{"operation":"document","citation":"99-0196","title":"Solvay Interox, Inc. — Hazardous Materials Safety Interpretation","source_type":"guidance","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2000-08-25","effective_on":null,"summary":"99-0196 response to Solvay Interox, Inc. concerning 173.31.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-99-0196.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-99-0196.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-99-0196","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/1999/990196.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nU.S.Department\nof Transportation\n400 Seventh Street, S.W.\nWashington, D.C. 20590\nSpecial Programs\nResearch and\nAdministration\nAUG 25 2000\nMark A. Feldman, Ph.D., CQMgr\nRef. Nos. 99-0196 & 00-0033\nRegulatory Affairs Manager\nSolvay Interox, Inc.\nP.O. Box 27328\nHouston, TX 77227-7328\nDear Dr. Feldman:\nI apologize for the delay in responding to your letters concerning the requirement in 49 CFR\n173.31(d)(1)(vi) to carefully inspect a frangible (rupture) disc in a pressure relief device prior to\neach hazardous material shipment. This requirement has its origins in regulations of the Interstate\nCommerce Commission issued in 1921. The wording of this requirement was most recently\nrevised in a final rule published on September 21, 1995, under RSPA's Docket Nos. HM-175A\nand 201 (60 Fed. Reg. 49098).\nAs the language of § 173.31(d)(1)(vi) states, the purpose of this type of inspection is to check \"for\ncorrosion or damage that may alter the intended operation of the device.\" For that reason, in\nresponse to a comment submitted in a separate rulemaking proceeding under Docket No. HM-216\n(61 Fed. Reg. 28666, 28671; June 5, 1996), we stated in the preamble that RSPA and FRA\nbelieve in order to fully inspect a rupture disc (both top and bottom), the disc must be removed\nfrom the safety vent device. It has been FRA's experience that a rupture disc may appear normal\non the top side, but be severely damaged or corroded on the bottom side.\nYou and others have raised concerns about the language of the present rule and its application to\npersons that forward a loaded tank car received from another location or return a tank car with\nresidue. We anticipate initiating a rulemaking in the near future to address these concerns.\nSincerely,\nTh\nDirector, Office of Hazardous\nMaterials Standards\n990196\n000033\n-\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\n$\nSOLVAY\nMack\nSOLVAY\nINTEROX\n$173.31\n00 - 0033\nJanuary 25, 2000\nMr. Edward T. Mazzullo\nResearch & Special Programs Administration\nOffice of Hazardous Materials Section\nDepartment of Transportation\nWashington, D.C. 20590\nRe: Interpretation of 49 CFR 173.31(d)(1)(vi), (Pressure Relief Device examination)\nDear Mr. Mazullo:\nWe recently became aware of a letter sent by the Chemical Manufacturers Association\nto the Department of Transportation (\"DOT\") concerning the interpretation by the\nFederal Railroad Administration (\"FRA\") of 49 CFR 173.31(d)(1)(vi) dated November 5,\n1999.\nAs members of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, we fully support and endorse\nwe feel that by confining its discussion to residue tank cars, the CMA letter\nits efforts to improve the safe handling of hazardous materials in all aspects. However,\nunnecessarily limits the scope of discussion. The same points being made by the CMA\nwith regard to empty cars apply to full railcars as well.\nIn addition to the points made by the CMA in their letter, requiring the rupture disk to be\nremoved from the safety device to fully inspect the disk in a loaded tank car presents\nfurther hazards and difficulties for many products due to the inherent nature of the\nmaterial.\nMany products are dangerous and require appropriate personal protective equipment\nbefore any work may be performed. Some of the personal protective equipment will\ndecrease the mobility and/or field of vision of an operator climbing a railcar and\ninspecting the rupture disk assembly as presently required / interpreted. This will\nsignificantly increase the operational hazards involved in rupture disk verification.\nSome materials may react adversely to even minute amounts of contamination resulting\nfrom opening the car. This situation would therefore require cleaning of the car before\nand/or after the disk inspection to prevent any such contamination unless the work were\nperformed under 'clean' conditions.\nSolvay Interox, Inc\n3333 Richmond Avenue, Houston, Texas 77098-3099 Mailing Address: P.O. Box 27328, Houston, Texas 77227-7328\nSolvay Companies Website: http://www.solvay.com\n1-800-INTEROX\nFax: 713/524-9032\nResponsble Care\n-\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nSOLVAY\nSOLVAY\nINTEROX\nFor very high purity materials, opening the railcar to perform the rupture disk inspection\nmay also compromise its quality unless the work were, again, performed under\nappropriate 'clean' conditions.\nThis would be the case, for example, for some grades of our product, hydrogen\nperoxide. Should it be necessary to clean a car before disk inspection, we would be\nrequired to rinse the car with high purity water. After inspection, we would again rinse\nto or superior in purity to that to be loaded in the rail car. This would delay shipment by\nthe car with high purity water and then again with at least 1000 gallons of product equai\nat least one day, and perhaps more.\nadditional waste will be generated and will require appropriate handling for disposal.\nIt should be noted, too, that, with each cleaning, as mentioned above, significant\nVery few, if any, of the rupture disks we have in service fail due to age or deterioration.\nMost fail due to mishandling or hydraulic surge during transit.\nHistory has shown that, at least for our peroxygen products, that a top only inspection is\nadequate to provide the necessary safety margins.\nWe respectfully request that you consider the actions and consequences that will result\nshould DOT interpretation continue as at present. We ask that DOT issue a revised\ninterpretation applicable to all offerors of rail tank cars reversing the interpretation DOT\nin Federal Register Docket HM-175A & HM-201 preamble (40CFR 173.31) of\nhas presented in the preamble to HM-216 [61FR 28671] back to its original explanation\nSeptember 1995.\nSincerely,\nnave Tille\nDr. Marc A. Feldman, CQMgr\nRegulatory Affairs Manager\nSolvay Interox, Inc.\nCc:\nM.E.Nevill\nG.W. Rousseau\nP.J. Harding\nC.R. Escobar\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nSOLVAY\nSOLVAY\nINTEROX\nMack\n3173.31\n09-0196\nJuly 15, 1999\nMr. Edward T. Mazzullo\nOffice of Hazardous Materials Section\nResearch & Special Programs Administration\nDepartment of Transportation\nWashington, D.C. 20590\nRe: Interpretation of 49 CFR 173.31 (d)(1)(vi)\nDear Mr. Mazullo:\nWe recently became aware of discussions at the Department of Transportation\n(\"DOT\") concerning the interpretation by the Federal Railroad Administration\n(\"FRA\") of 49 CFR 173.31(d)(1)(vi). As you know, this section addresses\npressure relief device examination before shipping.\nIt is our understanding that the FRA now interprets this section to require that the\nrailcar rupture disk must be removed from the safety device and carefully\ninspected, both top and bottom, before the railcar is moved. This new\ninterpretation apparently applies to all railcars, whether loaded or unloaded but\ncontaining a residue.\nWe believe this interpretation is contradictory to the original intent of this safety\nrequirement and that it potentially increases the hazards and difficulty in\ntransporting railcars.\nThe Contradiction:\nThe Federal Register Docket HM-175A & HM-201 rule-making preamble (40\nCFR 173.31) of September 21, 1995 states that the removal of the phrase \"to the\nextent practicable\" does not expand the scope of the standard. DOT continues\nto say that the purpose of the rule-making was to \"clarify the purpose of the\nregulations and to make the regulation more realistic and to eliminate from ,\nregulations items which were either very difficult to inspect such as a full\ninspection of safety relief valves or excess flow valves.\" DOT has also indicated\nthat \"Irlead literally, the regulation at that time would impose a duty on the\nshipper to disassemble and inspect safety valves and excess flow valves prior to\neach trip\", which implied that this was not the result sought.\nSolvav Interox, Inc\n3333 Richmond Avenue, Houston, Texas 77098-3099 Mailing Address: P.O. Box 27328, Houston, Texas 77227-7328\nSolvay Companies Website: http://www.solvay.com\n1-800-INTEROX 713/525-6500 Fax: 713/524-9032\nRespons ble Care'\n-\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nJuly 15, 1999\nMr. Edward T. Mazzullo\nPage 2 of 3\nUnless a distinction is now being made between these valves and rupture disks,\n216 [61 FR 28671], where it interprets 40 CFR 173.31(d) to mean the disk must\nwhich is not our understanding, DOT has reversed itself in the preamble to HM-\nbe removed from the safety device to fully inspect a rupture disk.\nSafety and Operational Consequences:\nRequiring customers to open the rupture disk assembly for inspection\nprior to returning an \"empty\" railcar would create significant risk to safety\nand potential liability unless extensive training were provided to each\ncustomer and each facility.\n2.\nOpening the rupture disk assembly may be hazardous in and of itself due\nto the nature of the materials being shipped. Many materials are\ninherently dangerous and require appropriate personal protective\nequipment or thorough car cleaning before any work may be performed.\nSome materials may react adversely to any contamination resulting from\nopening the car and may require additional cleaning after inspection. This\nwould be the case, for example, with hydrogen peroxide, which we ship in\nrailcars. Many customers do not have the resources to complete these\nmaterial specific requirements. It should be noted that, with each\ncleaning, significant additional waste may generated. In sum, it is likely\nthat many cars would need to be cleaned before every shipment, and\nsome may need to be cleaned twice before shipping. These cleanings\nwould have to be performed by both the supplier and the customer.\nEvery site that sends a hazardous material shipment or returns an \"empty\"\nrailcar containing residue would be required to register with the\nAssociation of American Railroads (AAR) as at least a Class F tank car\nfacility.\nThe quality of very high purity materials may be compromised by opening\na railcar to perform the rupture disk inspection.\nThe Department of Transportation and Research and Special Programs\nAdministration ('RSPA\") have always tried to balance risk and hazard\nmanagement with reason and practicality. This departure is a surprise and in our\nopinion does not follow those guidelines.\n-\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\nWe respectfully request that you review the actions and consequences that will\nresult should this interpretation continue in this direction.\nSincerely,\nDr. Marc A. Feldman, CQMgr\nRegulatory Affairs Manager\nSolvay Interox, Inc.\nCc:\nM.E.Nevill\nG.W. Rousseau\nM. Heimowitz\nL.D. Pieper\nP.J. Harding","truncated":false,"body_characters":10360}