNAM I
(b) (7X(F)
COLES
EAST LEG
VIGO
CUMBERLAND
CLAY
CLARK
MARTINSVILLE
OWEN
LINCOLN
ULIVAN
MOWAd
HAM
JASPEC
CRAWF
CHARLES
LAWRE
OPERATOR MAP
Page 2 of 7

<<<PAGE 10>>>

Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
(b) (7)(F)
Ashmore Incident Resnonse Man O

<<<PAGE 11>>>

Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Failed Pipeline Joint
Page 4 of 7

<<<PAGE 12>>>

Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Close-up photo showing rupture site
Page 5 of 7

<<<PAGE 13>>>

Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Field, north side of Ashmore station (provided by operator)
Internal view of removed pipe (provided by operator)
Page 6 of 7

<<<PAGE 14>>>

Appendix A - Maps and Photographs
Image of tie-in (provided by operator)
Page 7 of 7

<<<PAGE 15>>>

Appendix B - NRC Reports
TeleDetail
Page 1 of 2
VPHMSA
Administration
Materials Safely
Pipeline & Hazardous
HMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS
(Version 4.0.0 PROD)
Rules of Behavior
Home
Logout
Ment.
NRC Number:
Call Date:
882609
[Retum to Search]
09/03/2008
Call Time:
13:58:00
Caller Information
Address
Company Name
MARATHON PIPELINE
LAURA
PERRON
City
539 S. MAIN ST.
Country
FINDLAY
Phone 1
USA
Conndental
Organization Type
PRIVATE
2172511885
ZIp
Phone 2
45840
Ores No O No Response
Is caller the spller?
© Yes O No O No Response
First Name
Address
Company Name
LAURA
Discharger Information
MARATHON PIPELINE
Last Name
PErroN
Country
City
FINDLAY
539 S. MAIN ST.
Phone 1
USA
zip
State
OH
Organization Type
PRIVATE
2172511885
Phone 2
45840
Nearest City
State
Spill Information
Location
OAKLAND
County
Zip Code
CoLES
DTG Type
Spll Date
09/03/2008(mmidayyy)
Incident Type
ALL
<- Select DTG Type -> v
Spll Time
09 45 00
(24hh mm ss)
Descriotion
Reported Incident Type PIPELINE
THE CALLER IS REPORTING A POTENTIAL RELEASE OF ULTRA LOW SULFUR DIESEL FUEL FROM
PRESSURE.
LOCATE ANY POSSIBLE LEAKS.
AN UNDERGROUND 12 INCH FLOW LINE.
THE LINE HAS BEEN SHUT DOWN AND EMPLOYEES ARE CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING IO
THE POTENTIAL WAS CAUSED BY A DROP IN PIPELINE
laterals Invoive
Chris Code
Total Qty.
Water Ory.
Medium Type
Addltional Medium Information
-Select Medium
[POTENTIAL RELEASE TO THE SOIL, DEER CREEK AND GREASY CREEK
Evacuations
Injures
Damages
Federal Agency Notted O Yes O No Unknown
Other Agency Noted O Yes O No Unknown
State Agency Noted O Yes No Unknown
Remedal Actions
Page 1 of 4

<<<PAGE 16>>>

Appendix B - NRC Reports
TeleDetail
Page 2 of 2
EMPLOYEES ARE IN THE PROCESS OF SEARCHING THE LINE FOR ANY SINGS OF A RELEASE
NONE
Adattonal Inte
Degrees
Latttude
Lenatude
Minutes
seconds
Quadrant
Distance from City
Degrees
Seconds
Range
Section
Township
Direction
quadrant
Milepost
• Rescinded Commenta (max 250 characters)
ex Previous
1.1 of 1
Page 2 of 4

<<<PAGE 17>>>

Appendix B - NRC Reports
TeleDetail
Page 1 of 2
VPHMSA
Administration
Materials Safely
Pipeline & Hazardous
HMIS->INCIDENTS->TELEPHONICS
(Version 4.0.0 PROD)
Rules of Behavior
Home
Logout
Ment.
NRC Number:
Call Date:
882650
[Retum to Search]
09/03/2008
Call Time:
19:08:59
Caller Information
Address
Company Name
MARATHON PIPELINE
LAURA
PERRON
City
539 S. MAIN ST.
Country
FINDLAY
Phone 1
USA
Conndental
Organization Type
PRIVATE
2172511885
ZIp
Phone 2
45840
Ores No O No Response
Is caller the spller?
© Yes O No O No Response
First Name
Address
Company Name
LAURA
Discharger Information
MARATHON PIPELINE
Last Name
PERRON
City
539 S. MAIN ST.
Phone 1
Country
USA
zip
State
OH
Organization Type
PRIVATE
2172511885
Phone 2
State
Spill Information
Nearest Cly
Location
ASHMOORE
Zip Code
County
10151 NORTH COUNTY ROAD 2170 E
Spll Date
Incident Type
DTG Type
09/03/2008(mm/dayyy)
ALL
<- Select DTG Type -> v
Spll Time
[15 00 00
(24hh mm ss)
Reported Incident Type PIPELINE
UNKNOWN CAUSES.
CALLER IS REPORTING A DISCHARGE OF ULTRA LOW SULFER DIESEL FROM A PIPELINE DUE TO
Matertals Involved
Material / Chris Name
DIL DIESEL
loos
"Chris Code
1900 BARRELS
Total Qty
Water ory.
Adational Medium Information
Medium Type
<- Select Medium
SOIL
Evacuations
Injures
Fatalites
Damages
Ores No Unknown
Federal Agency Noted O yes O No ® Unknown
Other Agency Notted
Ores ONo Unknown
State Agency Noted O Yes O No Unknown
Bemedal Actions
Page 3 of 4

<<<PAGE 18>>>

Appendix B - NRC Reports
TeleDetail
Page 2 of 2
WAS SHUT IN.
CAUSE OF DISCHARGE IS UNDER INVESTIGATION.
BEGINNING CLEANUP OPERATIONS. LINE
Adattonal Inte
CALLER HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Degrees
Latitude
Lenatude
Minutes
seconds
Quadrant
Distance from City
Degrees
Seconds
section
Direction
Quadrant
Range
Township
Milepost
• Rescinded Commenta (max 250 characters)
ex Previous
1.1 of 1
Page 4 of 4

<<<PAGE 19>>>

Appendix C - Operator's Accident Report
U.S Department of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
ACCIDENT REPORT –
HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE
SYSTEMS
Report format corresponds to
Form PHMSA F 7000-1 (01-2001)
Original
Report Date
October 03, 2008
No. 20080292 - 14467
PART A – GENERAL INFORMATION
N Original Report Y Supplemental
Report Y Final Report
Last Revision Date 01/14/2015
1. Operator Name and Address
a. Operator's 5-digit Identification Number 32147
b. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter
Owner's OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if
known)
c. Name of Operator MARATHON PIPE LINE LLC
d. Operator street address 539 SOUTH MAIN STREET
e. Operator address City FINDLAY
County or Parish HANCOCK
State OH
Zip code 45840
2. Time and date of the accident
Hour 09:44
Date of the accident 09/03/2008
3. Location of accident
a. Latitude 39.523801
Longitude -88.070495
b. City ASHMORE
County or Parish COLES
c. State IL
Zip Code 61912
d. Mile Post/Valve Station
Survey Station No 2207+54
4. Telephone Report
NRC Report Number 882609
Date 09/03/2008
5. Losses (Estimated)
Public/Community Losses reimbursed by operator
Public/private property damage $ 118,587
Cost of emergency response phase $ 2,543,148
Cost of environmental remediation $ 38,875
Other Costs $ 0
Describe
Operator Losses
Value of product lost $ 81,620
Value of operator property damage $ 99,802
Other Costs $ 54,036
Describe LAND PURCHASE SUPPORT
Total Costs $ 2,936,068
6. Commodity Spilled
Commodity spilled (yes/no) Y
a. Name of commodity spilled ULTRA LOW SULFUR DIESEL
b. Classification of commodity spilled
GASOLINE, DIESEL, FUEL OIL OR OTHER
PETROLEUM PRODUCT WHICH IS A LIQUID AT
AMBIENT CONDITIONS
c. Estimated amount of commodity involved
Unit of Measure BARRELS
Amount Spilled 770.00
Amount Recovered 770.00
CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS NO DATA
PART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
1
Page 1 of 6

<<<PAGE 20>>>

Appendix C - Operator's Accident Report
Preparer's Name JENNIFER RADER
Area Code and Telephone Number 4194214631
Preparer's E-mail Address JERADER@MARATHONOIL.COM
Area Code and Facsimile Number 4194213917
PART C – ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT
1. Additional location information
a. Line segment name or ID ASHMORE-CHAMPAIGN 12
b. Accident on Federal Land other than Outer
Continental Shelf NO
c. Is pipeline Interstate Y
Offshore N
d. Area
Block #
State
Outer Continental Shelf N
2. Location of system involved
Operator's Property NO
Pipeline Right of Way Y
High Consequence Area (HCA) N
Describe HCA
3. Part of system involved in accident ONSHORE PIPELINE, INCLUDING VALVE SITES
Other (specify)
If failure occurred on Pipeline, complete items a-g
a. Leak or Rupture RUPTURE
Type of Leak
- Puncture, diameter (inches)
Type of Rupture LONGITUDINAL-TEAR/CRACK
- Tear/Crack, length (inches) 3
- Propagation Length, total, both sides (feet) 6
Other (specify)
b. Type of block valve used for isolation immediate section
Upstream
Manual NO
Automatic NO
Remote Control YES
Check Valve NO
Downstream
Manual NO
Automatic NO
Remote Control YES
Check Valve NO
c. Length of segment isolated (ft) 79200
d. Distance between valves (ft) 316800
e. Is segment configured for internal inspection
tools? YES
f. Had there been an in-line inspection device run
at the point of failure? YES
g. If Yes, type of device run
High Resolution
Magnetic Flux
tool
YES Year run 2002
Low Resolution
Magnetic Flux
tool
NO Year run
UT tool NO Year run
Geometry tool YES Year run 2002
Caliper tool NO Year run
Crack tool NO Year run
Hard Spot tool NO Year run
Other tool NO Year run
4. Failure occurred on PIPE SEAM
Other (specify)
Year the component that failed was installed 1958
5. Maximum operating pressure (MOP)
2
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Appendix C - Operator's Accident Report
a. Estimated pressure at point and time of
accident (PSIG) 1158
b. MOP at time of accident (PSIG) 1211.00
c. Did an over pressurization occur relating to the
accident? N
PART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION
1. Nominal pipe size (NPS) (inches) 12.75
2. Wall thickness (inches) .25
3. Specification API 5L
SMYS 46000
4. Seam type ERW LOW FREQUENCY
5. Valve type N/A
6. Manufactured by REPUBLIC STEEL
in year 1958
PART E - ENVIRONMENT
1. Area of accident UNDER GROUND
Other (specify)
2. Depth of cover (inches) 4
PART F - CONSEQUENCES
1. Consequences Fatalities Injuries
a. Number of operator employees 0 0
Contractor employees working for operator 0 0
General public 0 0
Totals 0 0
b. Was pipeline/segment shutdown due to leak? Y
If Yes, how long? Days 1
Hours 5
Minutes 22
c. Product ignited Gas did not Ignite
d. Explosion NO EXPLOSION
e. Evacuation (general public only) N
Number of people
Reason for Evacuation
f. Elapsed time until area was made safe
Hours
Minutes
2. Environmental Impact
a. Wildlife Impact
Fish/aquatic N
Birds N
Terrestrial N
b. Soil Contamination Y
If Yes, estimated number of cubic yards 2902
c. Long term impact assessment performed N
d. Anticipated remediation Y
If Yes, check all that apply
Surface Water N
Groundwater N
Soil Y
Vegetation Y
Wildlife N
e. Water Contamination Y
Amount in water (barrels) 1
Ocean/Seawater N
Surface Y
Groundwater N
Drinking water N
Drinking water source
PART G – LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION
1. Computer based leak detection capability in
place? Y
2. Was the release initially detected by? CPM/SCADA-BASED SYSTEM WITH LEAK
DETECTION
3
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Appendix C - Operator's Accident Report
Other (specify)
3. Estimated leak duration Days 0
Hours 1
PART H – APPARENT CAUSE
H1 – CORROSION
1. External Corrosion
2. Internal Corrosion
Complete items a-e where applicable
a. Pipe Coating
b. Visual Examination
Other (specify)
c. Cause of Corrosion
Other (specify)
d. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be
under cathodic protection prior to discovering
accident?
Year Protection Started
e. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of
corrosion?
Estimated time prior to accident Years
Months
H2 – NATURAL FORCES
3. Earth Movement
Description
Other (specify)
4. Lightning
5. Heavy Rains/Floods
Description
Other (specify)
6. Temperature
Description
Other (specify)
7. High Winds
H3 – EXCAVATION DAMAGE
8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their
contractors / Not Third Party)
9. Third Party
a. Excavator group
b. Type
Other (specify)
c. Excavation was
d. Excavation was ongoing activity (Month or
longer)
If Yes, Date of last contact
e. Did operator get prior notification of
excavation activity?
If Yes; Date received null
Notification received from
f. Was pipeline marked?
i. Temporary markings
ii. Permanent markings
iii. Marks were
iv. Were marks made within required time?
H4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE
10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure
Fire/Explosion cause
11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to
excavation activity damaging pipe
12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13. Vandalism
H5 – MATERIAL AND/OR WELD FAILURES
Material
14. Body of Pipe
4
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<<<PAGE 23>>>

Appendix C - Operator's Accident Report
Description
Other (specify)
15. Component
Description
Other (specify)
16. Joint
Description
Other (specify)
Weld
17. Butt
Description
Other (specify)
18. Fillet
Description
Other (specify)
19. Pipe Seam Yes
Description LF ERV
Other (specify)
Complete a-g if you indicate any cause in part H5
a. Type of failure
Construction Defect N
Description POOR WORKMANSHIP
Material Defect Y
b. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in
transportation to the construction or fabrication
site?
N
c. Was part which leaked pressure tested before
accident occurred? Y
d. Date of test
Year 2004
Month 10
Day 12
e. Test medium WATER
Other (specify)
f. Time held at test pressure (hr) 8
g. Estimated test pressure at point of incident
(PSIG) 1514
H6 – EQUIPMENT
20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment
Description
Other (specify)
21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling
Description
Other (specify)
22. Seal Failure
Description
Other (specify)
H7 – INCORRECT OPERATION
23. Incorrect Operation
a. Type
Other (specify)
b. Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test
Drug test
Alcohol test
H8 - OTHER
24. Miscellaneous
Describe
25. Unknown
Describe
PART I – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT
THE FINDLAY OPERATIONS CENTER RECEIVED A SUCTION AND DISCHARGE PRESSURE
DEVIATION ALARMS AT ASHMORE STATION. A CPM LEAK ALARM FOLLOWED SHORTLY AFTER
AND THE WABASH SYSTEM WAS IMMEDIATELY SHUTDOWN. SHUTDOWN OF THE SYSTEM WAS
5
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<<<PAGE 24>>>

Appendix C - Operator's Accident Report
INITIATED 36 SECONDS AFTER CPM ALARM AND FLOW WAS STOPPED 11 SECONDS LATER. THE
WABASH EXPERIENCED A FAILURE 100 YARDS DOWNSTREAM OF ASHMORE STATION. THE LINE
WAS TURNED FROM CHAMPAIGN TO HAMMOND IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO FAILURE. ANALYSIS OF
THE PIPE REVEALED THAT THE FAILURE MECHANISM WAS A DEFORMATION ANOMALY THAT
WAS CENTERED ADJACENT TO THE LONGITUDINAL ERW SEAM WITH A SHEAR CRACK THAT
FORMED ON THE OUTSIDE DIAMTER OF THE PIPE DUE TO RE-ROUNDING OF THE DEFORMATION.
A LONGITUDINAL SEAM SPLIT DID OCCUR, AND WAS THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTOR TO THE
VOLUME RELEASED; HOWEVER, THE SEAM SPLIT WAS SECONDARY TO THE DEFORMATION
ANOMALY CENTERED ADJACENT TO THE LONGITUDINAL ERW SEAM. A REVISED FINAL REPORT
IS BEING SUBMITTED THIS 23RD DAY OF MARCH, 2010 CHANGING THE CAUSE FROM
MISCELLANEOUS TO RUPTURE, LONGITUDINAL SEAM SPLIT. THE DEFORMATION IS BELIEVED
TO HAVE OCCURRED DURING THE ORIGINAL COMMISSIONING HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE TEST.
THEREFORE, CONSTRUCTION DEFECT WAS SELECTED THOUGH NEITHER OPTION AVAILABLE IS
TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SITUATION. POOR WORKMANSHIP WAS SELECTED AS THE
SPECIFIC CONSTRUCTION DEFECT SINCE THE DEFORMATION OCCURRED DURING THE
ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION AND THE CRACKING PROPAGATION OCCURRED FROM REROUNDING
DURING HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE TESTS. BECAUSE THIS REPORTING FORM DOES NOT
ALLOW FOR REPORTING OF MINUTES IN QUESTION G3, THE DATA HAS BEEN INPUT AS LEAK
DURATION OF 1 HOUR. HOWEVER, AS NOTED IN THIS NARRATIVE, THE LINE WAS SHUTDOWN
UPON THE ALARM SIGNALING A FAILURE. WATER CONTAMINATION IS ESTIMATED AT LESS THAN
A BARREL, BUT DUE TO THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE FORM, IT IS LOGGED AS 1 BARREL. RUPTURE
PROPOGATION LENGTH WAS DETERMINED TO BE 70 INCHES, WHICH IS 5.8 FEET. DUE TO
CONSTRAINTS ON THE FORM, PROPOGATION LENGTH WAS ROUNDED UP TO 6 FEET.
MARATHON REPORTED A SECOND NRC REPORT (#882650) UPDATING SPILL VOLUME.
6
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Appendix D
Metallurgical Analysis
This document is on file at PHMSA
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