{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA Guidance, Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Distribution Integrity Management Programs","title":"Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Distribution Integrity Management Programs","source_type":"guidance","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2026-07-13","effective_on":"2026-07-13","summary":"Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Distribution Integrity Management Programs Action Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin. Summary PHMSA issues this advisory bulletin to remind owners and operators of gas distribution systems of the distribution integrity management program (DIMP) requirements under 49 CFR part 192, subpart P. The guidance is intended to improve implementation of DIMP risk ","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-guidance-enhancing-effectiveness-distribution-integrity-management-programs-ca65d296.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-guidance-enhancing-effectiveness-distribution-integrity-management-programs-ca65d296.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-guidance-enhancing-effectiveness-distribution-integrity-management-programs-ca65d296","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/pipeline-safety-guidance-enhancing-effectiveness-distribution-Integrity-management-programs","body":"Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Distribution Integrity Management Programs\n\nAction\nNotice; issuance of advisory bulletin.\n\nSummary\n\nPHMSA issues this advisory bulletin to remind owners and operators of gas distribution systems of the distribution integrity management program (DIMP) requirements under 49 CFR part 192, subpart P. The guidance is intended to improve implementation of DIMP risk evaluations by addressing factors such as high-risk infrastructure, interactive threats, and leak management effectiveness. In addition, the guidance urges pipeline operators to adopt the most appropriate risk models for use within their integrity management programs, with full consideration of probabilistic risk models.\n\nDetail\n\nPublished Date\n07/13/2026\n\nComment\nComment now on Regulations.gov\n\nFederal Register\n2026-14071\n\nDocket Number\nPHMSA-2026-2443\n\nDocument\nView PDF\n\n          Issued Date: Monday, July 13, 2026\n\n<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nFederal Register / Vol. 91, No. 132 / Monday, July 13, 2026 / Notices\n43015\nto be entered electronically at the\nappropriate times.\n• Pilots may call 1–800–WX–BRIEF\n(992–7433) or 1–833–AK–BRIEF (252–\n7433) file flight plans with a flight\nservice station specialist who enters the\ninformation directly into a computer\nsystem that transmits the information to\nthe appropriate air traffic facility. Pilots\ncalling certain flight service stations\nhave the option of using a voice\nrecorder to store the information that\nwill later be entered into a computer\nsystem by a specialist.\n• Using internet access, pilots may\nfile flight plans electronically through\nweb applications provided by flight\nservice, at no cost to the users. Third-\nparty subscription-based vendors are\nalso available for direct electronic filing.\nThe vendors allow pilots to store flight\ndata so that minimal additional\ninformation is required when filing a\nflight plan.\n• Private and corporate pilots who fly\nthe same aircraft and routes at regular\ntimes may store flight plans with flight\nservice stations. The flight plans will\nthen be transmitted automatically into\nthe air traffic system at the appropriate\ntime.\n• Pilots who visit a flight service\nstation in person may choose to file a\nflight plan by using a paper form. The\ndata will then be entered into a\ncomputer and filed electronically. The\npilot will often keep the paper copy for\nhis/her record.\nRespondents: Air carrier and air taxi\noperations, and certain corporate\naviation departments, General Aviation\nPilots.\nFrequency: On occasion.\nEstimated Average Burden per\nResponse: 2.5 minutes.\nEstimated Total Annual Burden:\n292,724.\nIssued in Washington, DC, on July 8, 2026.\nNathan Geoffry Dekker,\nAir Traffic Control Specialist, Office of Flight\nService Safety and Operations, AJR–B.\n[FR Doc. 2026–14010 Filed 7–10–26; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–13–P\n(PHMSA), Department of Transportation\n(DOT or Department).\nACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory\nbulletin.\nSUMMARY: PHMSA issues this advisory\nbulletin to remind owners and operators\nof gas distribution systems of the\ndistribution integrity management\nprogram (DIMP) requirements under 49\nCFR part 192, subpart P. The guidance\nis intended to improve implementation\nof DIMP risk evaluations by addressing\nfactors such as high-risk infrastructure,\ninteractive threats, and leak\nmanagement effectiveness. In addition,\nthe guidance urges pipeline operators to\nadopt the most appropriate risk models\nfor use within their integrity\nmanagement programs, with full\nconsideration of probabilistic risk\nmodels.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:\nNancy White by phone at 202–923–8268\nor by email at Nancy.White1@dot.gov.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: To\naddress National Transportation Safety\nBoard (NTSB) Safety Recommendations\nP–21–2 and P–26–2, PHMSA is\nreminding owners and operators of gas\ndistribution systems of existing DIMP\nrisk evaluation requirements under 49\nCFR part 192, subpart P. This guidance:\n• Emphasizes ongoing efforts to\nadvance pipeline safety risk\nmanagement and risk evaluations,\nincluding foundational concepts\ndeveloped by the PHMSA-organized\nRisk Modeling Work Group (RMWG)\nand its subsequent report, which\nprovides an overview of models that\nmay be universally applicable and used\nfor improved DIMP implementation.1\n• Reinforces existing PHMSA safety\ninitiatives, including the 2011 Call to\nAction to modernize aging and high-risk\npipeline infrastructure; recent DIMP\nimplementation guidance in ADB–\n2026–01; and the July 2025 Inspection\nand Enforcement Priorities\nmemorandum, which prioritizes\noversight of high-impact pipeline safety\nissues, including operator compliance\nwith DIMP regulations.2\n• Highlights recent updates to The\nGuide for Gas Transmission,\nDistribution, and Gathering Piping\nSystems (ANSI/GPTC Z380.1, 2022\nedition) addressing interactive threats,\nsystem degradation over time, and leak\ninvestigation procedures.\n• Urges pipeline operators to adopt\nthe most appropriate risk models for use\nwithin their integrity management\nprograms, with full consideration of\nprobabilistic risk models.\nGuidance and advisory bulletins are\nintended to provide clarity regarding an\noperator’s existing legal obligations but\nare not themselves rules meant to bind\nthe public in any way; they do not\nassign duties, create legally enforceable\nrights, or impose new obligations that\nare not otherwise contained in\nregulations. Accordingly, this guidance\nwill not be relied upon by the\nDepartment as an independent basis for\naffirmative enforcement action or other\nadministrative penalty.\nI. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2026–06)\nTo: Owners and Operators of Gas\nDistribution Pipeline Systems\nSubject: Guidance for Enhancing the\nEffectiveness of Distribution\nIntegrity Management Programs\nAdvisory: On February 23, 2018, a\nnatural gas distribution incident\noccurred on a system operated by Atmos\nEnergy Corporation (Atmos) in Dallas,\nTexas. The incident resulted in one\nfatality, four injuries, and major\nstructural damage to a home. Two\nseparate gas-related incidents occurred\ntwo days earlier at nearby residences\nserved by the same gas distribution\nsystem. Those incidents burned one\noccupant and caused significant\nstructural damage to both residences.\nThe NTSB determined the probable\ncause of the February 23 incident was:\n[T]he ignition of an accumulation of\nnatural gas that leaked from the gas\nmain that was damaged during a sewer\nreplacement project 23 years earlier and\nwas undetected by Atmos Energy\nCorporation’s investigation of two\nrelated natural gas incidents on the 2\ndays prior to the explosion.\nContributing to the explosion was\nAtmos Energy Corporation’s insufficient\nwet weather leak investigation\nprocedures. Contributing to the severity\nof the explosion was Atmos Energy\nlotter on DSK8BHNXB4PROD with NOTICES1\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n[Docket No. PHMSA–2026–2443]\nPipeline Safety: Guidance for\nEnhancing the Effectiveness of\nDistribution Integrity Management\nPrograms\nAGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\n1 See https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/risk-\nmodeling-work-group/risk-modeling-work-group-\noverview (providing guidance for documenting\nRMWG activities); PHMSA, Pipeline Risk Modeling:\nOverview of Methods and Tools for Improved\nImplementation (Feb. 1, 2020) (2020 Risk Modeling\nReport) available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/\npipeline/risk-modeling-work-group/pipeline-risk-\nmodeling-overview-methods-and-tools-improved-\nimplementation-report (discussing risk modeling\nprincipally in the context of gas transmission and\nhazardous liquid pipelines).\n2 DOT, U.S. Department of Transportation Call to\nAction To Improve the Safety of the Nation’s Energy\nPipeline System (Nov. 1, 2011) (Call to Action),\navailable at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-\nawareness/pipeline/call-to-action; PHMSA, ADB–\n2026–01, Pipeline Safety: Distribution Integrity\nManagement Program Considerations for Plastic\nPiping and Components, 91 FR 2995 (Jan. 23, 2026);\nPHMSA, Pipeline Safety Inspection and\nEnforcement Priorities (July 17, 2025), available at\nhttps://www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/\nphmsa-guidance/phmsa-pipeline-safety-inspection-\nand-enforcement-priorities.\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 17:39 Jul 10, 2026 Jkt 268001 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\13JYN1.SGM 13JYN1\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nlotter on DSK8BHNXB4PROD with NOTICES1\n43016 Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 132 / Monday, July 13, 2026 / Notices\nCorporation’s inaction to isolate the\naffected main and evacuate the houses.\nContributing to the degradation of the\npipeline system was Atmos Energy\nCorporation’s inadequate integrity\nmanagement program.3\nNTSB found that rain inhibited the\noperator’s ability to gather useful\nnatural gas leak measurement data,\ninhibited venting, and increased the\ntendency of natural gas to migrate\nlaterally where it could be stripped of\nodorant.4 In addition, NTSB noted that\nwhile these factors were discussed in\nthe general, safety-related sections of\nANSI/GPTC Z380.1, they were not\nintegrated into sections of ANSI/GPTC\nZ380.1 focusing on best practices for\noperator DIMPs. Consequently, the\nincreased risk associated with reduced\nmitigative capability was not considered\nby Atmos’s DIMP evaluation of risks.5\nNTSB determined that ‘‘[l]eak surveys\nprovide an indication of the leaks that\nmay be present at the time they are\nperformed but provide no information\non leaks that may occur in the future.’’ 6\nNTSB concluded that ‘‘[w]hile Atmos\nEnergy Corporation’s periodic leak\nsurvey methodology and frequency\ncomplied with minimum state and\nfederal requirements, it did not identify\nthe degraded system that was found\nafter the explosion.’’ 7\nNTSB found that ‘‘[i]n addressing the\nlikelihood of failure, age is generally\nrecognized as a strong indicator of\nperformance. However, gas distribution\noperators are not explicitly required to\nassess the age of their pipeline in the\nlikelihood of failure evaluation,’’ even\nthough ‘‘[t]rending failure rates by\nsystem age can reveal degrading\nperformance.’’ 8\nNTSB issued several safety\nrecommendations as a result of its\ninvestigation into this incident. Safety\nRecommendation P–21–2 in particular\nadvised PHMSA to ‘‘[e]valuate\nindustry’s implementation of the gas\ndistribution pipeline integrity\nmanagement requirements and develop\nupdated guidance for improving their\neffectiveness. The evaluation should\nspecifically consider factors that may\nincrease the likelihood of failure such as\nage; increase the overall risk (including\nfactors that simultaneously increase the\nlikelihood and consequence of failure);\nand limit the effectiveness of leak\nmanagement programs.’’ 9 In addition,\nNTSB issued safety recommendations\nP–21–13 10 and P–21–14 11 to the Gas\nPiping Technology Committee (GPTC)\nto update ANSI/GPTC Z380.1.12 GPTC\nrecently issued Addenda 2 and 4 of this\nstandard to address these NTSB safety\nrecommendations and, as a result, NTSB\nclosed both recommendations as\n‘‘Closed—Acceptable Action.’’\nFurther underscoring the need for\neffective risk management through\nDIMP, on January 24, 2024, a home\nexplosion and fire occurred in Jackson,\nMississippi. The incident resulted in\none fatality and one injury and\ndestroyed the home. Three days later,\non January 27, 2024, about 0.7 miles\nsoutheast of the first explosion, another\nhome explosion and fire occurred and\ndestroyed two homes.\nNTSB’s investigation revealed, in\nrelevant part, that the operator’s\ninadequate leak management program\nand its relative-risk model failed to\nclassify incident locations as high-risk.\nThese failures highlighted systemic\ninadequacies within the operator’s\ndistribution integrity management\nprogram.\nNTSB determined the probable cause\nof the January 2024 incidents was the\noperator’s:\ninadequate leak management program, which\nallowed for known natural gas leaks, from\n9 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 72.\n10 Safety Recommendation P–21–13 to GPTC:\n‘‘Develop additional guidance that identifies steps\ngas distribution operators can take to safely respond\nto leaks, fires, explosions, and emergency calls,\nconsidering the limitations due to wet weather\nconditions, that includes: (1) criteria for when to\nshut down or isolate gas distribution systems,\npressure test main and service lines, and begin\nevacuations; (2) leak investigation methods that are\nreliable in wet weather; (3) require an alternate safe\nresponse, such as an evacuation when reliable leak\ninvestigations are not possible due to wet weather;\nand (4) leak investigations that assess all viable gas\nmigration paths, including granular backfill and\ncrawlspaces.’’ See https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-\npublic/sr-details/P-21-013.\n11 Safety Recommendation P–21–14 to GPTC:\n‘‘Develop guidance that identifies steps that gas\ndistribution operators can take to ensure that their\ngas distribution integrity management program, at\na minimum, appropriately considers: (1) threats that\ndegrade a system over time, and (2) the increased\nrisk that can result from factors that simultaneously\nincrease the likelihood and consequence of failure.’’\nSee https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-\ndetails/P-21-014.\n12 PHMSA, Gas Distribution Integrity\nManagement Frequently Asked Questions, at 4 (Oct.\n26, 2015) (DIMP FAQs), https://\nwww.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/gas-distribution-\nintegrity-management/gas-distribution-integrity-\nmanagement-faqs (‘‘[While] [o]perators may use\nother approaches to meet the high-level\nrequirements of the [DIMP] regulation . . . PHMSA,\nState pipeline safety regulators and industry all\nparticipated in the development of the [ANSI/GPTC\nZ380.1] guidelines and have confidence that\noperators who use them in their programs will\ncomply with the requirements of the rule.’’).\nservice-line pipes that had partially pulled\nout of compression couplings due to soil\nmovement, to be left unrepaired for at least\n8 weeks, resulting in gas leaking from the\ncompression couplings and then migrating to\nthe nearby homes and igniting. Contributing\nto the explosions was Atmos Energy\nCorporation’s inadequate integrity\nmanagement program, which did not\nappropriately assess and address risk in its\npipeline system. Also contributing was an\nineffective public awareness program, which\ndid not adequately educate the public or\nemergency response officials on how to\nrespond to a suspected natural gas leak.13\nConsequently, NTSB reiterated Safety\nRecommendation P–21–2 to PHMSA\nand issued a new recommendation, P–\n26–2, urging PHMSA to advise operators\nto adopt more robust probabilistic risk\nmodels where appropriate.14\nPHMSA has long concluded that\n‘‘[t]he overriding principle in employing\nany type of risk model/assessment is\nthat it supports risk management\ndecisions to reduce risks.’’ 15 In 2020,\nPHMSA issued its Risk Modeling\nReport, providing an overview of the\nmajor types of pipeline risk models:\nqualitative models, relative assessment/\nindex models, quantitative system\nmodels, and probabilistic models, and\ntheir effectiveness in supporting risk\nassessments. The report noted that each\nrisk model provides distinct capabilities\ndepending on an operator’s specific\nsystem complexity, data availability,\nand resources. For example, qualitative\nand relative assessment/index models\ncan be effective and well-suited for\nsmaller, less complex distribution\nnetworks. PHMSA noted that less\ncomplex pipeline systems can be\ncharacterized by limited geographic\nextent and lower mileage; simple system\nconfiguration; uniform risk factors\nthroughout the system; and single, small\noperating organizations.16 PHMSA\nfurther noted that ‘‘[w]hile different risk\nmodel types have different capabilities\nfor evaluating risk reduction actions,\nquantitative system models or\nprobabilistic models are more versatile\nand provide greater capabilities to\nprovide risk insights and support\ndecision making.’’ 17 The report also\n3 NTSB, PAR–21/01, Atmos Energy Corporation\nNatural Gas-Fueled Explosion, Dallas, Texas, Feb.\n23, 2018, at 71 (Jan. 12, 2021) (PAR–21/01),\navailable at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/\nAccidentReports/Reports/PAR2101.pdf.\n4 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 67.\n5 Id.\n6 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 68.\n7 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 71.\n8 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 66.\n13 NTSB/PAR–26/01 at 85.\n14 NTSB, PIR–26/01, Atmos Energy Corporation\nNatural Gas-Fueled Home Explosions and Fires,\nJackson, Mississippi, January 24, 2024, and January\n27, 2024, at 86 (Mar. 12, 2026) (PIR–26/01),\navailable at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/\nAccidentReports/Reports/PIR2601.pdf.\n15 PHMSA, Pipeline Risk Modeling: Overview of\nMethods and Tools for Improved Implementation,\nat 6 (Feb. 1, 2020) (2020 Risk Modeling Report),\navailable at: https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/\nrisk-modeling-work-group/pipeline-risk-modeling-\noverview-methods-and-tools-improved-\nimplementation-report.\n16 2020 Risk Modeling Report, at 26.\n17 2020 Risk Modeling Report, at 6.\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 17:39 Jul 10, 2026 Jkt 268001 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\13JYN1.SGM 13JYN1\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nnoted that probabilistic models are\n‘‘distinguished from other quantitative\nsystem models by the use of probability\ndistributions, rather than single point\nvalue estimates, to represent model\ninputs,’’ and ‘‘are considered a best\npractice for supporting all decision\ntypes.’’ 18\nPursuant to § 192.1007(f), operators\nmust re-evaluate their DIMP as\nfrequently as determined to be\nappropriate, not to exceed five years.\nPHMSA emphasizes that risk\nassessment is a dynamic process, and\nthat owners and operators should\nupdate the risks and threats supporting\ntheir DIMP assessments as frequently as\neach calendar year when there is a\nchange in knowledge or factors that alter\nthe risk of failure.19 Evolving system\nconditions and knowledge may be\nidentified through many means,\nincluding records research, maintenance\nand repair records, existing safety\nprograms such as leak management\nprograms, excavations, lessons learned\nfrom industry incidents, or emerging\nthreat data.20\nRegardless of the risk model used,\nPHMSA reminds operators that\nidentified threats may be interactive\nbecause factors impacting the likelihood\nand consequence of failure from one\nthreat may be intensified by factors\nimpacting the likelihood and\nconsequence of failure from another\nthreat. Interactive threats may result in\nan otherwise premature failure at a\nlocation on the pipeline.21 Typical\npipeline threats include corrosion,\nnatural forces (including soil\nmovement), excavation damage, other\noutside force damage (e.g. vehicle\nimpacts), material or weld defects,\nequipment failure, incorrect operations,\nand any other issues that could threaten\nintegrity. An example of interactive\nthreats would be natural forces,\nincluding weather and earth movement/\nsoil issues in interaction with corrosion.\nPHMSA reminds operators that\npursuant to § 192.1007, an operator\nmust develop an understanding of its\n18 2020 Risk Modeling Report, at 82, 26.\n19 See 49 CFR 192.1007(f) and DIMP FAQs C.4.f.1.\n20 For distribution-focused guidance, see\nPHMSA’s historical DIMP development and\nimplementation meetings at https://\nwww.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/gas-distribution-\nintegrity-management/gas-distribution-integrity-\nmanagement-program-meetings. See also PHMSA,\nDIMP Implementation Insights for Operators (July\n2013), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/\nsites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2025-08/SGA_\n07232013\n_\nPHMSA\nDIMP\n_\n_McLaren.pdf.\n21 For discussions specifically on interactive\nthreats in distribution systems, see PHMSA Risk\nModeling Work Group, Interactive Threats (Aug.\n2016), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/\npipeline/risk-modeling-work-group/interactive-\nthreats-discussion. pipeline system based on reasonably\navailable information. This would\ninclude identifying additional\ninformation needed to fill gaps caused\nby missing, inaccurate, or incomplete\nrecords and developing a plan to collect\nthe information.\nOperators can collect this information\nthrough their normal activities,\nincluding those that go beyond the\nactivities specified in Part 192. For\nexample, missing facility location,\nmaterial, and condition data can be\ncaptured when a pipe is located or\nexposed. Maintenance personnel could\nbe surveyed about unusual\ncircumstances they have encountered or\nasked to review system descriptions to\nidentify useful information that might\nnot already be included.22\nIn addition, PHMSA reminds\noperators that maintaining the\neffectiveness of a DIMP requires both\nrecord preservation and continual\nprogram updates. Under § 192.1011,\noperators must maintain records\ndemonstrating compliance with DIMP\nrequirements for at least 10 years.\nPHMSA takes this opportunity to\nremind operators of the following\nagency actions:\nD 2011 DOT ‘‘Call to Action,’’ which\nemphasizes pipeline age and material\nare significant risk indicators, requiring\noperators to rigorously evaluate risks\nassociated with older, degraded\nfacilities;\nD July 2025 Inspection and\nEnforcement Priorities memorandum,\nwhich identifies gas distribution\nintegrity management programs as a top\npriority for Federal and State\ninspections;\nD Advisory Bulletin ADB–2026–01,\nwhich reinforces the existing\nrequirements of 49 CFR 192.1007(b) and\n(c) to identify threats and evaluate and\nrank risks, specifically highlighting how\ninteractive threats can compound the\nlikelihood and consequence of a failure.\nPHMSA advises gas distribution\npipeline operators to take the following\nactions to improve DIMP effectiveness:\nD Review NTSB’s Pipeline Accident\nReport PAR–21/01 (Dallas, Texas,\nFebruary 23, 2018) for information on\nrisks of interactive threats, which may\nincrease the likelihood and consequence\nof failure and factors that may limit the\neffectiveness of an operator’s leak\nmanagement program.\nD Review NTSB’s Pipeline\nInvestigation Report PIR 26/01 (Jackson,\nMississippi, January 24, 2024) for\ninformation on the importance of\nunderstanding pipeline systems, risk\nlotter on DSK8BHNXB4PROD with NOTICES1\nFederal Register / Vol. 91, No. 132 / Monday, July 13, 2026 / Notices\n43017\n22 DIMP FAQs, at 12–13.\nmodeling, and further discussion of leak\nmanagement.\nD In conducting evaluations of DIMP\nas required by § 192.1007(f), PHMSA\nurges pipeline operators to adopt the\nmost appropriate risk models for use\nwithin their distribution integrity\nmanagement programs, including\nconsideration of probabilistic risk\nmodels. PHMSA acknowledges that\neach risk model has its benefits.\nD Develop and implement a DIMP\nplan to evaluate and rank risks.\nPursuant to §§ 192.1005 and\n192.1007(c), operators must consider the\nlikelihood and consequence of failure\nfor all applicable threats. An effective\nrisk evaluation should account for how\ninteractive threats can simultaneously\nincrease both the likelihood and\nconsequences of an accident. Operators\nare also encouraged to account for time-\ndependent factors, such as the\nperformance characteristics of legacy\nmaterials or pipeline age. In addition,\noperators should evaluate the potential\nfor interactive threats, where multiple\nfactors like weather conditions, soil\ntype, and mechanical damage may\ninteract to increase risk. An effective\nevaluation should be sufficiently\ndetailed to identify where these\ninteractive threats may exist and may\nrequire review and integration of\nhistorical construction, design,\nmaintenance, operating, and leak\nrecords, and review of PHMSA’s legacy\nDIMP guidance.\nD Review updates to ANSI/GPTC\nZ380.1, 2022 Edition, Addendum 2,\nGuide Material Appendix (GMA) G–\n192–8 (DIMP). This addendum provides\nupdated guidance on fulfilling\n§ 192.1007 requirements. Specifically,\noperators should review GMA G–192–8:\n• Section 3.3 (Knowledge, Additional\nInformation) and Section 4.1 (Identify\nThreats, Primary Threats), which\nprovide information on accounting for\ntime-dependent threats that may\ndegrade pipeline assets over time.\n• Section 4.4 (Identify Threats,\nHandling Interactive Threats), which\nprovides information on identifying and\nranking threats that interact and may\nincrease overall risk, compounding the\nseverity, likelihood, or consequence of a\nfailure.\nD Review updates to ANSI/GPTC\nZ380.1, 2022 Edition, Addendum 4.\nThis addendum provides guidance on\nenhancing the effectiveness of a leak\nmanagement program (§ 192.1007(d)),\naddressing challenges such as\nenvironmental conditions that may\naffect emergency response and leak\ndetection. Key sections are as follows:\n• GM 192.615: Section 1.3\n(Emergency Plans), which provides\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 17:39 Jul 10, 2026 Jkt 268001 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\13JYN1.SGM 13JYN1\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\n43018 Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 132 / Monday, July 13, 2026 / Notices\nguidance on prompt and effective\nresponse to each type of emergency,\nincluding response guidance for\nemergencies involving non-typical soil\nconditions which may adversely affect\ngas migration or leak investigation\neffectiveness.23\n• GM 192.723: Section 1.4\n(Distribution Systems: Leakage\nSurveys), which provides guidance on\nconducting special one-time surveys,\nwhen gas migration or weather-related\nconditions may hinder leak detection.\n• GM 192.803: Section 1.2\n(Definitions), which provides examples\nof abnormal operating conditions.\n• GMA G–192–11/G–192–11A:\nSection 5 (Gas Leakage Control\nGuidelines for Natural/Petroleum Gas\nSystems), which provides information\non leak investigation and classification.\nSection 5.5 is a new section which\nprovides specific guidance for the\neffective emergency response and leak\ninvestigation in non-typical soil\nconditions.\nD Determine and implement measures\nto reduce the risks associated with the\nfailure of gas distribution pipeline assets\nas required by § 192.1007(d). These\nmeasures must include having an\neffective leak management program.\nPHMSA notes that data from DIMP risk\nmodels may help with determining\nwhether the current leak management\nmethod is effective. In addition, gas\ndistribution operators are encouraged to\nincorporate the updated ANSI/GPTC\nZ380.1 standard with considerations for\nnon-typical soil conditions and special\none-time leak surveys into their DIMP or\nincorporate other approaches to meet\nthe requirements of 49 CFR part 192,\nsubpart P (See DIMP FAQs, Section\nB.3).\nD Conduct evaluations of DIMP.\nSection 192.1007(f) requires operators to\nre-evaluate their DIMP at an interval\nthat considers the complexity of the\nsystem and the types of threats present,\nbut not less than every five years.\nOperators should ensure their re-\nevaluation cycle is frequent enough to\nincorporate ‘‘new knowledge’’ gained\nfrom incidents, leak history, or changes\nin environmental conditions (including\nconditions discussed in this advisory).\nPHMSA notes through its DIMP\nEnforcement Guidance that ‘‘[t]he\nperiod for the evaluation of program\neffectiveness must be as frequent as\nneeded to assure distribution system\nintegrity . . .’’ 24 and that many\nindustry best practices and consensus\nstandards, such as ANSI/GPTC Z380.1,\nuse a five-year maximum interval for\ncomprehensive program reviews to\nensure the program remains effective as\nsystem knowledge evolves.\nD Maintain records, for a period of at\nleast 10 years, demonstrating\ncompliance with requirements of 49\nCFR part 192, subpart P as required by\n§ 192.1011. Such records may include\ndocuments supporting threat\nidentification and risk analysis.\nExamples include records of identified\ninteractive threats in the operator’s\nsystem and records documenting\nmeasures implemented by the operator\nto reduce the risk to its pipeline system.\nPHMSA notes that this advisory\nbulletin does not have the force and\neffect of law and is not meant to bind\nowners, operators, or the public in any\nway. This guidance will not be relied\nupon by the Department as an\nindependent basis for affirmative\nenforcement action or other\nadministrative penalty.\nIssued in Washington, DC, on July 9, 2026,\nunder authority delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.\nThomas Correll,\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n[FR Doc. 2026–14071 Filed 7–10–26; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–60–P\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n[Docket No. PHMSA–2017–0151]\nPipeline Safety: Information Collection\nActivities\nAGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), DOT.\nACTION: Notice and request for\ncomments.\nDATES: Interested persons are invited to\nsubmit comments on or before August\n12, 2026.\nADDRESSES: The public is invited to\nsubmit comments regarding this\ninformation collection request,\nincluding suggestions for reducing the\nburden, to Office of Management and\nBudget (OMB), Attention: Desk Officer\nfor the Office of the Secretary of\nTransportation, 725 17th Street NW,\nWashington, DC 20503. Comments can\nalso be submitted electronically at\nwww.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:\nAngela Hill by email at angela.hill@\ndot.gov.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:\nI. Background\nTitle 5, Code of Federal Regulations\n(CFR) 1320.8(d), requires the Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) to provide\ninterested members of the public and\naffected agencies with the opportunity\nto comment on information collection\nand recordkeeping requests before they\nare submitted to OMB for approval. In\naccordance with this regulation, on\nJanuary 14, 2026, PHMSA published the\nPipeline Safety: Class Location Change\nRequirements final rule (91 FR 1608)\nwith a 60-day comment period\nsolicitation on its intent to request\nOMB’s approval of the information\ncollection request abstracted below.\nDuring that 60-day comment period,\nPHMSA received a comment from the\nPipeline Safety Trust (PST) regarding\nthe proposed information collection\nrequests associated with the final rule.1\nPST asserted that the requirement for\noperators to maintain traceable,\nverifiable, and complete (TVC) records\nfor pressure tests and pipe materials is\na pre-existing obligation under the\npipeline safety regulations (PSR).\nConsequently, PST argued that this\nburden should not be duplicative under\nthe Class Location Change Requirements\nfinal rule for operators electing to use\nthe integrity management (IM)\nalternative.2\nSUMMARY: In compliance with the\nPaperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44\nU.S.C. 3501 et seq.), this notice\nannounces that the information\ncollection request abstracted below is\nbeing forwarded to the Office of\nManagement and Budget (OMB) for\nreview and comment. A Federal\nRegister notice with a 60-day comment\nperiod soliciting comments on this\ninformation collection was published on\nJanuary 14, 2026.\nlotter on DSK8BHNXB4PROD with NOTICES1\n23 In March 2025, NTSB issued Safety Alert, SA–\n098, Natural Gas Alarms Save Lives, noting that\nnatural gas odorant may be stripped out if natural\ngas migrates through soil. See https://www.ntsb.gov/\nAdvocacy/safety-alerts/Pages/SA-098.aspx.\n24 PHMSA, Gas Distribution Pipeline Integrity\nManagement Enforcement Guidance, at 36 (Dec. 7,\n2015), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/\npipeline/enforcement/dimp-enforcement-guidance\n(‘‘DIMP Enforcement Guidance’’).\n1 PST, Comment, Docket ID PHMSA–20217–\n0151–0096 (Mar. 17, 2026).\n2 Beyond its comments about the information\ncollection requests, in its comment PST also\ndiscussed several elements of the final rule.\nPHMSA conducted public comment periods on the\nproposed rulemaking in 2020 and 2024 before\nissuing the final rule on January 14, 2026. The\nappropriate periods for public comment and for\nreconsideration of the rulemaking had concluded\nbefore the comment was submitted on March 17,\n2026. See 5 U.S.C. 553; 49 CFR 190.335. To the\nextent PST wishes to raise any of those issues\npertaining to the regulatory requirements in\n§ 192.611, it may pursue a petition for rulemaking,\n49 CFR 190.331.\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 17:39 Jul 10, 2026 Jkt 268001 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\13JYN1.SGM 13JYN1","truncated":false,"body_characters":31798}