{"operation":"document","citation":"PHMSA Guidance, Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological Hazards","title":"Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological Hazards","source_type":"guidance","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2022-06-02","effective_on":"2022-06-02","summary":"Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological Hazards Document 2022-11791.pdf (223.56 KB) This updated advisory bulletin reminds owners and operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, particularly those with facilities located onshore or in inland waters, about the serious safety-related issues that can result from earth movement and other geological h","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-potential-damage-pipeline-facilities-caused-by-earth-movement-and-other-geological-hazards-a1f9e056.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-potential-damage-pipeline-facilities-caused-by-earth-movement-and-other-geological-hazards-a1f9e056.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-guidance-pipeline-safety-potential-damage-pipeline-facilities-caused-by-earth-movement-and-other-geological-hazards-a1f9e056","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/pipeline-safety-potential-damage-pipeline-facilities-caused-by-earth-movement-and-other-geological-hazards","body":"Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth Movement and Other Geological Hazards\n\nDocument\n\n 2022-11791.pdf (223.56 KB)\n\n        This updated advisory bulletin reminds owners and operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, particularly those with facilities located onshore or in inland waters, about the serious safety-related issues that can result from earth movement and other geological hazards.\n\n          Issued Date: Thursday, June 2, 2022\n\n<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\n33576 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2022 / Notices\nÆ Are FTA’s methods of stakeholder\nengagement sufficient? What other\nmethods should FTA consider?\n6. Workforce\nAutomation will not replace transit\nbus operators in the foreseeable future,\nnonetheless, transit bus automation and\nautomated features will impact the\ntransit workforce, including bus\noperators, maintenance workers, and the\ndomestic supply chain, including bus\nmanufacturers.\nFTA seeks information from\nstakeholders on:\nÆ What activities have agencies\nundertaken to understand and prepare\nfor the impacts of automation on their\nworkforce? Please be specific and\ninclude examples where possible.\nÆ What types of new skills, training,\nand resources may be required for\ntransit workforce development and\ntransition?\nÆ What specific areas of workforce-\nrelated research should FTA consider?\nÆ What types of resources could FTA\nprovide to help agencies and their\nworkers adopt transit bus automation?\nPlease note, this RFI will serve as a\nplanning document. The RFI should not\nbe interpreted as policy, a solicitation\nfor applications, or an obligation on the\npart of the Government.\nNuria I. Fernandez,\nAdministrator.\n[FR Doc. 2022–11782 Filed 6–1–22; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–57–P\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n[Docket No. PHMSA–2022–0063]\nPipeline Safety: Potential for Damage\nto Pipeline Facilities Caused by Earth\nMovement and Other Geological\nHazards\nAGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), DOT.\nACTION: Notice; issuance of updated\nadvisory bulletin.\njspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES1\nSUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this\nupdated advisory bulletin to remind\nowners and operators of gas and\nhazardous liquid pipelines, including\nsupercritical carbon dioxide pipelines,\nof the potential for damage to those\npipeline facilities caused by earth\nmovement in variable, steep, and rugged\nterrain and terrain with varied or\nchanging subsurface geological\nconditions. Additionally, changing\nweather patterns due to climate change,\nincluding increased rainfall and higher\ntemperatures, may impact soil stability\nin areas that have historically been\nstable. These phenomena can pose a\nthreat to the integrity of pipeline\nfacilities if those threats are not\nidentified and mitigated. Owners and\noperators should consider monitoring\ngeological and environmental\nconditions, including changing weather\npatterns, in proximity to their facilities.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:\nMary McDaniel at 202–366–4595 or\nMary.McDaniel@dot.gov.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:\nI. Background\nThe purpose of this updated advisory\nbulletin is to remind owners and\noperators of gas and hazardous liquid\npipelines, particularly those with\nfacilities located onshore or in inland\nwaters, about the serious safety-related\nissues that can result from earth\nmovement and other geological hazards.\nAdditionally, changing weather patterns\ndue to climate change may result in\nheavier than normal rainfall and\nincreased temperatures causing soil\nsaturation and flooding or soil erosion.\nEither phenomenon may adversely\nimpact the stability of soil surrounding\nor supporting nearby pipeline facilities.\nThe United States Geological Survey\n(USGS) is a resource for pipeline owners\nand operators in evaluating earth\nmovement vulnerabilities of pipeline\nfacilities.\nGas and hazardous liquid pipelines\nare required to be designed to withstand\nexternal loads including those that may\nbe imposed by geological forces.\nSpecifically, gas pipelines must be\ndesigned in accordance with 49 CFR\n192.103 and hazardous liquid pipelines\nmust be designed in accordance with 49\nCFR 195.110. To comply with these\nregulations, the design of new pipelines,\nincluding repairs or replacement, must\nconsider the load that may be imposed\nby geological forces.\nOnce operational, § 192.317(a) states\nthat for gas transmission and part 192-\nregulated gathering pipelines ‘‘[t]he\noperator must take all practicable steps\nto protect each transmission line or\nmain from washouts, floods, unstable\nsoil, landslides, or other hazards that\nmay cause the pipeline to move or to\nsustain abnormal loads. In addition, the\noperator must take all practicable steps\nto protect offshore pipelines from\ndamage by mudslides, water currents,\nhurricanes, ship anchors, and fishing\noperations.’’ This advisory bulletin\naddresses those protective requirements\nassociated with damage caused by\ngeological factors.\nIn addition, § 192.705 requires\noperators of gas transmission lines, and\napplicable gas gathering lines, to have a\npatrol program to observe surface\nconditions on and adjacent to the\npipeline right-of-way for indications of\nleaks, construction activity, and other\nfactors affecting safety and operation.\nThe frequency of these patrols must be\nbased upon the size of the line,\noperating pressures, class locations,\nterrain, seasonal weather conditions,\nand other relevant factors. One of the\nprimary reasons for this patrol\nrequirement is to monitor geological\nmovement, both slowly occurring and\nacute changes, which may affect the\ncurrent or future safe operation of the\npipeline.\nFurthermore, for applicable gas\npipelines § 192.613(a) states that ‘‘each\noperator shall have a procedure for\ncontinuing surveillance of its facilities\nto determine and take appropriate\naction concerning changes in class\nlocation, failures, leakage history,\ncorrosion, substantial changes in\ncathodic protection requirements, and\nother unusual operating and\nmaintenance conditions.’’ Section\n192.613(b) further states that ‘‘[i]f a\nsegment of pipeline is determined to be\nin unsatisfactory condition but no\nimmediate hazard exists, the operator\nshall initiate a program to recondition or\nphase out the segment involved, or, if\nthe segment cannot be reconditioned or\nphased out, reduce the maximum\nallowable operating pressure in\naccordance with § 192.619(a) and (b).’’\nFor hazardous liquid pipelines,\n§ 195.401(b)(1) states that ‘‘[w]henever\nan operator discovers any condition that\ncould adversely affect the safe operation\nof its pipeline system, it must correct\nthe condition within a reasonable time.\nHowever, if the condition is of such a\nnature that it presents an immediate\nhazard to persons or property, the\noperator may not operate the affected\npart of the system until it has corrected\nthe unsafe condition.’’ Section\n195.401(b)(2) further states that ‘‘[w]hen\nan operator discovers a condition on a\npipeline covered under [the integrity\nmanagement requirements in] § 195.452,\nthe operator must correct the condition\nas prescribed in § 195.452(h).’’ Land\nmovement, soil instability due to\nsaturation, severe flooding, river scour,\nand river channel migration are the\ntypes of conditions that can adversely\naffect the safe operation of a pipeline\nand require corrective action under\n§§ 192.613(a) and 195.401(b).\nAdditional guidance for identifying risk\nfactors and mitigating natural force\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 20:23 Jun 01, 2022 Jkt 256001 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\02JNN1.SGM 02JNN1\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nhazards on pipeline segments that could\naffect high consequence areas, are\noutlined in Appendix C, section I,\nsubsection B, to part 195.\nPHMSA integrity management\nregulations require operators to take\nadditional preventative and mitigative\nmeasures to prevent, and to mitigate the\nconsequences of, failures on gas\ntransmission lines in high consequence\nareas (§ 192.935) and hazardous liquid\npipelines that are in or which could\naffect a high consequence area\n(§ 195.452(i)). An operator must base the\nadditional measures on the threats the\noperator has identified for each pipeline\nsegment. If an operator determines there\nis a threat to the pipeline, such as\noutside force damage (e.g., earth\nmovement or floods), the operator must\ntake steps to prevent a failure and to\nminimize the consequences of a failure\nunder these regulations.\nPHMSA is aware of recent earth\nmovement and other geological-related\nincidents and accidents and safety-\nrelated conditions throughout the\ncountry. Some of the more notable\nevents, including those discussed in a\nprior advisory bulletin (ADB–2019–02;\n84 FR 18919, 05/02/2019) are briefly\ndescribed below:\n• On March 11, 2022, a 22-inch\nhazardous liquid pipeline spilled 3,900\nbarrels of crude oil adjacent to the\nCahokia Creek approximately 15 miles\neast of St. Louis, Missouri. Preliminary\ninformation indicates land movement\nmay have contributed to this failure.\nThe National Transportation Safety\nBoard (NTSB) investigation into the\ncause continues as of the date of this\nnotice.\n• On May 30, 2021, a hazardous\nliquid pipeline spilled 640 barrels of\ngasoline in Greens Bayou affecting high\nconsequence areas near Houston, Texas.\nThe operator’s reported cause indicated\nearth movement/progressive ground\nmovement over time on a bayou bank.\n• On February 19, 2021, 22,318 one\nthousand cubic feet 1 (Mcf) of natural\ngas was released from a Type A\ngathering pipeline system in Belmont,\nOhio. A third-party subject matter\nexpert determined the proximate cause\nof this incident was land movement, or\nslip, that exerted force on the pipe\ncausing a circumferential crack in an\narea where evidence of stress corrosion\ncracking and general corrosion were\nfound.\n• On December 23, 2020, 4,450 Mcf\nnatural gas was released from a gas\ndistribution main line in the City of\njspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES1\nFederal Register / Vol. 87, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2022 / Notices\n33577\n1 Mcf stands for one thousand cubic feet. The\n‘‘M’’ is representative of the roman numeral for one\nthousand.\nNewport News, Virginia. The operator\nreport indicated that the apparent cause\nwas pipe stress created by ground\nsettlement which caused misalignment\nof a flange resulting in a pinhole leak on\ngasket.\n• On November 19, 2020, a pipeline\nspilled 17.50 barrels of crude oil east of\nI–5 in Kern, California during routine\nstart-up. A metallurgical analysis\ndetermined the root cause to be related\nto external factors (i.e., historical land\nmovement, terrain, and cyclic weather\npatterns around this pipeline segment).\nThere is a history of land movement in\nthe area, all of which contributed to\nunintentional bending of the pipeline\ncausing the circumferential cracking\nfound at the leak site.\n• On October 4, 2020, an intrastate\ngas transmission pipeline in Goodrich,\nTexas released 118,724 Mcf of natural\ngas below the Trinity River. While no\ndefinitive root cause was determined,\nthe operator used the geological,\nmeteorological, site-gathered\ninformation and historical data in its\ncomputer modeling and identified earth\nmovement of the soil surrounding the\npipe as the most plausible cause of the\nrupture. Circumferential stress corrosion\ncracking may have been a contributing\nfactor to the failure.\n• On May 19, 2020, 447 Mcf was\nreleased from a gas distribution main\npipeline in Edenville Township,\nMichigan due to heavy rain fall. An\ninvestigation confirmed a 4-inch steel\npipeline was severed when significant\nflooding in the area caused a road\nwashout/scouring.\n• On May 4, 2020, a 30-inch natural\ngas pipeline ruptured and ignited near\nHillsboro, Kentucky. Preliminary\ninformation indicates land movement\nmay have contributed to this failure.\nThe NTSB investigation into the cause\ncontinues as of the date of this notice.\n• On February 22, 2020, a carbon\ndioxide pipeline failed approximately\none mile southeast of Satartia,\nMississippi, releasing approximately\n30,000 barrels of liquid carbon dioxide\nthat immediately began to vaporize at\natmospheric conditions. The pipeline\nfailed on a steep embankment which\nhad subsided adjacent to a local\nhighway. Heavy rains are believed to\nhave triggered a landslide, which\ncreated axial strain on the pipeline and\nresulted in a full circumferential girth\nweld failure.\n• On January 29, 2019, a pipeline\nruptured near the town of Lumberport\nin Harrison County, West Virginia. The\nrupture was located at a girth weld of an\nelbow on the 12-inch interstate pipeline.\nThe root cause investigation concluded\nthat a landslide about 150 yards from\nthe rupture moved the pipeline\napproximately 10 feet from its original\nlocation causing excessive stress on the\npipe resulting in the rupture.\n• On January 21, 2019, a 30-inch\nnatural gas pipeline ruptured and\nignited near Summerfield, Ohio. A\nmetallurgical analysis indicates a girth\nweld failed due to ductile overload from\na longitudinal tensile or bending force,\nlikely from land movement.\n• On June 7, 2018, a 36-inch pipeline\nruptured in a rural, mountainous area\nnear Moundsville, West Virginia,\nresulting in the release of approximately\n165,000 Mcf of natural gas. According to\na metallurgical analysis, the rupture was\ncaused by earth movement on the right-\nof-way due to a single overload event.\nOverloading of the pipeline likely\nresulted from a series of lateral\ndisplacements with accompanying\nbending.\n• On April 30, 2018, an 8-inch\nintrastate pipeline failed in a remote\nmountainous region of Marshall County,\nWest Virginia resulting in the release of\n2,658 barrels of propane. The failure\nwas caused by lateral movement of the\npipeline due to earth movement along\nthe right-of-way.\n• On January 31, 2018, a 24-inch\ninterstate pipeline ruptured near the\ncity of Summerfield, Ohio releasing\napproximately 23,500 Mcf of natural gas\nin a rural forested area. A root cause\nanalysis concluded that the girth weld\nfailure was caused by axial stress due to\nmovement of the pipe that exceeded the\ncross-sectional tensile strength of the\nnet section weld zone surrounding the\ncrack initiation location.\n• On January 9, 2018, a 22-inch\ntransmission pipeline failed in\nMontecito, California. The incident\nresulted in a fire and explosion and the\nrelease of an estimated 12,000 Mcf of\nnatural gas. Heavy rains and localized\nflooding contributed to the pipe failure.\n• On December 5, 2016,\napproximately 14,400 barrels of crude\noil were spilled into an unnamed\ntributary to Ash Coulee Creek, Ash\nCoulee Creek itself, the Little Missouri\nRiver, and their adjoining shorelines in\nBillings County, North Dakota. The\nmetallurgical and root cause failure\nanalysis indicated the failure was\ncaused by compressive and bending\nforces due to a landslide impacting the\npipeline. The landslide was the result of\nexcessive moisture within the hillside\ncreating unstable soil conditions.\n• On October 21, 2016, a pipeline\nrelease of over 1,238 barrels of gasoline\nspilled into the Loyalsock Creek in\nLycoming County, Pennsylvania. The\nrelease was caused by extreme localized\nflooding and soil erosion.\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 20:23 Jun 01, 2022 Jkt 256001 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\02JNN1.SGM 02JNN1\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\njspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES1\n33578 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2022 / Notices\nWithin its rulemaking entitled ‘‘Safety\nof Gas Transmission Pipelines: Repair\nCriteria, Integrity Management\nImprovements, Cathodic Protection,\nManagement of Change, and Other\nRelated Amendments’’ (RIN 2137–\nAF39), PHMSA notes that it is\nconsidering adopting revisions to\n§ 192.613 that would oblige operators of\ngas transmission pipelines to conduct\ninspections on their facilities following\nan extreme weather event to ensure\ntimely identification and remediation of\ndamage to those facilities. In addition,\nthe Council on Environmental Quality\n(CEQ) recently issued interim guidance\nunderscoring the importance of the\nevaluation of, and emergency planning\nfor, geohazards for safe operation of\ncarbon dioxide and other pipeline\nfacilities.2\nII. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2022–01)\nAdvisory: All owners and operators of\ngas and hazardous liquid pipelines,\nincluding supercritical carbon dioxide\npipelines, are reminded that earth\nmovement, particularly in variable,\nsteep, and rugged terrain and terrain\nwith varied or changing subsurface\ngeological conditions, can pose a threat\nto the integrity of a pipeline if those\nthreats are not identified and mitigated.\nAdditionally, changing weather patterns\ndue to climate change may result in\nheavier than normal rainfall and higher\ntemperatures, resulting in soil saturation\nand flooding or soil erosion, each of\nwhich may adversely impact soil\nstability surrounding or supporting\nnearby pipeline facilities.\nPipeline operators should consider\ntaking the following actions to ensure\npipeline safety:\n1. Identify areas surrounding the\npipeline that may be prone to large earth\nmovement, including but not limited to\nslope instability, subsidence, frost\nheave, soil settlement, erosion,\nearthquakes, and other dynamic\ngeologic conditions that may pose a\nsafety risk.\n2. Use geotechnical engineers during\nthe design, construction, and ongoing\noperation of a pipeline system to ensure\nthat sufficient information is available\nto avoid or minimize the impact of earth\nmovement on the integrity of the\npipeline system. At a minimum,\noperators should consider soil strength\ncharacteristics, ground and surface\nwater conditions, propensity for erosion\nor scour of underlying soils, and the\npropensity of earthquakes or frost heave.\n2 CEQ, ‘‘Carbon Capture, Utilization, and\nSequestration Guidance,’’ 87 FR 8808, 8810 (Feb.\n16, 2022).\n3. Develop design, construction, and\nmonitoring plans and procedures for\neach identified location, based on the\nsite-specific hazards identified. When\nconstructing new pipelines, develop\nand implement procedures for pipe and\ngirth weld designs to increase their\neffectiveness for taking loads, either\nstresses or strains, exerted from pipe\nmovement in areas where geological\nsubsurface conditions and movement\nare a hazard to pipeline integrity.\n4. Monitoring plans may include\nprovisions related to the following:\n• Ensuring during construction of\nnew pipelines that excavators do not\nsteepen, load (including changing the\ngroundwater levels) or undercut slopes\nwhich may cause excessive ground\nmovement during construction or after\noperations commence.\n• Conducting periodic visits and site\ninspections. Increased patrolling may be\nnecessary due to potential hazards\nidentified and existing/pending weather\nconditions. Right-of-way patrol staff\nmust be trained on how to detect and\nreport conditions that may lead to or\nexhibit ground movement to appropriate\nstaff.\n• Identifying geodetic monitoring\npoints (i.e., survey benchmarks) to track\npotential ground movement.\n• Installing slope inclinometers to\ntrack ground movement at depth which\nmay otherwise not be detectable during\nright-of-way patrols.\n• Installing standpipe piezometers to\ntrack changes in groundwater\nconditions that may affect slope\nstability.\n• Evaluating the accumulation of\nstrain on the pipeline by installing\nstrain gauges.\n• Conducting stress/strain analysis\nutilizing in-line inspection tools\nequipped with inertia mapping unit\ntechnology and high resolution\ndeformation in-line inspection for pipe\nbending and denting from movement.\n• Utilizing aerial mapping light\ndetection and ranging or other\ntechnology to track changes in ground\nconditions.\n5. Develop mitigation measures to\nremediate the identified locations.\n6. Monitor environmental conditions\nand changing weather patterns in\nproximity to their facilities and evaluate\nsoil stability that may have been\nadversely impacted.\n• The National Oceanic and\nAtmospheric Administration’s National\nCenters for Environmental Information\nhas excellent information publicly\navailable. For example, see the National\nTemperature and Precipitation Maps at\nthe National Centers for Environmental\nInformation (https://\nwww.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/\nus-maps/).\n7. Use available data and information\nresources to assess pipeline facility\nvulnerability relative to landslides and\nother types of earth movement.\n• The USGS has excellent\ninformation publicly available regarding\nland movement. For example, see the\nLandslide Hazards Maps at the USGS\nwebsite (https://www.usgs.gov/\nprograms/landslide-hazards/maps).\n8. Consider the findings and\nrecommendations of pertinent research\nprojects, studies, and reports on the\nimpact of changing weather patterns on\nsoil stability.3 PHMSA also notes that\nindustry and academic materials could\nbe informative regarding relevant\nconsiderations and strategies for\nensuring pipeline integrity in areas of\nland movement or soil subsidence.\n9. Mitigation measures should be\nbased on site-specific conditions and\nmay include:\n• Re-routing the pipeline right-of-way\nprior to construction to avoid areas\nprone to large ground movement such as\nunstable slope areas, earthquake fault\nzones, permafrost movement, or scour.\n• Utilize properly designed\nhorizontal directional drilling to go\nbelow areas of potential land movement.\n• Installation of drainage measures in\nthe trench to mitigate subsurface flows\nand enhance surface water draining at\nthe site including streams, creeks, runs,\ngullies, or other sources of surface run-\noff that may be contributing surface\nwater to the site or changing\ngroundwater levels that may exacerbate\nearth movement.\n• Reducing the steepness of\npotentially unstable slopes, including\ninstalling retaining walls, soldier piles,\nsheet piles, wire mesh systems,\nmechanically stabilized earth systems\nand other mechanical structures.\n• Installing trench breakers and slope\nbreakers to mitigate trench seepage and\ndivert trench flows along the surface to\nsafe discharge points off the site or\nright-of-way.\n• Building retaining walls and/or\ninstalling steel piling or concrete\ncaissons to stabilize steep slope areas as\n3 For example, PHMSA has funded the following\nresearch and development projects on the impact of\nsoil movement and pipeline monitoring: Pipeline\nIntegrity Management for Ground Movement\nHazards (https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/\nPrjHome.rdm?prj=202); Combined Vibration,\nGround Movement, and Pipe Current Detector\n(https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/\nPrjHome.rdm?prj=655); Definition of Geotechnical\nand Operational Load Effects on Pipeline\nAnomalies (https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/\nPrjHome.rdm?prj=561); and Fiber Optic Sensors for\nDirect Pipeline Monitoring Under Geohazard\nConditions (https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/\nPrjHome.rdm?prj=889).\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 20:23 Jun 01, 2022 Jkt 256001 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\02JNN1.SGM 02JNN1\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\njspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES1\nFederal Register / Vol. 87, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2022 / Notices\n33579\nlong as the corrosion control systems are\nnot compromised.\n• Reducing the loading on the site by\nremoving and/or reducing the excess\nbackfill materials to off-site locations.\nSoil placement should be carefully\nplanned to avoid triggering earth\nmovement in other locations.\n• Compacting backfill materials at the\nsite to increase strength, reduce water\ninfiltration, and achieve optimal\nmoisture content.\n• Drying the soil using special\nadditives such as lime-kiln dust or\ncement-kiln to allow the materials to be\nre-used and worked at the site. Over-\nsaturated materials may require an\nextensive amount of time and space to\ndry.\n• Regrading the pipeline right-of-way\nto minimize scour and erosion.\n• Bringing the pipeline above ground\nand placing it on supports that can\naccommodate large ground movements\n(e.g., transitions across earthquake fault\nzones or unstable slopes, without\nputting excessive stress or strain on the\npipeline).\n• Reducing the operating pressure\ntemporarily or shutting-in the affected\npipeline segment completely.\n• Re-routing the pipeline when other\nappropriate mitigation measures cannot\nbe effectively implemented to maintain\nsafety.\nPipeline safety regulations require\nreporting of certain conditions that\nimpair the serviceability of a pipeline,\nas noted in §§ 191.23 and 195.55.\nPHMSA encourages pipeline\noperators to enhance their preparations\nand procedures beyond the minimum\nFederal standards and to address the\nunique threats, vulnerabilities, and\nchallenges of each individual pipeline\nfacility. Pipeline operators, Federal and\nstate regulators, and the public have a\ncommon goal of no damage and no\nreleases from pipeline infrastructure.\nWorking together will better achieve our\ngoal of zero incidents and releases.\nIssued in Washington, DC, on May 26,\n2022, under authority delegated in 49 CFR\n1.97.\nAlan K. Mayberry,\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n[FR Doc. 2022–11791 Filed 6–1–22; 8:45 am]\nBILLING CODE 4910–60–P\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nOffice of the Secretary\n[Docket No. OST 2022–0014]\nAgency Information Collection\nActivities: Notice of Request for New\nInformation Collection\nAGENCY: Office of the Secretary of\nTransportation (OST), DOT.\nACTION: Notice and request for\ncomments.\nSUMMARY: The OST invites public\ncomments about our intention to request\nthe Office of Management and Budget’s\n(OMB) approval to submit one\ninformation collection, which is\nsummarized below under\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION. We are\nrequired to publish this notice in the\nFederal Register by the Paperwork\nReduction Act of 1995.\nDATES: Please submit comments by\nAugust 1, 2022.\nADDRESSES: You may submit comments\nidentified by Docket ID OST 2022–0014\nby any of the following methods:\nWebsite: For access to the docket to\nread background documents or\ncomments received go to the Federal\neRulemaking Portal: Go to http://\nwww.regulations.gov. Follow the online\ninstructions for submitting comments.\nFax: 1–202–493–2251.\nMail: Docket Management Facility,\nU.S. Department of Transportation,\nWest Building Ground Floor, Room\nW12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,\nWashington, DC 20590–0001.\nHand Delivery or Courier: U.S.\nDepartment of Transportation, West\nBuilding Ground Floor, Room W12–140,\n1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,\nWashington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m.\nand 5 p.m. ET, Monday through Friday,\nexcept Federal holidays.\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tara\nLanigan (tara.lanigan@dot.gov),\nDepartment of Transportation, Office of\nthe Secretary of Transportation, 1200\nNew Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC\n20590. Office hours are from 7 a.m. to\n4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday,\nexcept Federal holidays.\nSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:\nTitle: Strengthening Mobility and\nRevolutionizing Transportation\n(SMART) Grant Program.\nOMB Control Number: Not applicable;\nthis is a new collection.\nSummary: The Bipartisan\nInfrastructure Law (BIL, also known as\nthe Infrastructure Investment and Jobs\nAct), enacted on November 15, 2021\nprovides for significant investments in\nAmerica’s transportation infrastructure.\nA key program of the legislation is the\nStrengthening and Revolutionizing\nTransportation (SMART) Grant Program\n($100 million per year), under which\n‘‘the Secretary shall provide grants to\neligible entities to conduct\ndemonstration projects focused on\nadvanced smart city or community\ntechnologies and systems in a variety of\ncommunities to improve transportation\nefficiency and safety’’ (BIL § 25005; 23\nU.S.C. 502(b)). More specifically,\nSMART Grants may be used to carry out\na project that demonstrates at least one\nof the following:\n• Coordinated Automation\n• Connected Vehicles\n• Systems Integration\n• Commerce Delivery and Logistics\n• Leveraging Use of Innovative Aviation\nTechnology\n• Smart Grid\n• Smart Technology Traffic Signals\nFor this competitive grant program,\nthe Office of the Secretary will issue a\nNotice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO)\nthat describes the requirements of the\nSMART Grant program, including the\ncriteria that will be used to evaluate\napplications. The NOFO will provide a\ndescription of the application\nrequirements. All eligible entities must\nsubmit a completed application in order\nto be considered for a grant award.\nThe applicants who are selected for a\ngrant (i.e., the grantees) will have\nadditional reporting requirements\nassociated with their SMART grant,\noutlined below.\n• Annual Implementation Reports.\nThese annual reports document project\nprogress in meeting its goals. The first\nreport is submitted not later than 2 years\nafter the date on which the SMART\ngrant is received and annually thereafter\nuntil the date on which the SMART\ngrant is expended.\nÆ The Final Implementation Report\nwill demonstrate how the deployment\nand operational costs of the project\ncompared to the benefits and savings;\nthe means by which each project has\nmet its original expectation, including\ndata findings on the impacts of the\nproject (e.g., safety, mobility, access,\nsystem efficiency, etc.) and lessons\nlearned.\n• Evaluation Plan. The evaluation\nplan describes how the project will be\nevaluated, including the anticipated\nimpacts of the project (e.g., goals), the\nmethods that will be used to measure\nthose impacts, and the performance\nmeasures.\n• Data Management Plan. The data\nmanagement plan provides more\ndetailed information on the types of\ndata being collected by the grantee and\nVerDate Sep<11>2014 20:23 Jun 01, 2022 Jkt 256001 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\\FR\\FM\\02JNN1.SGM 02JNN1","truncated":false,"body_characters":29400}