{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA Guidance, Pipeline Safety: Lessons Learned From the Release at Marshall, Michigan","title":"Pipeline Safety: Lessons Learned From the Release at Marshall, Michigan","source_type":"guidance","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2014-05-06","effective_on":"2014-05-06","summary":"Pipeline Safety: Lessons Learned From the Release at Marshall, Michigan Document 2014-10248.pdf (204.62 KB) PHMSA is issuing an advisory bulletin to inform all pipeline owners and operators of the deficiencies identified in Enbridge’s integrity management (IM) program that contributed to the release of hazardous liquid near Marshall, Michigan, on July 25, 2010. Pipeline owners and operators are encouraged to review t","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-lessons-learned-release-marshall-michigan-d5365a13.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-lessons-learned-release-marshall-michigan-d5365a13.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-lessons-learned-release-marshall-michigan-d5365a13","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/pipeline-safety-lessons-learned-release-marshall-michigan","body":"Pipeline Safety: Lessons Learned From the Release at Marshall, Michigan\n\nDocument\n\n 2014-10248.pdf (204.62 KB)\n\n        PHMSA is issuing an advisory bulletin to inform all pipeline owners and operators of the deficiencies identified in Enbridge’s integrity management (IM) program that contributed to the release of hazardous liquid near Marshall, Michigan, on July 25, 2010. Pipeline owners and operators are encouraged to review their own IM programs for similar deficiencies and to take corrective action. Operators should also consider training their control room staff as teams to recognize and respond to emergencies or unexpected conditions. Further, the advisory encourages operators to evaluate their leak detection capabilities to ensure adequate leak detection coverage during transient operations and assess the performance of their leak detection systems following a product release to identify and implement improvements as appropriate. Additionally, operators are encouraged to review the effectiveness of their public awareness programs and whether local emergency response teams are adequately prepared to identify and respond to early indications of ruptures. Finally, this advisory reminds all pipeline owners and operators to review National Transportation Safety Board recommendations following accident investigations. Owners and operators should evaluate and implement recommendations that are applicable to their programs.\n\n          Issued Date: Tuesday, May 6, 2014\n\n<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\n25990 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 87 / Tuesday, May 6, 2014 / Notices\nKey to ‘‘Reason for Delay’’\n1. Awaiting additional information from\napplicant\n2. Extensive public comment under\nreview\n3. Application is technically complex\nand is of significant impact or\nprecedent-setting and requires\nextensive analysis\n4. Staff review delayed by other priority\nissues or volume of special permit\napplications\nMeaning of Application Number\nSuffixes\nN—New application\nM—Modification request\nR—Renewal Request\nP—Party To Exemption Request\nIssued in Washington, DC, on April 23,\n2014.\nDonald Burger,\nChief, General Approvals and Permits.\nApplication No. Applicant Reason for\ndelay\nEstimated date\nof completion\nMODFICATION TO SPECIAL PERMITS\n15577–M ........... 15642–M ........... 12184–M ........... 11373–M ........... 14313–M ........... 9610–M ............. 15448–M ........... 15854–M ........... Olin Corporation, Oxford, MS ................................................................................................... Praxair Distribution, Inc., Danbury, CT ..................................................................................... Weldship Corporation, Bethlehem, PA ..................................................................................... Marlin Company, Inc., Lenoir, NC ............................................................................................ Airgas USA, LLC., Tulsa, OK ................................................................................................... ATK Small Caliber Systems, Independece, MO ...................................................................... U.S. Department of Defense, Scott AFB, IL ............................................................................ Colmac Coil Manufacturing, Inc., Colville, WA ......................................................................... 4 05–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 06–30–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 06–30–2014\n4 05–31–2014\nNEW SPECIAL PERMIT APPLICATIONS\n15767–N ........... 15863–N ........... 15882–N ........... 15973–N ........... 15955–N ........... 15962–N ........... 15997–N ........... 15991–N ........... 16011–N ........... 16021–N ........... 15998–N ........... 15999–N ........... 16001–N ........... 16120–N ........... Union Pacific Railroad Company, Omaha, NE ........................................................................ Baker Hughes, Oilfield Operations Inc., Houston, TX .............................................................. Ryan Air, Anchorage, AK ......................................................................................................... Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., Raynharn, MA ................................................................................. Thompson Tank, Inc., Lakewood, CA ...................................................................................... U.S. Department of Defense, (DOD) Scott AFB, IL ................................................................. Chemring Energetic Devices, Inc., Torrance, CA .................................................................... Dockweiler, Neustadt-Glewe, Germany ................................................................................... Americase, Waxahache, TX ..................................................................................................... U.S. Department of Defense, (DOD), Scott AFB, IL ................................................................ U.S. Department of Defense, (DOD), Scott AFB, IL ................................................................ National Aeronautics and Space Administration, (NASA), Washington, DC ........................... VELTEK, Malvern, PA .............................................................................................................. Pacific Helicopter Tours, Inc. .................................................................................................... 1 05–31–2014\n3 05–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 07–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 07–31–2014\n4 07–31–2014\n4 06–30–2014\n4 07–31–2014\n4 07–31–2014\n4 07–31–2014\n4 07–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\nRENEWAL SPECIAL PERMITS APPLICATIONS\n14267–R ........... 8971–R ............. 11602–R ........... 9874–R ............. 11373–R ........... LATA Environmental Services, of Kentucky, LLC, (LATA Kentucky), Kevil, KY ..................... Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations Inc., Houston, TX ............................................................... East Tennessee Iron & Metal, Inc., Rogersville, TN ................................................................ The Dow Chemical Company, Philadelphia, PA ...................................................................... Chem-Way Corporation, Columbia, SC ................................................................................... 3 05–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n4 05–31–2014\n[FR Doc. 2014–10069 Filed 5–5–14; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–60–M\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n[Docket No. PHMSA–2014–0020]\nPipeline Safety: Lessons Learned\nFrom the Release at Marshall,\nMichigan\nAGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA); DOT.\nACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory\nbulletin.\nsroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES\nSUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing an advisory\nbulletin to inform all pipeline owners\nand operators of the deficiencies\nidentified in Enbridge’s integrity\nmanagement (IM) program that\ncontributed to the release of hazardous\nliquid near Marshall, Michigan, on July\n25, 2010. Pipeline owners and operators\nare encouraged to review their own IM\nprograms for similar deficiencies and to\ntake corrective action. Operators should\nalso consider training their control room\nstaff as teams to recognize and respond\nto emergencies or unexpected\nconditions. Further, the advisory\nencourages operators to evaluate their\nleak detection capabilities to ensure\nadequate leak detection coverage during\ntransient operations and assess the\nperformance of their leak detection\nsystems following a product release to\nidentify and implement improvements\nas appropriate. Additionally, operators\nare encouraged to review the\neffectiveness of their public awareness\nprograms and whether local emergency\nresponse teams are adequately prepared\nto identify and respond to early\nindications of ruptures. Finally, this\nadvisory reminds all pipeline owners\nand operators to review National\nTransportation Safety Board\nrecommendations following accident\ninvestigations. Owners and operators\nshould evaluate and implement\nrecommendations that are applicable to\ntheir programs.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:\nLinda Daugherty by phone at 816–329–\n3821 or by email at linda.daugherty@\ndot.gov. Information about PHMSA may\nbe found at http://phmsa.dot.gov.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:\nI. Background\nOn July 25, 2010, at 5:58 p.m. eastern\ndaylight time, a segment of a 30-inch-\nVerDate Mar<15>2010 17:34 May 05, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00177 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\06MYN1.SGM 06MYN1\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nsroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES\nFederal Register / Vol. 79, No. 87 / Tuesday, May 6, 2014 / Notices\n25991\ndiameter pipeline (Line 6B), owned and\noperated by Enbridge Incorporated\n(Enbridge), ruptured in a wetland near\nMarshall, Michigan. The rupture was\nnot discovered or addressed for over 17\nhours. During that time period, Enbridge\ntwice pumped additional oil (81 percent\nof the total release) into Line 6B during\ntwo startups. The total release was\nestimated to be 843,444 gallons of crude\noil. The oil saturated the surrounding\nwetlands and flowed into Talmadge\nCreek and the Kalamazoo River. Local\nresidents self-evacuated from their\nhomes, and serious environmental\ndamage required long-term remediation.\nAbout 320 people reported symptoms\nconsistent with crude oil exposure. No\nfatalities were reported. Cleanup and\nremediation continues, and costs have\nexceeded $1 billion.\nThe National Transportation Safety\nBoard (NTSB) determined that the\nprobable cause of the pipeline rupture\nwas stress corrosion cracking that grew\nand coalesced from crack and corrosion\ndefects under disbonded polyethylene\ntape coating. The NTSB also determined\nthe rupture and prolonged release were\ncaused by pervasive organizational\nfailures at Enbridge that included: (1)\nDeficient integrity management (IM)\nprocedures, which allowed well-\ndocumented crack defects in corroded\nareas to propagate until the pipeline\nfailed; (2) inadequate training of control\ncenter personnel, which resulted in\nEnbridge’s failure to recognize the\nrupture for 17 hours and through two re-\nstarts of the pipeline; and (3)\ninsufficient public awareness and\neducation, which allowed the release to\ncontinue for nearly 14 hours after the\nfirst notification of an odor to local\nemergency response agencies.\nPHMSA IM Regulations\nSubpart O of 49 CFR part 192 and\n§ 195.452, also known as the IM\nregulations, require operators of gas\ntransmission and hazardous liquid\npipelines to institute a continual\nprocess for evaluation of pipeline\nintegrity (see also: Guidance in\nAdvisory Bulletin ADB–2012–10,\n‘‘Using Meaningful Metrics in\nConducting Integrity Management\nProgram Evaluations,’’ 77 FR 72435,\nDecember 5, 2012). Specifically,\n§§ 192.937 and 195.453(j) require that\nan operator have a continual process for\nthe evaluation of pipeline integrity. The\nevaluation must consider the results of\nintegrity assessments, data collection\nand integration, remediation, and\npreventative and mitigative actions in\nevaluating pipeline integrity. The\noperator must use the results from this\nevaluation to identify the threats\nspecific to each pipeline segment that\ncould impact a High Consequence Area\n(HCA) and the risk represented by those\nthreats. The operator must perform\nassessments that are specific to those\nthreats and then identify and implement\nappropriate remedial, preventative and\nmitigative measures. Sections 192.945\nand 195.452(k) require that an operator\nhave methods to measure the\neffectiveness of their integrity\nmanagement programs.\nAn operator’s IM program must\ninclude the results of past and present\nintegrity assessments, risk assessment\ninformation and data integrated from\nthroughout the pipeline system. This\ninformation and its analysis must be\ntaken into account when making\ndecisions about remediation, preventive\nand mitigative actions.\nThe ability to integrate and analyze\nthreat and integrity related data from\nmany sources is essential for sustaining\nand continually improving safety\nperformance and a proactive IM\nprogram. Operators must use the results\nfrom this integrated evaluation to\nidentify the threats specific to each\npipeline segment that could impact a\nHCA. The operator must then perform\nassessments that are specific to the\nidentified threats and implement\nremedial, preventive and mitigative\nmeasures, as appropriate.\nThe IM regulations supplement\nPHMSA’s prescriptive safety regulations\nwith requirements that are more\nperformance-based and process-\noriented. One of the fundamental tenets\nof the IM program is that each\nindividual pipeline has a unique risk\nprofile that is dependent on factors\nincluding the pipeline’s physical\nattributes, its geographical location, its\ndesign, its operating environment and\nthe commodity it transports. Pipeline\noperators use this risk profile to identify\nappropriate assessment tools, set the\nschedule for performing integrity\nassessments and identify the need for\nadditional preventive and mitigative\nmeasures such as lowering operating\npressures, installing automatic or\nremote control shut-off valves and\ninstalling additional right-of-way\nmarkers, among other safety measures. If\nthis risk profile information is\nunknown, unknowable, or uncertain,\nthe pipeline should be operated more\nconservatively.\nDeficiencies Found in Enbridge’s IM\nProgram\nThe following facts illustrate the ways\nin which Enbridge failed to institute and\nmaintain an adequate IM program:\nIn 2007, Enbridge experienced a\nrelease on its Line 3 in Glenavon,\nSaskatchewan. Following the\nTransportation Safety Board of Canada’s\ninvestigation and issuance of a report,\nEnbridge changed its assessment\nprocess to account for tool tolerances\nwhen performing engineering\nassessments. However, Enbridge did not\nretroactively apply these changes to the\n2005 in-line inspection (ILI) data\nassessments performed on the line that\nruptured near Marshall, Michigan. In its\ninvestigation of this incident, the NTSB\nfound that Enbridge’s IM program did\nnot incorporate a process of continuous\nreassessment to all pipeline engineering\nassessments, and it neglected to apply\nthe revised crack assessment methods to\nLine 6B. The NTSB also found a lack of\ndata integration was a significant\ncontributor to the consequences of the\nMarshall, Michigan incident.\nThe NTSB further concluded:\n• Enbridge’s response to past IM-\nrelated accidents focused only on the\nproximate cause, without a systematic\nexamination of company actions,\npolicies and procedures.\n• Enbridge’s IM program consistently\nchose a less-than-conservative approach\nto pipeline safety margins for crack\nfeatures.\n• In preparing the risk analysis,\nEnbridge failed to consider all relevant\nrisk factors associated with the\ndetermination of the amount of product\nthat could be released from a rupture on\nLine 6B.\n• The results of multiple ILI\nassessments on Line 6B were evaluated\nindependently and the information from\nthese assessments was not properly\nintegrated to assure pipeline integrity.\n• Enbridge used a lower safety margin\nwhen evaluating crack defects versus\ncorrosion defects. Enbridge’s criterion\nfor excavating and remediating a crack\ndefect was when the predicted failure\npressure was less than the hydrostatic\ntest pressure (1.25 times maximum\noperating pressure). Enbridge’s criterion\nfor excavating and remediating a\ncorrosion defect was when the predicted\nfailure pressure was less than the\nspecified minimum yield strength (1.39\ntimes maximum operating pressure).\n• Enbridge used the maximum depth\nreported in a 2005 UltraScan Crack\nDetection (USCD) ILI tool run without\naccounting for tool accuracy or\nperformance specifications. Further,\nEnbridge did not compare the 2005\nUSCD-reported wall thickness to a 2004\nUltraScan Wall Measurement tool run\nthat measured local wall thicknesses.\nEnbridge used the thicker, incorrect\nmeasurement in determining the\npredicted failure pressure and crack\ngrowth calculations.\nVerDate Mar<15>2010 17:34 May 05, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00178 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\06MYN1.SGM 06MYN1\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nsroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES\n25992 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 87 / Tuesday, May 6, 2014 / Notices\n• Enbridge did not account for the\ninteraction between corrosion and\ncracking. Assessments for corrosion in\n2004 and for cracks in 2005 showed\nareas of overlap. Using the crack depth\nmeasurements alone likely resulted in\nan underestimation of the total wall\nloss.\n• The ILI vendor’s junior analyst\nclassified certain features from the 2005\nUSCD ILI tool run as ‘‘crack-field’’\nfeatures, but the ILI vendor supervisor\nre-classified them as ‘‘crack-like’’\nfeatures in the report to Enbridge.\nEnbridge policies allowed longer\n‘‘crack-like’’ features to persist without\nfurther evaluation than ‘‘crack-field’’\nfeatures. The post-accident investigation\ndetermined that the features were in fact\n‘‘crack-field’’ features. Although the\nexcavation threshold for ‘‘crack-field’’\nfeatures was 2.5 inches, the\nmisclassified features measured 3.5\ninches and were not examined further.\n• The Enbridge crack management\ngroup used a fatigue-crack growth\nmodel to predict the remaining life of\nthe pipeline. In 2011, an independent\nconsultant determined that the\n‘‘environmentally assisted cracking\nmechanism that is most prevalent along\nEnbridge’s liquid pipeline system is\neither near-neutral pH SCC (stress\ncorrosion cracking) or corrosion\nfatigue.’’ The growth rates of\nenvironmentally assisted cracks can be\nexponentially greater than nominal\nfatigue-crack growth rates.\nPHMSA Control Center Operations and\nTraining Regulations\nSections 192.631 and 195.446 contain\nthe requirements for gas transmission\nand hazardous liquid control room\nmanagement, respectively, which\nestablish roles and responsibilities, tools\nand procedures that allow operators to\nperform their duties, alarm management\nand training. The requirements address\nmany of the deficiencies NTSB noted\nthat led to the prolonged release of\ncrude oil in Marshall, Michigan (see\nalso: Guidance in Advisory Bulletins\nADB–2005–06; ‘‘Countermeasures to\nPrevent Human Fatigue in the Control\nRoom;’’ 70 FR 46917; August 11, 2005,\nand ADB–2010–01; ‘‘Leak Detection on\nHazardous Liquid Pipelines;’’ 75 FR\n4134; January 26, 2010).\nDeficiencies Found in Enbridge’s\nControl Center Operations and Training\nWith respect to Enbridge’s control\ncenter operations and training, the\nNTSB concluded:\n• Due to the rapid growth of\nEnbridge’s pipeline system, Enbridge\nhired additional control center staff\nwithout objectively assessing whether\nthat growth in personnel would affect\nsafe operations.\n• The leak detection process was\nprone to misinterpretation, and control\ncenter analysts and operators were not\nadequately trained in how to recognize\nor address leaks, especially during\nstartup and shutdown. Therefore, low-\npressure alarms, material balance\nsystem alarms and sudden and complete\nloss of pump station discharge pressure\nwere mistakenly attributed to column\nseparation rather than a pipeline\nrupture. Furthermore, the control center\nignored warnings from field and\noperations personnel that there was a\npossible leak. In post-accident\ninterviews, control center personnel\nattributed its disinclination to believe a\nrupture had occurred to the absence of\nexternal leak detection notifications,\ndespite known limitations of the leak\ndetection system.\n• Control room personnel did not\nfollow the established procedure to shut\nthe pipeline down if column separation\ncouldn’t be resolved within 10 minutes.\n• Enbridge failed to train the control\ncenter staff in team performance, which\nresulted in poor communication and\nlack of leadership.\nPHMSA’s Public Awareness/Public\nEducation Regulations\nSections 192.616 and 195.440 contain\nthe requirements for gas transmission\nand hazardous liquid operators’ public\nawareness programs (PAP), respectively.\nThese regulations incorporate the\nAmerican Petroleum Institute’s (API)\nRecommended Practice (RP) 1162,\n‘‘Public Awareness Programs for\nPipeline Operators,’’ and require that\noperators notify affected municipalities,\nschool districts, businesses and\nresidents of the location of pipelines\nand pipeline facilities (see also:\nguidance in ADB–2010–08; ‘‘Emergency\nPreparedness Communications;’’ 75 FR\n67807; November 3, 2010, and ADB–\n2012–09; ‘‘Communication During\nEmergency Situations;’’ 77 FR 61826;\nOctober 11, 2012). Section 8 of API RP\n1162 contains guidance for\ncommunicating with emergency\nresponders, periodic evaluation of an\noperator’s PAP, and measuring the\neffectiveness of an operator’s PAP (see\nalso: guidance in ADB–2003–04;\n‘‘Pipeline Industry Implementation of\nEffective Public Awareness Programs;’’\n68 FR 52816; September 5, 2003, and\nADB–2003–08; ‘‘Self-Assessment of\nPipeline Operator Public Education\nPrograms;’’ 68 FR 66155; November 25,\n2003).\nVerDate Mar<15>2010 17:34 May 05, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00179 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\06MYN1.SGM 06MYN1\nDeficiencies Found in Enbridge’s Public\nAwareness/Public Education Program\nThe NTSB identified several\ndeficiencies in Enbridge’s PAP,\nincluding:\n• Enbridge’s PAP failed to effectively\ninform the affected public, including\ncitizens and emergency response\nagencies about the location of the\npipeline, how to identify a pipeline\nrelease and how to report suspected\nproduct releases.\n• Enbridge’s review of its public\nawareness program was ineffective in\nidentifying and correcting deficiencies.\n• An effective public awareness\nprogram would have better prepared\nlocal emergency response agencies to\nidentify and respond to early\nindications of a rupture, which, once\ncommunicated to Enbridge, would have\nprevented the restart of the line.\nII. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2014–02)\nTo: Owners and Operators of Natural\nGas and Hazardous Liquid Pipeline\nSystems.\nSubject: Integrity Management\nLessons Learned from the Marshall,\nMichigan, Release.\nAdvisory: To strengthen the\nDepartment’s safety efforts, PHMSA is\nissuing this advisory bulletin to notify\npipeline owners and operators they\nshould evaluate their safety programs\nand implement any changes to eliminate\ndeficiencies similar to the ones the\nNational Transportation Safety Board\n(NTSB) found when it investigated\nEnbridge’s July 25, 2010, crude oil\nrelease in Marshall, Michigan.\nSpecifically, the NTSB investigation\ninto the circumstances leading up to\nand following the release identified\nspecific deficiencies in three Enbridge\nprograms: integrity management (IM),\ncontrol center operations and public\nawareness. Had existing regulations,\nguidance, advisories and\nrecommendations regarding these\nprograms been properly acted upon, the\nconsequences of that incident could\nhave been prevented, or at the very\nleast, mitigated.\nIntegrity Management\nA fundamental tenet of the IM\nprogram is that pipeline operators must\nbe aware of the physical attributes of\ntheir pipelines, the threats and risks\nposed by and to their pipelines, and the\nenvironments which their pipelines\ntransverse. Operator IM programs\nshould reflect the recognition that each\npipeline is unique and has its own\nspecific risk profile that is dependent\nupon the pipeline’s attributes,\ngeographical location, design, operating\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nsroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES\nFederal Register / Vol. 79, No. 87 / Tuesday, May 6, 2014 / Notices\n25993\nenvironment, and commodity it\ntransports, among other factors. It is\nvital for operators to compile and\nintegrate this information into their IM\nprograms to effectively identify and\nevaluate risk. If this information is\nunknown, unknowable or uncertain,\noperators need to take a more\nconservative approach to operations.\nAs part of a robust IM program, an\noperator will match and use the right\ntools for the threats being investigated,\nset the proper schedule for pipeline\nsegment integrity assessments and\nidentify the need for additional\npreventative and mitigative measures\nthat protect pipeline integrity, including\nlower operating pressures, automatic\nshutoff or remotely controlled valves\nand additional right-of-way markers.\nHowever, an operator’s IM program\nmust go beyond simply assessing\npipeline segments and repairing\ndefects—in fact, American Petroleum\nInstitute (API) Standard 1160,\n‘‘Managing System Integrity for\nHazardous Liquid Pipelines,’’ defines\npipeline risk assessment as a continuous\nprocess and defines risk analysis as a\ncontinuous reassessment process.\nContinual improvement of IM programs\n(including improvements in the\nanalytical processes involved in\nanalyzing assessment results,\nidentifying threats, responding to risks,\nthe application and implementation of\nassessments and the development of\npreventative and mitigative measures) is\na key aspect and critical objective of an\neffective IM program.\nOccasionally, accident investigations\nor other events cause changes in how\noperators analyze assessment data,\nincluding analytical procedures,\nalgorithms, software, acceptance criteria\nor how anomalies are classified. For\ninstance, a change in how an anomaly\nis classified could impact remediation\ntime frames, assessment intervals,\ndecisions regarding preventative and\nmitigative measures and the overall\nperception of the integrity of the\npipeline. The NTSB noted that Enbridge\naccounted for changed tool tolerances\nwhen re-analyzing its Line 3 data after\nan incident, but this change in tool\ntolerances was not applied to the\nassessments performed on Line 6B.\nOperators should evaluate any changes\nin how assessment data is analyzed to\ndetermine if those changes will alter the\nresults of any previously performed\nintegrity assessments. If so, operators\nshould apply those changes to any\npreviously performed integrity\nassessments as appropriate.\nTo assist in evaluating possible\nassessment data analysis changes,\noperators should ensure that in-line\ninspection (ILI) vendors communicate\nany changes in their analytical\nprocesses that might require previous\nassessments to be re-analyzed.\nImprovements to vendor analytical\nprocesses may change anomaly\nclassifications in previous assessments,\nand while vendors typically apply these\nchanges to future assessments, it is rare\nfor vendors to re-analyze previously\nperformed assessments. Re-analyzing\nintegrity assessments when analytical\nchanges occur is critical for ensuring\nsafety based on the best available data\nand expertise.\nThe ability to analyze and integrate\nthreat- and integrity-related data from\nmany sources is essential for operators\nto continually improve and sustain\nsafety performance and proactive IM\nprograms. However, some operators are\nnot sufficiently aware of their pipeline\nattributes, are not adequately or\nconsistently assessing threats and risks\nand are not effectively integrating data\nas a part of their IM programs. A lack\nof data integration was a significant\ncontributor to the incident at Marshall,\nMI.\nWhen performing self-assessments of\nIM programs, operators should compare\ntheir performance measures and\nprogram evaluations against the\nguidance of ADB–2012–10, ‘‘Using\nMeaningful Metrics in Conducting\nIntegrity Management Program\nEvaluations’’ (77 FR 72435, December 5,\n2012).\nControl Center Operations\nSections 192.631 and 195.446 contain\nthe requirements for gas transmission\nand hazardous liquid control room\nmanagement, respectively. These\nrequirements address many of the\ndeficiencies the NTSB noted during\ntheir investigation of the incident at\nMarshall, MI.\nPHMSA advises operators to regularly\ntrain their control room teams and\nconsider establishing a program to train\ncontrol center staff as teams in the\nrecognition of and response to\nemergency and unexpected conditions\nthat include supervisory control and\ndata acquisition indications and leak\ndetection software. Operators should\nperform periodic evaluations of their\nleak detection capabilities to ensure that\nadequate leak detection coverage is\nmaintained during transient operations,\nincluding pipeline shutdown, pipeline\nstartup and column separation. PHMSA\npreviously issued ADB 10–01, ‘‘Leak\nDetection on Hazardous Liquid\nPipelines,’’ (75 FR 4134; January 26,\n2010) to provide guidance on this issue.\nIf an operator suffers an unexplained\nloss of product, the operator should shut\ndown the affected pipeline until the\nproblem is resolved. Operators should\nadditionally assess the performance of\ntheir leak detection system following a\nproduct release and identify and\nimplement improvements as\nappropriate.\nPipeline owners and operators are\nalso reminded to evaluate their control\nroom personnel scheduling policies and\npractices against the guidance of ADB\n05–06, ‘‘Countermeasures to Prevent\nHuman Fatigue in the Control Room’’\n(70 FR 46917; August 11, 2005).\nPublic Awareness Programs\nPHMSA advises operators to analyze\nand evaluate the effectiveness of their\npublic awareness programs and whether\nlocal emergency response agencies are\nprepared to identify and respond to\nearly indications of a rupture. Strong\npublic awareness and education\nprograms can help shorten incident\nresponse times and improve overall\nincident response.\nPipeline owners and operators should\nperform periodic self-assessments of\ntheir public awareness programs against\ntheir written public awareness program\nplans and API Recommended Practice\n1162. PHMSA previously issued\nguidance for these self-assessments\nunder ADB 03–04, ‘‘Pipeline Industry\nImplementation of Effective Public\nAwareness Programs’’ (68 FR 52816;\nSeptember 5, 2003) and ADB 03–08,\n‘‘Self-Assessment of Pipeline Operator\nPublic Education Programs’’ (68 FR\n66155; November 25, 2003). Further,\noperators are encouraged to review their\nprocedures for communicating during\nemergency situations to ensure\ncompliance with the guidance\npreviously issued in ADB 10–08,\n‘‘Emergency Preparedness\nCommunications’’ (75 FR 67807;\nNovember 3, 2010) and ADB 12–09,\n‘‘Communication During Emergency\nSituations’’ (77 FR 61826; October 11,\n2012).\nProactive Self-Assessment\nPHMSA strongly encourages operators\nto review past and future NTSB\nrecommendations that the NTSB\nprovides to pipeline operators following\nincident investigations. Operators\nshould proactively implement\nimprovements to their pipeline safety\nprograms based on these observations\nand recommendations so that the entire\nindustry can benefit from the mistakes\nof one operator.\nAuthority: 49 U.S.C. chapter 601: 49 CFR\n1.53.\nVerDate Mar<15>2010 17:34 May 05, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00180 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\06MYN1.SGM 06MYN1\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nsroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES\n25994 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 87 / Tuesday, May 6, 2014 / Notices\nIssued in Washington, DC on April 30,\n2014.\nJeffrey D. Wiese,\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n[FR Doc. 2014–10248 Filed 5–5–14; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–60–P\nMaterials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), DOT.\nACTION: Notice of actions on Special\nPermit Applications.\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\nSpecial Permit Applications\nAGENCY: Office of Hazardous Materials\nSafety, Pipeline and Hazardous\nSUMMARY: In accordance with the\nprocedures governing the application\nfor, and the processing of, special\npermits from the Department of\nTransportation’s Hazardous Material\nRegulations (49 CFR part 107, Subpart\nB), notice is hereby given of the actions\non special permits applications in\n(March to March 2014). The mode of\ntransportation involved are identified by\na number in the ‘‘Nature of\nApplication’’ portion of the table below\nas follows: 1—Motor vehicle, 2—Rail\nfreight, 3—Cargo vessel, 4—Cargo\naircraft only, 5—Passenger-carrying\naircraft. Application numbers prefixed\nby the letters EE represent applications\nfor Emergency Special Permits. It\nshould be noted that some of the\nsections cited were those in effect at the\ntime certain special permits were\nissued.\nIssued in Washington, DC, on April 23,\n2014.\nDonald Burger,\nChief, Special Permits and Approvals Branch.\nS.P. No. Applicant Regulation(s) Nature of special permit thereof\nMODIFICATION SPECIAL PERMIT GRANTED\n11993–M ...... 10427–M ...... 10232–M ...... 10832–M ...... Key Safety Systems, Lake-\nland, FL.\nAstrotech Space Operations,\nInc., Titusville, FL.\nITW Sexton, Decatur, AL ........ Autoliv ASP, Inc., Ogden, UT 15865–M ...... 14392–M ...... HeliStream Inc., Costa Mesa,\nCA.\nU.S. Department of Defense,\nScott AFB, IL.\n49 CFR 173.301(a)(1), and\n173.302a.\n49 CFR 173.61(a), 173.301(g),\n173.302(a), 173.336, and\n177.848(d).\n49 CFR 173.304(d) and\n173.306(a)(3).\n49 CFR 173.56(b), and\n173.61(a).\n49 CFR 172.101 Column(9B),\n172.301(c), 175.30, 175.33,\nPart 178, and 175.75.\n49 CFR 172.101 Column\n(10B), 176.83(a),(b) and (g),\n176.84(c)(2), 176.136,\n176.144(a), 172.203(a), and\n172.302(c).\nTo modify the special permit to add a Division 2.2 material.\nTo modify the special permit to authorize additional launch\nvehicles and increase the amount of Anhydrous ammonia\nto 120 pounds.\nTo modify the special permit to authorize a Division 2.1 mate-\nrial.\nTo modify the special permit to remove the inner packaging\nrequirements, remove the requirement for trays in outer\npackaging, and update locations where the permit may be\nused.\nTo modify the special permit to authorize Class 1, 2, 4, 8, 9,\nand additional Class 3 materials.\nTo modify the special permit to authorize all Government\nowned Maritime Prepostioning Ships to use alternative\nstowage.\nNEW SPECIAL PERMIT GRANTED\n15853–N ....... Praxair, Inc., Danbury, CT ...... 49 CFR 176.83 ........................ 15954–N ....... 15972–N ....... Rooney Oilfield Services,\nOdessa, TX.\nHeil Trailer International, Co.,\nAthens, TN.\n49 CFR 173.202, 173.203,\n173.241, 173.242 and\n173.243.\n49 CFR 178.345–2, 178.346–\n2, 178.347–2, 178.348–2\nand 178.345–3.\n15980–N ....... 16016–N ....... 16031–N ....... Windward Aviation, Inc.,\nPeunene, HI.\niSi Automotive Austria GmbH,\nVienna.\nAir Rescue Systems , Ash-\nland, OR.\n49 CFR 175.9(a) ..................... 49 CFR 173.301, 173.302a\nand 173.305.\n49 CFR § 172.101 Column\n(9B), § 172.204(c)(3),\n§ 173.27(b)(2),\n§ 175.30(a)(1),§§ 172.200\nand 172.301(c), Part 178\nand § 175.75.\nTo authorize the transportation in commerce of certain DOT\nSpecification or UN certified packaging containing Division\n2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 4.3, 5.1, 6.1, and Class 3 and Class 8 mate-\nrials in a single Container Transport Unit (CTU) consisting\nof multiple compartments in lieu of segregation when trans-\nported by cargo vessel. (mode 3)\nTo authorize the manufacture, mark, and and sale of non-UN\nstandard containers that are manifolded together within a\nframe and securely mounted on a truck chassis for trans-\nportation by motor vehicle. (mode 1)\nTo authorize the manufacture, marking, sale and use of and\nnon-DOT specification cargo tanks meeting all require-\nments for DOT 400 series cargo tanks except for the use\nof UNS S32101 (LDX 2101) as a material of construction\nand the head and shell thicknesses are less than required.\n(mode 1)\nTo authorize the transportation in commerce of aviation tur-\nbine engine fuel by external load. (mode 4)\nTo authorize the manufacture, marking, sale and use of non-\nDOT specification cylinders for use in automobile safety\nsystems. (modes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)\nTo authorize the transportation in commerce of certain haz-\nardous materials by cargo aircraft including by external\nload in remote areas of the US without being subject to\nhazard communication requirements and quantity limita-\ntions where no other means of transportation is available.\n(mode 4)\nVerDate Mar<15>2010 17:34 May 05, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\06MYN1.SGM 06MYN1","truncated":false,"body_characters":35615}