# Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Distribution Integrity Management Programs

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** PHMSA Guidance, Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Distribution Integrity Management Programs
- **title:** Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Distribution Integrity Management Programs
- **source type:** guidance
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** guidance
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2026-07-13
- **effective on:** 2026-07-13
- **summary:** Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Distribution Integrity Management Programs Action Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin. Summary PHMSA issues this advisory bulletin to remind owners and operators of gas distribution systems of the distribution integrity management program (DIMP) requirements under 49 CFR part 192, subpart P. The guidance is intended to improve implementation of DIMP risk 
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**body:**

Pipeline Safety: Guidance for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Distribution Integrity Management Programs

Action
Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin.

Summary

PHMSA issues this advisory bulletin to remind owners and operators of gas distribution systems of the distribution integrity management program (DIMP) requirements under 49 CFR part 192, subpart P. The guidance is intended to improve implementation of DIMP risk evaluations by addressing factors such as high-risk infrastructure, interactive threats, and leak management effectiveness. In addition, the guidance urges pipeline operators to adopt the most appropriate risk models for use within their integrity management programs, with full consideration of probabilistic risk models.

Detail

Published Date
07/13/2026

Comment
Comment now on Regulations.gov

Federal Register
2026-14071

Docket Number
PHMSA-2026-2443

Document
View PDF

          Issued Date: Monday, July 13, 2026

<<<PAGE 1>>>

Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 132 / Monday, July 13, 2026 / Notices
43015
to be entered electronically at the
appropriate times.
• Pilots may call 1–800–WX–BRIEF
(992–7433) or 1–833–AK–BRIEF (252–
7433) file flight plans with a flight
service station specialist who enters the
information directly into a computer
system that transmits the information to
the appropriate air traffic facility. Pilots
calling certain flight service stations
have the option of using a voice
recorder to store the information that
will later be entered into a computer
system by a specialist.
• Using internet access, pilots may
file flight plans electronically through
web applications provided by flight
service, at no cost to the users. Third-
party subscription-based vendors are
also available for direct electronic filing.
The vendors allow pilots to store flight
data so that minimal additional
information is required when filing a
flight plan.
• Private and corporate pilots who fly
the same aircraft and routes at regular
times may store flight plans with flight
service stations. The flight plans will
then be transmitted automatically into
the air traffic system at the appropriate
time.
• Pilots who visit a flight service
station in person may choose to file a
flight plan by using a paper form. The
data will then be entered into a
computer and filed electronically. The
pilot will often keep the paper copy for
his/her record.
Respondents: Air carrier and air taxi
operations, and certain corporate
aviation departments, General Aviation
Pilots.
Frequency: On occasion.
Estimated Average Burden per
Response: 2.5 minutes.
Estimated Total Annual Burden:
292,724.
Issued in Washington, DC, on July 8, 2026.
Nathan Geoffry Dekker,
Air Traffic Control Specialist, Office of Flight
Service Safety and Operations, AJR–B.
[FR Doc. 2026–14010 Filed 7–10–26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
(PHMSA), Department of Transportation
(DOT or Department).
ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory
bulletin.
SUMMARY: PHMSA issues this advisory
bulletin to remind owners and operators
of gas distribution systems of the
distribution integrity management
program (DIMP) requirements under 49
CFR part 192, subpart P. The guidance
is intended to improve implementation
of DIMP risk evaluations by addressing
factors such as high-risk infrastructure,
interactive threats, and leak
management effectiveness. In addition,
the guidance urges pipeline operators to
adopt the most appropriate risk models
for use within their integrity
management programs, with full
consideration of probabilistic risk
models.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Nancy White by phone at 202–923–8268
or by email at Nancy.White1@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: To
address National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendations
P–21–2 and P–26–2, PHMSA is
reminding owners and operators of gas
distribution systems of existing DIMP
risk evaluation requirements under 49
CFR part 192, subpart P. This guidance:
• Emphasizes ongoing efforts to
advance pipeline safety risk
management and risk evaluations,
including foundational concepts
developed by the PHMSA-organized
Risk Modeling Work Group (RMWG)
and its subsequent report, which
provides an overview of models that
may be universally applicable and used
for improved DIMP implementation.1
• Reinforces existing PHMSA safety
initiatives, including the 2011 Call to
Action to modernize aging and high-risk
pipeline infrastructure; recent DIMP
implementation guidance in ADB–
2026–01; and the July 2025 Inspection
and Enforcement Priorities
memorandum, which prioritizes
oversight of high-impact pipeline safety
issues, including operator compliance
with DIMP regulations.2
• Highlights recent updates to The
Guide for Gas Transmission,
Distribution, and Gathering Piping
Systems (ANSI/GPTC Z380.1, 2022
edition) addressing interactive threats,
system degradation over time, and leak
investigation procedures.
• Urges pipeline operators to adopt
the most appropriate risk models for use
within their integrity management
programs, with full consideration of
probabilistic risk models.
Guidance and advisory bulletins are
intended to provide clarity regarding an
operator’s existing legal obligations but
are not themselves rules meant to bind
the public in any way; they do not
assign duties, create legally enforceable
rights, or impose new obligations that
are not otherwise contained in
regulations. Accordingly, this guidance
will not be relied upon by the
Department as an independent basis for
affirmative enforcement action or other
administrative penalty.
I. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2026–06)
To: Owners and Operators of Gas
Distribution Pipeline Systems
Subject: Guidance for Enhancing the
Effectiveness of Distribution
Integrity Management Programs
Advisory: On February 23, 2018, a
natural gas distribution incident
occurred on a system operated by Atmos
Energy Corporation (Atmos) in Dallas,
Texas. The incident resulted in one
fatality, four injuries, and major
structural damage to a home. Two
separate gas-related incidents occurred
two days earlier at nearby residences
served by the same gas distribution
system. Those incidents burned one
occupant and caused significant
structural damage to both residences.
The NTSB determined the probable
cause of the February 23 incident was:
[T]he ignition of an accumulation of
natural gas that leaked from the gas
main that was damaged during a sewer
replacement project 23 years earlier and
was undetected by Atmos Energy
Corporation’s investigation of two
related natural gas incidents on the 2
days prior to the explosion.
Contributing to the explosion was
Atmos Energy Corporation’s insufficient
wet weather leak investigation
procedures. Contributing to the severity
of the explosion was Atmos Energy
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2026–2443]
Pipeline Safety: Guidance for
Enhancing the Effectiveness of
Distribution Integrity Management
Programs
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
1 See https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/risk-
modeling-work-group/risk-modeling-work-group-
overview (providing guidance for documenting
RMWG activities); PHMSA, Pipeline Risk Modeling:
Overview of Methods and Tools for Improved
Implementation (Feb. 1, 2020) (2020 Risk Modeling
Report) available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/
pipeline/risk-modeling-work-group/pipeline-risk-
modeling-overview-methods-and-tools-improved-
implementation-report (discussing risk modeling
principally in the context of gas transmission and
hazardous liquid pipelines).
2 DOT, U.S. Department of Transportation Call to
Action To Improve the Safety of the Nation’s Energy
Pipeline System (Nov. 1, 2011) (Call to Action),
available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-
awareness/pipeline/call-to-action; PHMSA, ADB–
2026–01, Pipeline Safety: Distribution Integrity
Management Program Considerations for Plastic
Piping and Components, 91 FR 2995 (Jan. 23, 2026);
PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Inspection and
Enforcement Priorities (July 17, 2025), available at
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/
phmsa-guidance/phmsa-pipeline-safety-inspection-
and-enforcement-priorities.
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43016 Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 132 / Monday, July 13, 2026 / Notices
Corporation’s inaction to isolate the
affected main and evacuate the houses.
Contributing to the degradation of the
pipeline system was Atmos Energy
Corporation’s inadequate integrity
management program.3
NTSB found that rain inhibited the
operator’s ability to gather useful
natural gas leak measurement data,
inhibited venting, and increased the
tendency of natural gas to migrate
laterally where it could be stripped of
odorant.4 In addition, NTSB noted that
while these factors were discussed in
the general, safety-related sections of
ANSI/GPTC Z380.1, they were not
integrated into sections of ANSI/GPTC
Z380.1 focusing on best practices for
operator DIMPs. Consequently, the
increased risk associated with reduced
mitigative capability was not considered
by Atmos’s DIMP evaluation of risks.5
NTSB determined that ‘‘[l]eak surveys
provide an indication of the leaks that
may be present at the time they are
performed but provide no information
on leaks that may occur in the future.’’ 6
NTSB concluded that ‘‘[w]hile Atmos
Energy Corporation’s periodic leak
survey methodology and frequency
complied with minimum state and
federal requirements, it did not identify
the degraded system that was found
after the explosion.’’ 7
NTSB found that ‘‘[i]n addressing the
likelihood of failure, age is generally
recognized as a strong indicator of
performance. However, gas distribution
operators are not explicitly required to
assess the age of their pipeline in the
likelihood of failure evaluation,’’ even
though ‘‘[t]rending failure rates by
system age can reveal degrading
performance.’’ 8
NTSB issued several safety
recommendations as a result of its
investigation into this incident. Safety
Recommendation P–21–2 in particular
advised PHMSA to ‘‘[e]valuate
industry’s implementation of the gas
distribution pipeline integrity
management requirements and develop
updated guidance for improving their
effectiveness. The evaluation should
specifically consider factors that may
increase the likelihood of failure such as
age; increase the overall risk (including
factors that simultaneously increase the
likelihood and consequence of failure);
and limit the effectiveness of leak
management programs.’’ 9 In addition,
NTSB issued safety recommendations
P–21–13 10 and P–21–14 11 to the Gas
Piping Technology Committee (GPTC)
to update ANSI/GPTC Z380.1.12 GPTC
recently issued Addenda 2 and 4 of this
standard to address these NTSB safety
recommendations and, as a result, NTSB
closed both recommendations as
‘‘Closed—Acceptable Action.’’
Further underscoring the need for
effective risk management through
DIMP, on January 24, 2024, a home
explosion and fire occurred in Jackson,
Mississippi. The incident resulted in
one fatality and one injury and
destroyed the home. Three days later,
on January 27, 2024, about 0.7 miles
southeast of the first explosion, another
home explosion and fire occurred and
destroyed two homes.
NTSB’s investigation revealed, in
relevant part, that the operator’s
inadequate leak management program
and its relative-risk model failed to
classify incident locations as high-risk.
These failures highlighted systemic
inadequacies within the operator’s
distribution integrity management
program.
NTSB determined the probable cause
of the January 2024 incidents was the
operator’s:
inadequate leak management program, which
allowed for known natural gas leaks, from
9 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 72.
10 Safety Recommendation P–21–13 to GPTC:
‘‘Develop additional guidance that identifies steps
gas distribution operators can take to safely respond
to leaks, fires, explosions, and emergency calls,
considering the limitations due to wet weather
conditions, that includes: (1) criteria for when to
shut down or isolate gas distribution systems,
pressure test main and service lines, and begin
evacuations; (2) leak investigation methods that are
reliable in wet weather; (3) require an alternate safe
response, such as an evacuation when reliable leak
investigations are not possible due to wet weather;
and (4) leak investigations that assess all viable gas
migration paths, including granular backfill and
crawlspaces.’’ See https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-
public/sr-details/P-21-013.
11 Safety Recommendation P–21–14 to GPTC:
‘‘Develop guidance that identifies steps that gas
distribution operators can take to ensure that their
gas distribution integrity management program, at
a minimum, appropriately considers: (1) threats that
degrade a system over time, and (2) the increased
risk that can result from factors that simultaneously
increase the likelihood and consequence of failure.’’
See https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-
details/P-21-014.
12 PHMSA, Gas Distribution Integrity
Management Frequently Asked Questions, at 4 (Oct.
26, 2015) (DIMP FAQs), https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/gas-distribution-
integrity-management/gas-distribution-integrity-
management-faqs (‘‘[While] [o]perators may use
other approaches to meet the high-level
requirements of the [DIMP] regulation . . . PHMSA,
State pipeline safety regulators and industry all
participated in the development of the [ANSI/GPTC
Z380.1] guidelines and have confidence that
operators who use them in their programs will
comply with the requirements of the rule.’’).
service-line pipes that had partially pulled
out of compression couplings due to soil
movement, to be left unrepaired for at least
8 weeks, resulting in gas leaking from the
compression couplings and then migrating to
the nearby homes and igniting. Contributing
to the explosions was Atmos Energy
Corporation’s inadequate integrity
management program, which did not
appropriately assess and address risk in its
pipeline system. Also contributing was an
ineffective public awareness program, which
did not adequately educate the public or
emergency response officials on how to
respond to a suspected natural gas leak.13
Consequently, NTSB reiterated Safety
Recommendation P–21–2 to PHMSA
and issued a new recommendation, P–
26–2, urging PHMSA to advise operators
to adopt more robust probabilistic risk
models where appropriate.14
PHMSA has long concluded that
‘‘[t]he overriding principle in employing
any type of risk model/assessment is
that it supports risk management
decisions to reduce risks.’’ 15 In 2020,
PHMSA issued its Risk Modeling
Report, providing an overview of the
major types of pipeline risk models:
qualitative models, relative assessment/
index models, quantitative system
models, and probabilistic models, and
their effectiveness in supporting risk
assessments. The report noted that each
risk model provides distinct capabilities
depending on an operator’s specific
system complexity, data availability,
and resources. For example, qualitative
and relative assessment/index models
can be effective and well-suited for
smaller, less complex distribution
networks. PHMSA noted that less
complex pipeline systems can be
characterized by limited geographic
extent and lower mileage; simple system
configuration; uniform risk factors
throughout the system; and single, small
operating organizations.16 PHMSA
further noted that ‘‘[w]hile different risk
model types have different capabilities
for evaluating risk reduction actions,
quantitative system models or
probabilistic models are more versatile
and provide greater capabilities to
provide risk insights and support
decision making.’’ 17 The report also
3 NTSB, PAR–21/01, Atmos Energy Corporation
Natural Gas-Fueled Explosion, Dallas, Texas, Feb.
23, 2018, at 71 (Jan. 12, 2021) (PAR–21/01),
available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/PAR2101.pdf.
4 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 67.
5 Id.
6 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 68.
7 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 71.
8 NTSB, PAR–21/01 at 66.
13 NTSB/PAR–26/01 at 85.
14 NTSB, PIR–26/01, Atmos Energy Corporation
Natural Gas-Fueled Home Explosions and Fires,
Jackson, Mississippi, January 24, 2024, and January
27, 2024, at 86 (Mar. 12, 2026) (PIR–26/01),
available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/PIR2601.pdf.
15 PHMSA, Pipeline Risk Modeling: Overview of
Methods and Tools for Improved Implementation,
at 6 (Feb. 1, 2020) (2020 Risk Modeling Report),
available at: https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/
risk-modeling-work-group/pipeline-risk-modeling-
overview-methods-and-tools-improved-
implementation-report.
16 2020 Risk Modeling Report, at 26.
17 2020 Risk Modeling Report, at 6.
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noted that probabilistic models are
‘‘distinguished from other quantitative
system models by the use of probability
distributions, rather than single point
value estimates, to represent model
inputs,’’ and ‘‘are considered a best
practice for supporting all decision
types.’’ 18
Pursuant to § 192.1007(f), operators
must re-evaluate their DIMP as
frequently as determined to be
appropriate, not to exceed five years.
PHMSA emphasizes that risk
assessment is a dynamic process, and
that owners and operators should
update the risks and threats supporting
their DIMP assessments as frequently as
each calendar year when there is a
change in knowledge or factors that alter
the risk of failure.19 Evolving system
conditions and knowledge may be
identified through many means,
including records research, maintenance
and repair records, existing safety
programs such as leak management
programs, excavations, lessons learned
from industry incidents, or emerging
threat data.20
Regardless of the risk model used,
PHMSA reminds operators that
identified threats may be interactive
because factors impacting the likelihood
and consequence of failure from one
threat may be intensified by factors
impacting the likelihood and
consequence of failure from another
threat. Interactive threats may result in
an otherwise premature failure at a
location on the pipeline.21 Typical
pipeline threats include corrosion,
natural forces (including soil
movement), excavation damage, other
outside force damage (e.g. vehicle
impacts), material or weld defects,
equipment failure, incorrect operations,
and any other issues that could threaten
integrity. An example of interactive
threats would be natural forces,
including weather and earth movement/
soil issues in interaction with corrosion.
PHMSA reminds operators that
pursuant to § 192.1007, an operator
must develop an understanding of its
18 2020 Risk Modeling Report, at 82, 26.
19 See 49 CFR 192.1007(f) and DIMP FAQs C.4.f.1.
20 For distribution-focused guidance, see
PHMSA’s historical DIMP development and
implementation meetings at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/gas-distribution-
integrity-management/gas-distribution-integrity-
management-program-meetings. See also PHMSA,
DIMP Implementation Insights for Operators (July
2013), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/
sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2025-08/SGA_
07232013
_
PHMSA
DIMP
_
_McLaren.pdf.
21 For discussions specifically on interactive
threats in distribution systems, see PHMSA Risk
Modeling Work Group, Interactive Threats (Aug.
2016), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/
pipeline/risk-modeling-work-group/interactive-
threats-discussion. pipeline system based on reasonably
available information. This would
include identifying additional
information needed to fill gaps caused
by missing, inaccurate, or incomplete
records and developing a plan to collect
the information.
Operators can collect this information
through their normal activities,
including those that go beyond the
activities specified in Part 192. For
example, missing facility location,
material, and condition data can be
captured when a pipe is located or
exposed. Maintenance personnel could
be surveyed about unusual
circumstances they have encountered or
asked to review system descriptions to
identify useful information that might
not already be included.22
In addition, PHMSA reminds
operators that maintaining the
effectiveness of a DIMP requires both
record preservation and continual
program updates. Under § 192.1011,
operators must maintain records
demonstrating compliance with DIMP
requirements for at least 10 years.
PHMSA takes this opportunity to
remind operators of the following
agency actions:
D 2011 DOT ‘‘Call to Action,’’ which
emphasizes pipeline age and material
are significant risk indicators, requiring
operators to rigorously evaluate risks
associated with older, degraded
facilities;
D July 2025 Inspection and
Enforcement Priorities memorandum,
which identifies gas distribution
integrity management programs as a top
priority for Federal and State
inspections;
D Advisory Bulletin ADB–2026–01,
which reinforces the existing
requirements of 49 CFR 192.1007(b) and
(c) to identify threats and evaluate and
rank risks, specifically highlighting how
interactive threats can compound the
likelihood and consequence of a failure.
PHMSA advises gas distribution
pipeline operators to take the following
actions to improve DIMP effectiveness:
D Review NTSB’s Pipeline Accident
Report PAR–21/01 (Dallas, Texas,
February 23, 2018) for information on
risks of interactive threats, which may
increase the likelihood and consequence
of failure and factors that may limit the
effectiveness of an operator’s leak
management program.
D Review NTSB’s Pipeline
Investigation Report PIR 26/01 (Jackson,
Mississippi, January 24, 2024) for
information on the importance of
understanding pipeline systems, risk
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43017
22 DIMP FAQs, at 12–13.
modeling, and further discussion of leak
management.
D In conducting evaluations of DIMP
as required by § 192.1007(f), PHMSA
urges pipeline operators to adopt the
most appropriate risk models for use
within their distribution integrity
management programs, including
consideration of probabilistic risk
models. PHMSA acknowledges that
each risk model has its benefits.
D Develop and implement a DIMP
plan to evaluate and rank risks.
Pursuant to §§ 192.1005 and
192.1007(c), operators must consider the
likelihood and consequence of failure
for all applicable threats. An effective
risk evaluation should account for how
interactive threats can simultaneously
increase both the likelihood and
consequences of an accident. Operators
are also encouraged to account for time-
dependent factors, such as the
performance characteristics of legacy
materials or pipeline age. In addition,
operators should evaluate the potential
for interactive threats, where multiple
factors like weather conditions, soil
type, and mechanical damage may
interact to increase risk. An effective
evaluation should be sufficiently
detailed to identify where these
interactive threats may exist and may
require review and integration of
historical construction, design,
maintenance, operating, and leak
records, and review of PHMSA’s legacy
DIMP guidance.
D Review updates to ANSI/GPTC
Z380.1, 2022 Edition, Addendum 2,
Guide Material Appendix (GMA) G–
192–8 (DIMP). This addendum provides
updated guidance on fulfilling
§ 192.1007 requirements. Specifically,
operators should review GMA G–192–8:
• Section 3.3 (Knowledge, Additional
Information) and Section 4.1 (Identify
Threats, Primary Threats), which
provide information on accounting for
time-dependent threats that may
degrade pipeline assets over time.
• Section 4.4 (Identify Threats,
Handling Interactive Threats), which
provides information on identifying and
ranking threats that interact and may
increase overall risk, compounding the
severity, likelihood, or consequence of a
failure.
D Review updates to ANSI/GPTC
Z380.1, 2022 Edition, Addendum 4.
This addendum provides guidance on
enhancing the effectiveness of a leak
management program (§ 192.1007(d)),
addressing challenges such as
environmental conditions that may
affect emergency response and leak
detection. Key sections are as follows:
• GM 192.615: Section 1.3
(Emergency Plans), which provides
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43018 Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 132 / Monday, July 13, 2026 / Notices
guidance on prompt and effective
response to each type of emergency,
including response guidance for
emergencies involving non-typical soil
conditions which may adversely affect
gas migration or leak investigation
effectiveness.23
• GM 192.723: Section 1.4
(Distribution Systems: Leakage
Surveys), which provides guidance on
conducting special one-time surveys,
when gas migration or weather-related
conditions may hinder leak detection.
• GM 192.803: Section 1.2
(Definitions), which provides examples
of abnormal operating conditions.
• GMA G–192–11/G–192–11A:
Section 5 (Gas Leakage Control
Guidelines for Natural/Petroleum Gas
Systems), which provides information
on leak investigation and classification.
Section 5.5 is a new section which
provides specific guidance for the
effective emergency response and leak
investigation in non-typical soil
conditions.
D Determine and implement measures
to reduce the risks associated with the
failure of gas distribution pipeline assets
as required by § 192.1007(d). These
measures must include having an
effective leak management program.
PHMSA notes that data from DIMP risk
models may help with determining
whether the current leak management
method is effective. In addition, gas
distribution operators are encouraged to
incorporate the updated ANSI/GPTC
Z380.1 standard with considerations for
non-typical soil conditions and special
one-time leak surveys into their DIMP or
incorporate other approaches to meet
the requirements of 49 CFR part 192,
subpart P (See DIMP FAQs, Section
B.3).
D Conduct evaluations of DIMP.
Section 192.1007(f) requires operators to
re-evaluate their DIMP at an interval
that considers the complexity of the
system and the types of threats present,
but not less than every five years.
Operators should ensure their re-
evaluation cycle is frequent enough to
incorporate ‘‘new knowledge’’ gained
from incidents, leak history, or changes
in environmental conditions (including
conditions discussed in this advisory).
PHMSA notes through its DIMP
Enforcement Guidance that ‘‘[t]he
period for the evaluation of program
effectiveness must be as frequent as
needed to assure distribution system
integrity . . .’’ 24 and that many
industry best practices and consensus
standards, such as ANSI/GPTC Z380.1,
use a five-year maximum interval for
comprehensive program reviews to
ensure the program remains effective as
system knowledge evolves.
D Maintain records, for a period of at
least 10 years, demonstrating
compliance with requirements of 49
CFR part 192, subpart P as required by
§ 192.1011. Such records may include
documents supporting threat
identification and risk analysis.
Examples include records of identified
interactive threats in the operator’s
system and records documenting
measures implemented by the operator
to reduce the risk to its pipeline system.
PHMSA notes that this advisory
bulletin does not have the force and
effect of law and is not meant to bind
owners, operators, or the public in any
way. This guidance will not be relied
upon by the Department as an
independent basis for affirmative
enforcement action or other
administrative penalty.
Issued in Washington, DC, on July 9, 2026,
under authority delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Thomas Correll,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2026–14071 Filed 7–10–26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2017–0151]
Pipeline Safety: Information Collection
Activities
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
DATES: Interested persons are invited to
submit comments on or before August
12, 2026.
ADDRESSES: The public is invited to
submit comments regarding this
information collection request,
including suggestions for reducing the
burden, to Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), Attention: Desk Officer
for the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation, 725 17th Street NW,
Washington, DC 20503. Comments can
also be submitted electronically at
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Angela Hill by email at angela.hill@
dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) 1320.8(d), requires the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) to provide
interested members of the public and
affected agencies with the opportunity
to comment on information collection
and recordkeeping requests before they
are submitted to OMB for approval. In
accordance with this regulation, on
January 14, 2026, PHMSA published the
Pipeline Safety: Class Location Change
Requirements final rule (91 FR 1608)
with a 60-day comment period
solicitation on its intent to request
OMB’s approval of the information
collection request abstracted below.
During that 60-day comment period,
PHMSA received a comment from the
Pipeline Safety Trust (PST) regarding
the proposed information collection
requests associated with the final rule.1
PST asserted that the requirement for
operators to maintain traceable,
verifiable, and complete (TVC) records
for pressure tests and pipe materials is
a pre-existing obligation under the
pipeline safety regulations (PSR).
Consequently, PST argued that this
burden should not be duplicative under
the Class Location Change Requirements
final rule for operators electing to use
the integrity management (IM)
alternative.2
SUMMARY: In compliance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), this notice
announces that the information
collection request abstracted below is
being forwarded to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and comment. A Federal
Register notice with a 60-day comment
period soliciting comments on this
information collection was published on
January 14, 2026.
lotter on DSK8BHNXB4PROD with NOTICES1
23 In March 2025, NTSB issued Safety Alert, SA–
098, Natural Gas Alarms Save Lives, noting that
natural gas odorant may be stripped out if natural
gas migrates through soil. See https://www.ntsb.gov/
Advocacy/safety-alerts/Pages/SA-098.aspx.
24 PHMSA, Gas Distribution Pipeline Integrity
Management Enforcement Guidance, at 36 (Dec. 7,
2015), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/
pipeline/enforcement/dimp-enforcement-guidance
(‘‘DIMP Enforcement Guidance’’).
1 PST, Comment, Docket ID PHMSA–20217–
0151–0096 (Mar. 17, 2026).
2 Beyond its comments about the information
collection requests, in its comment PST also
discussed several elements of the final rule.
PHMSA conducted public comment periods on the
proposed rulemaking in 2020 and 2024 before
issuing the final rule on January 14, 2026. The
appropriate periods for public comment and for
reconsideration of the rulemaking had concluded
before the comment was submitted on March 17,
2026. See 5 U.S.C. 553; 49 CFR 190.335. To the
extent PST wishes to raise any of those issues
pertaining to the regulatory requirements in
§ 192.611, it may pursue a petition for rulemaking,
49 CFR 190.331.
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