# Department of Energy — Hazardous Materials Safety Interpretation - **operation:** document - **citation:** 08-0245 - **title:** Department of Energy — Hazardous Materials Safety Interpretation - **source type:** guidance - **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration - **status:** guidance - **official:** true - **published on:** 2008-11-26 - **effective on:** Not available - **summary:** 08-0245 response to Department of Energy concerning 173.433, 173.476. - **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-08-0245.json - **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-08-0245.md - **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-08-0245 - **source url:** https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/2008/080245.pdf **body:** <<>> U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration NOV 2 6 208 1200 New Jersey Ave., SE Washington, DC 20590 Mr. James M. Shuler Manager, Packaging Certification Program Safety Management and Operations Office of Environmental Management Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 Ref. No. 08-0245 Dear Mr. Shuler: This responds to your September 29,2008 letter requesting clarification of Competent Authority approvals USN0696lS-96 and USN0695lS-96 issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation in accordance with the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171 - 180). Specifically, you ask if the competent authority approvals referenced above, are required to specifically list daughter products, which would be present during transportation. If so, you ask if it would be necessary to apply for a modification to the above mentioned approvals to specifically list the additional radionuclides in order for those Competent Authority approvals to be valid. The answer is no. Competent Authority approvals issued in accordance with $ 173.476 of the HMR require a detailed description of the contents of a special form capsule. However, the approvals do not have to identify daughter products that are part of the natural decay chain of the parent radionuclide. Therefore, it is not necessary to apply for a modification of the above referenced competent authority approvals to identify daughter products. I hope this information is helpful. Please contact us if you require additional assistance. Sincerely, , ,,,,U? d2 Charles Betts Chief, Standards Development Office of Hazardous Materials Standards <<>> Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 Mr. Jarnes Wfiarns Radoactive Materials Br#mch Office of Hazardous Materials 'Technology Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety AclnlirListl-ation U.S. Department of Transportation East Bulldmg, E21-330, PHH-23 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. Washmgton, D.C. 20590-0001 Dear Mr. Wdhams: As you know, the NA-23 Office of Global'T'hxeat Keduction's Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) at Los A l m o s National Laboxatory is a regstered user of QSA Global, Inc. Model I1 and Model I11 Special Form Capsules under competent authority certificate numbers USA/0696/S-96 and USr1/0635/S-96. -4s a follow-up t o their letter to the U.S. Departinent of Transportadon (DO13 dated August 15, discussing approved radjonuclide content in the nvo special form capsule models referenced above, an interpretation is requested to determine whether or not decay daughter products in eqdibrium with the nuclides named in the above certificates must also be specifically h t e d on the certificates of competent authority. Thank you for your assistance arld cooperation. If you have any questions, please contact me or Justu~ Griffin in Los Alamos at 505-606-0362. Best regards, 3 James M. Shuler @y..-. m , ?@%-&> Manager, Pacltaging Certification IJrogrorn Safety Management and Operations Office of Environmental Management cc: Ioanna M. Iliopulos, NA-211 Abigd B. Cuthbertson, NA-211 Justin M. GrifGn, M N L - N3: OSIW Juha Whbvorth, IANL - NN <<>> Alamos NATIONAL LABORATORY EST.1943 ---- Off-Site Source Recovery Project N-3: International Threat Reduction PO Box 1663, Mail Stop J552 Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 505-667-471 1 /Fax: 505-665-791 3 Date: August 15,2008 Refer To: N3: 08-096 fichard Boyle Radoactive Materials Branch Office of Hazardous Materials Technology Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Adrmnistration East Building, 2nd Floor, PHH-23 U.S. Department of Transportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20590-0001 SUBJECT: Special form capsules containing sealed sources with impurities and daughter nuclides Dear Mr. Boyle: T h s correspondence was developed through collaboration with Dr. James Shuler, Manager of the Packaging Certification Program for the U.S. Department of Energy. Since time is of the essence for resolution, Dr. Shuler has provided consent for us to contact the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) directly regardmg the issue described herein. As verbally advised by DOT, the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) at Los Alamos National Laboratory will not transport QSA Global Model I1 or Model I11 Special Form Capsules under certificate numbers USA/0696/S-96 and USA/0695/S-96, respectively, for shipment of sealed sources containing 2 3 ? ~ until resolution of concerns related to authorized content includng impurities and daughter nuclides is achieved. The purpose of this letter is to provide more detailed background information on the current situation, a brief chronology of events, a description of how estimation of sealed source content is calculated as requested, and a brief summary of impact to shppers of special form sources. Backmound Information To better understand the issue at hand, we must consider what we have found to be the initial cause of this misunderstanding. It is necessary to review the text in Item 3 of COCA No. USA/0696/S-96 and No. USA/0695/S-96, which are provided below in Figures 1 and 2, respectively: 3. Radioactive Contents - The capsule described by this certificate is authorized to contain any one of the following radionuclides or tne sole pair of radionuclides, In the chemical forms identified, and limited to the activity shown, in the table below. The radioactive material is limited to solid form in stainless steel capsules, between layers of non-radioactive stainless steel, or affixed to non-radioactive stainless steel by electroplating or other means. The maximum mass of the contents is llmited to 2,500 grams. Figure 1: QSA Global Model I1 Content Description (USA/0696/S-96) \@f/OQ.f,// 5 . c < / ; / i f ] / h / O / < ~ < / J i'~//i?"(( j < ( d O ? O j An Equal Opportunity Employer I Operated by Los Alamos Nat~onal Security LLC for DOEINNSA <<>> 3. Radioactive C o n t e n c s - The capsule described by thi3 certificate is alithorized to contain any one of t h e foilowinp radionuclides or the sole pair of radionuclides, i n the chemical forms i d e n t i f i e d , and limited t o the activity shown, in t h e table below. The radioactive material is limlted to solid form in stainless steel capsules, between layers o f non-radioactive stainless sceel, or affixed to non-radioactive stainless s t e e l by electroplating o r other means. The maximum mass o f the contents i s limited to 2,000 grams. Figure 2: QSA Global Model 111 Content Description (USA/0695/S-96) The particular wording in question for both cases above is the line, ". . .authorized to contain any one of the following radionuclides.. ." As users of these special form capsules and as individuals involved in the initial analysis of the Model I1 and Model I11 capsules for certification by QSA Global, we contend that the original intent of this verbiage was to limit contents to a unique type of sealed source based on its primary useful isotope* not just a pure/unique isotope. As you know, it is inherent in the production process of manufactured radlonuclides and due to radioactive decay that other radioactive constituents (impurities) will be present. As Item 3 is currently written in each certificate, it could inadvertently be interpreted to restrict capsule contents to one specific and pure radlonuclide listed in the table below Item 3. However, since it is not possible to have a pure radlonuclide (due to impurities and daughter products), the line should be read/interpreted as saying, ". . .authorized to contain any one of the following types of sealed sources (includmg radionuclide im~urities and decav ~roducts). . .," to fully encompass its original intent. OSRP will ask QSA Global to correct this phrasing in a future revision of these certificates. A portion of the table below Item 3 in each of the special form certificates referenced above is copied as Figure 3 below. As you can see, for 23"u/~e neutron sources (or simply 2 3 9 ~ u without beryhum), the maximum activity can be 100.0 Ci, but only a total of 350g 23"u isotope is allowed. Figure 3: Portion of COCA Table Showing Plutonium Content Limits T h s indicates that the luniting factor for content of 2 3 ~ ~ isotope is 350g or about 22 Ci, whde the overall maximum activity is 100 Ci. This suggests that the difference (100 - 22 =: 78 Ci) will accommodate the radlonuclide impurities and daughter products with higher specific activities. Even though t h s tablet does not specifically list other commonly known plutonium production impurities or daughter products of 2 3 9 ~ u , it is understood that all sealed sources contain such impurities and decay products. OSRP was not able to locate any special form certificates where radlonuclide impurities present in a sealed source due to isotope production or evolution of daughter products were specifically identified in the certificate. Although all special form certificates ' For example, 24lAm/Be sources only or 239Pu/Be sources only - while not allowing 241Am/Be sources to be encapsulated along with 239Pu/Be sources. Only a portion of the content Limit table is presented in Figure 3. Both certificates indude several other isotopes as approved content; however, none of these include listings of impurities or daughter products either. . . \ ( i t + i ~ ~ / ~ i , / .5'('( JU-~(?: / / ) j " / i t < $ ~ , l"~~irc*<~ An Equal Opportunity Employer I Operated by Los Alamos National Security LLC for DOEINNSA <<>> for radoactive materials are affected, of particular importance in terms of isotopic distribution within the source, are sealed sources containing 23"u, 23$~, 2 5 2 ~ f , and 241Am. Chronolow of Events Leadin~ UD to this Letter Earlier this year OSRP visited Switzerland to encapsulate five unwanted, U.S.-orign 23"u/~e sources into two dfferent QSA Global Model I1 special form capsules in accordance with certificate USA/0696/S-96 (Rev 3) for threat reduction purposes. The Model I1 capsules were then packaged into two Type AF containers and prepared for interim shpment to Germany and subsequent repatriation to the United States. This work was performed under direction from the NA-21 Office of Global Threat Reduction, NNSA Office of Defense Nonproliferation. The German competent authority, upon review of the encapsulation and packagmg documentation, requested additional characterization information on each of the sources, with identification of both decay products and impurities. Radioanalysis is not performed on any sources by OSRP; so in order to meet this request, the German authorities were instead supplied with copies of in-house characterization modeling reports. These reports are generated by OSRP using average isotopic breakdown content based on known historical 233p~ production records, estimated impurities, and evolution of daughter products due to decay. T h s data is required (and has been accepted) for ultimate disposition of the sources at a transuranic waste disposal facility in the United States. We suspect that this characterization report was used to document the other radonuclide contents of the capsules besides the primary useful constituent of the sealed sources. Using this ad&tional information, the German competent authority took the position that the radoactive contents were not compliant with the description in the referenced certificate. Understandably, they refuse to accept the packaged sources, under Special Form Certificate USA/0696/S-96 (Rev 3), until they receive addtional clarification from the original Swiss applicant. Since OSRP does not have any regulatory authority over these matters, we advised the Swiss facdtty where the sources were packaged to drectly contact the U.S. competent authority for clarification. As a result, the Swiss facility contacted Mr. James Wdltams via email to address the situation. Mr. Wdltams then contacted OSRP by phone to state that without additional information, he was in agreement with the German competent authorities and that OSRP should desist use and transport of QSA Global Model I1 and Model I11 Special Form Capsules (USA/0696/S-96 and USA/0695/S- 96) containing 239Pu until the situation is resolved. Estimation of Sealed Source Content The OSRP in-house methodS used for estimation of all nuclides in a Z3"u source; and data in the characterization documents provided to Germany is based on modeling information on the isotopic content of 23"u materials origmally supplied by U.S. production reactors, such as Hanford, to source manufacturers. Through prior research, records were identified that documented the transfer of 239Pu material to these source manufacturers (e.g., Mound, Monsanto) which were sufficiently complete to allow an estimation of the total gram quantities of each type of material supplied. The types of material and the characteristic isotopic make-up within these types of material is also documented thus allowing development of a weighted average for all 239Pu materials provided for the commercial manufacture of sealed sources containing 239P~. ' Tables showing EPA approved radionudide breakdown for 239Pu,238Pu, and 24lAm used for OSRP in-house characterization for waste disposal is provided in Attachment 1. An Equal Opportunity Employer I Operated by Los Alamos National Security LLC for DOEINNSA <<>> With documents available showing the mass of materials used in the manufacture of a source, application of that weighted average (when corrected for decay) allows estimation of the isotopic content of 2 3 g ~ u sources at a given time, such as upon disposal. This modeling result was fully accepted by the U.S. EPA for disposal of the unwanted sources at the designated waste disposal facihty. However, the result is based on the entire documented dataset. No indlvidual records exist whtch identify the exact type of material used or the isotopic breakdown present in a specific indlvidual sealed source containing 23?P~; nonetheless, individual sealed sources are reasonably bounded by this modeling result. Please note that OSRP shippers report content accordmg to the 95% rule on the package label and shipping paper, whtch for 23g~u/Be sealed sources usually includes 2 3 ' ? ? ~ , 241Am, 2 J O ~ ~ , and 241P~. l l u s is done for all shtpments whether the 2 3 g ~ u sources are in a Model I1 or I11 special form capsule, or if the sealed sources are left as normal form and shipped in a Type B Packaging. I m ~ a c t to S h i ~ ~ e r s of S~ecial Form Sources Most users and shtppers of sealed sources do not realize that the special form source they ship contains radionuclide impurities and daughter products. They only consider the useful component (a.k.a., major constituent such as 241Am) of the radioactive source when ffing out shtpping papers and labeling not realizing there are other nuclides in the source. As previously stated, OSRP was not able to locate any special form certificates where radionuclide impurities present in a sealed source due to isotope production or evolution of daughter products were specifically identified in the special form certificate. The impact of this recent verbal interpretation effectively questions the compliance of the following: OSRP source recovery actions via Type A shipments when compliance is based on the use of a QSA Global special form capsule under USA/0696/S-96 or USA/0695/S-96 All shipments using any other special form certificate for sources known to contain impurities and decay products whtch are not specifically included as authorized content in the certificate Any shipments of sealed sources, includmg shipments of unwanted and at-risk sources, to the WIPP facility for final disposition when the special form certificate for the sources involved does not address any decay products and impurities Conclusions Impurities due to isotope production and evolution of daughter products are present in all special form and other radioactive sealed sources but are not commonly listed individually on the certifications. In addition to affecting OSRP recovery of dlsused sealed sources, potentially including shipments of sources to WIPP for disposal, h s question also implies that any sealed source transported under a special form certificate not specifically authorizing the presence of known impurities or decay products is non-compliant. In our specific case, the wordlng in Item 3 of special form certificates USA/0696/S-96 and USA/0695/S-96 could inadvertently be interpreted to restrict capsule contents to one specific and pure radionuclide. As previously stated, the line should instead be read to say, ". ..authorized to contain any one of the following types of sealed sources (includm~ radlonuclide im~urities and decay products). . .," to fully encompass its original intent. OSRP will ask QSA Global to correct t h s An Equal Opportunity Employer I Operated by Los Alamos National Security LLC for DOEINNSA <<>> phrase in a f u ~ ~ r c revision of these certificates; however, in the meantime we request your office provide efficient evaluation and resolution of this issue with these ceruficates. If you have any questions or require additional information pcrtincnt to this issue, please contact me at 505-606-0362 or send email to - jgriffm@lanl.gov, Attachments: Tables of Sample r\pproximations for Radionuclide Distribution in "'l'u, 2'8P~, and 241 Am sealed sources. Cy: James Shder, U.S. Department of E~lergy, EM-60 Brcndan 131app, U.S. Department of State Ioatltla hi. Iliopulos, NA-211 Abigail B. Guthbertson, NA-211 Dave McCollum, 0s-IT, A194 Gilbert Torres, OS-PT, A194 Nancy J. Nicholas, N-DO, F650 Rick Kasmussen, N3:OSRI', 1552 Julia Whinvorth, NN, E521 Lori Podolak, QSA Global N-3 Fiie, E541 OSRI' Pilc, J552 iTdlih~ftf.(%! \ L>L./I fl tfh >7/!g/i , \ 0/84-( <" !>> Attachment 1 By no means are the following tables meant to imply that all 239Pu, 238Pu, and 241Am sealed sources contain the exact radionuclide distributions shown. Actual content of indtvidual sealed sources will vary. Nuclide Mass fraction of Plutonium Grams of Nuclide per Gram of ~lutonium Specific Curies of ' Activity Nuclide per (CiIg) Gram of Plutonium pr-90 i . O ~ S E - O ~ 1 .O~E-O~ 1.38~i-021 1.43~-05 1 Table 1: Sample Approximation of Radionuclide Distribution in Pu-239 Sources Note: Plutonium created by negtron activation o f 2 3 8 ~ never occt/rs in an isotopicalbpt/refonn. The isotopic impt/n'tiesforplutonit/m range from mass numbers 238 to 242. Activities o f these Pt/ isotopes, p l ~ ~ ~ ' A m , m.wt be evaluated by spec$% material &be and decqed to date. The same concept also applies to other radioisotopes. Table 2: Sample Approximation of Radionuclide Distribution in Pu-238 Sources <<>> Attachment 1 Table 3: Sample Approximation of Radionuclide Dispibution in Am-241 Sources - **truncated:** false - **body characters:** 18984