{"operation":"document","citation":"08-0245","title":"Department of Energy — Hazardous Materials Safety Interpretation","source_type":"guidance","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2008-11-26","effective_on":null,"summary":"08-0245 response to Department of Energy concerning 173.433, 173.476.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-08-0245.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-08-0245.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-08-0245","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/2008/080245.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\nNOV 2 6 208\n1200 New Jersey Ave., SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nMr. James M. Shuler\nManager, Packaging Certification Program\nSafety Management and Operations\nOffice of Environmental Management\nDepartment of Energy\nWashington, DC 20585\nRef. No. 08-0245\nDear Mr. Shuler:\nThis responds to your September 29,2008 letter requesting clarification of Competent\nAuthority approvals USN0696lS-96 and USN0695lS-96 issued by the U.S. Department of\nTransportation in accordance with the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR\nParts 171 - 180). Specifically, you ask if the competent authority approvals referenced above,\nare required to specifically list daughter products, which would be present during\ntransportation. If so, you ask if it would be necessary to apply for a modification to the\nabove mentioned approvals to specifically list the additional radionuclides in order for those\nCompetent Authority approvals to be valid.\nThe answer is no. Competent Authority approvals issued in accordance with $ 173.476 of\nthe HMR require a detailed description of the contents of a special form capsule. However,\nthe approvals do not have to identify daughter products that are part of the natural decay\nchain of the parent radionuclide. Therefore, it is not necessary to apply for a modification of\nthe above referenced competent authority approvals to identify daughter products.\nI hope this information is helpful. Please contact us if you require additional assistance.\nSincerely,\n, ,,,,U? d2\nCharles Betts\nChief, Standards Development\nOffice of Hazardous Materials Standards\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nDepartment of Energy\nWashington, DC 20585\nMr. Jarnes Wfiarns\nRadoactive Materials Br#mch\nOffice of Hazardous Materials 'Technology\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety AclnlirListl-ation\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nEast Bulldmg, E21-330, PHH-23\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E.\nWashmgton, D.C. 20590-0001\nDear Mr. Wdhams:\nAs you know, the NA-23 Office of Global'T'hxeat Keduction's Off-Site Source Recovery Project\n(OSRP) at Los A l m o s National Laboxatory is a regstered user of QSA Global, Inc. Model I1 and\nModel I11 Special Form Capsules under competent authority certificate numbers USA/0696/S-96\nand USr1/0635/S-96.\n-4s a follow-up t o their letter to the U.S. Departinent of Transportadon (DO13 dated August 15,\ndiscussing approved radjonuclide content in the nvo special form capsule models referenced\nabove, an interpretation is requested to determine whether or not decay daughter products in\neqdibrium with the nuclides named in the above certificates must also be specifically h t e d on the\ncertificates of competent authority.\nThank you for your assistance arld cooperation. If you have any questions, please contact me or\nJustu~ Griffin in Los Alamos at 505-606-0362.\nBest regards,\n3 James M. Shuler\n@y..-. m , ?@%-&>\nManager, Pacltaging Certification IJrogrorn\nSafety Management and Operations\nOffice of Environmental Management\ncc: Ioanna M. Iliopulos, NA-211\nAbigd B. Cuthbertson, NA-211\nJustin M. GrifGn, M N L - N3: OSIW\nJuha Whbvorth, IANL - NN\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nAlamos\nNATIONAL LABORATORY\nEST.1943 ----\nOff-Site Source Recovery Project\nN-3: International Threat Reduction\nPO Box 1663, Mail Stop J552\nLos Alamos, New Mexico 87545\n505-667-471 1 /Fax: 505-665-791 3\nDate: August 15,2008\nRefer To: N3: 08-096\nfichard Boyle\nRadoactive Materials Branch\nOffice of Hazardous Materials Technology\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Adrmnistration\nEast Building, 2nd Floor, PHH-23\nU.S. Department of Transportation\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E.\nWashington, D.C. 20590-0001\nSUBJECT: Special form capsules containing sealed sources with impurities and daughter nuclides\nDear Mr. Boyle:\nT h s correspondence was developed through collaboration with Dr. James Shuler, Manager of the\nPackaging Certification Program for the U.S. Department of Energy. Since time is of the essence\nfor resolution, Dr. Shuler has provided consent for us to contact the U.S. Department of\nTransportation (DOT) directly regardmg the issue described herein.\nAs verbally advised by DOT, the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) at Los Alamos National\nLaboratory will not transport QSA Global Model I1 or Model I11 Special Form Capsules under\ncertificate numbers USA/0696/S-96 and USA/0695/S-96, respectively, for shipment of sealed\nsources containing 2 3 ? ~ until resolution of concerns related to authorized content includng\nimpurities and daughter nuclides is achieved.\nThe purpose of this letter is to provide more detailed background information on the current\nsituation, a brief chronology of events, a description of how estimation of sealed source content is\ncalculated as requested, and a brief summary of impact to shppers of special form sources.\nBackmound Information\nTo better understand the issue at hand, we must consider what we have found to be the initial cause\nof this misunderstanding. It is necessary to review the text in Item 3 of COCA No. USA/0696/S-96\nand No. USA/0695/S-96, which are provided below in Figures 1 and 2, respectively:\n3. Radioactive Contents - The capsule described by this certificate is\nauthorized to contain any one of the following radionuclides or tne sole\npair of radionuclides, In the chemical forms identified, and limited to\nthe activity shown, in the table below. The radioactive material is\nlimited to solid form in stainless steel capsules, between layers of\nnon-radioactive stainless steel, or affixed to non-radioactive stainless\nsteel by electroplating or other means. The maximum mass of the\ncontents is llmited to 2,500 grams.\nFigure 1: QSA Global Model I1 Content Description (USA/0696/S-96)\n\\@f/OQ.f,// 5 . c < / ; / i f ] / h / O / < ~ < / J i'~//i?\"(( j < ( d O ? O j\nAn Equal Opportunity Employer I Operated by Los Alamos Nat~onal Security LLC for DOEINNSA\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\n3. Radioactive C o n t e n c s - The capsule described by thi3 certificate is\nalithorized to contain any one of t h e foilowinp radionuclides or the sole\npair of radionuclides, i n the chemical forms i d e n t i f i e d , and limited t o\nthe activity shown, in t h e table below. The radioactive material is\nlimlted to solid form in stainless steel capsules, between layers o f\nnon-radioactive stainless sceel, or affixed to non-radioactive stainless\ns t e e l by electroplating o r other means. The maximum mass o f the\ncontents i s limited to 2,000 grams.\nFigure 2: QSA Global Model 111 Content Description (USA/0695/S-96)\nThe particular wording in question for both cases above is the line, \". . .authorized to contain any\none of the following radionuclides.. .\" As users of these special form capsules and as individuals\ninvolved in the initial analysis of the Model I1 and Model I11 capsules for certification by QSA\nGlobal, we contend that the original intent of this verbiage was to limit contents to a unique type of\nsealed source based on its primary useful isotope* not just a pure/unique isotope. As you know, it is\ninherent in the production process of manufactured radlonuclides and due to radioactive decay that\nother radioactive constituents (impurities) will be present.\nAs Item 3 is currently written in each certificate, it could inadvertently be interpreted to restrict\ncapsule contents to one specific and pure radlonuclide listed in the table below Item 3. However,\nsince it is not possible to have a pure radlonuclide (due to impurities and daughter products), the line\nshould be read/interpreted as saying, \". . .authorized to contain any one of the following types of\nsealed sources (includmg radionuclide im~urities and decav ~roducts). . .,\" to fully encompass its\noriginal intent. OSRP will ask QSA Global to correct this phrasing in a future revision of these\ncertificates.\nA portion of the table below Item 3 in each of the special form certificates referenced above is\ncopied as Figure 3 below. As you can see, for 23\"u/~e neutron sources (or simply 2 3 9 ~ u without\nberyhum), the maximum activity can be 100.0 Ci, but only a total of 350g 23\"u isotope is allowed.\nFigure 3: Portion of COCA Table Showing Plutonium Content Limits\nT h s indicates that the luniting factor for content of 2 3 ~ ~ isotope is 350g or about 22 Ci, whde the\noverall maximum activity is 100 Ci. This suggests that the difference (100 - 22 =: 78 Ci) will\naccommodate the radlonuclide impurities and daughter products with higher specific activities.\nEven though t h s tablet does not specifically list other commonly known plutonium production\nimpurities or daughter products of 2 3 9 ~ u , it is understood that all sealed sources contain such\nimpurities and decay products. OSRP was not able to locate any special form certificates where\nradlonuclide impurities present in a sealed source due to isotope production or evolution of\ndaughter products were specifically identified in the certificate. Although all special form certificates\n' For example, 24lAm/Be sources only or 239Pu/Be sources only - while not allowing 241Am/Be sources to be encapsulated along with\n239Pu/Be sources.\nOnly a portion of the content Limit table is presented in Figure 3. Both certificates indude several other isotopes as approved\ncontent; however, none of these include listings of impurities or daughter products either.\n. .\n\\ ( i t + i ~ ~ / ~ i , / .5'('( JU-~(?: / / ) j \" / i t < $ ~ , l\"~~irc*<~\nAn Equal Opportunity Employer I Operated by Los Alamos National Security LLC for DOEINNSA\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nfor radoactive materials are affected, of particular importance in terms of isotopic distribution\nwithin the source, are sealed sources containing 23\"u, 23$~, 2 5 2 ~ f , and 241Am.\nChronolow of Events Leadin~ UD to this Letter\nEarlier this year OSRP visited Switzerland to encapsulate five unwanted, U.S.-orign 23\"u/~e\nsources into two dfferent QSA Global Model I1 special form capsules in accordance with certificate\nUSA/0696/S-96 (Rev 3) for threat reduction purposes. The Model I1 capsules were then packaged\ninto two Type AF containers and prepared for interim shpment to Germany and subsequent\nrepatriation to the United States. This work was performed under direction from the NA-21 Office\nof Global Threat Reduction, NNSA Office of Defense Nonproliferation.\nThe German competent authority, upon review of the encapsulation and packagmg documentation,\nrequested additional characterization information on each of the sources, with identification of both\ndecay products and impurities. Radioanalysis is not performed on any sources by OSRP; so in order\nto meet this request, the German authorities were instead supplied with copies of in-house\ncharacterization modeling reports. These reports are generated by OSRP using average isotopic\nbreakdown content based on known historical 233p~ production records, estimated impurities, and\nevolution of daughter products due to decay. T h s data is required (and has been accepted) for\nultimate disposition of the sources at a transuranic waste disposal facility in the United States.\nWe suspect that this characterization report was used to document the other radonuclide contents\nof the capsules besides the primary useful constituent of the sealed sources. Using this ad&tional\ninformation, the German competent authority took the position that the radoactive contents were\nnot compliant with the description in the referenced certificate. Understandably, they refuse to\naccept the packaged sources, under Special Form Certificate USA/0696/S-96 (Rev 3), until they\nreceive addtional clarification from the original Swiss applicant.\nSince OSRP does not have any regulatory authority over these matters, we advised the Swiss facdtty\nwhere the sources were packaged to drectly contact the U.S. competent authority for clarification.\nAs a result, the Swiss facility contacted Mr. James Wdltams via email to address the situation. Mr.\nWdltams then contacted OSRP by phone to state that without additional information, he was in\nagreement with the German competent authorities and that OSRP should desist use and transport\nof QSA Global Model I1 and Model I11 Special Form Capsules (USA/0696/S-96 and USA/0695/S-\n96) containing 239Pu until the situation is resolved.\nEstimation of Sealed Source Content\nThe OSRP in-house methodS used for estimation of all nuclides in a Z3\"u source; and data in the\ncharacterization documents provided to Germany is based on modeling information on the isotopic\ncontent of 23\"u materials origmally supplied by U.S. production reactors, such as Hanford, to source\nmanufacturers.\nThrough prior research, records were identified that documented the transfer of 239Pu material to\nthese source manufacturers (e.g., Mound, Monsanto) which were sufficiently complete to allow an\nestimation of the total gram quantities of each type of material supplied. The types of material and\nthe characteristic isotopic make-up within these types of material is also documented thus allowing\ndevelopment of a weighted average for all 239Pu materials provided for the commercial manufacture\nof sealed sources containing 239P~.\n' Tables showing EPA approved radionudide breakdown for 239Pu,238Pu, and 24lAm used for OSRP in-house characterization for\nwaste disposal is provided in Attachment 1.\nAn Equal Opportunity Employer I Operated by Los Alamos National Security LLC for DOEINNSA\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nWith documents available showing the mass of materials used in the manufacture of a source,\napplication of that weighted average (when corrected for decay) allows estimation of the isotopic\ncontent of 2 3 g ~ u sources at a given time, such as upon disposal. This modeling result was fully\naccepted by the U.S. EPA for disposal of the unwanted sources at the designated waste disposal\nfacihty. However, the result is based on the entire documented dataset. No indlvidual records exist\nwhtch identify the exact type of material used or the isotopic breakdown present in a specific\nindlvidual sealed source containing 23?P~; nonetheless, individual sealed sources are reasonably\nbounded by this modeling result.\nPlease note that OSRP shippers report content accordmg to the 95% rule on the package label and\nshipping paper, whtch for 23g~u/Be sealed sources usually includes 2 3 ' ? ? ~ , 241Am, 2 J O ~ ~ , and 241P~.\nl l u s is done for all shtpments whether the 2 3 g ~ u sources are in a Model I1 or I11 special form\ncapsule, or if the sealed sources are left as normal form and shipped in a Type B Packaging.\nI m ~ a c t to S h i ~ ~ e r s of S~ecial Form Sources\nMost users and shtppers of sealed sources do not realize that the special form source they ship\ncontains radionuclide impurities and daughter products. They only consider the useful component\n(a.k.a., major constituent such as 241Am) of the radioactive source when ffing out shtpping papers\nand labeling not realizing there are other nuclides in the source.\nAs previously stated, OSRP was not able to locate any special form certificates where radionuclide\nimpurities present in a sealed source due to isotope production or evolution of daughter products\nwere specifically identified in the special form certificate.\nThe impact of this recent verbal interpretation effectively questions the compliance of the following:\nOSRP source recovery actions via Type A shipments when compliance is based on the use\nof a QSA Global special form capsule under USA/0696/S-96 or USA/0695/S-96\nAll shipments using any other special form certificate for sources known to contain\nimpurities and decay products whtch are not specifically included as authorized content in\nthe certificate\nAny shipments of sealed sources, includmg shipments of unwanted and at-risk sources, to\nthe WIPP facility for final disposition when the special form certificate for the sources\ninvolved does not address any decay products and impurities\nConclusions\nImpurities due to isotope production and evolution of daughter products are present in all special\nform and other radioactive sealed sources but are not commonly listed individually on the\ncertifications.\nIn addition to affecting OSRP recovery of dlsused sealed sources, potentially including shipments of\nsources to WIPP for disposal, h s question also implies that any sealed source transported under a\nspecial form certificate not specifically authorizing the presence of known impurities or decay\nproducts is non-compliant.\nIn our specific case, the wordlng in Item 3 of special form certificates USA/0696/S-96 and\nUSA/0695/S-96 could inadvertently be interpreted to restrict capsule contents to one specific and\npure radionuclide. As previously stated, the line should instead be read to say, \". ..authorized to\ncontain any one of the following types of sealed sources (includm~ radlonuclide im~urities and decay\nproducts). . .,\" to fully encompass its original intent. OSRP will ask QSA Global to correct t h s\nAn Equal Opportunity Employer I Operated by Los Alamos National Security LLC for DOEINNSA\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nphrase in a f u ~ ~ r c revision of these certificates; however, in the meantime we request your office\nprovide efficient evaluation and resolution of this issue with these ceruficates.\nIf you have any questions or require additional information pcrtincnt to this issue, please contact me\nat 505-606-0362 or send email to - jgriffm@lanl.gov,\nAttachments: Tables of Sample r\\pproximations for Radionuclide Distribution in \"'l'u, 2'8P~, and\n241 Am sealed sources.\nCy: James Shder, U.S. Department of E~lergy, EM-60\nBrcndan 131app, U.S. Department of State\nIoatltla hi. Iliopulos, NA-211\nAbigail B. Guthbertson, NA-211\nDave McCollum, 0s-IT, A194\nGilbert Torres, OS-PT, A194\nNancy J. Nicholas, N-DO, F650\nRick Kasmussen, N3:OSRI', 1552\nJulia Whinvorth, NN, E521\nLori Podolak, QSA Global\nN-3 Fiie, E541\nOSRI' Pilc, J552\niTdlih~ftf.(%! \\ L>L./I fl tfh >7/!g/i , \\ 0/84-( <\" !<e r:-2?rfJry\nAn Equal Opportunity Employer I Operated by Los Alamos National Security LLC for DOWNNSA\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nAttachment 1\nBy no means are the following tables meant to imply that all 239Pu, 238Pu, and 241Am sealed\nsources contain the exact radionuclide distributions shown. Actual content of indtvidual sealed\nsources will vary.\nNuclide\nMass fraction\nof Plutonium\nGrams of\nNuclide per\nGram of\n~lutonium\nSpecific\nCuries of '\nActivity\nNuclide per\n(CiIg) Gram of\nPlutonium\npr-90 i . O ~ S E - O ~ 1 .O~E-O~ 1.38~i-021 1.43~-05 1\nTable 1: Sample Approximation of Radionuclide Distribution in Pu-239 Sources\nNote: Plutonium created by negtron activation o f 2 3 8 ~ never occt/rs in an isotopicalbpt/refonn. The isotopic\nimpt/n'tiesforplutonit/m range from mass numbers 238 to 242. Activities o f these Pt/ isotopes, p l ~ ~ ~ ' A m , m.wt\nbe evaluated by spec$% material &be and decqed to date. The same concept also applies to other radioisotopes.\nTable 2: Sample Approximation of Radionuclide Distribution in Pu-238 Sources\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nAttachment 1\nTable 3: Sample Approximation of Radionuclide Dispibution in Am-241 Sources","truncated":false,"body_characters":18984}