{"operation":"document","citation":"0900006480e836ad","title":"U.S. DOT/PHMSA - Environmental Assessment: Final Rule","source_type":"rulemaking","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":null,"effective_on":null,"summary":"Scope: Nationwide final rule titled \"Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management Program for Gas Distribution Pipelines\" requiring operators of gas distribution systems to develop and implement integrity management (IM) programs, with tailored requirements for different operator types and installation of excess flow valves (EFVs) on certain new or replaced residential service lines. Purpose: To enhance safety by identifying and reducing pipeline integrity risks and to allow risk-based adjustments to some fixed-interval regulatory requirements. Key conclusion/limitation: The EA states it provides sufficient evidence that the rule's provisions are \"expected to have no significant impact on the environment\" and the agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e836ad.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e836ad.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/regulations-gov-attachment-0900006480e836ad","source_url":"https://downloads.regulations.gov/PHMSA-RSPA-2004-19854-0253/attachment_1.pdf","body":"<<<PAGE 1>>>\n\nrir-n-r _ ^\nr T Grmmmm\nEnvironmental Assessment: Final Rule\nPipeline Safety: Integrity Management Program for Gas Distribution\nPipelines\nPHMSA-RSPA-2004-19854\nOffice of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nMay 10,2009\n\n<<<PAGE 2>>>\n\nPHMSA/OPS Environmental Checklist\nPHMSA/OPS Environmental Checklist\nAction Name: Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management Program for Gas Distribution\nPipelines\nPHMSA-RSPA-2004-19854\nAction Location:\nNationwide\nAction Description:\nPHMSA/OPS is issuing a rule to require operators of gas distribution pipeline systems to\ndevelop and implement integrity management programs.\nAction Category:\nFinal Rule\nENVIRONMENTAL CHECKLIST\nProject Description:\nPHMSA is amending the Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations to require operators of gas\ndistribution pipelines to develop and implement integrity management (IM) programs.\nThe purpose of these programs is to enhance safety by identifying and reducing pipeline\nintegrity risks. The IM programs required by this rule are similar to those required for\ngas transmission pipelines but are tailored to reflect the differences in and among\ndistribution pipelines. Based on the required risk assessments and enhanced controls, the\nrule also permits operators to submit a proposal to adjust intervals for leak detection\nsurveys and other fixed-interval requirements in the agency's existing regulations for gas\ndistribution pipelines. To further minimize regulatory burdens, the rule establishes\nsimpler requirements for master meter and small liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) operators\nserving fewer than 100 customers from a single line, reflecting the relatively lower risk of\nthese small pipelines.\n\n<<<PAGE 3>>>\n\nActivity Year: 2008 Forward\nPart I. Checklist Analysis.\n1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Is there greater size or scope than generally experienced for a\nparticular category of action?\nIs the action located near a site that involves a unique\ncharacteristic of the geographic area, such as a historic or cultural\nresource, park land, wetland, wild and scenic river, ecologically\ncritical area, or property requiring special consideration under 49\nU.S.C. 303(c)?\nIs there a likelihood that the action would be highly controversial\non environmental grounds?\nIs there a potential for effects on the human environment that are\nhighly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks?\nWill the action cause effects on the human or natural environment\nthat may be precedent setting?\nAre the action's impacts likely to create cumulatively significant\nimpacts when considered along with other past, present, and\nreasonably foreseeable future actions?\nIs the action likely to have an impact on a district, site, highway,\nstructure, or object that is listed on or eligible for listing on the\nNational Register of Historic Places, or to cause the loss or\ndestruction of a significant scientific, cultural, or historic resource?\nWill the action have a significant effect on species or habitats\nprotected by the Endangered Species Act or other statute?\nIs there a likelihood that the action would be inconsistent with or\ncause a violation of any Federal, State, local, or tribal law or\nrequirement imposed for the protection of the environment?\nIs the action likely to have an impact that may be both beneficial\nand adverse? A significant impact may exist even if it is believed\nthat, on balance, the effect will be beneficial such as likelihood that\nair emissions exceed de minimis levels or otherwise that a formal\nClean Air Act conformity determination is required?\nYES\nNO\nNEED\nDATA\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\n\n<<<PAGE 4>>>\n\n11. Are there reportable releases of hazardous or toxic substances as\nspecified in 40 CFR Part 302, Designation, Reportable Quantities,\nand Notification in the vicinity of the action?\n12. Are there reportable releases of petroleum, oils, and lubricants,\napplication of pesticides and herbicides, or where the action results\nin the requirement to develop or amend a Spill Prevention,\nControl, or Countermeasures Plan?\n13. Does the action have the potential to degrade already poor\nenvironmental conditions? Does the initiation of degrading\ninfluence activity, or affect areas not already significantly\nmodified from their natural condition?\n14. Does the action have the potential to impact minority and/or low-\nincome populations?\n15. Other environmental considerations not included on checklist.\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nPart 11. Comments or Additional Information Related to Part I:\nThe following space is provided to discuss the '*yes\" responses to the above\ncategories (identify by corresponding number), or to provide any supplemental\ninformation.\n#2 the action involves pipelines that may be located near, parks, wetlands, or wild\nand scenic rivers, or other ecologically critical areas, or property requiring special\nconsideration under 49 U.S.C. 303(c). To the extent that distribution pipelines may\nbe near these locations, there will be benefits of fewer incidents due to the rule.\n#14 the action has the potential to impact minority and/or low-income populations\nsince distribution pipelines will provide these populations with gas service. To the\nextent that distribution pipelines may be near these populations, there will be benefits\nof fewer incidents due to the rule.\nPart III. Conclusions.\n1. This action is a Categorical Exclusion (CE) and it requires no further environmental\nreview [ ]\nComments:\n2. This action is a CE, but it is recommended for further review under one or more of the\nenvironmental authorities noted below (list). [ ]\n\n<<<PAGE 5>>>\n\nComments:\n3. An EA was conducted for this action. X\nComments: The Environmental Assessment follows this section.\n4. An EIS is recommended for this action. Comments:\n[ ]\n5. A SEIS is recommended for this action. [ ]\nComments:\n6. A FEIS is recommended for this action. [ ]\nComments:\nDate Preparer/Envirormiental Project Manager Title/Position\nDate Environmental Reviewer Title/Position\n• B B B B ^ B ^ ^ I ^ B H B ^ i ^ H a B i\n\n<<<PAGE 6>>>\n\n1. Environmental Assessment\nThis Environmental Assessment is prepared in accordance with the National\nEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C).' This assessment addresses\nthe need for the action, the alternatives considered, the environment affected by this\naction, and the consequences to the environment. This Environmental Assessment\nprovides sufficient evidence to determine that the provisions of the rule are expected to\nhave no significant impact on the environment.\n1.1 Introduction\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has issued IM\nprogram regulations for operators of hazardous liquid pipelines (49 CFR 195,452) and\ngas transmission pipelines (49 CFR Part 192, Subpart O).\nPHMSA is revising the Pipeline Safety Regulations to require operators of gas\ndistribution pipelines to develop and implement programs that will better assure the\nintegrity of their pipeline systems (49 CFR Part 192, Docket No. PHMSA-RSPA-2004-\n19854). The IM approach was designed to promote continuous improvement in pipeline\nsafety by requiring operators to identify and invest in risk control measures beyond core\nregulatory requirements.\n1.2 Background\nExisting integrity management regulations cover operators of hazardous liquid pipelines\n(49 CFR 195.452, published at 65 FR 75378 and 67 FR 2136) and gas transmission\npipelines (49 CFR 192, Subpart Q, published at 68 FR 69778). These regulations require\nthat operators of these pipelines develop and follow individualized integrity management\n(IM) programs, in addition to PHMSA's core pipeline safety regulations.\nPHMSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on June 25, 2008, (73 FR\n36015) to extend its integrity management approach to the largest segment of the\nNation's pipeline network - the gas distribution pipelines that directly serve homes,\nschools, businesses, and other natural gas consumers. Significant differences between\ngas distribution pipelines and gas transmission or hazardous liquid pipelines made it\nimpractical to apply the existing regulations to distribution pipelines.\nOn December 12, 2008, PHMSA discussed the proposed rule with the Technical Pipeline\nSafety Standards Committee (TPSSC). The TPSSC is a statutorily mandated advisory\ncommittee that advises PHMSA about the technical feasibility, reasonableness and cost-\n' Pub. L. 91-190,42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, January 1, 1970, as amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub.\nL. 94-83, August 9, 1975, and Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(b), Sept. 13, 1982).\n\n<<<PAGE 7>>>\n\neffectiveness of its proposed regulations. PHMSA discussed some of the key comments\nreceived in response to the NPRM, e.g., burdensome documentation requirements,\nperformance through people, plastic pipe failure reporting and excess flow valves. These\ncomments are discussed in the preamble to the final rule. After careful consideration, the\nTPSSC voted imanimously to find the NPRM (with proposed changes as discussed at the\nmeeting) and supporting regulatory evaluation technically feasible, reasonable,\npracticable, and cost effective.\nIn the final rule, gas distribution pipeline operators are required to implement an IM\nprogram similar to those required by gas transmission operators but they are tailored to\nreflect the differences in and among distribution pipelines. This rule requires operators of\ngas distribution pipelines and of LPG distribution pipeline serving 100 or more customers\nfrom a single source to develop and implement an IM program no later than 18 months\nafter the effective date of this final rule. The rule establishes simpler requirements for\nmaster meter and small LPG operators, reflecting the relatively lower risk of these small\npipelines.\nPHMSA is adding a new Subpart P - Gas Distribution Pipeline Integrity Management to\n49 U.S.C, Part 192 as follows:\n§ 192.1001 What definitions apply to this subpart?\n§ 192.1003 What do the regulations in this subpart cover?\n§ 192.1003 What definitions apply to this subpart?\n§ 192.1005 What must a gas distribution operator (other than a master meter or small\nLPG operator) do to implement this subpart?\n§ 192.1007 What are the required elements of an integrity management IM plan?\n§ 192.1009 What must an operator report when plastic pipe compression couplings fail?\n§ 192.1011 What records must an operator keep?\n§ 192.1013 When may an operator deviate from required periodic inspections under this\npart?\n§ 192.1015 What must a master meter or small liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) operator\ndo to implement this subpart?\nThe final rule also adds a requirement that operators install excess flow valves (EFV) on\nall new and replaced residential service lines serving single residences, as required by the\nPIPES Act.\n1.3 Purpose and Need\nThe IM approach was designed to promote continuous improvement in pipeline safety by\nrequiring operators to identify and invest in risk control measures beyond core regulatory\nrequirements. Aimually, incidents and accidents associated with gas distribution pipeline\nsystems average more than 10 fatalities, more than 40 serious injuries, and tens of\nmillions of dollars in property damages. Also, each year hundreds of millions of dollars\nof gas is lost due to leaks in the systems. This regulation is designed to address the\n^m\n\n<<<PAGE 8>>>\n\nhazards that lead to those incidents as well as reduce gas loss by including leak\nmanagement and excess flow valve provisions.\nThis rule addresses recommendations from DOT's Inspector General and the National\nTransportation Safety Board (NTSB). It also implements requirements in the Pipeline\nInspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act (PIPES Act) of 2006.\n1.4 Public Involvement\nPHMSA has solicited the opinions of industry, other agencies, and stakeholders through\npublic meetings, requests for public comment, electronic discussion forums. Federal\nRegister notices, and other smaller meetings and conference calls. Throughout the\ndevelopment of this rule, PHMSA has held Advisory Committee Meetings with industry\nand public representatives, and meetings with NTSB representatives to discuss issues\nrelated to the rule. All information pertaining to the development of the rule is in the\ndocket and/or on the PHMSA website.\n1.5 Alternatives Considered\nPHMSA considered several alternatives to assure the necessary protection from potential\nincidents caused by gas distribution pipelines, with the intention of selecting the\nalternative that is likely to result in the highest net benefits. PHMSA considered the\nfollowing approaches:\n• No action.\n• Apply existing gas transmission pipeline IMP regulations to gas distribution\npipelines.\n• Model State legislation by imposing requirements on excavators and others\noutside the regulatory jurisdiction of pipeline safety authorities.\n• Develop guidance documents for adoption by States.\n• Implement prescriptive Federal regulations, specifying in detail, actions that must\nbe taken to assure distribution pipeline integrity.\n• Implement risk-based, flexible, performance-oriented Federal regulations,\nestablishing high-level elements that must be included in integrity management\nprograms.\n1.5.1 Baseline: No Action\nThis was used as the baseline against which PHMSA compared all other alternatives.\nRegulatory analyses typically consider an alternative in which the agency would not take\nany action, because it would maintain the status quo. No new requirements would be\n\n<<<PAGE 9>>>\n\nlevied. No new costs would be incurred to implement new requirements. No new\nbenefits would result.\nPHMSA is initiating this rulemaking in response to the mandate concerning IMPs for\ndistribution systems contained in the PIPES Act of 2006 (Public Law No: 109-468, Dec.\n29, 2006). Begiiming in 2000, the Agency promulgated regulations requiring operators\nof hazardous liquid pipelines (49 CFR 195.452, published at 65 FR 75378 and 67 FR\n2136) and gas transmission pipelines (49 CFR 192, Subpart O, published at 68 FR 69778)\nto develop and follow individualized IMPs, in addition to PHMSA's core pipeline safety\nregulations. Although some distribution pipeline operators are already implementing\nsome elements of integrity management into their systems, the IMP approach was\ndesigned to promote continuous improvement in pipeline safety by requiring all operators\nto identify and invest in risk control measures beyond core regulatory requirements\nexisting today.\nBy not taking action, the Agency would be unresponsive to the congressional mandate in\nthe PIPES Act, and there would likely be no reductions in the numbers of deaths, injuries,\nor property damages associated with risks related to distribution lines. Although this\nalternative would not lead to increased compliance costs, there would be no reduction in\nthe societal costs associated with the deaths, injuries, and property damages associated\nwith distribution pipeline incidents. This alternative results in zero net benefits. Thus,\nthis alternative is the baseline for comparison with other alternatives.\n1.5.2 Apply existing sas transmission pipeline IMP regulations to sas distribution\npipelines\nThis alternative was determined by PHMSA to be infeasible.\nGas distribution pipelines are different from hazardous liquid and gas transmission\npipelines. Distribution systems combine main lines with an almost equal amount of\nmileage branching from the main lines to connect services to natural gas users. Lines are\ngenerally smaller in diameter, operate at much lower pressures, and are constructed of a\nvariety of materials, both metallic and non-metallic. Approximately half of the pipe in\ndistribution systems is plastic, compared to very small amounts of plastic gas\ntransmission pipeline. To reach the many end users they serve, distribution pipelines\ninclude extensive branching and interconnection compared to transmission systems that\nhave long uninterrupted runs of pipe. These differences substantially distinguish\ndistribution systems from transmission systems, and thus it is not technically feasible to\napply gas transmission integrity management requirements to distribution pipelines. For\ninstance, the low pressures, small diameters, and complex connections associated with\ndistribution systems make it infeasible to use smart pigs or hydrotesting, techniques that\nare used by transmission lines for integrity management. Since we have determined this\nalternative is not technically feasible to implement, we were unable to estimate impacts.\nConsequently, no further consideration was given to this alternative.\n\n<<<PAGE 10>>>\n\n1.5.3 Model State legislation, potentially imposing requirements on excavators and\nothers outside the jurisdiction of pipeline safety authorities\nThis alternative was determined by PHMSA to be impractical because PHMSA could not\nensure that any or all of the States would adopt the model State legislation.\nAccording to the Integrity Management for Gas Distribution Report of Phase I\nInvestigations, experience indicates that this option may not be practical for addressing\nthe broad question of integrity management. The study group that prepared the report\nreferenced the failure of State legislatures to adopt an available model from the Common\nGround effort to prevent excavation damage.^\nThe study group found that model State legislation may be useful for narrower issues,\nsuch as improving excavation damage prevention through implementation of\ncomprehensive damage prevention programs, including active enforcement.^ The report\nconcludes, \"There are many factors affecting State approaches to regulation. It would be\nvery unlikely that all States could adopt model legislation with sufficient consistency that\nwould represent a national solution to integrity management concerns.\"\nAfter careful study, this option is not considered any further as a means of addressing the\nentire integrity management issue, because the integrity management study group found\nthat the issues surrounding integrity management are broad and require a holistic\napproach at the Federal level. Not being operationally feasible, this alternative was not\nconsidered to be amenable to a comparison of the costs and benefits.\n1.5.4 Guidance documents for adoption by States with the intent of States mandating use\nof the guidance\nAs with the previous alternative, this alternative was determined by PHMSA to be\nunworkable because PHMSA could not ensure that any of the States would mandate the\nuse of the guidance, and distribution safety would not improve.\nThe Integrity Management for Gas Distribution Report of Phase I Investigations\ndetermined that this option is essentially the same as Option 5.3 above, except it\ncontemplates States adopting the guidance as mandatory requirements. As with model\nlegislation, the study group considered that adoption likely would not occur in many\nStates. Although the Federal Government establishes basic safety standards, integrity\nmanagement-certified States are responsible for intrastate pipelmes. The study group\nnotes that States have not uniformly adopted recommended approaches in the past.\nSelecting this option would thus provide only the illusion of a solution. The costs of such\nan approach would be relatively low, but if the conclusions of the study group are correct.\n^ The group was composed of representatives of the natural gas distribution industry. State pipeline\nregulatory authorities, and the public. Integrity Management for Gas Distribution: Report of Phase I\nInvestigations,\" December 2005.,p. 71.\n^Ibid.,p.71.\n\n<<<PAGE 11>>>\n\nthere would also be low benefits and perhaps, insignificant net benefits. For these\nreasons, this alternative was not considered any further.\n7.5.5 Prescriptive Federal regulation, specifying in detail actions that must be taken to\nassure distribution pipeline integrity\nThis alternative was determined by PHMSA to be too inflexible to be applicable to all\nrelevant situations that distribution system operators might face.\nThe Integrity Management for Gas Distribution Report of Phase I Investigations\nreaffirms the need for a flexible Federal rule. The study group reasoned that a highly\ndetailed prescriptive regulation would lack the flexibility needed to address the unique\ncircumstances of individual States and operators. The study group reported, \"The issues\nimportant to assuring the integrity of these diverse systems will vary. This diversity\nmakes it difficult for any one prescriptive requirement to address all possible\ncircumstances. It is important that any new requirements that are developed allow\nsufficient flexibility for the operators of distribution pipeline systems, and the State\nregulators who oversee their operations, to customize their integrity management efforts\nto address their specific systems, threats, and issues.\"\"^\nAlthough some small operators might prefer a prescriptive regulation, most large\noperators want the flexibility of a performance-based regulation. The wide range in size\nand nature of distribution pipeline systems calls for a flexible approach to integrity\nmanagement rather than a single detailed set of requirements. Giving operators the\nguidance, and allowing them to shape it to fit their particular system, will assure integrity\nmanagement is implemented efficiently and effectively. A detailed prescriptive rule was\ndeemed by PHMSA to be too inflexible to be applicable to all relevant situations that\ndistribution operators might face, since there is wide spectrum of distribution operators,\nfrom master meters (mostly one-person operations) to large utilities covering thousands\nof miles of pipelines and over a million customers. Thus a prescriptive rule would be\ninappropriate and cost prohibitive, resulting in many operators being required to perform\ntasks not appropriate for their pipeline systems.^ For these reasons, a prescriptive Federal\nregulation was evaluated no further.\n1.5.6 Risk-based, flexible, performance-oriented Federal regulation, establishing\nhigh-level elements that must be included in integrity management programs\nThis altemative was determined by PHMSA to be practicable and is compared in this\ndocument with the baseline \"no action\" altemative. As will be demonstrated, there are\nsignificant net benefits associated with this altemative.\nThis altemative—the subject of the proposal—creates a high-level, flexible, and\nperformance-based Federal regulation that requires gas distribution operators to develop\nand implement an integrity management program for their distribution pipeline systems.\n' * Integrity Management for Gas Distribution. Report of Phase Ilnvestigations. December 2005. p. 13-14.\n^ Ibid.,, p.72\n10\n\n<<<PAGE 12>>>\n\nThe regulation requires all operators of a distribution pipeline system to implement an\nintegrity management program and prescribes minimum requirements each operator must\nmeet in doing so. An integrity management program is intended to manage the risks\nassociated with an operator's pipeline system.\nAn integrity management plan must address, at a minimum, the following elements:\n• Improving knowledge of the system's infrastructure\n• Identifying threats (existing and potential)\n• Evaluating and prioritizing risk\n• Identifying and implementing measures to mitigate risks\n• Measuring performance, monitoring results, and evaluating effectiveness\n• Periodic re-evaluation and improvement\n• Reporting results.\nThis altemative also embraces the installation of excess flow valves (EFVs). An operator\nwill be required to install an EFV on newly installed or replaced service lines that operate\ncontinuously throughout the year at a pressure not less than 10 psig and serve a single-\nfamily residence, unless doing so would not be practicable. This requirement applies\nonly to new or replaced service lines. There is no requirement for an operator to install\nan EFV retroactively on an existing service. The PIPES Act 2006 mandated this\nrequirement.\nThe requirement on EFVs is intended to replace the notification requirements in 49 CFR\n192.383, which requires operators to notify the customer for new and replaced service\nlines about the availability and benefits derived for installing an EFV. PHMSA believes\nthe customer notification requirement would not be necessary if the rule goes into effect.\nFederal pipeline safety law requires States adopt requirements at least as stringent as\nthose established by PHMSA to maintain their certification to exercise regulatory\njurisdiction over intrastate pipeline safety. This altemative establishes basic requirements,\nwhile allowing States the flexibility to accommodate the unique needs of different\ngeographical areas and different communities of operators. Furthermore, the altemative\ndoes this while assuring that a Federal mle, which provides for a consistent approach to\ndistribution integrity management, is implemented. For the reasons stated above, this\naltemative was selected.\nAfter considering all the altematives, PHMSA selected the \"implementation of risk-\nbased, flexible, performance-oriented Federal regulations establishing high-level\nelements that must be included in integrity management plans as part of an integrity\nmanagement program.\" PHMSA modified the NPRM in response to concerns voiced by\nindustry and public. The final mle is in the docket.\n1.6 Comparison of Alternatives\n11\n\n<<<PAGE 13>>>\n\nPHMSA determined that none of the altematives presented significant adverse impacts to\nthe environment, including natural resources, endangered species, and resources\nprotected by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). PHMSA also found that\nrevising the Federal pipeline regulations offered potential benefits for public health and\nsafety, particularly in the area of reducing the level of pipeline incidents and accidents. A\ndetailed regulatory impact analysis (RIA) has been prepared for this mle and is posted in\nthe docket (PHMSA-RSPA-2004-19854).\n1.7 Environmental Effects of the Rule\nThe Nation's pipelines are located throughout the United States, onshore and offshore,\nand traverse of variety of environments—from highly populated urban sites to remote,\nunpopulated rural areas. This mle covers all gas distribution pipeline systems. The\npipeline infrastmcture is a network of over 2 million miles of pipeline that moves\nmillions of gallons of hazardous liquids and over 55 billion cubic feet of natural gas\ndaily.^ The biggest source of energy is petroleum, including oil and natural gas. Together,\nthey supply 65 percent of the energy in the United States.^\nThe physical environment potentially affected by the mle includes the airspace, water\nresources (e.g., oceans, streams, lakes), cultural and historical resources (e.g., properties\nlisted on the National Register of Historic Places), biological and ecological resources\n(e.g., coastal zones, wetlands, plant and animal species and their habitat, forests,\ngrasslands, offshore marine ecosystems), and special ecological resources (e.g.,\nthreatened and endangered plant and animal species and their habitat, national and State\nparklands, biological reserves, wild and scenic rivers) that exist directly adjacent to and\nwithin the vicinity of pipelines.\nBecause the pipelines subject to the mle contain hazardous materials, resources within\nthe physically affected environment, as well as public health and safety, may be affected\nby gas pipeline incidents such as spills and leaks. Incidents on pipelines can result in\nfires and explosions, with resulting damage to the local environment. In addition, since\npipelines often contain gas streams laden with condensates and natural gas liquids\n(NGL's), failures also result in spills of these liquids, which can cause environmental\nharm. Depending on the size of a spill or gas leak, and the nature of the impact zone, the\nenvironmental impacts could vary from property damage and environmental damage to\ninjuries or, on rare occasions, fatalities.\nWhile IMPs cannot eliminate all pipeline failures, they can reduce the frequency of these\nevents. Thus on a national scale, the cumulative environmental damage from gas\ndistribution pipeline accidents is reduced. Since the provisions of the mle will be\nimplemented on systems that can affect populated areas, it is expected that the areas will\nbenefit by the reduced likelihood of a pipeline failure. PHMSA concludes that requiring\n* PHMSA, Pipeline Basics, http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/PipelineBasics.htm.\n^ GAO/RCED-00-128, \"The Office of Pipeline Safety is Changing How it Oversees the Pipeline Industry.\"\n* PHMSA. Pipeline Safety Q&As.\n12\n\n<<<PAGE 14>>>\n\npipeline operators to implement more systematic and integrated approaches to assure\npipeline integrity will enhance control of pipeline risks and improve industry\nperformance.\n1.8 Conclusion and Finding of No Significant Impact (PONS!)\nPHMSA's assessment finds that there are no adverse significant environmental impacts\nassociated with the mle.\nThe provisions of this mle build in and improve current regulatory requirements related\nto identification of adverse impacts on the environment. The mle enhances safety by\nidentifying and reducing pipeline integrity risks. The IM programs required by this mle\nare similar to those required for gas transmission pipelines but are tailored to reflect the\ndifferences in and among distribution pipelines. Based on the required risk assessments\nand enhanced controls, the mle also authorizes States to approve risk-based adjustment of\nprescribed intervals for leak detection surveys and other fixed-interval requirements in\nthe Agency's existing regulations for gas distribution pipelines. The mle also requires\noperators to install excess flow valves on new and replaced residential service lines,\nsubject to feasibility criteria outlined in the mle. The net environmental impact of this\nmle will be positive.\n2. List of Preparers and Reviewers\nThis EA was prepared by Volpe, revised by Econometrica, Inc. and reviewed by staff and\nspecialists within PHMSA.\n13","truncated":false,"body_characters":30005}