{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA Guidance, Pipeline Safety: Establishing Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure or Maximum Operating Pressure Using Record Evidence, and Integrity Management Risk Identification, Assessment, Prevention and Mitigation","title":"Pipeline Safety: Establishing Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure or Maximum Operating Pressure Using Record Evidence, and Integrity Management Risk Identification, Assessment, Prevention and Mitigation","source_type":"guidance","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":null,"effective_on":null,"summary":"Pipeline Safety: Establishing Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure or Maximum Operating Pressure Using Record Evidence, and Integrity Management Risk Identification, Assessment, Prevention and Mitigation Document 2011-208.pdf (154.45 KB) PHMSA is issuing an Advisory Bulletin to remind operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities of their responsibilities, under Federal integrity management (IM) regulatio","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-establishing-maximum-allowable-operating-pressure-or-maximum-operating-pressure-using-record-evidence-integrity-management-risk-identification-assessment-prevention-mitigation-f49ab1f7.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-establishing-maximum-allowable-operating-pressure-or-maximum-operating-pressure-using-record-evidence-integrity-management-risk-identification-assessment-prevention-mitigation-f49ab1f7.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-establishing-maximum-allowable-operating-pressure-or-maximum-operating-pressure-using-record-evidence-integrity-management-risk-identification-assessment-prevention-mitigation-f49ab1f7","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/pipeline-safety-establishing-maximum-allowable-operating-pressure-or-maximum-operating-pressure-using-record-evidence-integrity-management-risk-identification-assessment-prevention-mitigation","body":"Pipeline Safety: Establishing Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure or Maximum Operating Pressure Using Record Evidence, and Integrity Management Risk Identification, Assessment, Prevention and Mitigation\n\nDocument\n\n 2011-208.pdf (154.45 KB)\n\n        PHMSA is issuing an Advisory Bulletin to remind operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities of their responsibilities, under Federal integrity management (IM) regulations, to perform detailed threat and risk analyses that integrate accurate data and information from their entire pipeline system, especially when calculating Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) or Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP), and to utilize these risk analyses in the identification of appropriate assessment methods, and preventive and mitigative measures.\n\n          Effective Date: Monday, January 10, 2011\n\n<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\n1504 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2011 / Notices\nsrobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES\nprovisions of Federal transit laws (49\nU.S.C. 5323(b), and 5324), the project-\nlevel air quality conformity regulation of\nthe U.S. Environmental Protection\nAgency (EPA) (40 CFR part 93), the\nsection 404(b)(1) guidelines of EPA (40\nCFR part 230), the regulation\nimplementing section 106 of the\nNational Historic Preservation Act (36\nCFR part 800), the regulation\nimplementing section 7 of the\nEndangered Species Act (50 CFR part\n402), section 4(f) of the Department of\nTransportation Act (23 CFR part 774),\nand Executive Orders 12898 on\nenvironmental justice, 11988 on\nfloodplain management, and 11990 on\nthe protection of the wetlands.\nThe FTA regulations implementing\nNEPA, as well as provisions of the Safe,\nAccountable, Flexible, Efficient\nTransportation Equity Act: A Legacy for\nUsers (SAFETEA–LU), requires that\nFTA and METRO (1) invite other\nFederal and non-Federal agencies and\nNative American Tribes that may have\nan interest in the proposed project to\nbecome ‘‘participating agencies;’’ (2)\nprovide an opportunity for involvement\nby participating agencies and the public\nto help define the purpose and need,\nand the range of alternatives for\nconsideration; and (3) establish a plan\nfor coordinating public and agency\nparticipation in, and comment on, the\nenvironmental review. It is possible that\nFTA and METRO will not be able to\nidentify all Federal and non-Federal\nagencies and Native American Tribes\nthat may have such an interest. Any\nFederal or non-Federal agency or Native\nAmerican Tribe interested in the\nproposed project that does not receive\nan invitation to become a participating\nagency should notify at the earliest\nopportunity the Project Manager\nidentified above under ADDRESSES.\nPaperwork Reduction\nThe Paperwork Reduction Act seeks,\nin part, to minimize the cost to the\ntaxpayer of the creation, collection,\nmaintenance, use, dissemination, and\ndisposition of information. Consistent\nwith this goal and with principles of\neconomy and efficiency in government,\nit is FTA policy to limit insofar as\npossible distribution of complete\nprinted sets of environmental\ndocuments. Accordingly, unless a\nspecific request for a complete printed\nset of environmental documents is\nreceived (preferably in advance of\nprinting), FTA and its grantees will\ndistribute only the executive summary\nof the environmental document together\nwith a Compact Disc of the complete\nenvironmental document. A complete\nprinted set of the environmental\ndocument will be available for review at\nthe libraries and governments offices in\nthe project area; an electronic copy of\nthe complete environmental document\nwill also be available on the project Web\nsite at http://www.ridemetro.org.\nBlas M. Uribe,\nFTA Deputy Regional Administrator.\n[FR Doc. 2011–149 Filed 1–7–11; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE P\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n[Docket No. PHMSA–2010–0381\nPipeline Safety: Establishing Maximum\nAllowable Operating Pressure or\nMaximum Operating Pressure Using\nRecord Evidence, and Integrity\nManagement Risk Identification,\nAssessment, Prevention, and\nMitigation\nAGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA); DOT.\nACTION: Notice; issuance of Advisory\nBulletin.\nSUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing an\nAdvisory Bulletin to remind operators\nof gas and hazardous liquid pipeline\nfacilities of their responsibilities, under\nFederal integrity management (IM)\nregulations, to perform detailed threat\nand risk analyses that integrate accurate\ndata and information from their entire\npipeline system, especially when\ncalculating Maximum Allowable\nOperating Pressure (MAOP) or\nMaximum Operating Pressure (MOP),\nand to utilize these risk analyses in the\nidentification of appropriate assessment\nmethods, and preventive and mitigative\nmeasures.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:\nAlan Mayberry by phone at 202–366–\n5124 or by e-mail at\nalan.mayberry@dot.gov. All materials in\nthis docket may be accessed\nelectronically at http://\nwww.regulations.gov. General\ninformation about the PHMSA Office of\nPipeline Safety (OPS) can be obtained\nby accessing OPS’s Internet home page\nat http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:\nBackground\nPHMSA’s goal is to improve the\noverall integrity of pipeline systems and\nreduce risks. To adequately evaluate\nrisk, it is necessary to identify and\nevaluate the physical and operational\ncharacteristics of each individual\npipeline system. To that end, the\nHazardous Liquid and Gas Transmission\nPipeline Integrity Management (IM)\nPrograms were created with the\nfollowing objectives:\n• Ensuring the quality of pipeline\nintegrity in areas with a higher potential\nfor adverse consequences (high\nconsequence areas or HCAs);\n• Promoting a more rigorous and\nsystematic management of pipeline\nintegrity and risk by operators;\n• Maintaining the government’s\nprominent role in the oversight of\npipeline operator integrity plans and\nprograms; and\n• Increasing the public’s confidence\nin the safe operation of the nation’s\npipeline network.\nThe IM regulations supplement\nPHMSA’s prescriptive safety regulations\nwith requirements that are intelligent,\nperformance based and process-\noriented. One of the fundamental tenets\nof the IM program is that pipeline\noperators must be aware of the physical\nattributes of their pipeline as well as the\nphysical environment that it\ntransverses. These programs reflect the\nrecognition that each pipeline is unique\nand has its own specific risk profile that\nis dependent upon the pipelines\nattributes, its geographical location,\ndesign, operating environment, the\ncommodity being transported, and many\nother factors. This information is a vital\ncomponent in an operator’s ability to\nidentify and evaluate the risks to its\npipeline and identify the appropriate\nassessment tools, set the schedule for\nassessments of the integrity of the\npipeline segments and identify the need\nfor additional preventive and mitigative\nmeasures such as lowering operating\npressures. If this information is\nunknown, or unknowable, a more\nconservative approach to operations is\ndictated.\nAn IM program must go beyond\nsimply assessing pipeline segments and\nrepairing defects. Improving operator IM\nprograms, the analytical processes\ninvolved in identifying and responding\nto risk, and the application of\nassessment and development of\npreventive and mitigative measures is\nalso a critical objective. In addition, the\nability to integrate and analyze threat\nand integrity related data from many\nsources is essential for enhanced safety\nand proactive integrity management.\nHowever, some operators are not\nsufficiently aware of their pipeline\nattributes nor are they adequately or\nconsistently assessing threats and risks\nas a part of their IM programs.\nOver the past several years, PHMSA\ninspections and investigations have\nrevealed deficiencies in individual\nVerDate Mar<15>2010 18:19 Jan 07, 2011 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\10JAN1.SGM 10JAN1\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nsrobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES\nFederal Register / Vol. 76, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2011 / Notices\n1505\noperators’ risk analysis approaches, the\nintegration of data into these risk\nassessments, the abilities to adequately\nsupport the selection of assessment\nmethods, identification and\nimplementation of preventive and\nmitigative measures, and maintenance\nof up-to-date risk information and\nfindings about their pipeline segments.\nIn particular, operators’ programs fail to\nadequately address stress corrosion\ncracking, seam failure, or internal\ncorrosion in their threat identification\nand risk assessments. The actual use of\nthreat and risk information to determine\nassessment methods, to evaluate other\npreventive and mitigative measures, and\nto use those measures during periodic\nevaluation have been found to be\ndeficient. Inspections and investigations\nhave revealed examples where\nassessment methods, specific tools, and\nschedules were not based on a rigorous\nassessment of the type of threats posed\nby the pipeline segment, including\nconsideration of the age, design, pipe\nmaterial including seam type, coating,\nwelding technique, cathodic protection,\nsoil type, surrounding environment,\noperational history, or other relevant\nfactors. Finally, inspections and\ninvestigations indicate that efforts to\ncollect and integrate risk information\ncan be inappropriately narrow, lack\nverification and fail to take into account\nrelevant risk information and lessons\nlearned from other parts of their system.\nIn recent pipeline accident\ninvestigations, NTSB and PHMSA have\ndiscovered indications that operator\noversight of IM programs has been\nlacking and thereby failed to detect\nflaws and deficiencies in their\nprograms. The level of self-evaluation\nand oversight currently being exercised\nby some pipeline operators is not\nuniformly applied. The NTSB is also\nconcerned that pipeline operators\nthroughout the United States may have\ndiscrepancies in their records that could\npotentially compromise the safe\noperation of their pipelines. NTSB has\nrecommended that operators diligently\nand objectively scrutinize the\neffectiveness of their programs, identify\nareas for improvement, and implement\ncorrective measures.\nOn January 3, 2011, NTSB\nrecommended that PHMSA inform the\npipeline industry of the circumstances\nleading up to and the consequences of\nthe September 9, 2010, pipeline rupture\nin San Bruno, California, to ensure that\nboth PHMSA and NTSB findings and\nrecommendations with respect to the\nverification of records used to establish\nor adjust MAOP or MOP are\nexpeditiously incorporated into the IM\nprograms for pipeline operators. The\npipeline rupture in San Bruno, CA\ninvolved a 30-inch-diameter natural gas\ntransmission pipeline owned and\noperated by Pacific Gas and Electric\nCompany (PG&E). The rupture occurred\nin a residential area killing eight people,\ninjuring many more, and causing\nsubstantial property damage. The\nrupture created a crater about 72 feet\nlong by 26 feet wide. A ruptured pipe\nsegment about 28 feet long was found\nabout 100 feet away from the crater. The\nresulting fire destroyed 37 homes and\ndamaged 18. NTSB’s preliminary\nfindings indicate that the pipeline\noperator did not have an accurate basis\nfor the MAOP calculation.\nThere are several methods available\nfor establishing MAOP or MOP. A\nhydrostatic pressure test that stresses\nthe pipe to a designated percent of the\ndesired MAOP or MOP, without failure,\nis generally the most effective method.\nHydrostatic testing requirements and\nrestrictions for natural gas pipelines are\nspecified in Title 49 CFR Part 192,\nSubpart J. Similar requirements for\nhazardous liquid pipelines are found in\n49 CFR Part 195, Subpart E. Although\nhydrostatic testing is recognized to be\nthe most direct and effective\nmethodology for validating a MAOP or\nMOP, its implementation requires that\noperating lines be shut down, which\nmay adversely affect customers\ndependent on the natural gas supplied\nby the pipeline, particularly if the pipe\nfails during the test, which could\nnecessitate a protracted shutdown.\nConsequently, operators prefer to use\navailable design, construction,\ninspection, testing, and other related\nrecords to calculate the valid MAOP or\nMOP. However, this method is\nsusceptible to error if pipeline records\nare inaccurate. With respect to the\nportion of the pipeline that failed in the\nSeptember 9, 2010, San Bruno incident,\nPG&E used available design,\nconstruction, inspection, testing, and\nother related records to calculate the\nMAOP. The NTSB’s examination of the\nruptured pipe segment and review of\nPG&E records revealed that although the\nas-built drawings and alignment sheets\nmark the pipe as seamless API 5L Grade\nX42 pipe, the pipeline in the area of the\nrupture was constructed with\nlongitudinal seam-welded pipe. The\nruptured pipe segment was constructed\nof five sections of pipe, some of which\nwere short pieces measuring about four\nfeet long, containing different\nlongitudinal seam welds of various\ntypes, including single- and double-\nsided welds. Consequently, the short\npieces of pipe of unknown\nspecifications in the ruptured pipe\nsegment may not have been as strong as\nthe seamless API 5L Grade X42 steel\npipe listed in PG&E’s records. PG&E’s\nrecords also identify Consolidated\nWestern Steel Corporation as the\nmanufacturer of the accident segment of\nLine 132. However, after physical\ninspection of the ruptured section,\ninvestigators were unable to confirm the\nmanufacturing source of some of the\npieces of ruptured pipe.\nIntegrity Management Regulatory\nProvisions\nFor hazardous liquid pipelines,\n§ 195.452 establishes requirements for\nIM programs in HCAs. Section\n195.452(b)(1) requires that each operator\nof a hazardous liquid pipeline ‘‘develop\na written IM program that addresses the\nrisks on each segment of pipeline.’’\nSection 195.452(e) defines the minimum\nlist of risk factors that must be included\nin the risk assessments used to schedule\nsegment assessments. Appendix C\nprovides additional guidance on these\nrisk factors. Section 195.452(f) defines\nthe required elements of an IM program.\nThese elements include an analysis that\nintegrates all available information\nabout the integrity of the entire pipeline\nand the consequences of a failure,\nincluding data gathered during previous\nintegrity assessments and data gathered\nin conjunction with other maintenance\ninspections and investigations. These\nelements also include an identification\nof additional preventive and mitigative\nmeasures to protect the HCAs\n(§ 195.452(i)), including conducting a\nrisk analysis in which an operator must\nevaluate the likelihood of a pipeline\nrelease and how it could affect the\nHCAs. Preventive and mitigative\nmeasures to be evaluated based on risk\nfactors include, but are not limited to,\nleak detection system modifications and\ninstallation of additional Emergency\nFlow Restricting Devices.\nFor natural gas pipelines, Subpart O\nof 49 CFR Part 192 establishes the\nrequirements for IM programs in HCAs.\nSection 192.911(c) requires that IM\nprograms include ‘‘[a]n identification of\nthreats to each covered pipeline\nsegment, which must include data\nintegration and a risk assessment.’’ This\nsection further requires ‘‘[a]n operator\nmust use the threat identification and\nrisk assessment to prioritize covered\nsegments for assessment (§ 192.917) and\nto evaluate the merits of additional\npreventive and mitigative measures\n(§ 192.935) for each covered segment.’’\nSection 192.917(b) requires an operator\nto integrate existing data and\ninformation on the entire pipeline that\ncould be relevant to a covered segment.\nIn performing this data gathering and\nVerDate Mar<15>2010 18:19 Jan 07, 2011 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\10JAN1.SGM 10JAN1\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nsrobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES\n1506 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2011 / Notices\nintegration, an operator must follow the\nrequirements in ASME/ANSI B31.8S,\nsection 4. At a minimum, an operator\nmust gather and evaluate the set of data\nspecified in Appendix A to ASME/ANSI\nB31.8S, and consider both on the\ncovered segment and similar non-\ncovered segments, past incident history,\ncorrosion control records, continuing\nsurveillance records, patrolling records,\nmaintenance history, internal inspection\nrecords, operating stress levels, past\npressure test information, soil\ncharacteristics, and all other conditions\nspecific to each pipeline. Section\n192.917(c) states that an operator must\nconduct a risk assessment that follows\nASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and\nconsiders the identified threats for each\ncovered segment. An operator must use\nthe risk assessment to prioritize the\ncovered segments for the baseline and\nperiodic reassessments, and to\ndetermine what additional preventive\nand mitigative measures are needed for\nthe covered segment. Sections 192.919\nand 192.921(a) further require that the\noperator explain why the particular\nassessment method for each segment\nwas selected to address the identified\nthreats to each covered segment.\nSpecifically, § 192.921(a) requires the\noperator to select the method or\nmethods best suited to address the\nidentified threats to the covered\nsegment (pipeline), which include\ninternal inspection tool[s], pressure test,\ndirect assessment, or other technology\nthat an operator demonstrates can\nprovide an equivalent understanding of\nthe condition of the pipeline. More than\none assessment method may be required\nto address all the threats to the covered\npipeline segment. Section 192.935\nrequires that an operator take additional\nmeasures beyond those already required\nby Part 192 to prevent a pipeline failure\nand to mitigate the consequences of a\npipeline failure in a HCA. An operator\nmust base the additional measures on\nthe threats the operator has identified to\neach pipeline segment. This section\nrequires that an operator conduct, in\naccordance with one of the risk\nassessment approaches in ASME/ANSI\nB31.8S, section 5, a risk analysis of its\npipeline to identify additional measures\nto protect the HCA and enhance public\nsafety.\nAdvisory Bulletin (ADB–11–01)\nTo: Owners and Operators of\nHazardous Liquid and Gas Pipeline\nSystems.\nSubject: Establishing Maximum\nAllowable Operating Pressure or\nMaximum Operating Pressure Using\nRecord Evidence, and Integrity\nManagement Risk Identification,\nAssessment, Prevention, and Mitigation.\nAdvisory: To further enhance the\nDepartment’s safety efforts and\nimplement the NTSB’s January 3, 2011,\nrecommendation to PHMSA [P–10–1],\nPHMSA is issuing this Advisory\nBulletin concerning establishing MAOP\nand MOP using record evidence and\nintegrity management; threat and risk\nidentification; risk assessment; risk\ninformation collection, accuracy and\nintegration, and identification and\nimplementation of preventive and\nmitigative measures.\nI. Establishing MAOP or MOP Using\nRecord Evidence\nAs PHMSA and NTSB recommended,\noperators relying on the review of\ndesign, construction, inspection, testing\nand other related data to calculate\nMAOP or MOP must assure that the\nrecords used are reliable. An operator\nmust diligently search, review and\nscrutinize documents and records,\nincluding but not limited to, all as-built\ndrawings, alignment sheets, and\nspecifications, and all design,\nconstruction, inspection, testing,\nmaintenance, manufacturer, and other\nrelated records. These records shall be\ntraceable, verifiable, and complete. If\nsuch a document and records search,\nreview, and verification cannot be\nsatisfactorily completed, the operator\ncannot rely on this method for\ncalculating MAOP or MOP. Copies of\nthe recommendations issued by NTSB\nto PHMSA, PG&E, and the California\nPublic Utilities Commission, are\navailable in the public docket and at\nPHMSA’s Web site: http://\nwww.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs/ntsb.\nII. Performing Risk Identification,\nAssessment, Data Accuracy, Prevention,\nand Mitigation\nPipeline operators are reminded of\ntheir responsibilities to identify pipeline\nintegrity threats, perform rigorous risk\nanalyses, integrate information, and\nidentify, evaluate, and implement\npreventive and mitigative measures as\nrequired by the Federal pipeline safety\nregulations. Operators should\nthoroughly review their current IM\nprograms and make any changes\nnecessary to become fully compliant\nwith the Federal pipeline safety\nregulations. Future, PHMSA inspections\nwill place emphasis on the areas noted\nin this Advisory Bulletin.\nOperators are also advised that\nPHMSA and its State partners intend to\nsponsor a public workshop on threat\nand risk identification, risk assessment,\nrisk information collection and\nintegration, and identification of\npreventive and mitigative measures. The\npurpose of the workshop will be to\nexpand the industry’s knowledge base\nabout effective IM programs. At this\nworkshop, PHMSA will discuss the\nprogress it has seen and the challenges\nremaining. Operators with demonstrably\neffective programs will be invited to\nshare information. Public participation\nwill be encouraged.\nA. Risk and Threat Identification\nPHMSA emphasizes the need for\noperators to be fully cognizant of the\nphysical and operational characteristics\nof their systems, understand the threats\nto their systems, and the risks posed by\ntheir systems. Each operator is\nultimately responsible for identifying all\nrisk factors and cannot rely solely on the\nfactors in § 195.452(e) and Appendix C\nof Part 195 or § 192.917. Any operator\nof a hazardous liquid or gas\ntransmission pipeline that is not fully\ncognizant of the location, pipe material\nand seam type, coating, cathodic\nprotection history, repair history,\nprevious pressure testing, or operational\npressure history, and other assessment\ninformation, incident data, soil type and\nenvironment, operational history, or\nother key risk factors of a pipeline\noperating at or above 30% SMYS should\n(1) institute an aggressive program as\nsoon as possible to obtain this\ninformation, (2) assess the risks, and\n(3) take the proper mitigative measures\nbased upon the operator’s IM program\nrisk findings. In addition, if these\noperators do not have verified\ninformation on key risk factors, an\nimmediate and interim mitigation\nmeasure that should be strongly\nconsidered is a pressure reduction to 80\npercent of the operating pressure for the\nprevious month, hydro testing the\npipeline or creating a remediation\nprogram to identify threat risks.\nOperators of transmission pipelines\noperating below 30% SMYS should also\nconduct an integrity threat and risk\nreview of these pipelines to ensure\nsafety in HCAs. PHMSA will require an\noperator that has not adequately\nidentified all threats to take mitigative\nmeasures.\nB. Risk Assessment\nOperators are advised to re-examine\nthe basis for their IM assessment, as\nwell as their MAOP or MOP\ncalculations and documentation to meet\nFederal regulations in 49 CFR Parts 192\nand 195. Operators must consider all\nsignificant risk factors in their risk\nassessments; conduct risk assessments\ncapable of supporting identification of\npreventive and mitigative measures;\nintegrate into their threat and risk\nVerDate Mar<15>2010 18:19 Jan 07, 2011 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\10JAN1.SGM 10JAN1\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nassessments all relevant risk\ninformation from prior integrity\nassessments, inspections, investigations,\nand incidents with design, construction,\noperational and maintenance data; to\ncritically analyze the integrated data\nand incorporate the analysis into their\nrisk assessments and integrity-related\ndecision making; update and maintain\ntheir risk information; and to ensure\nthat the risk information is made\navailable throughout the organization in\na form that can effectively support\ndecisions on integrity assessment\nmethods, tools, process and procedure\nchanges, and schedule during the\nrequired periodic evaluations of\npipeline integrity. PHMSA and its State\npartners intend to verify that operators\nhave taken these actions during the\ncourse of future pipeline safety\ninspections and investigations.\nC. Data Accuracy\nOperators must review and scrutinize\npipeline infrastructure documents and\nrecords, including but not limited to, all\nas-built drawings, alignment sheets,\nspecifications, and all design,\nconstruction, inspection, testing,\nmaterial manufacturer, operational\nmaintenance data, and other related\nrecords, to ensure company records\naccurately reflect the pipeline’s physical\nand operational characteristics. These\nrecords should be traceable, verifiable,\nand complete to meet §§ 192.619 and\n195.302. Incomplete or partial records\nare not an adequate basis for\nestablishing MAOP or MOP using this\nmethod. If such a document and records\nsearch, review, and verification cannot\nbe satisfactorily completed, the operator\nmay need to conduct other activities\nsuch as in-situ examination, pressure\ntesting, and nondestructive testing or\notherwise verify the characteristics of\nthe pipeline when identifying and\nassessing threats or risks.\nD. Risk Mitigation and Prevention\nPHMSA advises operators to\nimplement a robust IM process that\nincludes methods best suited to address\nthe threats and risks identified\n(§ 192.921(a) and § 195.452(f)).\nOperators must use post assessment and\ncontinuing evaluation processes to\nevaluate program effectiveness in\nidentifying threats, addressing threat\npreventative and mitigative measures,\nand providing internal IM program\nfeedback of assessment findings so the\nassessment process can be updated\nbased upon threat findings.\nIssued in Washington, DC, on January 4,\n2011.\nJeffrey D. Wiese,\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n[FR Doc. 2011–208 Filed 1–7–11; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–60–P\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nSurface Transportation Board\nRelease of Waybill Data\nThe Surface Transportation Board has\nreceived a request from Michael Behe\nrepresenting FRN, LLC (WB604–9–\n1/03/11) for permission to use certain\ndata from the Board’s 2009 Carload\nWaybill Sample. A copy of this request\nmay be obtained from the Office of\nEconomics.\nThe waybill sample contains\nconfidential railroad and shipper data;\ntherefore, if any parties object to these\nrequests, they should file their\nobjections with the Director of the\nBoard’s Office of Economics within\n14 calendar days of the date of this\nnotice. The rules for release of waybill\ndata are codified at 49 CFR 1244.9.\nContact: Scott Decker, (202) 245–\n0330.\nAndrea Pope-Matheson,\nClearance Clerk.\n[FR Doc. 2011–155 Filed 1–7–11; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4915–01–P\nDEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY\nDepartmental Offices; Privacy Act of\n1974, as Amended\nAGENCY: Departmental Offices, Treasury.\nACTION: Notice of Proposed Privacy Act\nSystem of Records.\nsrobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES\nFederal Register / Vol. 76, No. 6 / Monday, January 10, 2011 / Notices\n1507\nSUMMARY: In accordance with the\nPrivacy Act of 1974, as amended, the\nDepartmental Offices, U.S. Department\nof the Treasury (‘‘Treasury’’) gives notice\nof the establishment of a Privacy Act\nSystem of Records.\nDATES: Comments must be received no\nlater than February 9, 2011. The new\nsystem of records will be effective\nFebruary 9, 2011 unless the comments\nreceived result in a contrary\ndetermination.\nADDRESSES: Comments should be sent to\nClaire Stapleton, Consumer Financial\nProtection Bureau Implementation\nTeam, 1801 L Street, NW., Washington,\nDC 20036. Comments will be made\navailable for inspection upon written\nrequest. Treasury will make such\ncomments available for public\ninspection and copying in Treasury’s\nLibrary, Room 1428, Main Treasury\nBuilding, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue,\nNW., Washington, DC 20220, on official\nbusiness days between the hours of\n10 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Time. You\ncan make an appointment to inspect\ncomments by telephoning (202) 622–\n0990. All comments, including\nattachments and other supporting\nmaterials, will become part of the public\nrecord and subject to public disclosure.\nYou should submit only information\nthat you wish to make available\npublicly.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:\nClaire Stapleton, Consumer Financial\nProtection Bureau Implementation\nTeam, 1801 L. Street, NW., Washington,\nDC 20036, (202) 435–7220.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Dodd-\nFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer\nProtection Act (‘‘Act’’), Public Law 111–\n203, Title X, established the Consumer\nFinancial Protection Bureau (CFPB).\nOnce fully operational, CFPB will\nadminister, enforce and implement\nFederal consumer financial protection\nlaws, and, among other powers, will\nhave authority to protect consumers\nfrom unfair, deceptive, and abusive\npractices when obtaining consumer\nfinancial products or services. The Act\ngrants Treasury certain ‘‘interim\nauthority’’ to help stand up the agency.\nThe CFPB implementation team,\ncurrently within Treasury, will maintain\nthe records covered by this notice.\nThe new systems of records described\nin this notice, Treasury/DO.315—CFPB\nImplementation Team Consumer\nInquiry and Complaint Database, will be\nused to collect, respond to, and refer\nconsumer inquiries and complaints\nconcerning consumer financial products\nand services. A description of the new\nsystem of records follows this Notice.\nThe report of a new system of records\nhas been submitted to the Committee on\nOversight and Government Reform of\nthe House of Representatives, the\nCommittee on Homeland Security and\nGovernmental Affairs of the Senate, and\nthe Office of Management and Budget,\npursuant to Appendix I to OMB Circular\nA–130, ‘‘Federal Agency\nResponsibilities for Maintaining\nRecords About Individuals,’’ dated\nNovember 30, 2000, and the Privacy\nAct, 5 U.S.C. 552a(r).\nThe system of records entitled,\n‘‘Treasury/DO.315—CFPB\nImplementation Team Consumer\nInquiry and Complaint Database’’ is\npublished in its entirely below.\nVerDate Mar<15>2010 18:19 Jan 07, 2011 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\10JAN1.SGM 10JAN1","truncated":false,"body_characters":29820}