{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA FIR, Texas Gas Transmission LLC, 2015-09-09","title":"Texas Gas Transmission, LLC-9/9/15","source_type":"incident","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2017-06-22","effective_on":"2015-09-09","summary":"Texas Gas Transmission LLC; Hazardous Liquid; LA; failure 2015-09-09; apparent cause: Material Failure of Pipe or Weld.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-texas-gas-transmission-llc-9915.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-texas-gas-transmission-llc-9915.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-fir-texas-gas-transmission-llc-9915","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/inspections-and-investigations/texas-gas-transmission-llc-9915","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nDOT U.S. Department of Transportation\nPHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nOPS Office of Pipeline Safety\nSouthwest Region\nPrincipal Investigator Molly Atkins\nRegion Director R.M. Seeley\nDate of Report 6/10/2016\nSubject Failure Investigation Report – Texas Gas Transmission, LLC, Gas\nPipeline Rupture in Farmerville, LA\nOperator, Location, & Consequences\nDate of Failure September 9, 2015\nCommodity Released Natural Gas – 42,100.00 MCF\nCity/Parish & State Farmerville, Union Parish, Louisiana\nOpID & Operator Name 19270, Texas Gas Transmission, LLC\nUnit # & Unit Name\n3964, Sharon-Haughton Area\nInspection System ID\n3020\nSMART Activity # 151281\nMilepost/Location MLS 26-1, Mile Post (MP) 28.8\nFatalities 0\nInjuries\n0\nEvacuations\nGeneral public – 16 people in the surrounding area\nDescription of Area Impacted Pipeline right-of-way in a rural area\nProperty Damage $220,000 of estimated property damage and $248,000 of gas loss. Total\ncost: $468,000.\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Texas Gas Transmission, LLC\nSeptember 9, 2015 | Farmerville, LA\nExecutive Summary\nOn September 9, 2015, at approximately 4:33 p.m. Central Time (CT), a pipeline rupture occurred on Texas Gas\nTransmission, LLC’s (TGT), No. 1 line (MLS 26-1). MLS 26-1 is a 26-inch-diameter pipeline that is part of TGT’s\nmain line natural gas pipeline system located near mile post (MP) 28.8 in Farmerville, Union Parish, Louisiana.\nThe rupture ejected a piece of pipe 45 feet and 10 inches long from the ditch into a wooded area adjacent to\nthe pipeline right-of-way (ROW). This pipeline failure did not result in ignition of the escaping gas, injuries, or\nfatalities; however, 16 people were evacuated from the surrounding area overnight as a precautionary\nmeasure.\nAt 5:23 p.m. CT the TGT reported the incident to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) in National Response Center (NRC) report #1128025. PHMSA dispatched an investigator to perform\nan on-site investigation.\nMetallurgical failure analyses determined that the cause of the accident was a combination of corrosion and\nnear-neutral pH stress corrosion cracking at a point located on the bottom of the pipeline where the pipe was\ninstalled over an area of sandy clay and rocky material.\nPage 2 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Texas Gas Transmission, LLC\nSeptember 9, 2015 | Farmerville, LA\nSystem Details\nThe TGT is a long-haul interstate natural gas pipeline that transports gas from Gulf Coast supply areas to on-\nsystem markets in the Midwest and off-system markets in the Northeast. The TGT is a wholly owned\noperating subsidiary of Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP (BWP).\n1\nBWP is a midstream master limited partnership that provides transportation, storage, gathering, and\nprocessing of natural gas and liquids. It owns and operates approximately 14,090 miles of interconnected\nnatural gas pipelines through its subsidiaries, directly serving customers in 13 States and indirectly serving\ncustomers throughout the Northeastern and Southeastern United States via numerous interconnections with\nunaffiliated pipelines. BWP also owns and operates more than 435 miles of natural gas liquid pipelines in\nLouisiana and Texas. The BWP system is represented by the map shown in Figure 1:\nFigure 1 – Boardwalk Partners Pipeline, LP, System Map2\nThe TGT runs north and east from Louisiana, eastern Texas, and Arkansas through Louisiana, Arkansas,\nMississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Indiana; it also travels into Ohio and, via smaller-diameter lines, Illinois.\nThe market area directly served by the TGT encompasses eight States in the South and Midwest, including the\nfollowing metropolitan areas: Memphis, Tennessee; Louisville, Kentucky; Cincinnati and Dayton, Ohio; and\nEvansville and Indianapolis, Indiana. The TGT also has indirect market access to the Northeast through\ninterconnections with unaffiliated pipelines.\n²\n1 Texas Gas Transmission, LLC. Welcome to Texas Gas. Retrieved from: http://www.txgt.com/.\n2 Boardwalk Pipeline Partners. Fact Sheet. Retrieved from: http://www.bwpmlp.com/AboutUs.aspx?id=146.\nPage 3 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nFigure 2 - Incident Vicinity Map and ROW Looking to the East\nFailure Investigation Report – Texas Gas Transmission, LLC\nSeptember 9, 2015 | Farmerville, LA\nThe incident occurred on the TGT’s MLS 26-1 at approximately MP 28.8. Figure 2 is a post-incident view of the\ngeneral vicinity and the ROW, which is in Union\nParish in rural north-central Louisiana. Additional\nphotographs of the vicinity may be found in the\nmetallurgical failure analysis in Appendix A.\nThis pipeline system (ISID 3020) is in the PHMSA-\nidentified Sharon-Haughton Area (Unit ID 3964),\nwhich is inspected by PHMSA’s Southern Region.\nPipe Specifications\nThe pipeline was constructed in 1949 using\nAmerican Petroleum Institute (API) 5LX Grade\nX52 electric fusion-welded pipe manufactured by\nthe A.O. Smith Corporation. The pipe is 26 inches\nin outside diameter with a nominal wall thickness\nof 0.281 inches at the failure location. The\nmaximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP)\nof the pipeline, as established by hydrostatic\ntesting, is 810 pounds per square inch gauge\n(psig). The most recent test took place on\nSeptember 23, 1976, and included a 100%\nspecified minimum yield strength (SMYS) spike\ntest followed by a 90% SMYS eight-hour hold period without any failures. The pipeline was originally covered\nwith a coal tar-type coating and protected from external corrosion via an impressed current cathodic\nprotection (CP) system that was put into service in 1949.\nEvents Leading up to the Failure\nThe TGT was operating the pipeline at 766 psig immediately prior to the incident. The pipeline was flowing at\na lower pressure than normal due to maintenance activities that were being conducted in the area at the time\nof the failure.\nEmergency Response\nThe operator received a call from local emergency responders reporting an explosion and blowing gas in the\nvicinity of the pipeline ROW at approximately the same time as the pipeline control center observed a\npressure drop on the supervisory control and data acquisition system. The TGT initiated its emergency\nresponse procedures, isolated a 10-mile pipeline segment between the upstream and downstream valves on\neither side of the failure location, and evacuated 16 people from the surrounding area as a precautionary\nmeasure. The TGT notified the NRC of the accident at 5:23 p.m. CT in NRC Report #1128025, which PHMSA’s\nPage 4 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Texas Gas Transmission, LLC\nSeptember 9, 2015 | Farmerville, LA\nSouthwest Region received via email from the Crisis Management Center at 5:43 p.m. CT. PHMSA dispatched\na Southwest Region accident investigator to the site at 6:00 p.m. CT.\nSummary of Initial Start-up and Return-to-Service\nThe damaged area of the line was replaced with a new segment of pipe, at which time a pig launcher and\nreceivers were added to allow the TGT to perform in-line inspection (ILI) on the pipeline segment. Due to the\nmode of failure, and based on the results of the root cause analysis, the TGT determined that they needed to\nperform an ILI inspection using both magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and transverse flux inspection (TFI) tools\nprior to restarting the system. The TGT purged the pipeline and maintained a maximum operating pressure of\n648 psig—80% of the 810 pounds per square inch MAOP—while they performed the internal inspection. The\nTGT operated the pipeline at the reduced pressure of 648 psig until after ILI data was received and actionable\nanomalies were addressed. The pipeline was returned to full operating pressure on December 18, 2015.\nThe TGT used deformation tool inspection and the data from the MFL to identify signatures similar to the\nanomaly that caused the pipeline failure. Of the 14 locations identified and excavated—all of which had\npotential matching attributes and indications—none displayed stress corrosion cracking (SCC).\nInvestigation Details\nAt 7:30 a.m. CT on September 10, 2015, the PHMSA Southwest Region accident investigator arrived at the\nfailure site, which he toured after meeting operator personnel. At approximately 12:00 p.m. CT a staff\nconsultant/metallurgist from Stress Engineering Services, Inc. (SES), arrived onsite to begin evidence collection\nand to perform a site survey. PHMSA accompanied the SES metallurgist during the site survey to monitor field\nmeasurements and observations.\nThe origin of failure was identified on the bottom quarter of the segment of pipe that was ejected from the\nditch, as depicted in a diagram sketched by PHMSA and shown in Figure 3:\nPage 5 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nFigure 3 - Failure Origin Location Sketch by PHMSA\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nMeasurements were taken after the origin of failure was located. The photographs in Figure 4 depict the\ncorrelation of the ejected pipe with the in-situ pipe and ditch location:\nFigure 4 - Correlation of Ejected Pipe Segment with the Ditch and In Situ Pipe\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Texas Gas Transmission, LLC\nSeptember 9, 2015 | Farmerville, LA\nBased on field observations, the SES and PHMSA stated that the preliminary determination of the cause of\nfailure was localized environmental cracking in combination with external corrosion. The failure originated on\nthe bottom of the pipe where it rested on a rock ledge outcrop in the otherwise relatively homogenous clay-\nlike material of the ditch. The photos in Figure 4 show this outcropping, which is the dark grey, rocky material\nsurrounded by orange clay soil. A more detailed description of the soil conditions can be found in the\nmetallurgical failure analysis report in Appendix D.\nThe affected pipe sections were identified, their edges protected, and the segments prepared for transport to\nthe SES laboratory in Houston, Texas. After that was accomplished the PHMSA investigator left the site.\nThe pipeline was located in a Class 1 rural area and no High Consequence Areas (HCA) were affected by the\nincident.\nMetallurgical Examination\nThe SES completed a metallurgical failure analysis of the pipe from the incident and issued their findings in a\nreport dated November 6, 2016. The report, which can be found in Appendix D, summarized the findings as\nfollows:\nBased on visual examination and metallurgical analyses of the pipe samples provided to SES\nalong with information gathered during a visit to the Monroe failure site, SES concluded that the\nsubject failure was the result of external corrosion in combination with near-neutral pH stress\ncorrosion cracking (SCC). This damage occurred at about the 6:00 o’clock orientation where the\nsoil supporting the pipeline contained rocky material that damaged the coating and likely\nshielded this area, rendering it difficult to maintain the CP potential. This rocky material\nsupporting the pipe was part of a black layer of sedimentary deposits (which were readily seen in\nthe ditch). The soil above and below this black layer consisted of sandy clay material and was not\ncompacted to form hard or rock-like material.\n. . . .\nBased on SES’s visual examination and metallurgical analyses of the samples provided, along\nwith observations from a visit to the site, SES concluded that the Monroe failure was caused by a\ncombination of corrosion and near-neutral pH stress corrosion cracking. The information\navailable to SES did not allow a determination of the precise timing or exact conditions that led\nto the failure. However, it was apparent that corrosion enlarged cracks in the pipe, thereby\nsignificantly contributing to the failure.\nThe mechanical properties of the pipe material were tested and found to meet the requirements\nof API 5LX in effect in 1948 (as well as current requirements). While the material toughness was\nlow, this property alone did not play a significant role in the failure.\nPHMSA concurs with the findings in SES’s metallurgical failure analysis report.\nPage 8 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Texas Gas Transmission, LLC\nSeptember 9, 2015 | Farmerville, LA\nInvestigation Findings & Contributing Factors\nThe failure was caused by a combination of factors that exacerbated localized corrosion in a limited area of\nlow-pH stress corrosion cracking, thereby expanding the cracks until they led to failure. The failure, which was\nnot readily apparent from the surface of the ground, was likely related to placement of the pipe on an area of\nrocky material that damaged the pipe’s coating and thus contributed to external corrosion.\nThe TGT’s subsequent examination of the MFL and TFI ILI data for 14 sites with similar signal indications\nrevealed no SCC. These findings reinforce the difficulty in finding or predicting the conditions or locations that\nresult in the combination of this type of low-level corrosion with SCC.\nPage 9 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\nFailure Investigation Report – Texas Gas Transmission, LLC\nSeptember 9, 2015 | Farmerville, LA\nAppendixes\nA Maps\nB NRC Report\nC Operator Incident Reports to PHMSA\nD Metallurgical Failure Analysis Report\nPage 10 of 10\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nNATIONAL PIPELINE MAPPING SYSTEM FOR OFFICIAL USE\nONLY\n(b) (7)(F)\nLegend\nQueried Incidents (Gas)\nIncidents (Gas)\nGas Transmission Pipelines\nPipelines depicted on this map represent gas\ntransmission and hazardous liquid lines only. Gas\ngathering and gas distribution systems are not\nrepresented.\nThis map should never be used as a substitute for\ncontacting a one-call center prior to excavation\nactivities. Please call 811 before any digging\noccurs.\nQuestions regarding this map or its contents can be\ndirected to npms@dot.gov.\nProjection: Geographic\nDatum: NAD83\nMap produced by the P MMA application at\nwww npms.phmsa dot gov\nDate Printed: May 25, 2016\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nFrom: CMC-01 (OST)\nSent: Wednesday, September 09, 2015 5:43 PM\nTo: PHMSA PHP80 Response; PHMSA PHP400 SOUTHWEST\nSubject: NRC#1128025: Pipeline - Union County, LA (176 miles NW of Baton Rouge, LA), natural gas\nrelease\nThis report is forwarded for your situational awareness. CMC 6-1863\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802\n***GOVERNMENT USE ONLY***GOVERNMENT USE ONLY***\nInformation released to a third party shall comply with any\napplicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws\nIncident Report # 1128025\nINCIDENT DESCRIPTION\n*Report taken by: CIV ANTONAY GREER at 18:22 on 09-SEP-15\nIncident Type: PIPELINE\nIncident Cause: UNKNOWN\nAffected Area:\nIncident occurred on 09-SEP-15 at 16:30 local incident time.\nAffected Medium: AIR /ATMOSPHERE- NO OFF SITE IMPACT\nREPORTING PARTY\nName:\nJAY JONES\nOrganization: BOARDWALK PIPELINES/ TEXAS GAS\nAddress:\n610 WEST 2ND ST.\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nOWENSBORO, KY 42301\nEmail Address: jay.jones@bwpmlp.com\nPRIMARY Phone: (270)6886800\nType of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE\n_______________________________________________________________________\nSUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY\nName: JAY JONES\nOrganization: BOARDWALK PIPELINES/ TEXAS GAS\nAddress: 610 WEST 2ND ST.\nOWENSBORO, KY 42301\nPRIMARY Phone: (270)6886800\n________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT LOCATION\nCounty: UNION\nState: LA\nLatitude: 38° 50' 53\" N\nLongitude: 092° 28' 00\" W\nNEAR FOWLER RD. & TIGER BEND\n_______________________________________________________________________\nRELEASED MATERIAL(S)\nCHRIS Code: ONG Official Material Name: NATURAL GAS\nAlso Known As:\nQty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT\n________________________________________________________________________\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\nDESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT\nNATURAL GAS IS RELEASING FROM A 26\" TRANSMISSION PIPELINE, DUE TO\nUNKNOWN CAUSES.\n________________________________________________________________________\nSENSITIVE INFORMATION\nOSC,\nTHE POSITION THE RP PROVIDED IS INACCURATE. GIS PLACED THE NEAREST\nCOORDINATES AT\nLATITUDE: 32.844491N\nLONGITUDE: -92. 283871\n________________________________________________________________________\nINCIDENT DETAILS\nPipeline Type: TRANSMISSION\nDOT Regulated: YES\nPipeline Above/Below Ground: BELOW\nExposed or Under Water: NO\nPipeline Covered: UNKNOWN\n______________________________________________________________________\nIMPACT\nFire Involved: NO Fire Extinguished: UNKNOWN\nINJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:\nFATALITIES: NO Empl/Crew: Passenger: Occupant:\nEVACUATIONS:NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:\n\n<<<PAGE 15>>>\n\nDamages: NO\nHours Direction of\nClosure Type Description of Closure Closed Closure\nN\nAir:\nN Major\nRoad: Artery:N\nN\nWaterway:\nN\nTrack:\nEnvironmental Impact: NO\nMedia Interest: UNKNOWN Community Impact due to Material:\n______________________________________________________________________\nREMEDIAL ACTIONS\nBLOCK VALVES ARE BEING CLOSED, CREW ONSITE.\nRelease Secured: NO\nRelease Rate:\nEstimated Release Duration:\n______________________________________________________________________\nWEATHER\nWeather: UNKNOWN, ºF\n______________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED\nFederal:\n\n<<<PAGE 16>>>\n\nState/Local:\nState/Local On Scene:\nState Agency Number:\n_______________________________________________________________________\nNOTIFICATIONS BY NRC\nAR DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (COMMAND CENTER)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (501)6820713\nARKANSAS POISON CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (501)6866161\nAR STATE EMERGENCY SERVICES (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (501)6836700\nCENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (GRASP)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (770)4887100\nDOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (202)3661863\nU.S. EPA VI (MAIN OFFICE)\n(866)3727745\nFLD INTEL SUPPORT TEAM NEW ORLEANS (SUPERVISOR, FIST NEW ORLEANS)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (504)5894224\nJFO-LA (COMMAND CENTER)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)3366513\nJFO-LA (FEMA JFO LA)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)3366513\nLA DEPT OF ENV QUAL (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)2193640\n\n<<<PAGE 17>>>\n\nLA DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURSES (OFFICE OF CONSERVATION)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)3425524\nLA DEPT OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (337)\nLA GOV OFFICE HS AND EMERGENCY PREP (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)9257500\nLA GOV OFFICE HS AND EMERGENCY PREP (SITUATIONAL AWARENESS N.E. LOUISIA\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)9257500\nLA OFFICE OF GOV (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)2195800\nLA OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (888)2937020\nNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (202)2829201\nNOAA RPTS FOR LA (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (206)5264911\nNATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (AUTOMATIC REPORTS)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (202)2671136\nNTSB PIPELINE (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (202)3146293\nREPORTING PARTY (RP SUBMITTER)\n09-SEP-15 18:37\nSECTOR LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER (AUTO NRC NOTIFICATIONS)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)2985400\nLA STATE POLICE (MAIN OFFICE)\n\n<<<PAGE 18>>>\n\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)9256595\nLA STATE POLICE (ANALYTICAL AND FUSION EXCHANGE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)9254192\nMSU BATON ROUGE (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (225)2985400\nDEPT OF ENERGY STPR (STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE-EMERGENCY MGMT)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (504)7344113\nUSCG DISTRICT 8 (MAIN OFFICE)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (504)5896225\nUSCG DISTRICT 8 (PLANNING)\n09-SEP-15 18:37 (504)6712080\n_______________________________________________________________________\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION\n______________________________________________________________________\n*** END INCIDENT REPORT #1128025 ***\nReport any problems by calling 1-800-424-8802\nPLEASE VISIT OUR WEB SITE AT http://www.nrc.uscg.mil\nThe information contained in this communication from the Department of Transportation’s Crisis\nManagement Center (CMC) Watch may be sensitive or privileged and is intended for the sole use of\npersons or entities named. If you are not an intended recipient of this transmission, you are prohibited\nfrom disseminating, distributing, copying or using the information. If you have received this\ncommunication in error, please immediately contact the CMC Watch at (202) 366-1863 to arrange for\nthe return of this information.\n\n<<<PAGE 19>>>\n\nNOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 191. Failure to report can result in a civil penalty not to\nexceed 100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except that the maximum civil\npenalty shall not exceed $1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122.\nOMB NO: 2137-0522\nEXPIRATION DATE: 10/31/2017\nOriginal Report\nDate: 10/08/2015\nU.S Department of Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nNo. 20150120 - 17094\n--------------------------------------------------\n(DOT Use Only)\nINCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND\nGATHERING PIPELINE SYSTEMS\nA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply\nwith a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid\nOMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2137-0522. All responses to this collection of information are\nmandatory. Send comments regarding the burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the\nburden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590.\nINSTRUCTIONS\nImportant: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific\nexamples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the PHMSA Pipeline Safety Community Web Page at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms.\nPART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION\nReport Type: (select all that apply) Original: Supplemental: Yes Final:\nYes\nLast Revision Date: 05/23/2016\n1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): 19270\n2. Name of Operator TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC\n3. Address of Operator:\n3a. Street Address 9 GREENWAY PLAZA SUITE 2800\n3b. City HOUSTON\n3c. State Texas\n3d. Zip Code: 77046\n4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Incident: 09/09/2015 16:30\n5. Location of Incident:\nLatitude: 32.848632\nLongitude: -92.285693\n6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 1128025\n7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the\nNational Response Center (if applicable): 09/09/2015 17:23\n8. Incident resulted from: Unintentional release of gas\n9. Gas released: (select only one, based on predominant volume\nreleased) Natural Gas\n- Other Gas Released Name:\n10. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally - Thousand\nCubic Feet (MCF): 42,100.00\n11. Estimated volume of intentional and controlled release/blowdown -\nThousand Cubic Feet (MCF)\n12. Estimated volume of accompanying liquid release (Barrels):\n13. Were there fatalities? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n13a. Operator employees\n13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n13c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n13e. General public\n13f. Total fatalities (sum of above)\n14. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? No\n- If Yes, specify the number in each category:\n14a. Operator employees\n14b. Contractor employees working for the Operator\n14c. Non-Operator emergency responders\n14d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT\nassociated with this Operator\n14e. General public\n14f. Total injuries (sum of above)\n15. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the incident? No\n- If No, Explain: Rerouted gas flow\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 1 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 20>>>\n\n- If Yes, complete Questions 15a and 15b: (use local time, 24-hr clock)\n15a. Local time and date of shutdown\n15b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted\n- Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required)\n16. Did the gas ignite? No\n17. Did the gas explode? No\n18. Number of general public evacuated: 16\n19. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock):\n19a. Local time operator identified Incident– effective 10-2014,\nchanged from \"Incident\" to \"failure\" 09/09/2015 16:33\n19b. Local time operator resources arrived on site 09/09/2015 17:30\nPART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION\n1. Was the origin of the Incident onshore? Yes\n- Yes (Complete Questions 2-12)\n- No (Complete Questions 13-15)\nIf Onshore:\n2. State: Louisiana\n3. Zip Code: 71241\n4. City Farmerville\n5. County or Parish Union\n6. Operator designated location Milepost/Valve Station\nSpecify: 28+4276\n7. Pipeline/Facility name: Main Line System\n8. Segment name/ID: MLS\n9. Was Incident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf\n(OCS)? No\n10. Location of Incident : Pipeline Right-of-way\n11. Area of Incident (as found) : Underground\nSpecify: Under soil\nOther – Describe:\nDepth-of-Cover (in): 48\n12. Did Incident occur in a crossing? No\n- If Yes, specify type below:\n- If Bridge crossing –\nCased/ Uncased:\n- If Railroad crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Road crossing –\nCased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled\n- If Water crossing –\nCased/ Uncased\nName of body of water (If commonly known):\nApprox. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\nSelect:\nIf Offshore:\n13. Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident:\n14. Origin of Incident:\n- If \"In State waters\":\n- State:\n- Area:\n- Block/Tract #:\n- Nearest County/Parish:\n- If \"On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)\":\n- Area:\n- Block #:\n15. Area of Incident:\nPART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION\n1. Is the pipeline or facility: - Interstate - Intrastate Interstate\n2. Part of system involved in Incident: Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\n3. Item involved in Incident: Pipe\n- If Pipe – Specify: Pipe Body\n3a. Nominal diameter of pipe (in): 26\n3b. Wall thickness (in): .281\n3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 52,000\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 2 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 21>>>\n\n3d. Pipe specification: API 5L\n3e. Pipe Seam – Specify: Flash Welded\n- If Other, Describe:\n3f. Pipe manufacturer: A. O. Smith\n3g. Year of manufacture: 1949\n3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Incident – Specify: Coal Tar\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Weld, including heat-affected zone – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n- If Valve – Specify:\n- If Mainline – Specify:\n- If Other, Describe:\n3i. Mainline valve manufacturer:\n3j. Year of manufacture:\n- If Other, Describe:\n4. Year item involved in Incident was installed: 1949\n5. Material involved in Incident: Carbon Steel\n- If Material other than Carbon Steel or Plastic – Specify:\n6. Type of Incident involved: Rupture\n- If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size:\nin. (axial) by\nin. (circumferential)\n- If Leak - Select Type:\n- If Other – Describe:\n- If Rupture - Select Orientation: Longitudinal\n- If Other – Describe:\nApprox. size: in. (widest opening): 26\nby in. (length circumferentially or axially): 552\n- If Other – Describe:\nPART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION\n1. Class Location of Incident: Class 1 Location\n2. Did this Incident occur in a High Consequence Area (HCA)? No\n- If Yes:\n2a. Specify the Method used to identify the HCA:\n3. What is the PIR (Potential Impact Radius) for the location of this\nIncident? Feet: 511\n4. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\ndue to heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n5. Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged\nNOT by heat/fire resulting from the Incident? No\n6. Were any of the fatalities or injuries reported for persons located\noutside the PIR? No\n7. Estimated Property Damage :\n7a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private\nproperty damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator – effective 6-\n2011, \"paid/reimbursed by the Operator\" removed\n$ 5,000\nEstimated cost of gas released unintentionally – effective 6-2011,\nmoved to item 7f\nEstimated cost of gas released during intentional and controlled\nblowdown – effective 6-2011, moved to item 7g\n7b. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs $ 207,439\n7c. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response $ 7,500\n7d. Estimated other costs $ 0\nDescribe:\n7e. Property damage subtotal (sum of above) $ 219,939\nCost of Gas Released\n7f. Estimated cost of gas released unintentionally $ 133,367\n7g. Estimated cost of gas released during intentional and\ncontrolled blowdown $ 114,655\n7h. Total estimated cost of gas released (sum of 7.f & 7.g above) $ 248,022\nTotal of all costs $ 467,961\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 3 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 22>>>\n\nPART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION\n1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Incident (psig): 766.00\n2. Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) at the point and\ntime of the Incident (psig): 810.00\nAdded 10-2014 2a. MAOP established by 49 CFR section: 192.619(a)(1)\n- If Other, specify:\n3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the\nIncident: Pressure did not exceed MAOP\n4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations\n(such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility\nrelating to the Incident operating under an established pressure\nrestriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the\nMAOP?\nNo\n- If Yes - (Complete 4a and 4b below)\n4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure\nrestriction?\n4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the\nState?\n5. Was \"Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites\" OR \"Offshore Pipeline,\nIncluding Riser and Riser Bend\" selected in PART C, Question 2? Yes\n- If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5e. below):\n5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source: Manual\n5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release\nsource:\nManual\n5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 52,800\n5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection\ntools? Yes\n- If No – Which physical features limit tool accommodation? (select all that apply)\n- Changes in line pipe diameter\n- Presence of unsuitable mainline valves\n- Tight or mitered pipe bends\n- Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting\ninstrumentation, etc.)\n- Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux\nleakage internal inspection tools)\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5e. For this pipeline, are there operational factors which\nsignificantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool\nrun?\nNo\n- If Yes, which operational factors complicate execution? (select all that apply)\n- Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall build-up\n- Low operating pressure(s)\n- Low flow or absence of flow\n- Incompatible commodity\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n5f. Function of pipeline system: Transmission System\n6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based\nsystem in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Incident? Yes\n- If Yes:\n6a. Was it operating at the time of the Incident? Yes\n6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Incident? Yes\n6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the\ndetection of the Incident?\nYes\n6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), alert(s),\nevent(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with the confirmation of\nthe Incident?\nYes\n7. How was the Incident initially identified for the Operator? Notification from Emergency Responder\n- If Other – Describe:\n7a. If \"Controller\", \"Local Operating Personnel, including\ncontractors\", \"Air Patrol\", or \"Ground Patrol by Operator or its\ncontractor\" is selected in Question 7, specify:\n8. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or\ncontrol room issues were the cause of or a contributing factor to the\nIncident?\nNo, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary\ndue to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did not\ninvestigate)\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 4 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 23>>>\n\n- If No, the operator did not find that an investigation of the\ncontroller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to:\n(provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate)\nIncident occurred at a pressure below MAOP\n- If Yes, Descr be investigation result(s) (select all that apply):\n- Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, continuous\nhours of service (while working for the operator), and other\nfactors associated with fatigue\n- Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations,\ncontinuous hours of service (while working for the Operator)\nand other factors associated with fatigue\n- Provide an explanation for why not:\n- Investigation identified no control room issues\n- Investigation identified no controller issues\n- Investigation identified incorrect controller action or\ncontroller error\n- Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the\ncontroller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s)\nresponse\n- Investigation identified incorrect procedures\n- Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment\noperation\n- Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected\ncontrol room operations, procedures, and/or controller\nresponse\n- Investigation identified areas other than those above –\nDescribe:\nPART F - DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING INFORMATION\n1. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator employees tested\nunder the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's\nDrug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n1a. How many were tested:\n1b. How many failed:\n2. As a result of this Incident, were any Operator contractor employees\ntested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of\nDOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations?\nNo\n- If Yes:\n2a. How many were tested:\n2b. How many failed:\nPART G - APPARENT CAUSE\nSelect only one box from PART G in the shaded column on the left representing the APPARENT Cause of the Incident, and answer the\nquestions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing, or root causes of the Incident in the narrative (PART H).\nApparent Cause: G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld\nG1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nCorrosion Failure – Sub-cause:\n- If External Corrosion:\n1. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply)\n- Galvanic\n- Atmospheric\n- Stray Current\n- Microbiological\n- Selective Seam\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the following: (select all that apply)\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other – Describe:\n4. Was the failed item buried under the ground?\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 5 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 24>>>\n\n- If Yes:\n4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic protection at\nthe time of the incident?\n- If Yes, Year protection started:\n4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the\npoint of the incident?\n4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been conducted\nat the point of the incident?\nIf \"Yes, CP Annual Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Close Interval Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\nIf \"Yes, Other CP Survey\" – Most recent year conducted:\n- If No:\n4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted?\n5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of\nthe corrosion?\n- If Internal Corrosion:\n6. Results of visual examination:\n- If Other, Describe:\n7. Cause of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Corrosive Commodity\n- Water drop-out/Acid\n- Microbiological\n- Erosion\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the following (select all that apply):\n- Field examination\n- Determined by metallurgical analysis\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply):\n- Low point in pipe\n- Elbow\n- Drop-out\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\n10. Was the gas/fluid treated with corrosion inh bitors or biocides?\n11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating?\n12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely\nutilized?\n13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized?\nComplete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (from PART C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n14. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point\nof the Incident?\n14a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Ultrasonic\nMost recent year run:\n- Geometry\nMost recent year run:\n- Caliper\nMost recent year run:\n- Crack\nMost recent year run:\n- Hard Spot\nMost recent year run:\n- Combination Tool\nMost recent year run:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nMost recent year run:\n- Other\nMost recent year run:\nIf Other, Describe:\n15. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes,\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 6 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 25>>>\n\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n16. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost recent year conducted:\n- If Yes, but the point of the Incident was not identified as a dig site:\nMost recent year conducted:\n17. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at\nthe point of the Incident since January 1, 2002?\n17a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most\nrecent year the examination was conducted:\n- Radiography\nMost recent year examined:\n- Guided Wave Ultrasonic\nMost recent year examined:\n- Handheld Ultrasonic Tool\nMost recent year examined:\n- Wet Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\n- Dry Magnetic Particle Test\nMost recent year examined:\n- Other\nMost recent year examined:\nIf Other, Describe:\nG2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-handed column\nNatural Force Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods:\n1. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Heavy Rains/Floods:\n2. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Lightning:\n3. Specify:\n- If Temperature:\n4. Specify:\n- If Other, Descr be:\n- If Other Natural Force Damage:\n5. Describe:\nComplete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is selected.\n6. Were the natural forces causing the Incident generated in conjunction\nwith an extreme weather event?\n6a. If yes, specify: (select all that apply):\n- Hurricane\n- Tropical Storm\n- Tornado\n- Other\n- If Other, Describe:\nG3 - Excavation Damage only one sub-cause can be picked from shaded left-hand column\nExcavation Damage – Sub-Cause:\n- If Previous Damage Due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions 1-5 ONLY IF the \"Item Involved in Incident\" (From Part C,\nQuestion 3) is Pipe or Weld.\n1. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of\nthe Incident?\n1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and indicate most recent year run:\n- Magnetic Flux Leakage\nYear:\n- Ultrasonic\nYear:\n- Geometry\nYear:\n- Caliper\nForm PHMSA F 7100.2 Page 7 of 13\nReproduction of this form is permitted\n\n<<<PAGE 26>>>\n\nYear:\n- Crack\nYear:\n- Hard Spot\nYear:\n- Combination Tool\nYear:\n- Transverse Field/Triaxial\nYear:\n- Other:\nYear:\nDescribe:\n2. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was\ncompleted BEFORE the damage was sustained?\n3. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted\nsince original construction at the point of the Incident?\n- If Yes:\nMost recent year tested:\nTest pressure (psig):\n4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline\nsegment?\n- If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Incident:\nMost ","truncated":true,"body_characters":52298}