{"operation":"document","citation":"PI-21-0004","title":"Pacific Gas and Electric Company — Pipeline Safety Interpretation","source_type":"guidance","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"guidance","official":true,"published_on":"2021-06-24","effective_on":null,"summary":"PI-21-0004 response to Pacific Gas and Electric Company concerning 192.939.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-pi-21-0004.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-pi-21-0004.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-interpretation-pi-21-0004","source_url":"https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/standards-rulemaking/pipeline/interpretations/75361/pacific-gas-and-electric-company-pi-21-0004-06-24-2021-part-192939.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration June 23, 2021\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nMs. Christine Cowsert\nVP, Gas Asset Mgmt. & System Operations\nPacific Gas and Electric Company\n6121 Bollinger Canyon Road\nSan Ramon, CA 64583\nDear Ms. Cowsert:\nIn a letter to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), dated\nApril 28, 2021, you requested an interpretation of 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part\n192. Specifically, you requested an interpretation of 49 CFR § 192.939.\nYou asked when must an assessment of a newly activated threat be completed in an existing high\nconsequence area (HCA) if the threat is newly activated during the reassessment period provided\nby 49 CFR § 192.939. You stated your concern is that when a newly activated threat becomes\nactive shortly before the conclusion of a scheduled reassessment cycle, an integrity assessment\nfor the covered segment would not be complete if not all threats present at the start of the next\nscheduled reassessment cycle have been assessed. In addition, you mentioned your discussion\nwith the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and their interpretation of the\napplicability of the regulations, and provided examples and excerpts of the regulations as\nappendices.\nPHMSA agrees with the CPUC’s assessment that 49 CFR § 192.939 does not have an exception\nfor newly discovered threats within existing HCAs if they are discovered within an assessment\ncycle. Therefore, a pipeline operator must assess a newly activated threat on a covered segment\nwithin the same assessment cycle as other threats that were previously identified through risk\nassessment under 49 CFR § 192.917(a) regardless of when the threat becomes active. PHMSA\nrecognizes that an operator may not be able to comply with the requirements stated in 49 CFR §\n192.939 in limited instances, in which case PHMSA may allow a waiver from a reassessment\ninterval required by 49 CFR § 192.939 if the waiver would not be inconsistent with pipeline\nsafety. Those limited instances include where an operator cannot obtain the internal inspection\ntools within the required reassessment period, and where the operator cannot maintain local\nproduct supply if it conducts the reassessment within the required interval. Section 192.943\ndescribes how to seek a waiver if one of these conditions applies.\nThe below referenced 49 CFR Part 192 sections should help give clarity on the need to take\nprompt action to address a newly identified threat to a HCA:\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety provides written clarifications of the Regulations (49 CFR\nParts 190-199) in the form of interpretation letters. These letters reflect the agency's current application of the regulations to the specific facts\npresented by the person requesting the clarification. Interpretations do not create legally-enforceable rights or obligations and are provided to\nhelp the public understand how to comply with the regulations.\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\n2\n• Section 192.917 combines the threat identification process in 49 CFR § 192.917(a), the\ndata gathering and integration process in 49 CFR § 192.917(b), and § 192.917(c)\nspecifies “an operator must conduct a risk assessment that follows ASME/ANSI B31.8S,\nsection 5, and considers the identified threats for each covered segment. An operator\nmust use the risk assessment to prioritize the covered segments for the baseline and\ncontinual reassessments (§§ 192.919, 192.921, and 192.937), and to determine what\nadditional preventive and mitigative measures are needed for the covered segment.”\n• Section 192.933(a) requires “an operator to take prompt action to address all anomalous\nconditions the operator discovers through the integrity assessment. In addressing all\nconditions, an operator must evaluate all anomalous conditions and remediate those that\ncould reduce a pipelines integrity. An operator must be able to demonstrate that the\nremediation of the condition will ensure the condition is unlikely to pose a threat to the\nintegrity of the pipeline until the next reassessment of the covered segment.”\n• Section 192.933(a)(1) requires a temporary pressure reduction “if an operator is unable to\nrespond within the time limits for certain conditions specified in this section, the operator\nmust temporarily reduce the operating pressure of the pipeline or take other action that\nensures the safety of the covered segment.”\n• Section 192.933(c) requires “an operator must complete remediation of a condition\naccording to a schedule prioritizing the conditions for evaluation and remediation.\nUnless a special requirement for remediating certain conditions applies, as provided in\nparagraph (d) of this section, an operator must follow the schedule in ASME/ANSI\nB31.8S (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7), section 7, Figure 4. If an operator\ncannot meet the schedule for any condition, the operator must explain the reasons why it\ncannot meet the schedule and how the changed schedule will not jeopardize public\nsafety.”\n• Section 192.937(b) specifies “an operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as\nfrequently as needed to assure the integrity of each covered segment. The periodic\nevaluation must be based on a data integration and risk assessment of the entire pipeline\nas specified in § 192.917.” For all gas transmission pipelines, other than plastic\ntransmission pipelines, 49 CFR § 192.937(b) requires “the evaluation must consider the\npast and present integrity assessment results, data integration and risk assessment\ninformation (§ 192.917), and decisions about remediation (§ 192.933) and additional\npreventative and mitigative actions (§ 192.935). An operator must use the results from\nthis evaluation to identify the threats specific to each covered segment and the risk\nrepresented by these threats.”\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety provides written clarifications of the Regulations\n(49 CFR Parts 190-199) in the form of interpretation letters. These letters reflect the agency's current application of the regulations to the\nspecific facts presented by the person requesting the clarification. Interpretations do not create legally-enforceable rights or obligations and\nare provided to help the public understand how to comply with the regulations.\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nFurthermore, if an operator requests a Waiver as noted in 49 CFR § 192.943, PHMSA would\ndetermine during the Wavier evaluation process, as required in 49 CFR § 190.341, if the request\nfor an assessment extension is consistent with pipeline safety.\nIf we can be of further assistance, please contact Tewabe Asebe at 202-366-5523.\nSincerely,\nJohn A. Gale\nDirector, Office of Standards\nand Rulemaking\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety provides written clarifications of the Regulations (49 CFR\nParts 190-199) in the form of interpretation letters. These letters reflect the agency's current application of the regulations to the specific facts\npresented by the person requesting the clarification. Interpretations do not create legally-enforceable rights or obligations and are provided to\nhelp the public understand how to comply with the regulations.\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\nChristine Cowsert\nVice President\nGas Asset Mgmt\n& System Operations\n6121 Bollinger Canyon Road\nSan Ramon, CA 94583\nPhone: (925) 244 - 4600\nE-mail: Christine.Cowsert@pge.com\nApril 28, 2021\nJohn Gale\nOffice of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30)\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590-0001\nRE: Request for Interpretation of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 Subpart O Related to Newly Activated\nThreats\nDear Mr. Gale:\nPursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.11(b), Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) is requesting an\ninterpretation from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Office\nof Pipeline Safety regarding the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 192, Subpart O, Gas Transmission\nPipeline Integrity Management (IMP) for the following question:\nIf a threat is newly activated in an existing high consequence area (HCA) during\nthe reassessment period provided by 49 C.F.R. § 192.939, what is the time\nrequirement to complete an assessment of the newly activated threat?\nI. Background\nPG&E and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) have discussed that Part 192,\nSubpart O is silent on whether the integrity management regulations require separate assessment\nintervals for different active1 threats on a covered segment. The federal pipeline regulations, and\nspecifically 49 C.F.R. § 192.939, require an operator to implement a “maximum assessment\ninterval by an allowable reassessment method [of] 7 calendar years.” The IMP regulations do not\nexpressly address newly activated threats, nor is there any guidance expressly on point.\nIn these discussions, CPUC representatives advanced that the integrity management regulations\n(including 49 C.F.R. § 192.939) imply that a pipeline operator must assess a newly activated threat\non a covered segment within the same reassessment cycle as other threats that were previously\nidentified through risk assessment (under 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(a)), regardless of when the threat\nbecomes active. Under this rationale, when a newly activated threat becomes active shortly before\nthe conclusion of a scheduled reassessment cycle, an integrity assessment for the covered segment\nwould not be complete if all threats present at the start of the next scheduled reassessment cycle\n1 As used in this request, an “active” threat refers to a threat that requires integrity assessment as provided\nin Advisory Bulletin, ABD 2017-01, Pipeline Safety: Deactivation of Threats (2017). A threat becomes\n“activated” when an operator, through the continual evaluation of potentially applicable threats consistent\nwith the guidance in the advisory bulletin, identifies data to suggest that the operator should conduct an\nintegrity assessment for that threat.\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nhave not been assessed. Further, the CPUC has noted that an operator can extend this period (up\nto 3 years) under limited circumstances and only for specific threats by conducting a confirmatory\ndirect assessment (CDA) by the end of the reassessment interval (7 years) under 49 C.F.R. §\n192.931(a).\nThere are IMP regulations and guidance that indicate otherwise, however, by providing operators\nwith a more flexible timeframe to incorporate new information into their IMP programs.\nSpecifically, the IMP regulations provide operators with a reasonable time period to assess newly\nidentified HCAs and newly installed pipe (10 years) and IMP guidance provides operators with\nflexibility to incorporate new information into their IMP programs. These regulations and\nguidance indicate that as long as an appropriate assessment is performed within the 7 year\nreassessment cycle, an operator may assess a newly activated threat based on an assessment of the\nrisk factors associated with that threat prior to the next scheduled reassessment if practicable and\nnot to exceed 7 years from the date the threat becomes active. This interpretation accounts for the\nfact that, as a practical matter, an operator may not be able to assess the newly activated threat on\nthe same reassessment interval as other previously identified threats, depending on the threat, the\nappropriate methods for assessing that threat, and tool limitations.\nTo clarify the assessment requirement, the CPUC recommended that PG&E submit a written\nrequest to PHMSA for interpretation regarding the time to complete the assessment of a newly\nactivated threat in an existing HCA. Specific examples that may be helpful for understanding the\napplication of the reassessment interval are included in Appendix A.\nII. IMP Regulations\nSection 192.939 sets forth the requirements for establishing a reassessment interval for active\nthreats that are identified during the initial baseline assessment. The regulation does not expressly\naddress the timing for an assessment of a newly activated threat that becomes active on a covered\nsegment (i.e., HCA) during the reassessment interval. In addition, 49 C.F.R. § 192.937 requires\nthat operators evaluate new information and integrate that information into their risk assessment\nto identify new threats relevant to a covered segment. This provision does not provide a schedule\nfor assessing a newly activated threat on a covered segment.\nNewly identified HCAs and newly constructed pipelines, however, are addressed by the IMP\nregulations. Specifically, 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.905(c) and 192.921(f)-(g) provide that an operator is\nrequired to incorporate a newly identified HCA into its written IMP within 1 year, and that the\noperator has up to 10 years from the date of identification/installation to conduct an integrity\nassessment.\nIn addition, 49 C.F.R. § 192.921(a) recognizes that a pipeline operator may have to select multiple\nassessment methods to address each of the threats on a covered segment. An operator must select\na “method or methods” that is “best suited” to address the threats to which the covered segment is\nsusceptible. This provides for the separate management of each threat, as a single assessment\nmethod cannot address all threats on every pipeline segment, particularly where a segment cannot\nbe assessed by in-line inspection (ILI).\nThe IMP regulations provide two limited avenues to extend a current reassessment schedule: CDA\nand a 6-month extension. The ability to use CDA under 49 C.F.R. § 192.931(a) is limited to certain\nthreats and specific circumstances (i.e., external and internal corrosion), and it does not have\nuniversal application to all threats. In addition, the allowance under 49 C.F.R. § 192.939(a) to\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\n“request a 6–month extension of the 7–calendar-year reassessment interval” provides operators\nwith the ability to request an extension of a reassessment interval based on some unforeseen\ncircumstances (e.g., complications with an assessment tool). This extension, however, has limited\napplicability for an operator that identifies a new active threat on a pipeline segment near the end\nof a reassessment interval. Based on the complexity of the threat and the assessment method used\nto assess that threat, a 6-month extension does not provide sufficient time for an operator to\nconduct a risk assessment, identify the proper assessment method and vendor, and conduct the\nassessment.\nSubpart O of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 incorporates by reference many sections of longstanding industry\nstandard, ASME B31.8S-2004, Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines, and much of Part 192\nis based on this standard. Similar to the IMP rules, ASME B31.8S does not expressly require that\nan operator incorporate a newly activated threat into the current reassessment. Instead, it states\nthat risk assessment results should be updated and used for future scheduling of integrity\nassessments. See ASME B31.8S-2004, Section 2.4.1, Integrity Management Plan (“As new risks\nor new manifestations of previously known risks are identified, additional mitigative actions to\naddress these risks shall be performed, as appropriate. Furthermore, the updated risk assessment\nresults shall also be used to support scheduling of future integrity assessments.”) (incorporated by\nreference at 49 C.F.R. § 192.917).\nThis standard also recognizes that threats may need to be assessed with different methods or\ntechnology and at different times. See, e.g., id. at Section 2.3.4, Integrity Assessment (“Integrity\nassessment method selection is based on the threats that have been identified. More than one\nintegrity assessment method may be required to address all the threats to a pipeline segment.”); Id.\nat Section 6.1, General (“More than one method and/or tool may be required to address all the\nthreats in a pipeline segment.”). In addition to the express recognition that threats should be\nmanaged separately, ASME B31.8S-2004 provides a process for determining distinct integrity\nassessment intervals related to Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) and External Corrosion Direct\nAssessment (ECDA). See, e.g., id. at Section 7.3.2, SCC Threat; Id. at Section 7.4.1, ECDA\n(incorporated by reference at 49 C.F.R. § 192.933).\nFor convenience, excerpts of relevant regulations are included in Appendix B.\nIII. Relevant IMP Guidance\nPHMSA has not published guidance that directly addresses the reassessment requirements for a\nnewly activated threat. Consistent with the regulations for newly identified HCAs, certain IMP\nguidance provides flexibility for operators to incorporate new information into their risk\nassessments “as appropriate” and while “diligently pursu[ing] completion of actions required by\nthe rule.” In particular, a variety of PHMSA Gas IMP FAQs recognize both that (1) there is a\ncontinual requirement for pipeline operators to evaluate and update their risk analysis and\nassessment plans periodically, and (2) that, as a practical matter, this process takes time and\nrequires flexibility.\nFor example, PHMSA IMP FAQ 234 states that “[o]perators should use the results of the updated\nrisk analysis to modify their baseline assessment plans and other IM actions, as appropriate.” FAQ\n234 recognizes that pipeline operators have an obligation to continually update and reevaluate their\nrisk analysis for threats on a covered segment. It does not provide a timeframe for this requirement,\nbut states that operators should use new information to update their IM actions “as appropriate.”\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\nSimilarly, PHMSA IMP FAQ 124 provides that for IMP regulations that do not include specific\ntime periods for completion operators should “diligently pursue” completion of those actions under\nthe rule. Specifically, “OPS expects operators to diligently pursue completion of actions required\nby the rule. At the same time, OPS recognize that these actions cannot occur immediately. OPS\ninspectors will assess an operator’s plans, actions, and progress to verify that an operator is making\na good faith effort to comply.” This PHMSA FAQ expressly recognizes that operators need time\nto complete certain actions under the IMP regulations and that allowances should be made to give\noperators sufficient time to comply.\nAs noted above, PHMSA also allows an operator flexibility in conducting an assessment on newly\nidentified HCAs. With respect to growth of an existing HCA, PHMSA IMP FAQ 223 provides\nguidance as to the requirement to assess these segments and states that “[o]perators must assure,\nhowever, that the pipe newly covered under the IM program is appropriately assessed at the next\nscheduled assessment for the covered segment.” In this instance, PHMSA does not require an\noperator to assess the new length of a pipeline segment within the current reassessment period, but\nPHMSA expressly recognizes that the new length of the pipeline segment should be assessed\nduring the next assessment interval.\nLastly, PHMSA IMP FAQ 40 addresses how often periodic integrity assessments must be\nperformed on HCA pipeline segments. Here, PHMSA provides that “[a]ssessments of some kind\nmust be performed at intervals no longer than 7 calendar years. Assessments for all threats must\nbe performed using in-line inspection, pressure testing, direct assessment, or ‘other technology’\nwithin the maximum intervals specified in 192.939, which vary based on operating stress levels.”\nThis PHMSA FAQ does not state or imply that assessments “for all threats” must be completed\nwithin the same interval, but reaffirms that threats may need to be assessed through different\nmethods or technology.\nIV. Summary\nThe federal pipeline safety IMP regulations do not appear to require an operator, unless justified\nbased on risk, to assess a newly activated threat within an existing reassessment period – an interval\nthat was established based on entirely different active threats. If PHMSA intended such a result,\nit would have expressly noted that in the regulations or guidance. Instead, analogous IMP\nregulations addressing newly identified HCAs and PHMSA FAQ guidance provide operators with\nsufficient time and flexibility in recognition of the importance of assessing and prioritizing active\nthreats on a covered segment and the practical realities of the time required to schedule and conduct\nintegrity assessments. As such, PG&E seeks to confirm with PHMSA that the IMP rules allow\noperators to assess a newly activated threat based on the circumstances and not to exceed 7 years\nfrom the day the threat becomes active.\nTo conclude otherwise would impose an inflexible requirement to assess a newly activated threat\nduring the existing reassessment interval, which is not supported by the IMP regulations, the\nrulemaking history, or guidance. In addition, it would be impractical and overly burdensome given\nthe complexity of identifying threats on a pipeline segment and assessing the risks associated with\nthose threats through a wide variety of assessment methods which are not applicable to all threats.\nIt takes significant time to identify the proper assessment method for a particular threat, budget for\nthe assessment, select a qualified vendor, and implement the assessment.\nFor all of these reasons, it seems clear that the pipeline safety regulations account for the\ncomplexity associated with integrity assessments and that the interval for assessing a newly\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nactivated threat begins to run on the date that the threat becomes active. PG&E appreciates CPUC\nstaff for initially raising this issue and for their recommendation that PG&E seek clarification from\nPHMSA.\n_____________________\nThank you for your consideration of this request and, to assist in PHMSA’s review, PG&E requests\na meeting to further discuss the issues and address any questions you may have. If you have any\nquestions, please contact Vince Tanguay, Director of Risk, Compliance & Operator Qualifications,\nat Vincent.Tanguay@pge.com or (925) 786-7144.\nSincerely,\nChristine Cowsert\nVice President, Gas Asset Mgmt & System Operations\nEnclosure:\nPGE Interpretation Request Appendices A-C\ncc:\nLeslie Palmer, CPUC\nTerence Eng, CPUC\nDennis Lee, CPUC\nMeredith Allen, PG&E\nVince Tanguay, PG&E\nSusie Richmond, PG&E","truncated":false,"body_characters":22351}