# WISCONSIN GAS COMPANY, D/B/A WE-ENERGIES — Gas distribution — incident on 2005-12-30

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** PHMSA Report 20060039
- **title:** WISCONSIN GAS COMPANY, D/B/A WE-ENERGIES — Gas distribution — incident on 2005-12-30
- **source type:** incident
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2005-12-30
- **effective on:** 2005-12-30
- **summary:** Gas distribution incident in MILWAUKEE, MILWAUKEE County, WI. Reported cause: 23. Reported consequences: 0 fatalities, 0 injuries, $325,425 reported property damage. Operator-reported incident data submitted to PHMSA, generally within 30 days. Records may be supplemented or corrected and do not represent final agency causal findings. PHMSA trend classification: significant incident, not serious, not fire-first.
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**body:**

Gas distribution incident in MILWAUKEE, MILWAUKEE County, WI. Reported cause: 23. Reported consequences: 0 fatalities, 0 injuries, $325,425 reported property damage. Operator-reported incident data submitted to PHMSA, generally within 30 days. Records may be supplemented or corrected and do not represent final agency causal findings.

Report number: 20060039.

Operator ID: 22763.

Reported incident date: 12/30/2005.

Cause detail: INCORRECT OPERATION

Cause detail: ON DECEMBER 30TH, 2005 A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE FROM SOUTHERN CROSS CORPORATION, PERFORMED A GAS SERVICE SURVEY INVOLVING AN INSIDE METER SET AT 3491 N. BARLETT AVENUE, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN. WHILE COMPLETING THE LEAK SURVEY ON THE INSIDE METER SET, HE FOUND A SMALL LEAK IN THE AREA OF A PIPE ON THE END OF A 2 INCH TEE LOCATED BETWEEN THE END OF THE GAS SERVICE PIPE ENTRY POINT AND THE SERVICE REGULATOR (GAS IN AIR READING TAKEN WAS 0.65 OF 1% AT THE THREADED REGION OF THE PLUG). IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES, HE CALLED IN THE LEAK TO GAS DISPATCH AT 2:15PM AND GRADED IT AS A GRADE 2 LEAK (THE COMPANY DEFINES A GRADE 2 LEAK AS "A LEAK THAT IS RECOGNIZED AS BEING NON-HAZARDOUS AT THE TIME OF DETECTION, BUT REQUIRES SCHEDULED REPAIR BASED ON POSSIBLE FUTURE HAZARD"). GAS DISPATCH, IMMEDIATELY SCHEDULED A FIELD WORK ORDER TO REPAIR THE LEAK. AT 4:38PM THAT SAME AFTERNOON, GAS DISPATCHRECEIVED A CALL FROM THE SERVICE FITTER WHO TOOK THE WORK ORDER TO FIX THE LEAK THAT HE HAD A SERIOUS PROBLEM. HE INFORMED DISPATCH THAT THE HUSE BLEW UPAND WAS ON FIRE. IN ADDITION, HE REQUESTED THAT A CONSTRUCTIONAND REPAIR (C & R) CREW BE SENT TO ASSIST IN TURNING OFF THE GAS SUPPLY TO THE BUILDING. AT APPROXIMATELY 5:15PM, GAS DISPATCH RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE C & R CREW THAT THE GAS SUPPLY TOT HE BUILDING HAD BEEN SHUT OFF AT THE CURB VALVE TO THE BUILDING AND THAT THE FIRE DEPARTMENT NOW HAD CONTROL OF THE FIRE WHICH HAD BEEN THREATENING THE REMAINING 4 ADJACENT UNITES OF THE 6 UNITS APARTMENT COMPLEX. DRUING THE FOLLOWING WEEK OF JANUARY 1, 2006, THE COMPANY CONDUCTED A FORMAL INCIDENT REVIEW PROCESS. AS PART OF THAT REVIEW, A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED WITH THE EMPLOYEE INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT AS WELL AS OTHERS WHO ARRIVED AT THE SCENE TO ASSIST THE EMPLOYEE AND/OR THE EMERGENCY CREWS. BASED ON THE RESULTS OF THE REVIEWS, AND STATEMENTS MADE BY THE COMPANY'S SERVICE FITTER INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT, THE FOLLOWING RECONSTRUCTION OF ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER THE EMPLOYEE ARRIVED TO REMEDIAATE THE LEAK WAS MADE: AFTER ARRIVING AT THE APARTMENT COMPLEX AND VERIFING THE LOCATIONAND PRESENCE OF THE LEAK REPORTED, THE EMPLOYEE MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO TIGHTEN THE PIPE PLUG, BUT FAILED TO STOP THE LEAK. HE THEN ATTEMPTED TO BACK OFF THE PLUG AND APPLY PIPE DOPE TOT HE THREADED AREA TO CREATE A BETTER LEAK SEAL. HIS FIRST ATTEMPT FAILED TO STOP THE LEAK AND DURING THE SECOND ATTEMPT TO RE-DOPE THE THREADS, THE PIPE PLUG FELL FREE. WITH GAS NOW ESCAPING, HE ATTEMPTED TO RE-THREAD THE PIPE PLUG BACK INTO THE TEE WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY OPEINING AN ADJACENT WINDOW TO VENTILATE THE ESCAPING GAS. UNABLE TO COMPLETE EITHER TASK, THE BASEMENT ROOM QUICKLY FILLED WITH AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE OF GAS. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHAT IGNITED THE MIXTURE, BUT SOURCES OF POTENTIAL IGNITION WERE PRESENT SUCH AS FURNACES AND WATER HEATERS. THE SUBSEQUENT EXPLOSION APPARENTLY KNOCKED HIM TO THE FLOOR AND HIS NEXT RECOLLECTION WAS FINDING HIMSELF LYING ON THE FLOOR LOOKING UP AND SEEING FLAMES ACROSS THE BASEMENT CEILING JOISTS. HE IMMEDIATELY MADE HIS WAY UP THE STAIRS WHERE HE WAS MET BY ONE OF THE RESIDENTS ALREADY EXITING THE BUILDING. EVEN THOUGH EH SUFFERED 2ND DEGREE BURNES PRIMARILY TO HIS FACIAL AREA, HE CONTINUED TO MAKE SURE ALL THE RESIDENCES WERE EVACUATED WHILE MAKING HIS EMERGENCY CALL BACK TO GAS DISPATCH SEEKING HELP. THE FIRE DEPARTMENT, EVENTUALLY RECOGNIZING THE MAN WAS INJURED, LED HIM TO AN EMERGENCY VEHICLE WHERE HE WAS TRASPORTED TO A NEARBY HOSPITAL AND WAS TREATED AND RELEASED THAT SAME EVENING FOR BURN INJURIES. COMPANY ACTONS TAKEN FOLOWING THE INCIDENT TWO SAFETY RELATED INITIATIVES HAVE ALREADY BEEN PUT INTO PLACE: (1) A COMPANY WIDE NOTIFICATION WAS SENT OUT TO ALL GAS OPERATING PERSONNEL ON WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 4TH, 2006 THAT GAS FIELD PERSONNEL WORKING ON INSIDE GAS FACILITIES SHALL NOT DISTURB ANY PIPING THAT DOES NOT HAVE A READILY ACCESSIBLE CONTROL VALVE. MORE SPECIFICALLY: REPAIRS UPSTREAM OF THE REGULATOR-THE U PSTEAM VALVE MUST BE SHUT OFF. FOR REPAIRS DOWNSTEAM OF THE REGULATOR, THE UPSTEAM VALVE MUST BE READILY ACCESSIBLE AND OPERABLE. (2) A SERVICE FITTER REFRESHER TRAINING HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED. THE TRAINING WILL REVIEW SAFETY PROCEDURES, INCLUDE SCENARIO DISCUSSIONS TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS, AND INCLUDE A TEST AT THE END AND THE SCORES REVIEWED. ALL TRAINING SESSIONS ARE TO BE COMPLETED BY JANUARY 31, 2006.

PHMSA trend classification: significant incident, not serious, not fire-first.

PHMSA standardized cause: INCORRECT OPERATION — OTHER INCORRECT OPERATION.

PHMSA indexed costs: $325,425 reported total cost, $196,443.482 in 1984 dollars, $483,589.682 in current-year dollars.

PHMSA trend flags, standardized causes, and indexed costs are analytical fields added to operator-reported incident data. They do not represent final agency causal findings.
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