# Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting From Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** PHMSA Guidance, Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting From Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines
- **title:** Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting From Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines
- **source type:** guidance
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** guidance
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2016-06-21
- **effective on:** 2016-06-21
- **summary:** Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting From Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines Document 2016-14651.pdf (218.39 KB) PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to remind all owners and operators of hazardous liquid, carbon dioxide, and gas pipelines, as defined in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 192 and 195, to *40399 consider the overall integrity of the f
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Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting From Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines

Document

 2016-14651.pdf (218.39 KB)

        PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to remind all owners and operators of hazardous liquid, carbon dioxide, and gas pipelines, as defined in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 192 and 195, to *40399 consider the overall integrity of the facilities to ensure the safety of the public and operating personnel and to protect the environment. Operators are reminded to review their pipeline operations to ensure that pipeline segments that are both buried and insulated have effective coating and corrosion-control systems to protect against cathodic protection shielding, conduct in-line inspections for all threats, and ensure in-line inspection tool findings are accurate, verified, and conducted for all pipeline threats. 

          Issued Date: Tuesday, June 21, 2016

<<<PAGE 1>>>

40398 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 119 / Tuesday, June 21, 2016 / Notices
entered into this docket is available on
the World Wide Web at http://
www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Bianca Carr, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Maritime
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Room W23–453,
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202–
366–9309, Email Bianca.carr@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As
described by the applicant the intended
service of the vessel BALAJAN is:
Intended Commercial Use of Vessel:
‘‘San Francisco Bay Sailing Tours’’.
Geographic Region: ‘‘California’’.
The complete application is given in
DOT docket MARAD–2016–0059 at
http://www.regulations.gov. Interested
parties may comment on the effect this
action may have on U.S. vessel builders
or businesses in the U.S. that use U.S.-
flag vessels. If MARAD determines, in
accordance with 46 U.S.C. 12121 and
MARAD’s regulations at 46 CFR part
388, that the issuance of the waiver will
have an unduly adverse effect on a U.S.-
vessel builder or a business that uses
U.S.-flag vessels in that business, a
waiver will not be granted. Comments
should refer to the docket number of
this notice and the vessel name in order
for MARAD to properly consider the
comments. Comments should also state
the commenter’s interest in the waiver
application, and address the waiver
criteria given in § 388.4 of MARAD’s
regulations at 46 CFR part 388.
Privacy Act
Anyone is able to search the
electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the
comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume
65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78).
By Order of the Maritime Administrator.
Dated: June 14, 2016.
T. Mitchell Hudson, Jr.,
Secretary, Maritime Administration.
[FR Doc. 2016–14662 Filed 6–20–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–81–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Maritime Administration
[Docket No. MARAD–2016–0061]
Requested Administrative Waiver of
the Coastwise Trade Laws: Vessel
HEAD PELICAN; Invitation for Public
Comments
AGENCY: Maritime Administration,
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Notice.
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY: As authorized by 46 U.S.C.
12121, the Secretary of Transportation,
as represented by the Maritime
Administration (MARAD), is authorized
to grant waivers of the U.S.-build
requirement of the coastwise laws under
certain circumstances. A request for
such a waiver has been received by
MARAD. The vessel, and a brief
description of the proposed service, is
listed below.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
July 21, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to
docket number MARAD–2016–0061.
Written comments may be submitted by
hand or by mail to the Docket Clerk,
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M–30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. You may also
send comments electronically via the
Internet at http://www.regulations.gov.
All comments will become part of this
docket and will be available for
inspection and copying at the above
address between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
E.T., Monday through Friday, except
federal holidays. An electronic version
of this document and all documents
entered into this docket is available on
the World Wide Web at http://
www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Bianca Carr, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Maritime
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Room W23–453,
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202–
366–9309, Email Bianca.carr@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As
described by the applicant the intended
service of the vessel HEAD PELICAN is:
Intended Commercial Use of Vessel:
Private Vessel Charters, Passengers
Only. Cruises and corporate executive
sightseeing tours.
Geographic Region: California,
Oregon and Washington. LIMITED
charters in Alaska, EXCLUDING waters
in Southeastern Alaska and waters north
of a line between Gore Point to Cape
Suckling—including the North Gulf
Coast and Prince William Sound).
The complete application is given in
DOT docket MARAD–2016–0061 at
http://www.regulations.gov. Interested
parties may comment on the effect this
action may have on U.S. vessel builders
or businesses in the U.S. that use U.S.-
flag vessels. If MARAD determines, in
accordance with 46 U.S.C. 12121 and
MARAD’s regulations at 46 CFR part
388, that the issuance of the waiver will
have an unduly adverse effect on a U.S.-
vessel builder or a business that uses
U.S.-flag vessels in that business, a
waiver will not be granted. Comments
should refer to the docket number of
this notice and the vessel name in order
for MARAD to properly consider the
comments. Comments should also state
the commenter’s interest in the waiver
application, and address the waiver
criteria given in § 388.4 of MARAD’s
regulations at 46 CFR part 388.
Privacy Act
Anyone is able to search the
electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the
comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume
65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78).
By Order of the Maritime Administrator.
Dated: June 14, 2016.
T. Mitchell Hudson, Jr.,
Secretary, Maritime Administration.
[FR Doc. 2016–14663 Filed 6–20–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–81–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2016–0071]
Pipeline Safety: Ineffective Protection,
Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion
Resulting From Insulated Coatings on
Buried Pipelines
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA); DOT.
ACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory
Bulletin.
SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this
advisory bulletin to remind all owners
and operators of hazardous liquid,
carbon dioxide, and gas pipelines, as
defined in 49 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Parts 192 and 195, to
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<<<PAGE 2>>>

consider the overall integrity of the
facilities to ensure the safety of the
public and operating personnel and to
protect the environment. Operators are
reminded to review their pipeline
operations to ensure that pipeline
segments that are both buried and
insulated have effective coating and
corrosion-control systems to protect
against cathodic protection shielding,
conduct in-line inspections for all
threats, and ensure in-line inspection
tool findings are accurate, verified, and
conducted for all pipeline threats.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Operators of pipelines subject to
regulation by PHMSA should contact
Mr. Kenneth Lee at 202–366–2694 or
email to: kenneth.lee@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On May 19, 2015, the Plains Pipeline,
L.P. (Plains), Line 901, a 24-inch
pipeline in Santa Barbara County,
California, ruptured, resulting in the
release of approximately 2,934 barrels of
heavy crude oil. The spill resulted in
substantial damage to natural habitats
and wildlife. This buried pipeline failed
due to extensive external corrosion that
occurred under the insulated coating.
The Line 901 pipeline is coated with
coal tar urethane and covered with foam
insulation which, in turn, is covered by
a tape wrap over the insulation. Shrink
wrap sleeves, which provide a barrier
between the steel pipeline and soil for
corrosion prevention, are present at the
pipeline joints (girth welds) on Line
901. Line 901 carried high-viscosity
crude oil at a temperature of
approximately 135 degrees Fahrenheit
to facilitate transport. Line 901’s pipe
specifications are API 5L, Grade X–65
pipe, 0.344-inch wall thickness, with a
high frequency-electric resistance
welded (HF–ERW) long seam. Line 901
was hydrotested to 1,686 pounds per
square inch gauge (psig) on November
25, 1990, and has a maximum operating
pressure (MOP) of 1,341 psig. Line 901
delivered crude oil into 30-inch Line
903. Line 901 is 10.7 miles in length and
Line 903 is 128 miles in length. Line
903 has similar insulated coating and
shrink wrap sleeves at girth welds.
Under 49 CFR 195.563, cathodic
protection (CP) is required to prevent
external corrosion of buried pipelines.
Historical CP records for Line 901
revealed protection levels that typically
are sufficient to protect non-insulated,
buried, coated steel pipe. As mentioned
previously, however, Line 901 and Line
903 are insulated. An increasing
24-INCH LINE 901—ILI ASSESSMENT RESULTS
frequency and extent of corrosion
anomalies were noted on both Lines 901
and 903 on in-line inspection tool (ILI)
survey results, anomaly excavations,
and repairs. PHMSA inspectors noted
moisture entrained in the insulation at
four excavations performed by Plains on
Line 901 after the May 19, 2015 spill.
Plains conducted ILI surveys on Line
901 to assess the integrity of the
pipeline in accordance with pipeline
safety regulations in 2007, 2012, and
2015. Under § 195.452(j)(3), all
pipelines are required to be surveyed at
intervals commensurate with the
pipeline’s risk of integrity threats, but at
least every five years. Plains changed
Line 901 from a five-year assessment
cycle to a three-year assessment cycle
after the 2012 ILI survey. Preliminary
data from the results of the ILI surveys
are summarized below and show a
growing number of corrosion anomalies
on Line 901. Discrepancies between the
ILI data generated during the 2007 and
2012 surveys of Line 901 and the ‘‘as
found’’ anomaly sizes discovered in
correlation digs after those prior surveys
had not been shared with the ILI vendor
to reanalyze the data. The frequency and
magnitude of the anomalies below are
derived from the reported ILI vendor
analysis.
Metal loss June 19, 2007 July 3, 2012 May 6, 2015 *
Greater than 80% ........................................................................................................................ 60 to 79% .................................................................................................................................... 40 to 59% .................................................................................................................................... 12 0 0 2
2 5 54 12
80
* Results not received until after spill.
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 119 / Tuesday, June 21, 2016 / Notices
40399
The most recent ILI survey for Line
901 was completed on May 6, 2015. At
the time of the spill, the preliminary
vendor report had not been received. As
a result, no correlation digs for this ILI
survey had been attempted.
The May 6, 2015, ILI survey data and
subsequent analysis by the ILI vendor
predicted external corrosion at the
failure site with an area of 5.38 inches
by 5.45 inches, and a maximum depth
of 47% of the original pipe wall
thickness. After the failure, the
metallurgical investigators physically
measured external corrosion at the
failure site to have a maximum depth of
89%. The dimensions of the corrosion
feature were 12.1 inches axially by 7.4
inches in circumference. The maximum
depth, as measured using laser scan
data, was 0.318 inches or 89% of the
measured pipe wall thickness (0.359
inches). Discrepancies between the
historic ILI data and the ‘‘as found’’
anomaly size had not been shared with
the ILI vendor to reanalyze the data.
PHMSA determined that the
proximate or direct cause of the release
was progressive external corrosion of
the insulated, buried steel pipeline. The
corrosion occurred under the pipeline’s
coating system, which consisted of a
urethane coal tar coating applied
directly to the bare steel pipe, covered
by foam thermal insulation with an
overlying tape wrap. Water was noted in
the foam insulation at a number of digs,
indicating that the integrity of the
coating system had been compromised.
The external corrosion was facilitated
by the environment’s wet/dry cycling,
as determined by the PHMSA-approved,
third-party metallurgical laboratory. The
release was a single event caused at an
area where external corrosion had
thinned the pipeline wall thickness.
There is no evidence that the pipeline
leaked before the rupture. There was a
telltale ‘‘fish mouth’’ (a split due to
over-pressurization) at the release site
indicating the line failed in a single
event.
PHMSA’s Failure Investigation Report
indicated that the proximate or direct
cause of the Line 901 failure was
external corrosion that thinned the pipe
wall to a level where it ruptured
suddenly and released heavy crude oil.
PHMSA’s Failure Investigation Report
of the Plains Line 901 incident can be
reviewed at:.http://phmsa.dot.gov/
staticfiles//PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/
Files/PHMSA
Failure
_
_Investigation_
Report_
Plains
_Pipeline_
LP
Line
901
_
_
_
Public.pdf. PHMSA’s investigation
identified numerous contributory causes
of the rupture, including:
(1) Ineffective protection against
external corrosion of the pipeline:
• The condition of the pipeline’s
coating and insulation system fostered
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<<<PAGE 3>>>

asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
40400 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 119 / Tuesday, June 21, 2016 / Notices
an environment that led to external
corrosion; and
• The pipeline’s CP system was not
effective in preventing corrosion from
occurring beneath the pipeline’s
coating/insulation system.
(2) Failure to detect and mitigate the
corrosion:
• The ILI and subsequent analysis of
ILI data did not characterize the extent
and depth of the external corrosion
accurately.
Corrosion under insulation (CUI) is
recognized as an integrity threat
difficult to address through
conventional cathodic protection
systems and can lead to accelerated
wall-loss corrosion and stress corrosion
cracking of the pipe steel. A NACE
International (NACE) technical
committee report titled ‘‘Effectiveness of
Cathodic Protection on Thermally
Insulated Underground Metallic
Structures’’ dated September 2006
(NACE International Publication
10A392, 2006 Edition), was prepared as
a guide for external corrosion control of
thermally-insulated underground
metallic surfaces and considerations of
the effectiveness of CP. A summary of
the NACE report’s conclusions are as
follows:
(1) ‘‘Generally, the application of
external CP to thermally insulated
metallic surfaces has been ineffective.
(2) The principal or primary means of
corrosion control of thermally-insulated
metallic surfaces is the application of an
effective coating on the metallic surface.
(3) Care is typically taken in the
application of the external jacket and
during pipe installation to minimize
water ingress, which causes corrosion at
imperfections in the primary coating.
(4) When practical, the thermally
insulated metallic surfaces need to be
inspected at routine time intervals for
metal loss (e.g., an internal pipeline
inspection tool could be used).’’
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2016–04)
To: Owners and Operators of
Hazardous Liquid, Carbon Dioxide and
Gas Pipelines.
Subject: Ineffective Protection,
Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion
Resulting from Insulated Coatings on
Buried Pipelines.
Advisory: Operators of hazardous
liquid, carbon dioxide and gas
pipelines, as defined in 49 CFR parts
192 and 195, should review their
operating, maintenance, and integrity
management activities to ensure that
their insulated and buried pipelines
have effective cathodic protection
systems, including coating systems to
protect against cathodic protection
shielding and moisture under the
coatings with higher operating
temperatures, and in-line inspection
tool findings are accurate, verified, and
the in-line tools are appropriate for the
pipeline threat. This bulletin is
intended to inform operators about
PHMSA’ failure investigation of the
Plains Pipeline May 19, 2015, accident
in Santa Barbara, California and to urge
operators to take all necessary actions,
including, but not limited to, those set
forth in this bulletin, to prevent and
mitigate the breach of integrity, leaks,
and/or failures of their pipeline
facilities and to ensure the safety of the
public and operating personnel and to
protect the environment.
Operators must have and implement
procedures to operate, maintain, assess,
and repair their pipelines. These
procedures for insulated and buried
pipelines should take into
consideration:
(1) The need for coatings and cathodic
protection systems to be designed,
installed, and maintained so as not to
foster an environment of shielding and
moisture that can lead to excessive
external corrosion growth rates and pipe
steel cracking such as stress corrosion
cracking.
(2) Coatings for buried, insulated
pipelines that may result in cathodic
protection ‘‘shielding’’ yet still comply
with 49 CFR part 192, subpart I or 49
CFR part 195, subpart H. Inadequate
corrosion prevention may be addressed
through any one or more methods, or a
combination of methods, including, but
not limited to, the following:
• Replacing insulated and buried
pipelines with compromised coating
systems or inadequate cathodic
protections systems;
• Repairing or re-coating
compromised portions of the coating on
insulated and buried pipelines to ensure
adequate corrosion control; or
• Taking other special precautions if
an operator suspects that adequate
cathodic protection cannot be provided
due to shielding resulting from
insulated coatings that have become
disbonded. Such precautions may
include:
Æ More frequent reassessments;
Æ Usage of the appropriate
assessment tools for all threats
including stress corrosion cracking;
Æ Coordination of data from the
appropriate ILI technologies;
Æ More stringent repair criteria
targeted at CUI or corrosion under
disbonded coatings for insulated and
buried pipelines;
Æ Usage of a leak detection system
with instrumentation and associated
calculations to monitor line pack (the
total volume of liquid present in a
pipeline section) along all portions of
the pipeline when it is operating or shut
down; and
Æ Valve spacing to limit any possible
spill volumes with remotely operated
valves and pressure monitoring at the
valves.
(3) Advanced ILI data analysis
techniques to account for the potential
growth of CUI, including interaction
criteria for anomaly assessment.
(4) ILI data, subsequent analysis of the
data, and pipeline excavations that:
• Confirm the accuracy of the ILI data
to characterize the extent and depth of
the external corrosion and ILI tolerances
and unity charts;
• Follow the ILI guidelines of API
Standard 1163, ‘‘In-Line Inspection
Systems Qualification Standard’’ 2nd
edition, April 2013, (API Std. 1163) for
ILI assessments;
• Use additional or more frequent
reassessment intervals and
confirmations when the insulated and
buried pipeline external coating, shields
the pipeline from CP, retains moisture
on insulated coating systems, and
operates at higher operating
temperatures; and
• Assess and mitigate operational and
environmental conditions in shielded
and insulated coatings that lead to
excessive corrosion growth rates, pipe
steel cracking, and all other threats.
In addition to the above, an operator’s
operating and maintenance processes
and procedures should be reviewed and
updated at least annually, unless
operational inspections for integrity
warrant shorter review periods.
Issued in Washington, DC, on June 15,
2016, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety.
[FR Doc. 2016–14651 Filed 6–20–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–W
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS
Health Services Research and
Development Service, Scientific Merit
Review Board; Notice of Meetings
The Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) gives notice under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App.
2, that the Health Services Research and
Development Service Scientific Merit
Review Board will conduct in-person
and teleconference meetings of its seven
Health Services Research (HSR)
subcommittees on the dates below from
8:00 a.m. to approximately 5:00 p.m.
(unless otherwise listed) at the Hilton
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- **body characters:** 21512