{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA Guidance, Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting From Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines","title":"Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting From Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines","source_type":"guidance","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2016-06-21","effective_on":"2016-06-21","summary":"Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting From Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines Document 2016-14651.pdf (218.39 KB) PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to remind all owners and operators of hazardous liquid, carbon dioxide, and gas pipelines, as defined in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 192 and 195, to *40399 consider the overall integrity of the f","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-ineffective-protection-detection-and-a4a013b6.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-ineffective-protection-detection-and-a4a013b6.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-ineffective-protection-detection-and-a4a013b6","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/pipeline-safety-ineffective-protection-detection-and","body":"Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting From Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines\n\nDocument\n\n 2016-14651.pdf (218.39 KB)\n\n        PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to remind all owners and operators of hazardous liquid, carbon dioxide, and gas pipelines, as defined in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 192 and 195, to *40399 consider the overall integrity of the facilities to ensure the safety of the public and operating personnel and to protect the environment. Operators are reminded to review their pipeline operations to ensure that pipeline segments that are both buried and insulated have effective coating and corrosion-control systems to protect against cathodic protection shielding, conduct in-line inspections for all threats, and ensure in-line inspection tool findings are accurate, verified, and conducted for all pipeline threats. \n\n          Issued Date: Tuesday, June 21, 2016\n\n<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\n40398 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 119 / Tuesday, June 21, 2016 / Notices\nentered into this docket is available on\nthe World Wide Web at http://\nwww.regulations.gov.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:\nBianca Carr, U.S. Department of\nTransportation, Maritime\nAdministration, 1200 New Jersey\nAvenue SE., Room W23–453,\nWashington, DC 20590. Telephone 202–\n366–9309, Email Bianca.carr@dot.gov.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As\ndescribed by the applicant the intended\nservice of the vessel BALAJAN is:\nIntended Commercial Use of Vessel:\n‘‘San Francisco Bay Sailing Tours’’.\nGeographic Region: ‘‘California’’.\nThe complete application is given in\nDOT docket MARAD–2016–0059 at\nhttp://www.regulations.gov. Interested\nparties may comment on the effect this\naction may have on U.S. vessel builders\nor businesses in the U.S. that use U.S.-\nflag vessels. If MARAD determines, in\naccordance with 46 U.S.C. 12121 and\nMARAD’s regulations at 46 CFR part\n388, that the issuance of the waiver will\nhave an unduly adverse effect on a U.S.-\nvessel builder or a business that uses\nU.S.-flag vessels in that business, a\nwaiver will not be granted. Comments\nshould refer to the docket number of\nthis notice and the vessel name in order\nfor MARAD to properly consider the\ncomments. Comments should also state\nthe commenter’s interest in the waiver\napplication, and address the waiver\ncriteria given in § 388.4 of MARAD’s\nregulations at 46 CFR part 388.\nPrivacy Act\nAnyone is able to search the\nelectronic form of all comments\nreceived into any of our dockets by the\nname of the individual submitting the\ncomment (or signing the comment, if\nsubmitted on behalf of an association,\nbusiness, labor union, etc.). You may\nreview DOT’s complete Privacy Act\nStatement in the Federal Register\npublished on April 11, 2000 (Volume\n65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78).\nBy Order of the Maritime Administrator.\nDated: June 14, 2016.\nT. Mitchell Hudson, Jr.,\nSecretary, Maritime Administration.\n[FR Doc. 2016–14662 Filed 6–20–16; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–81–P\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nMaritime Administration\n[Docket No. MARAD–2016–0061]\nRequested Administrative Waiver of\nthe Coastwise Trade Laws: Vessel\nHEAD PELICAN; Invitation for Public\nComments\nAGENCY: Maritime Administration,\nDepartment of Transportation.\nACTION: Notice.\nasabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES\nSUMMARY: As authorized by 46 U.S.C.\n12121, the Secretary of Transportation,\nas represented by the Maritime\nAdministration (MARAD), is authorized\nto grant waivers of the U.S.-build\nrequirement of the coastwise laws under\ncertain circumstances. A request for\nsuch a waiver has been received by\nMARAD. The vessel, and a brief\ndescription of the proposed service, is\nlisted below.\nDATES: Submit comments on or before\nJuly 21, 2016.\nADDRESSES: Comments should refer to\ndocket number MARAD–2016–0061.\nWritten comments may be submitted by\nhand or by mail to the Docket Clerk,\nU.S. Department of Transportation,\nDocket Operations, M–30, West\nBuilding Ground Floor, Room W12–140,\n1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,\nWashington, DC 20590. You may also\nsend comments electronically via the\nInternet at http://www.regulations.gov.\nAll comments will become part of this\ndocket and will be available for\ninspection and copying at the above\naddress between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m.,\nE.T., Monday through Friday, except\nfederal holidays. An electronic version\nof this document and all documents\nentered into this docket is available on\nthe World Wide Web at http://\nwww.regulations.gov.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:\nBianca Carr, U.S. Department of\nTransportation, Maritime\nAdministration, 1200 New Jersey\nAvenue SE., Room W23–453,\nWashington, DC 20590. Telephone 202–\n366–9309, Email Bianca.carr@dot.gov.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As\ndescribed by the applicant the intended\nservice of the vessel HEAD PELICAN is:\nIntended Commercial Use of Vessel:\nPrivate Vessel Charters, Passengers\nOnly. Cruises and corporate executive\nsightseeing tours.\nGeographic Region: California,\nOregon and Washington. LIMITED\ncharters in Alaska, EXCLUDING waters\nin Southeastern Alaska and waters north\nof a line between Gore Point to Cape\nSuckling—including the North Gulf\nCoast and Prince William Sound).\nThe complete application is given in\nDOT docket MARAD–2016–0061 at\nhttp://www.regulations.gov. Interested\nparties may comment on the effect this\naction may have on U.S. vessel builders\nor businesses in the U.S. that use U.S.-\nflag vessels. If MARAD determines, in\naccordance with 46 U.S.C. 12121 and\nMARAD’s regulations at 46 CFR part\n388, that the issuance of the waiver will\nhave an unduly adverse effect on a U.S.-\nvessel builder or a business that uses\nU.S.-flag vessels in that business, a\nwaiver will not be granted. Comments\nshould refer to the docket number of\nthis notice and the vessel name in order\nfor MARAD to properly consider the\ncomments. Comments should also state\nthe commenter’s interest in the waiver\napplication, and address the waiver\ncriteria given in § 388.4 of MARAD’s\nregulations at 46 CFR part 388.\nPrivacy Act\nAnyone is able to search the\nelectronic form of all comments\nreceived into any of our dockets by the\nname of the individual submitting the\ncomment (or signing the comment, if\nsubmitted on behalf of an association,\nbusiness, labor union, etc.). You may\nreview DOT’s complete Privacy Act\nStatement in the Federal Register\npublished on April 11, 2000 (Volume\n65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78).\nBy Order of the Maritime Administrator.\nDated: June 14, 2016.\nT. Mitchell Hudson, Jr.,\nSecretary, Maritime Administration.\n[FR Doc. 2016–14663 Filed 6–20–16; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–81–P\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n[Docket No. PHMSA–2016–0071]\nPipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection,\nDetection, and Mitigation of Corrosion\nResulting From Insulated Coatings on\nBuried Pipelines\nAGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA); DOT.\nACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory\nBulletin.\nSUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this\nadvisory bulletin to remind all owners\nand operators of hazardous liquid,\ncarbon dioxide, and gas pipelines, as\ndefined in 49 Code of Federal\nRegulations (CFR) Parts 192 and 195, to\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 18:37 Jun 20, 2016 Jkt 238001 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\21JNN1.SGM 21JNN1\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nconsider the overall integrity of the\nfacilities to ensure the safety of the\npublic and operating personnel and to\nprotect the environment. Operators are\nreminded to review their pipeline\noperations to ensure that pipeline\nsegments that are both buried and\ninsulated have effective coating and\ncorrosion-control systems to protect\nagainst cathodic protection shielding,\nconduct in-line inspections for all\nthreats, and ensure in-line inspection\ntool findings are accurate, verified, and\nconducted for all pipeline threats.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:\nOperators of pipelines subject to\nregulation by PHMSA should contact\nMr. Kenneth Lee at 202–366–2694 or\nemail to: kenneth.lee@dot.gov.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:\nI. Background\nOn May 19, 2015, the Plains Pipeline,\nL.P. (Plains), Line 901, a 24-inch\npipeline in Santa Barbara County,\nCalifornia, ruptured, resulting in the\nrelease of approximately 2,934 barrels of\nheavy crude oil. The spill resulted in\nsubstantial damage to natural habitats\nand wildlife. This buried pipeline failed\ndue to extensive external corrosion that\noccurred under the insulated coating.\nThe Line 901 pipeline is coated with\ncoal tar urethane and covered with foam\ninsulation which, in turn, is covered by\na tape wrap over the insulation. Shrink\nwrap sleeves, which provide a barrier\nbetween the steel pipeline and soil for\ncorrosion prevention, are present at the\npipeline joints (girth welds) on Line\n901. Line 901 carried high-viscosity\ncrude oil at a temperature of\napproximately 135 degrees Fahrenheit\nto facilitate transport. Line 901’s pipe\nspecifications are API 5L, Grade X–65\npipe, 0.344-inch wall thickness, with a\nhigh frequency-electric resistance\nwelded (HF–ERW) long seam. Line 901\nwas hydrotested to 1,686 pounds per\nsquare inch gauge (psig) on November\n25, 1990, and has a maximum operating\npressure (MOP) of 1,341 psig. Line 901\ndelivered crude oil into 30-inch Line\n903. Line 901 is 10.7 miles in length and\nLine 903 is 128 miles in length. Line\n903 has similar insulated coating and\nshrink wrap sleeves at girth welds.\nUnder 49 CFR 195.563, cathodic\nprotection (CP) is required to prevent\nexternal corrosion of buried pipelines.\nHistorical CP records for Line 901\nrevealed protection levels that typically\nare sufficient to protect non-insulated,\nburied, coated steel pipe. As mentioned\npreviously, however, Line 901 and Line\n903 are insulated. An increasing\n24-INCH LINE 901—ILI ASSESSMENT RESULTS\nfrequency and extent of corrosion\nanomalies were noted on both Lines 901\nand 903 on in-line inspection tool (ILI)\nsurvey results, anomaly excavations,\nand repairs. PHMSA inspectors noted\nmoisture entrained in the insulation at\nfour excavations performed by Plains on\nLine 901 after the May 19, 2015 spill.\nPlains conducted ILI surveys on Line\n901 to assess the integrity of the\npipeline in accordance with pipeline\nsafety regulations in 2007, 2012, and\n2015. Under § 195.452(j)(3), all\npipelines are required to be surveyed at\nintervals commensurate with the\npipeline’s risk of integrity threats, but at\nleast every five years. Plains changed\nLine 901 from a five-year assessment\ncycle to a three-year assessment cycle\nafter the 2012 ILI survey. Preliminary\ndata from the results of the ILI surveys\nare summarized below and show a\ngrowing number of corrosion anomalies\non Line 901. Discrepancies between the\nILI data generated during the 2007 and\n2012 surveys of Line 901 and the ‘‘as\nfound’’ anomaly sizes discovered in\ncorrelation digs after those prior surveys\nhad not been shared with the ILI vendor\nto reanalyze the data. The frequency and\nmagnitude of the anomalies below are\nderived from the reported ILI vendor\nanalysis.\nMetal loss June 19, 2007 July 3, 2012 May 6, 2015 *\nGreater than 80% ........................................................................................................................ 60 to 79% .................................................................................................................................... 40 to 59% .................................................................................................................................... 12 0 0 2\n2 5 54 12\n80\n* Results not received until after spill.\nasabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES\nFederal Register / Vol. 81, No. 119 / Tuesday, June 21, 2016 / Notices\n40399\nThe most recent ILI survey for Line\n901 was completed on May 6, 2015. At\nthe time of the spill, the preliminary\nvendor report had not been received. As\na result, no correlation digs for this ILI\nsurvey had been attempted.\nThe May 6, 2015, ILI survey data and\nsubsequent analysis by the ILI vendor\npredicted external corrosion at the\nfailure site with an area of 5.38 inches\nby 5.45 inches, and a maximum depth\nof 47% of the original pipe wall\nthickness. After the failure, the\nmetallurgical investigators physically\nmeasured external corrosion at the\nfailure site to have a maximum depth of\n89%. The dimensions of the corrosion\nfeature were 12.1 inches axially by 7.4\ninches in circumference. The maximum\ndepth, as measured using laser scan\ndata, was 0.318 inches or 89% of the\nmeasured pipe wall thickness (0.359\ninches). Discrepancies between the\nhistoric ILI data and the ‘‘as found’’\nanomaly size had not been shared with\nthe ILI vendor to reanalyze the data.\nPHMSA determined that the\nproximate or direct cause of the release\nwas progressive external corrosion of\nthe insulated, buried steel pipeline. The\ncorrosion occurred under the pipeline’s\ncoating system, which consisted of a\nurethane coal tar coating applied\ndirectly to the bare steel pipe, covered\nby foam thermal insulation with an\noverlying tape wrap. Water was noted in\nthe foam insulation at a number of digs,\nindicating that the integrity of the\ncoating system had been compromised.\nThe external corrosion was facilitated\nby the environment’s wet/dry cycling,\nas determined by the PHMSA-approved,\nthird-party metallurgical laboratory. The\nrelease was a single event caused at an\narea where external corrosion had\nthinned the pipeline wall thickness.\nThere is no evidence that the pipeline\nleaked before the rupture. There was a\ntelltale ‘‘fish mouth’’ (a split due to\nover-pressurization) at the release site\nindicating the line failed in a single\nevent.\nPHMSA’s Failure Investigation Report\nindicated that the proximate or direct\ncause of the Line 901 failure was\nexternal corrosion that thinned the pipe\nwall to a level where it ruptured\nsuddenly and released heavy crude oil.\nPHMSA’s Failure Investigation Report\nof the Plains Line 901 incident can be\nreviewed at:.http://phmsa.dot.gov/\nstaticfiles//PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/\nFiles/PHMSA\nFailure\n_\n_Investigation_\nReport_\nPlains\n_Pipeline_\nLP\nLine\n901\n_\n_\n_\nPublic.pdf. PHMSA’s investigation\nidentified numerous contributory causes\nof the rupture, including:\n(1) Ineffective protection against\nexternal corrosion of the pipeline:\n• The condition of the pipeline’s\ncoating and insulation system fostered\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 18:37 Jun 20, 2016 Jkt 238001 PO 00000 Frm 00141 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\21JNN1.SGM 21JNN1\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nasabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES\n40400 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 119 / Tuesday, June 21, 2016 / Notices\nan environment that led to external\ncorrosion; and\n• The pipeline’s CP system was not\neffective in preventing corrosion from\noccurring beneath the pipeline’s\ncoating/insulation system.\n(2) Failure to detect and mitigate the\ncorrosion:\n• The ILI and subsequent analysis of\nILI data did not characterize the extent\nand depth of the external corrosion\naccurately.\nCorrosion under insulation (CUI) is\nrecognized as an integrity threat\ndifficult to address through\nconventional cathodic protection\nsystems and can lead to accelerated\nwall-loss corrosion and stress corrosion\ncracking of the pipe steel. A NACE\nInternational (NACE) technical\ncommittee report titled ‘‘Effectiveness of\nCathodic Protection on Thermally\nInsulated Underground Metallic\nStructures’’ dated September 2006\n(NACE International Publication\n10A392, 2006 Edition), was prepared as\na guide for external corrosion control of\nthermally-insulated underground\nmetallic surfaces and considerations of\nthe effectiveness of CP. A summary of\nthe NACE report’s conclusions are as\nfollows:\n(1) ‘‘Generally, the application of\nexternal CP to thermally insulated\nmetallic surfaces has been ineffective.\n(2) The principal or primary means of\ncorrosion control of thermally-insulated\nmetallic surfaces is the application of an\neffective coating on the metallic surface.\n(3) Care is typically taken in the\napplication of the external jacket and\nduring pipe installation to minimize\nwater ingress, which causes corrosion at\nimperfections in the primary coating.\n(4) When practical, the thermally\ninsulated metallic surfaces need to be\ninspected at routine time intervals for\nmetal loss (e.g., an internal pipeline\ninspection tool could be used).’’\nII. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2016–04)\nTo: Owners and Operators of\nHazardous Liquid, Carbon Dioxide and\nGas Pipelines.\nSubject: Ineffective Protection,\nDetection, and Mitigation of Corrosion\nResulting from Insulated Coatings on\nBuried Pipelines.\nAdvisory: Operators of hazardous\nliquid, carbon dioxide and gas\npipelines, as defined in 49 CFR parts\n192 and 195, should review their\noperating, maintenance, and integrity\nmanagement activities to ensure that\ntheir insulated and buried pipelines\nhave effective cathodic protection\nsystems, including coating systems to\nprotect against cathodic protection\nshielding and moisture under the\ncoatings with higher operating\ntemperatures, and in-line inspection\ntool findings are accurate, verified, and\nthe in-line tools are appropriate for the\npipeline threat. This bulletin is\nintended to inform operators about\nPHMSA’ failure investigation of the\nPlains Pipeline May 19, 2015, accident\nin Santa Barbara, California and to urge\noperators to take all necessary actions,\nincluding, but not limited to, those set\nforth in this bulletin, to prevent and\nmitigate the breach of integrity, leaks,\nand/or failures of their pipeline\nfacilities and to ensure the safety of the\npublic and operating personnel and to\nprotect the environment.\nOperators must have and implement\nprocedures to operate, maintain, assess,\nand repair their pipelines. These\nprocedures for insulated and buried\npipelines should take into\nconsideration:\n(1) The need for coatings and cathodic\nprotection systems to be designed,\ninstalled, and maintained so as not to\nfoster an environment of shielding and\nmoisture that can lead to excessive\nexternal corrosion growth rates and pipe\nsteel cracking such as stress corrosion\ncracking.\n(2) Coatings for buried, insulated\npipelines that may result in cathodic\nprotection ‘‘shielding’’ yet still comply\nwith 49 CFR part 192, subpart I or 49\nCFR part 195, subpart H. Inadequate\ncorrosion prevention may be addressed\nthrough any one or more methods, or a\ncombination of methods, including, but\nnot limited to, the following:\n• Replacing insulated and buried\npipelines with compromised coating\nsystems or inadequate cathodic\nprotections systems;\n• Repairing or re-coating\ncompromised portions of the coating on\ninsulated and buried pipelines to ensure\nadequate corrosion control; or\n• Taking other special precautions if\nan operator suspects that adequate\ncathodic protection cannot be provided\ndue to shielding resulting from\ninsulated coatings that have become\ndisbonded. Such precautions may\ninclude:\nÆ More frequent reassessments;\nÆ Usage of the appropriate\nassessment tools for all threats\nincluding stress corrosion cracking;\nÆ Coordination of data from the\nappropriate ILI technologies;\nÆ More stringent repair criteria\ntargeted at CUI or corrosion under\ndisbonded coatings for insulated and\nburied pipelines;\nÆ Usage of a leak detection system\nwith instrumentation and associated\ncalculations to monitor line pack (the\ntotal volume of liquid present in a\npipeline section) along all portions of\nthe pipeline when it is operating or shut\ndown; and\nÆ Valve spacing to limit any possible\nspill volumes with remotely operated\nvalves and pressure monitoring at the\nvalves.\n(3) Advanced ILI data analysis\ntechniques to account for the potential\ngrowth of CUI, including interaction\ncriteria for anomaly assessment.\n(4) ILI data, subsequent analysis of the\ndata, and pipeline excavations that:\n• Confirm the accuracy of the ILI data\nto characterize the extent and depth of\nthe external corrosion and ILI tolerances\nand unity charts;\n• Follow the ILI guidelines of API\nStandard 1163, ‘‘In-Line Inspection\nSystems Qualification Standard’’ 2nd\nedition, April 2013, (API Std. 1163) for\nILI assessments;\n• Use additional or more frequent\nreassessment intervals and\nconfirmations when the insulated and\nburied pipeline external coating, shields\nthe pipeline from CP, retains moisture\non insulated coating systems, and\noperates at higher operating\ntemperatures; and\n• Assess and mitigate operational and\nenvironmental conditions in shielded\nand insulated coatings that lead to\nexcessive corrosion growth rates, pipe\nsteel cracking, and all other threats.\nIn addition to the above, an operator’s\noperating and maintenance processes\nand procedures should be reviewed and\nupdated at least annually, unless\noperational inspections for integrity\nwarrant shorter review periods.\nIssued in Washington, DC, on June 15,\n2016, under authority delegated in 49 CFR\n1.97.\nAlan K. Mayberry,\nActing Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety.\n[FR Doc. 2016–14651 Filed 6–20–16; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–60–W\nDEPARTMENT OF VETERANS\nAFFAIRS\nHealth Services Research and\nDevelopment Service, Scientific Merit\nReview Board; Notice of Meetings\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs\n(VA) gives notice under the Federal\nAdvisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App.\n2, that the Health Services Research and\nDevelopment Service Scientific Merit\nReview Board will conduct in-person\nand teleconference meetings of its seven\nHealth Services Research (HSR)\nsubcommittees on the dates below from\n8:00 a.m. to approximately 5:00 p.m.\n(unless otherwise listed) at the Hilton\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 18:37 Jun 20, 2016 Jkt 238001 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\21JNN1.SGM 21JNN1","truncated":false,"body_characters":21512}