# Envirocare of Utah, LLC — Hazardous Materials Safety Interpretation - **operation:** document - **citation:** 05-0241 - **title:** Envirocare of Utah, LLC — Hazardous Materials Safety Interpretation - **source type:** guidance - **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration - **status:** guidance - **official:** true - **published on:** 2006-01-24 - **effective on:** Not available - **summary:** 05-0241 response to Envirocare of Utah, LLC concerning 172.101, 173.403, 173.453. - **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-05-0241.json - **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-05-0241.md - **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-05-0241 - **source url:** https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/2005/050241.pdf **body:** <<>> of Transportation U.S. Department 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 Hazardous Materials Safety Pipeline and Administration JAN 24 2006 Mr. Mark Ledoux Ref. No.: 05-0241 Corporate Radiation Safety Officer Envirocare of Utah, LLC 605 North 5600 West Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 Dear Mr. Ledoux, This is in response to your September 13, 2005 letter requesting clarification of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180) regarding the applicability of fissile material exceptions. Specifically, you ask whether § 173.453(c) of the HMR applies to waste generated at the Eastern Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP). You describe the waste as demolition debris from the K-25 and K-27 buildings with enriched uranyl fluoride as surface contamination on structural steel and as scale within process piping and equipment. Prior to transportation structural foam filling is placed in process equipment voids to restrict geometry changes. concentrations of solid fissile material commingled with solid non-fissile material The fissile material exception provided in § 173.453(c) applies when there are low provided that there are at least 2000 grams of non-fissile material for every gram of fissile material and there are no more than 180 grams of fissile material distributed within 360 kg of contiguous non-fissile material. liquid state under conditions normally incident to transportation. The potential for voids with structural foam is a step towards improved safety assurance, but such foam 172.101 050241 173.403 173.453 (c) <<>> does not eliminate the potential for the uranyl fluoride changing from a solid state to a liquid state because of its high solubility in water. Therefore, the exception in 173.453(c) does not apply to the situation you have described. I hope this satisfies your inquiry. If we can be of further assistance, please contact us. Sincerely, 18st Office of Hazardous Materials Standards <<>> Fichenlaub ENVIROCARE OF UTAH, LLC SAFE AND SECURE 1734830 RAM CD05-0441 September 13, 2005 05-0241 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety U.S. Department of Transportation Washington, DC 20590-0001 Attention: Richard Boyle, PHH-23 Dear Mr. Boyle: in 49 CFR173.453(c) to waste generated at the Eastern Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP). Specifically, Envirocare of Utah, LLC (Envirocare), hereby requests an interpretation of the applicability of the exception found meets the intent of the fissile exception given in the reference. However, Envirocare and the waste generator Envirocare has determined that demolition debris with surface contamination, primarily enriched uranyl fluoride, would like concurrence on this determination from DOT - RSPA. The following information is provided to assist you in this determination: The waste material is primarily metal debris including steel building materials and segmented process equipment, The fissile material in question is enriched uranyl fluoride. The fissile material is present primarily as which are generated from the demolition of the K-25 and K-27 buildings at the East Tennessee Technology Park. contamination on the structural steel and as scale within the process piping and equipment. Specifically, Section 5.1.2 "Fissile-Material Exemptions," Section 5.3.3 "Recommendations for Fissile-Material Envirocare reviewed NUREG/CR-5542, prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for US NRC. • Exemptions," and Appendix G "Recommended New Criteria for Fissile-Material Exemptions." ORNL respect to 10CFR73.15, et al. performed various models to evaluate criticality safety during transportation to support rulemaking activities with ORNL suggests in the first bullet of Section 5.3.3 that the exemption should be based on a ratio of fissile material ratio). (The NRC through rulemaking changed the language to "solid" in lieu of "insoluble-in-water and to non-fissile material which is insoluble-in-water and noncombustible (excluding special moderators from the noncombustible") The logic for these criteria is two-fold: concern, and "Add enhanced ensurance in preventing a potential transport situation that could provide a criticality safety Maintain flexibility for regulators, licensees, and operators by precluding the need to prescribe and use a TI for transport control." Appendix G provides recommendations for several transportation scenarios: • Exemptions for Packages with Small Fissile Material Mass (<15 grams with a ratio of 200:1 non-fissile to fissile-material) • Exemptions for Packages Meeting Standards for NCT • Exemptions for Packages not Meeting the Standard for NCT (normal condition of transport) 605 NORTH 5600 WEST • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116 • TELEPHONE (801) 532-1330 <<>> ENVIROCARE Page 2 September 13, 2005 The applicable recommendation for the K-25/K-27 scenario is the Exemption for Packages not Meeting the Standard for NCT. This section (G.2) describes the mass density scenario of 350 g of U-235 with 2000 g of aluminum metal. CONCLUSIONS cubic-feet rail cars from ETTP (i.e. building materials, process piping, and process equipment with the exception Based on the research in the previous paragraphs, it is Envirocare's opinion that the material transported by 6000 and may be fissile excepted/exempted in accordance with 49CFR173.453(c) and 10CFR71.15. The reasoning for of the compressor seals and converters) would at a minimum qualify for a specific exception from the DOT/NRC, this opinion is that: The solid nonfissile to fissile-material ratio is greater than 2000:1 geometry changes in transport as well in accident scenarios. The proposed material preparation (i.e. structural foam filling in process equipment voids) will further restrict The material per rail car would be limited to 350 g of U-235 to meet our disposal license and SNM exemption. Sincerely, Mark Ledoux, CHP Corporate Radiation Safety Officer - **truncated:** false - **body characters:** 5984