# Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and Securing Pipelines From Unauthorized Access

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** PHMSA Guidance, Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and Securing Pipelines From Unauthorized Access
- **title:** Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and Securing Pipelines From Unauthorized Access
- **source type:** guidance
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** guidance
- **official:** true
- **published on:** Not available
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and Securing Pipelines From Unauthorized Access Document 2016-29500.pdf (226.83 KB) PHMSA is issuing this Advisory Bulletin in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to remind all pipeline owners and operators of the importance of safeguarding and securing their pipeline facilities and monitoring their Supervisory Cont
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Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and Securing Pipelines From Unauthorized Access

Document

 2016-29500.pdf (226.83 KB)

        PHMSA is issuing this Advisory Bulletin in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to remind all pipeline owners and operators of the importance of safeguarding and securing their pipeline facilities and monitoring their Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for abnormal operations and/or indications of unauthorized access or interference with safe pipeline operations. Additionally, this Advisory Bulletin is to remind the public of the dangers associated with tampering with pipeline system facilities.This Advisory Bulletin follows recent incidents in the United States that highlight threats to oil and gas infrastructure. On October 11, 2016, several unauthorized persons accessed and interfered with pipeline operations in four states, creating the potential for serious infrastructure damage and significant economic and environmental harm, as well as endangering public safety. While the incidents did not result in any damage or injuries, the potential impacts emphasize the need for increased awareness and vigilance.

          Effective Date: Friday, December 9, 2016

<<<PAGE 1>>>

Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 237 / Friday, December 9, 2016 / Notices
89183
until the period of availability expires,
the funds are fully expended, the funds
are rescinded by Congress, or the funds
are otherwise reallocated. To meet
program oversight responsibilities, FTA
must continue to collect information
until the period of availability expires,
the funds are fully expended, the funds
are rescinded by Congress, or the funds
are otherwise reallocated.
Respondents: States, Metropolitan
Planning Organizations, and Local
Governmental Authorities.
Estimated Annual Burden on
Respondents: 15 hours for each of the
respondents.
Estimated Total Annual Burden: 303
hours.
Frequency: Annual.
William Hyre,
Deputy Associate Administrator for
Administration.
[FR Doc. 2016–29505 Filed 12–8–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2016–0137)
Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and
Securing Pipelines From Unauthorized
Access
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA); DOT.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of Advisory
Bulletin.
mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES
harm, as well as endangering public
safety. While the incidents did not
result in any damage or injuries, the
potential impacts emphasize the need
for increased awareness and vigilance.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Operators of pipelines subject to
regulation by DOT, PHMSA, should
contact Nathan A. Schoenkin by phone
at 202–366–4774 or by email at
Nathan.Schoenkin@dot.gov.
Information about PHMSA may be
found at http://phmsa.dot.gov. Pipeline
operators with questions on TSA’s
Pipeline Security Guidelines should
contact Steven Froehlich by phone at
571–227–1240 or by email at
Steven.Froehlich@tsa.dhs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Incident Details
On Tuesday October 11, 2016,
individuals contacted four pipeline
operators informing them they would
shut down the pipelines used to
transport crude oil from Canada to the
United States. The operators (Enbridge,
Kinder Morgan, Spectra Energy, and
TransCanada) took steps to prevent
damage to the pipelines and contacted
local and federal law enforcement. The
individuals cut the chains and padlocks
at valve sites near Leonard, Minnesota;
Burlington, Washington; Eagle Butte,
Montana; and Wahalla, North Dakota.
The individuals then closed valves on
Enbridge’s Lines 4 and 67, Spectra
Energy’s Express Pipeline, and
TransCanada’s Keystone Pipeline. The
Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain’s Puget
SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this
Sound Pipeline was not operating at the
Advisory Bulletin in coordination with
time. Several individuals were arrested
the Department of Homeland Security’s
by local law enforcement.
(DHS), Transportation Security
Had the pipeline operators not shut
Administration (TSA), to remind all
down their lines in response to the
pipeline owners and operators of the
threats, a pipeline rupture could have
importance of safeguarding and securing
occurred. A pipeline rupture due to
their pipeline facilities and monitoring
tampering with valves can have
their Supervisory Control and Data
significant consequences such as death,
Acquisition (SCADA) systems for
injury, and economic and
abnormal operations and/or indications
environmental harm.
of unauthorized access or interference
with safe pipeline operations.
Additionally, this Advisory Bulletin is
to remind the public of the dangers
associated with tampering with pipeline
system facilities.
This Advisory Bulletin follows recent
incidents in the United States that
highlight threats to oil and gas
infrastructure. On October 11, 2016,
several unauthorized persons accessed
and interfered with pipeline operations
in four states, creating the potential for
serious infrastructure damage and
significant economic and environmental
Pipeline Safety and Security
PHMSA and TSA have a mutual
interest in ensuring coordinated,
consistent, and effective activities that
improve interagency cooperation on
transportation security and safety
matters. PHMSA focuses on the safety of
the Nation’s pipelines and administers
the pipeline safety regulatory program
(49 CFR part 190–199). TSA focuses on
the security of the Nation’s pipelines
and has authored Pipeline Security
Guidelines for operators available
online at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/
default/files/
tsapipelinesecurityguidelines-2011.pdf.
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2016–06)
To: Owners and Operators of
Hazardous Liquid, Carbon Dioxide and
Gas Pipelines
Subject: Safeguarding and Securing
Pipelines from Unauthorized Access
Advisory: PHMSA is issuing this
Advisory Bulletin in coordination with
TSA to remind all pipeline owners and
operators of the importance of
safeguarding and securing their pipeline
facilities and monitoring their SCADA
systems for abnormal operations and/or
indications of unauthorized access or
interference with safe pipeline
operations. Additionally, this Advisory
Bulletin is to remind the public of the
dangers associated with tampering with
pipeline system facilities.
If You See Something, Say SomethingTM
Tampering with pipeline facilities can
have deleterious effects on the safety of
the Nation’s pipeline system. Tampering
or acts of sabotage can also lead to the
loss of life, injury, and significant harm
to the economy and environment. At 49
CFR 190.291, any person that willingly
and knowingly injures or destroys, or
attempts to injure or destroy a pipeline
facility is subject to a fine in Title 18 of
the United States Code and
imprisonment for a term not to exceed
20 years for each offense. Individuals
are reminded that ‘‘If you See
Something, Say Something’’TM applies
to the safety and security of our national
pipeline infrastructure. Individuals that
see something suspicious should reach
out to their local law enforcement.
Informed, alert communities play a vital
role in keeping our Nation’s energy
infrastructure safe. Emphasizing that
‘‘Homeland Security Starts with
Hometown Security,’’ DHS encourages
businesses to ‘‘Connect, Plan for, Train,
and Report’’. Tools and resources to
help businesses plan, prepare, and
protect themselves from suspicious
activities or attacks are located online at
https://www.dhs.gov/hometown-
security.
Relationships With Local Law
Enforcement
PHMSA reminds pipeline operators
that a strong relationship with local law
enforcement is extremely beneficial for
safe pipeline operations. Two-way
communications between operators and
law enforcement can help to stop threats
before they occur. Relationships should
be cultivated well in advance of an
incident to facilitate mutually
dependable communication during an
incident.
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<<<PAGE 2>>>

mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES
89184 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 237 / Friday, December 9, 2016 / Notices
Increased Security Patrols
Pipeline operators should consider
increasing the frequency of security
patrols along their right of ways.
Operators may want to consider the use
of new technologies to aid in pipeline
security patrols, such as unmanned
aerial systems if authorized in the areas
of operation. Frequent patrols may help
inform pipeline companies of
individuals who regularly congregate
near a pipeline, or of potentially unsafe
conditions at a valve or pump station.
Information regarding suspicious
individuals should be promptly
forwarded to federal, state, and local
law enforcement.
Protection of Facilities
PHMSA’s Office of Pipeline Safety
requires pipeline operators to provide
protection for valves on hazardous
liquid pipelines at 49 CFR 195.420(c).
Additionally, at 49 CFR 195.436,
hazardous liquid pipeline operators are
required to provide protection for each
pumping station, breakout tank area,
and other exposed facility from
vandalism and unauthorized entry.
Furthermore, at 49 CFR 192.179(b)(1),
natural and other gas pipeline operators
must ensure that the valve and
operating device to open or close the
valve must be protected from tampering
and damage. PHMSA recommends that
pipeline operators review their valve
and facility protection measures and
consider taking additional steps to
secure them.
Operators should evaluate what type
of locks and security fences are being
used at valve stations and if they are
capable of preventing unauthorized
personnel from gaining access to
pipeline valve facilities. Pipeline
operators may choose to make
mechanical operation of valves more
difficult without proper equipment.
The use of deterrent text and signage
at pipeline facilities may be beneficial to
decrease acts of sabotage against a
pipeline facility. The text should
include the potential consequences if a
valve is closed improperly and a rupture
was to occur. Additionally the deterrent
text should include reference to the
PHMSA regulation found at 49 CFR
190.291 discussing the criminal
penalties for tampering with pipeline
facilities. Remote facilities should
consider equipping the facilities with
motion sensing cameras and/or motion
detectors to alert control centers of
tampering.
SCADA System Monitoring
Due to the criticality of SCADA
systems in the safe operations of a
pipeline, operators should have strong
protocols in place to ensure the systems
will not be tampered with. SCADA
systems can be tampered with or
disabled by a physical or cyber vector.
PHMSA is aware of prior intrusion
attempts on pipeline infrastructure. An
operator should harden physical and
software borders around SCADA
systems to limit the risk to the safe
operation of pipelines. The following
methods can be used to harden the
software and physical borders around
the SCADA system: (1) Segregating the
control system network from the
corporate network; (2) Limiting remote
connection ports to the control system,
and if necessary requiring token-based
authentication to gain access; (3)
Adding physical protection around
remote sites with SCADA network
access; (4) Enhancing user access
control on SCADA system networks and
devices and limiting access to critical
system to individuals with a safety/
business need; and [5] Employing
application whitelisting and strict
policies on peripheral devices (to
include removable media, printers,
scanners, etc.) connected to the SCADA
network.
Furthermore, DHS’s Industrial Control
System Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS–CERT) developed a guidance
document titled: ‘‘Recommended
Practice: Improving Industrial Control
System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-
Depth Strategies.’’ The document
provides guidance for developing
mitigation strategies for specific cyber
threats and direction on how to create
a Defense-in-Depth security program for
control system environments, and is
available online at https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/
recommended
_practices/NCCIC_
ICS-
CERT
_Defense_
in
_Depth_
2016
_
S508C.pdf.
Incident and Accident Reporting
Operators are reminded that incidents
and accidents must be promptly
reported to the appropriate federal,
state, and local agency. Requirements
for immediate notification of certain
incident and accident reporting
requirements are found at 49 CFR 191.5
and 195.52. Furthermore, since
tampering with a pipeline can lead to a
release, PHMSA recommends that
operators should contact the National
Response Center by telephone to 800–
424–8802 (in Washington, DC, 202–
267–2675) following any physical
security event that may interfere with
the safe operation of a pipeline. Please
note only ‘‘unclassified’’ incident
details should be reported by phone to
the National Response Center.
TSA recommends in its Pipeline
Security Guidelines that pipeline
operators notify the Transportation
Security Operations Center via phone at
866–615–5150 or email at TSOC.ST@
dhs.gov as soon as possible to report
security concerns or suspicious activity.
Furthermore it is recommended that
pipeline operators notify DHS’s ICS–
CERT if the operator has an Industrial
Control System concern with a cyber
security nexus. Operators can report to
ICS–CERT by emailing ics-cert@
hq.dhs.gov or by calling 877–776–7585.
PHMSA has coordinated with several
components within DHS and the
Department of Energy on this Advisory
Bulletin.
Issued in Washington, DC, on December 5,
2016, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety.
[FR Doc. 2016–29500 Filed 12–8–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS
MyVA Federal Advisory Committee;
Notice of Meeting
The Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) gives notice under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App.
2., that the MyVA Advisory Committee
(MVAC) will meet January 10–11, 2017,
at the Department of Veterans Affairs,
Georgetown University Lohrfink
Auditorium—Ground Floor,
Georgetown McDonough School of
Business, Rafik B. Hariri Building, 37th
and O Street NW., Washington, DC
20057. The meeting is open to the
public.
The purpose of the Committee is to
advise the Secretary, through the
Executive Director, MyVA Task Force
Office, regarding the MyVA initiative
and VA’s ability to rebuild trust with
Veterans and other stakeholders,
improve service delivery with a focus
on Veteran outcomes, and set the course
for longer-term excellence and reform of
VA.
On January 10, from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00
p.m., the Committee will convene an
open session to discuss the progress on
and the integration of the work in the
five key MyVA work streams—Veteran
Experience (explaining the efforts
conducted to improve the Veteran’s
experience), Employees Experience,
Support Services Excellence (such as
information technology, human
resources, and finance), Performance
Improvement (projects undertaken to
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